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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
"As a kid, I once got involved in a traffic accident. I was sitting 
in the back of a lorry when the thing overturned. When I got 
home, I was still bleeding a bit from my leg. My father asked: 
'what's the matter, boy?' Since my father despised the owner of 
the lorry, I lied and told him I had slipped from a wall. As I did 
not want my father to find out, that same day I went to my 
grandfather who had a wooden image of San Ram6n - you 
know, the saint who takes care that gossip is not spread. With 
some chewing gum, I attached two one-cent coins to the saint 
so that he would not forget me. After a few days however gossip 
reached my father's ears, and I got a real huge beating. So I 
went back to San Ramon, took the cents away from him, and 
bought me some breads with it. When my grandfather died 
some years later, lots of people went to his house to see if they 
could get hold of some of his belongings. I was among the first 
to be at his place, and the first thing took was San Ram6n's 
image. I ran home, and threw San Ramon into the fireplace. I 
remember saying: 'so lef s see, bastard, who saves you from this 
one!'" 
Andronido (77), a farmer from San Gabriel 
This thesis is about tacos (a traditional Mexican dish), tiendas (shops which 
more often than not seem to specialize in about everything) and mezcal (a 
distilled liquor of which tequila is the best known variety). More specifically, 
it is a study on problem-solving by rural small-scale entrepreneurs who wish 
to make their firms flourish and who are involved in the production and 
distribution of these goods and services. As so many pieces of work, this study 
grew out of the uneasy tension between love and hate. Between love for the 
extraordinary cunning, the shrewd strategizing, and the endless craftiness of 
these entrepreneurs, and hate for the hardships, the suffering, the 
marginalization of their vast majority. Between admiration for the irony 
displayed by these businessmen in the face of adversity, and the horror of 
discovering that the 'universe of the possible' of others is so infinitely inferior 
to mine. Between the joy of finding new theoretical avenues to understand 
the practices of entrepreneurs, and the feeling of anger and impotence when 
looking at the way in which these entrepreneurs are portrayed in most 
sociological literature as well as in the policies - however well-intended -
which they engender. 
Like Andrdnido, in this thesis I am deliberately iconoclastic. I do 
away with cherished theoretical notions which I believe have more harmful 
than beneficial effects for the lives of rural entrepreneurs. I am aware that this 
may upset some readers. But this is my choice. And my responsibility. Thus 
in the pages to come you will not find any reference to traditional sociological 
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notions of 'culture' or 'context'. No reference to 'culture' because the concept 
has been reserved by Western science to describe one of the 'objective' 
entities used to constitute "Man" (cf. Latour 1988b). No reference to 'context' 
because the term suggests that the activities of men and women need to be 
situated into an existing framework of action defined a priori by the analyst. 
Instead, this thesis explores the relationships between men without ignoring 
the things of the world - the objects which make visible these relationships. 
And it probes the ways in which men and women try to give themselves a 
context. In addition, this study returns positively to what is defined negatively: 
small firms which are generally attributed to be pre-capitalist, informal, 
traditional oroperating underground (as against capitalist, formal, modern and 
visible). The thesis does so by taking a novel theoretical framework - actor-
network theory - out of the province of the sociology of science and 
technology and into the domain of development sociology, applying it to the 
analysis of rural small-scale entrepreneurial projects. It is this, I believe, which 
may account for the potential value of this study. 
This thesis is part of a large collective of people and things. It adds to this 
collective, just as it itself is an effect of it. Of course, I myself brought together 
the different elements, but without them this study would have never seen 
the light. To thank all of them would no doubt be an impossible task. Yet 
some of them were crucial, and some of them I would like to thank expressly. 
Jan den Ouden, for his catching lectures which turned me into an 
anthropological convert, and for the notion that the study of the Other is the 
best way to understand oneself. I am indebted to him for the idea that 
acknowledging a plurality of worlds is the keystone to tolerance. Pieter de 
Vries and Monique Nuijten for their sincere friendship, and for the long 
discussions and heated debates we had about the interpretation of the events 
in which we participated during fieldwork. Their company was indeed a great 
addition to our stay in Mexico. Alberto Arce for his enthusiastic and 
contagious urge to pursue that which is not obvious, and who taught me not 
to separate morality from science. Jan Kees van Donge, for strengthening my 
belief that I should problematize 'culture'. Thea Hilhorst, for her ability to 
let others have confidence in themselves, and for introducing me to sociology. 
Joek Roex, MagdaVillarrealJens Andersson, Horacia Fajardo, Gabriel Torres 
and Humberto Gonzalez for acting as efficient sparring partners with whom 
I could discuss, test and hotly debate my ideas. Jos Michel and Nannie Brink, 
for their adeptness in finding solutions to problems - not problems to 
solutions. 
A special word of gratitude for my supervisor, Norman Long, who 
prepared me to take practice in earnest. I enjoyed his enthusiasm, and admire 
his Epicurean and agnostic lifestyle which taught me to make the most of 
fieldwork situations (and academic ones). He was there when I needed him 
(and, sometimes, when I did not!). I value his way of putting everything into 
perspective, and of encouraging me to pursue my own ideas, even when these 
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did not coincide with his way of thinking: the true quality of a professor. I 
will never forget when, after an undergraduate course, he bluntly said to me: 
"I can't teach you anything; if at all, I can only stimulate you to swim on your 
own." I think he did. 
Apart from these friends and colleagues, I wish to thank all those who 
made our stay in Mexico a pleasant one. Our thankfulness in particular to 
David Flores, Graciela Zepeda, Pablo Naranjo, Teodoro and Margarita 
Naranjo, Cuca Zepeda, Chabelo Flores, Le6n G6mez, Carlos and Anita 
Garcfa, Juan Arias, Carlos Ortfz, Federico Paz, Armando Corona, Matilde 
Estrada, Nachoand RosaG6mez,Tono and Gonzales, LupeCisneros and their 
families for showing me some unimaginable facets of the human condition. 
In line with the argument of this thesis I also have to mention some of the 
non-humans which did not go off on their own, and helped me put together 
this piece of work. Mezcal, for the freedom of association it sometimes allows, 
and for setting the stage for the construction of trust. No doubt, without 
mezcal I would never have grasped the relationships that constitute the groups 
in which it is enjoyed. Also, a word of appreciation for my computer (despite 
the hard times it sometimes gave me), the pick-up truck which never let us 
down, the El Grullo bank's automatic teller machine, the different libraries 
and books consulted. And, of course, the Wageningen Agricultural University 
for its Assistent in Opleiding grant and excellent benefits which more than 
once were detoured to make the lives of some friends a little more bearable. 
Finally, I wish to mention my indebtedness to Margreet for her selfless 
enthusiasm to take on new things. Without her, doors would have stayed 
forever closed. To my daughters, Francesca and Lorena, whose presence 
enriched my life substantially - and kept me from overindulging in mezcal. 
To my father, Frans, for his continuous backing and understanding of the 
sometimes idiosyncratic ways of a son. And to my mother, Lucy, for her 
eternal support and inspiration and who, unluckily, did not have the time to 
see this finished product. This thesis is dedicated to her memory. 
Gerard Verschoor 
April 1997 
CHAPTER 1 
SMALL FIRMS AND DEVELOPMENT 
Images, epistemological prescriptions, and Great Divides 
This study is about the dynamics and feasibility of small-scale entrepre-
neurial projects. It is a search for the conditions that make it possible for 
some activities to be more durable than others. More than anything, it is a 
study of the practices that make a business more or less feasible. Put 
differently, it is a study about problem solving. To a great extent, then, 
this thesis is about work. A lot of work. Work that needs to be organized 
in space and time. Work in process. Thus, in the empirical Chapters you 
will meet busy entrepreneurs actively casting their ordering webs around 
themselves. But there is more to it. Sometimes I do not talk about these 
entanglements as such. For here and there I try to come to grips with 
issues that have more to do with social theory than with the businesses 
and ventures that appear in the empirical Chapters of this thesis. And 
sometimes my rhetoric takes a methodological turn - perhaps only to chal-
lenge the methods of scientific procedure that have virtually colonized the 
language of development economics and sociology. 
Development economics and sociology: two disciplines, (too?) many 
paradigms. The fact is, small-scale enterprises have been central in the 
agenda of these disciplines for a long time. More recently, policy makers 
have also joined the debate and shown renewed interest in small firms. 
This interest has been spurred by expectations arising from success stories 
about the ability of small firms to adapt to crisis situations at the heart of 
capitalism itself.1 However, whether or not the performance of small 
firms elsewhere meets these expectations is an open question. Although 
the literature on the theme suggests that there is a remarkable increase in 
the number and employment share of small firms in Third World econ-
omies, little substantial knowledge about them exists. A key issue here is 
the feasibility of small businesses. What firms are feasible? What are the 
conditions for their success? Do technology choice, flexibility, 
innovativeness or relative size determine the vitality of small firms? Or is 
it how they are organized, and in what institutional environment they 
operate, that is important? 
These and related questions are important, I argue, because great 
hopes are placed on the role of small firms as a cure-all for economic 
crisis. Indeed, national and international agencies now dedicate a growing 
part of their resources to catapult the new key units of economic develop-
ment: 'small firms' and 'the region'. Thus new policy initiatives and 
programs promoting small enterprises in a regional setting now saturate 
government agendas almost everywhere. In Mexico, for example, the 
Salinas administration (1988-1994) responded to the enormous growth of 
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small-scale enterprise (both in urban and rural areas) by launching a 
number of large-scale programs that were expected to increase the 
competitiveness and productivity of the micro, small-scale and medium 
sized enterprise sector. In fact, the most important government programs 
under the Salinas administration concerned the creation of alternative 
income possibilities within this sector.2 As soon, however, as policy 
initiatives and programs towards the sector are formulated, two immediate 
difficulties come to the fore. The first, as Pyke (1994:1) points out, is how 
regional governments and other regional institutions should act in order to 
develop their areas at a time of great international change, characterized 
by the emergence of strong global interdependences and growing 
supranational powers, and the impingement upon localities of economic 
and political action initiated exogenously, beyond regional borders. This 
problem, of course, is linked to a second one: what 'small firms' should 
be helped? How should these firms be helped? 
Both problems, I contend, arise from a very limited knowledge base about 
the dynamics of small firms: a knowledge base that reflects a vocabulary 
unable to identify a number of crucial issues. So, for example, concepts 
such as 'small firms' or the 'informal sector' hide more than they actually 
clarify. What is needed is another mode of understanding, a vocabulary 
that brings forward that which remains hidden by these slippery concepts. 
An idiom that does justice to the heterogeneity of firms. A language that 
gives priority to the way in which this heterogeneity is constructed, and 
which involves manifold struggles, negotiations and accommodations over 
a broad range of issues that are crucial for the operation of firms. In short, 
a vocabulary of problem-solving that is willing to tackle head-on the 
challenge of understanding the organizing practices that arise from 
actors' wills to bring about desired changes in the running of their enter-
prises (cf. Long and van der Ploeg 1994). 
In order to understand the dynamics of small firms in general, and 
their feasibility in particular, altogether different questions need to be 
asked. It is not enough any more to look at the social, economic, or 
political factors that affect them in isolation from each other. Neither is it 
enough to cling to the received notions of people making, exchanging 
and consuming products and services in different 'spheres' of 'the 
economy'. Likewise, recourse to ideas about the cognitive characteristics 
of entrepreneurs, or to the diverse attributes of markets, seem hopelessly 
outdated. W e need to go further, to create new ways of thinking about 
small firms. Ways that make visible what was heretofore invisible: the 
making of durable firms and institutions (and the institutionalization of 
specific practices); the globalization of the local (and the localization of 
the global); the fluidity of structure (and the structuring of fluidity). 
Indeed, to address these theoretical concerns we need to pose other 
questions. Questions that are not overloaded with assumptions about the 
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character of small entrepreneurs; questions that do not switch from 
vocabulary when referring to the social or to the technical; questions that 
do not change the grid of analysis by referring to 'individualistic' or 
'societal' factors. 
In this thesis I address some of the problems inherent in traditional 
sociological and economic theory by way of a threefold strategy. First, in 
the empirical Chapters I try not to fix the identity of entrepreneurs from 
the outset. Instead, I follow them in their strategies and stratagems -
exploring how, in the process, they construct their identities (and that of 
others). In other words, / study small firms, while suspending assumptions 
about their nature. Second, I try not to impose my analytical 
categorizations upon the messy, heterogeneous social and material 
practices of entrepreneurs - that is, / describe small firms without reducing 
entrepreneurs' practices to social (or economic, or political, or cultural) 
attributes alone. Finally, I try to avoid making assumptions about a 
backdrop of social, economic, or technical factors affecting small firms. 
Instead, I start from the notion that the definition of the character of the 
backdrop is something that is itself at stake in action. Put differently, / 
abstain from eliciting exogenous factors to account for entrepreneurs' 
actions. These three starting points, I argue, offer new theoretical possibil-
ities to reconceptualize the dynamics of small-scale entrepreneurial 
projects.3 
Small firms and development: old ways of talking 
The aim of this thesis is to cast new light on the phenomenon of small-
scale enterprise. Before developing my alternative, let me first briefly 
illustrate the epistemological model I wish to counter. My main conten-
tion against 'traditional' ways of addressing small firms is that these make 
a habit of first defining the nature of small firms, then proceed to pre-
scribe how to go about studying them. This usually - if not always -
means either overemphasizing economic factors and downplaying social 
ones, or stressing social factors while bracketing the economic. 
Where do these epistemological assumptions (and prescriptions) 
come from? As Foucault (1991) argues, the different perspectives of 
sociologists and economists have their own genealogies. Ideas, for 
example, equating small firms with tradition and economic backwardness 
or promoting modern, large firms as stepping-stones for economic prog-
ress and growth have a history to them. How did these ideas originate? 
What was the context that made it possible to think about the specific 
role of small firms in development? I contend that these stories, these 
genealogies, can to a certain extent be traced back - via liberal political 
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economists such as Smith, Ricardo, and Malthus - to the very beginnings 
of the Critique of Enlightenment. 
From the time of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason onwards, what has 
been central in the sciences is the belief that it was possible to produce 
knowledge of unquestionable, universal validity not only about the 
natural world but also about social life and its guiding principles. This 
belief, of course, can be criticized from a wide variety of angles.4 For my 
purposes, what is crucial in the Critique is the separation between a 
natural world full of mute objects, and a world of culture full of human 
subjects. The natural sciences soon turned this newly found Nature into 
their private hunting ground, while nineteenth century political philos-
ophers converted the human into the realm of their contemplations. Both 
camps build unassailable walls around their sciences by way of 
positivistic methods in the natural sciences and complicated hermeneutic 
spirals in the social ones. 
It did not take long before the separation between the social and 
the natural sciences was emulated within the social sciences themselves. 
Thus, after Nature was severed from Culture, Economy was amputated 
from Society, Politics from Religion, 'modern' man from 'premodern' 
woman. Indeed, every field that could be stripped-down to a number of 
bare, essential laws soon became a fully-fledged science. This, then, is the 
characteristic of Modernity: the ability to separate everything that was 
formerly treated as part of one single cosmology. To take an example 
concerning mezcal (a strong liquor made in Jalisco; see Chapters Seven, 
Eight and Nine): what does this separation consist of? To consumers, 
distillers or sellers of the drink mezcal is a cosmology. To them, mezcal 
maps out a world in which markets, aromatic organic compounds, public 
health directives, volatile alcohols, tax legislation, land reform, the 
weather and heavy hangovers are all caught up in the same story and 
associated with one another. To them, the web is seamless (Hughes 
1983): mezcal is a highly complex mixture of social and natural elements 
that cannot be dissected to show the particular 'nature' of the liquor. It is 
thus much more than a 'commodity ecumene' - which Appadurai (1986) 
defines as a transcultural social network of relationships linking producers, 
distributors and consumers of a particular commodity - for mezcal traces 
an abundance of elements that spill over the purely social, making it look 
like a bizarre monster to modern scientists. In contrast, scientists would 
warn distillers, drunkards or traders - distrustful creatures that they are -
that they have it all mixed-up: their view of mezcal is distorted by relig-
ion, superstition, tradition. What is needed, the modern scientist would 
argue, is to apply reason to mezcal, and proceed to dissect it into its 
constituent parts. "Let us separate the economic from the social; chemistry 
from politics; taxes from drinking", she would suggest. "Organic com-
pounds are the realm of chemistry; let chemists experiment with that. 
Public health is a medical issue; let doctors make their diagnoses. Markets 
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are for economists; let them provide us with appealing models. And let us 
leave the weather to the meteorologists." As to the hangovers: modern 
scientists do not suffer from them. They just don't mix their elements... 
The new, modern ability to purify, that is, to separate all kinds of events 
into their constituent parts - and eventually attributing them to a Nature or 
a Culture pole - took root in the social sciences around the end of the 
eighteenth, beginning of the nineteenth century. In that period, the 
Modern Critique finally made it possible to distinguish between the laws 
of external nature and the conventions of society (Latour 1993:130). 
Modernizers were finally able to project all hybrid phenomena (like 
mezcal) either onto the domain of Natural Law (the World), or onto that 
of prejudice and ideology (the Word). As a consequence of this process of 
purification, economic behaviour was believed to be governed by the 
laws of Nature. Behaviour that was deemed non-economic was remitted 
to the realm of Society - which was thought to be tyrannized by human 
passions, interests or ignorance. Thus, in analogy to the first 
Enlightenment thinkers, social scientists such as Smith, Ricardo and 
Malthus - with a little help from the 'scientific method' of positivism -
embarked on a crusade of demolishing the ill-founded pretensions of 
human fantasy in order to uncover the Laws of Nature. In other words, 
Enlightenment thinkers proposed to conceive the economy as a domain of 
natural law which, if left unobstructed, functioned according to its own 
internal laws which were inclined towards a state of social balance - a 
balance or equilibrium which, in Hirschman's (1977) words, was seen as 
"...coming by courtesy of the "invisible hand'". In contrast, 'society' 
represented 'non-economic', social or - as some authors have suggested -
irrational behaviour often based on relations of reciprocity and redistri-
bution.5 
Once Economy and Society are separated and purified from each other's 
influence, it becomes possible to posit the idea of a homo economicus 
(the rational, atomized, self-interested individual who is minimally 
affected by social relations in his/her market competitive behaviour) and a 
homo sociologicus (whose behaviour is norm- or rule-guided) to provide a 
philosophical underpinning to both sides of the divide. In the course of a 
century now, proponents of both sides of this Great Divide have 
quarrelled about the alleged superiority of their models. One particularly 
lively form that this debate has taken is that between formalists and 
substantivists. The formalists argue that economic behaviour is heavily 
embedded in social relations in premarket (or premodern) societies, but 
that it becomes much more autonomous with modernization. Formalism 
thus "... sees the economy as an increasingly separate, differentiated 
sphere in modern society, with economic transactions defined no longer 
by the social or kinship obligations of those transacting but by rational 
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calculations of individual gain." (Granovetter 1992:53). Formalists some-
times stretch their argument and claim that "the traditional situation is 
reversed: instead of economic life being submerged in social relations, 
these relations become an epiphenomenon of the market"{ibid., p.53). 
The substantivist school, associated with the anthropological work of 
Polanyi et a/ (1957) and with the idea of a moral economy (Scott 1976), 
challenge the formalists' view and contend that any kind of behaviour is, 
in principle, embedded in the daily flow of social relations: hence the 
market is immersed in social relations. 
It is not my intention to review these controversies here. Suffice it 
to say that, historically speaking, the role accorded to small firms in 
economic development depends from which side of the Divide one is 
looking. For those anthropologists and sociologists who advocated the 
homo sociologicus position, as well as for those enlightened economists 
who tried to reunite the two poles again, it was clear that small firms had 
an important say in economic development. Thus by the mid-1950s, 
strong arguments in favour of small enterprises, such as labour 
intensiveness, adaptability, advantageous utilization of local production 
factors, reduced dependence on imports and their role in providing a 
seed-bed for indigenous entrepreneurial development, had already been 
confirmed (cf. Schumpeter 1934). 
Supporters of the homo economicus position, however, 'won' the 
debate. They won in the sense that they were able to mobilize more 
'allies'. That is, they mobilized the 'scientific method', used statistical 
data, or enrolled international agencies. Indeed, for decades there was a 
widely-shared understanding among mainstream development economists 
on how industrial societies evolved. According to this understanding, 
rapid modernization and a 'take-off' (Rostow 1963) into self-sustained 
growth could only be achieved by a strategy of accelerated industrializa-
tion based on capital intensive, large enterprises that utilized modern 
technology. According to one authoritative scholar (Mingione 1991), 
development economists clung to this modernization model precisely 
because it conformed closely to the classical economy assumption of the 
existence of homo economicus and its corollary proposition, that of the 
market paradigm. Again, what these assumptions - which are supported 
by the majority of social scientists - suggest is that the market is separate 
from, and autonomous of, social conditioning. That is, the market is an 
entity that is totally separated from the social. Hence most social scientists 
consider the market to be the dominant form of social behaviour or the 
dominant structuring force in social life. From the point of view of the 
market paradigm, social context exists only as a subproduct of market 
interaction (cf. Mingione 1991:5). 
In the context of theories of economic development, especially in 
Third World regions, the force of this analytic model based on the market 
paradigm proved formidable. Indeed, the model was pivotal for the 
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construction of the very notion of 'underdeveloped economies'.6 Two 
influential economists - Nurkse (1953) and Arthur Lewis (1954), both 
quoted in Escobar (1995) - can be seen as having laid down the founda-
tions for this notion. As Escobar (1995:77) argues, the central discursive 
operation (which reflects the Modern Critique) of such models was the 
division of a country's economy and social life into two sectors: one 
modern, the other traditional. Development, in Nurkse's and Lewis' 
eyes, consisted of the progressive encroachment of the modern upon the 
traditional. This image soon found its way into national governments, the 
United Nations, the ILO, the World Bank and the IMF. 
The effects of this conception were immense since tradition was 
equated with economic backwardness. As a consequence, the 'traditional' 
sector was at best seen as playing a transitory role towards a higher stage 
of development - and thus only needed in countries that were passing 
through an early phase of industrialization (cf. Piore and Sabel 1984). It 
was expected, or hoped, that in the course of economic maturation, small 
firms would gradually decline in favour of large-scale businesses. At worst 
(cf. Lewis 1954, quoted in Escobar 1995), the so-called 'traditional' sector 
was thought to have no contribution whatsoever to the process of devel-
opment and, therefore, had to be obliterated as soon as possible if 
economic growth was to occur. 
Small firms and development: the return of the vanquished 
By the early 1970s it became evident, however, that something was 
wrong with the prediction that development based upon the moderniz-
ation model would bring about equity and progress for all. Vast and 
growing discrepancies in real-term incomes both within but also between 
countries became more apparent. Together with this trend, a large 
increase in the number of small-scale economic activities co-existing 
alongside large enterprises could be observed. This of course posed an 
insurmountable problem to proponents of the market paradigm (cf. 
Mingione 1991). Indeed, for a large and growing part of Third World 
populations only a strong embeddedness of market relations in relations 
of reciprocity and redistribution made life minimally bearable. With this 
evidence, the model of atomized, individual competitive behaviour as 
independent from the moral, ethical, and religious principles inherent in 
local social institutions collapsed. As it turned out, the very idea (and 
idealist position) that an analytic concept such as homo economicus could 
control or grasp an object situated 'out there' in 'The Economy' was 
doomed to failure. 
Consequently, new theories were designed, tested, overhauled, 
provided with fashionable neo- or post- prefixes, or plainly abandoned to 
their fate in the "garbage dump of history". New concepts snatched the 
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spotlights for a while, then slowly waned. These days other, more 
appealing theories such as flexible specialization or regulationist theory 
preach from the high pulpit of science. There, they are allowed to reign 
unchallenged - until of course more attractive ideas push them off the cliff 
to join their predecessors. 
Today, when opening the file on theories of small firms one can charac-
terize three different positions. A first line of (policy-oriented) research 
stresses the dynamic and sheltered potential for economic expansion and 
employment inherent in small firms. Indeed, at the beginning of the 
1970s, there was an increasing awareness that most developing econ-
omies could not incorporate the growing urban labour force into the 
labour market - despite the fact that some countries were achieving 
prolonged periods of high growth rates. This realization was accompanied 
by a re-emergence of the issue of the role of small firms in the develop-
ment process. The increased attention to small-scale economic activities 
reached a climax with the promotion of the concept of the 'informal 
sector' by the ILO's Kenya report (1972)7, meaning by this those small-
scale economic activities characterized by "family ownership, small scale 
of operations, use of labour-intensive production methods and adapted 
technology, reliance on indigenous resources, unprotected labour, ease of 
entry and unregulated and competitive markets" (ILO 1972:6). 
Alternatively, a second line of (theoretical) research emphasizes the 
explanation and/or understanding of small-scale economic activities in 
relation to capitalist and traditional modes of production and the structural 
position of small firms in regimes of accumulation and regulation -both in 
the First and the Third World. This approach replaces the formal/informal 
dichotomy with a model conforming to the variable articulation of 
capitalist and non-capitalist forms and modes of production within the 
context of concrete social formations (Prattis 1987:31). Subsequent fine-
tuning of the model introduced the category of 'simple' or 'petty' com-
modity production8 (Bienefeld 1975; Ennew, Hirst and Tribe 1977). 'Petty 
commodity production' signified that individuals or households could not 
reproduce themselves without some involvement in commodity circuits, 
and that the general 'logic' governing economic life and livelihood 
strategies was that of capitalism (as summarized by Long 1986:12-13). 
This insight appeared to be corroborated by a wide body of evidence 
stemming from the patterns of uneven growth that characterized the Third 
World in the 1960s and early 1970s, and which had produced an expan-
sion and diversification of different forms of small-scale enterprise which 
could not be interpreted as transitional or residual (MacEwen-Scott 
1986:3). The major achievement of this approach - which will further be 
referred to as the commoditization theory - is that it contradicted the 
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prediction that small-scale, non-capitalist enterprises would in the long 
run wither away in the face of capitalist expansion. 
A third, and more recent line of research on small firms that takes a 
middle-of-the-road position between practical and theoretical concerns, is 
that avowed by proponents of the flexible specialization paradigm. Origi-
nally, the model of flexible specialization was advanced by Piore and 
Sabel (1984), who contrasted it with the model of industrialization based 
on a Fordist type of production organization. As these authors argue, the 
deterioration in industrial performance in a number of Western countries 
results from the limits of rigid, mass production systems in which mass 
goods are produced using standardized machinery and unskilled workers. 
As an alternative, Piore and Sabel propose the flexible specialization 
model. In particular, they emphasize the decentralization of big factory 
chains and redeployment of productive forces into small units that can 
take advantage of flexible technologies. This, they argue, would enable 
crisis-ridden economies to react to ceaseless changes by introducing 
manufacturing systems capable of making specialized goods using multi-
purpose, flexible machinery and skilled labour (cf. Hirst and Zeitlin 
1991:2). Although of a Western genealogy, the applicability of the flexible 
specialization model for the Third World has been explicitly discussed by 
Schmitz (1990) and a number of colleagues (Pedersen 1989, Rasmussen 
1992, Spaeth 1993, Sverrisson 1993). Methodologically, the flexible 
specialization approach is very appealing because its general argument is 
that the strength of small-scale enterprise cannot be comprehended by 
examining individual firms. Rather, these firms are seen as organizations 
interacting within highly volatile, sometimes chaotic, but nevertheless 
identifiable networks. As Pedersen et a/ argue (1994:15), in these net-
works entrepreneurs associate with workers, traders and other participants 
in utilizing available and adaptable techniques, thus forming a collective 
production unit or 'meta-enterprise'. 
Small firms and development: new ways of talking, or the same old wine 
in new bottles? 
The pros and cons of the theories discussed above notwithstanding, one 
question would be in place here. How far have we really travelled since 
Smith, Ricardo and Malthus? The question is pertinent because, as I will 
argue, most new theories dealing with small firms are to a larger or lesser 
extent based on the same triad of assumptions that are made by the 
modernization model they criticize. The first assumption is often referred 
to as essentialism. As Woolgar (1988:55) contends, essentialism underlies 
the metaphor of scientific discovery, 
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"... the idea of dis-covering, [which is] precisely that of uncover-
ing and revealing something which had been there all along. 
One removes the covers and thereby exposes the thing for what 
it is; one pulls back the curtains on the facts. The image derives 
in part from the notion of geographical discovery. One travels 
to a distant place and finds (comes upon or otherwise stumbles 
over) what was already there. The crucial part is the prior 
existence of the discovered object." 
In the context of the economics and sociology of development, 
essentialism implies that as soon as a phenomenon that is deemed 
'economic' and inexplicable in terms of existing concepts is found, new 
concepts are invented ('commoditization', 'fertility rates', 
'underemployment, 'literacy', and so on). As the object of (economic) 
science, these concepts are thus thought to stand for, represent or trans-
late a real and objective life that enjoys a pre-existence that is indepen-
dent of the way it is perceived. Thus economic essentialism can be seen 
as the reduction of complex social behaviour to a pre-existent, theoretical 
model of The Economy (as that body that unites 'commoditization', 
'underemployment', 'fertility rates', 'literacy' and so on) which may be 
'discovered' on the basis of logical reflection by trained, positivist econ-
omists who follow the rules of 'scientific method'.9 
A case in point is the discourse that has constructed the notion of 
'underdeveloped areas'. For example - and following classical econ-
omics - development economists assumed that 'Progress' was an attribute 
of 'Nature'. In other words, progress was seen as inherent in a natural 
state of affairs.10 This essentialist idea came back in the form of a belief 
that "progress was inherent in nature and that the task of the scholar was 
to discover the pattern of its unfolding and recommend policies that 
would hasten its inevitable attainment" (Greenfield et a/ 1979:6). Note, 
however, what is entailed in this. By equating economic progress and 
Nature, a linearity is build into the analysis - a linearity that can eventual-
ly be measured with the aid of concepts such as 'rural underemployment', 
a 'low level of industrialization', a 'set of obstacles' to industrial develop-
ment, a 'disadvantage' in international trade and so on (cf. Escobar 
1995:75). Other 'measurement sticks' that have structured the discourse of 
development include 'uneconomic' use of resources due to small size of 
enterprises, 'rural overcrowding' or 'traditionally determined behaviour for 
the bulk of the populace' (Leibenstein 1957). 
Crude essentialism, however, is not the exclusive right of modern-
ization theories. The articulationist school, for example, can equally be 
brought to task for its reliance on the metaphor of progress as a natural 
condition. This is evident in the work of authors such as Meillassoux 
(1981), who tried to explain the survival of pre- and non-capitalist rela-
tions of production as a structured feature of capitalism. However, right 
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from the start Meillassoux takes for granted - and this is the essentialist 
assumption - that there actually exists something like capitalist and pre-
capitalist relations of production that are independent from the scientific 
gaze. Hence theoretical frameworks are constructed which maintain that, 
although functional to capitalism, over the long run non-capitalist rela-
tions will inevitably follow a 'natural' course and end up converted into 
capitalist ones. 
Yet, what does one do with concepts such as 'capitalism' - that 
primeval essence - if one takes the position that the term is itself a social 
construction? I suggest that, instead of taking for granted these grand 
essences, one should take seriously the question of the extent to which 
the features, characteristics and definitions of economic phenomena first 
and foremost reflect the classificatory practices of social scientists them-
selves, rather than the 'actual' or 'objective' character of these phenom-
ena. What does this mean in relation to the different discourses about 'the 
economy' or 'economic development'? The point is simple. There is no 
such thing as 'the economy' or 'economic development' that is indepen-
dent of our way of conceiving them (cf. Strathern 1980) . These terms are 
nothing more than a means to represent the invisible, to create an object. 
But what is it that makes it look as if 'the economy' is something pre-
social, something universal? Maybe it is more fruitful to ask what makes 
'the economy' appear as self-evident, and perhaps even a 'natural' field of 
activity in any society? For there is nothing essential in 'the economy'. 
After all, before one can meaningfully start talking about it, one needs to 
make visible the invisible world of exchanges. As Latour (1990:38 ) 
argues, 'the economy' is plainly invisible as long as cohorts of inquirers 
and inspectors have not filled in long questionnaires, as long as answers 
have not been punched onto cards, treated by computers, and analyzed 
by economists. It is only at the end that an aggregate hybrid called 'the 
economy' emerges from the piles of charts and lists. 
Clearly, then, the relationship between the object (The Economy') 
and its constituent phenomena is no more than a practical exercise of 
social scientists. A practical exercise which, as Foucault tells us, creates a 
Panopticon that tries to mould and control its subject. Of course, 'The 
Economy' - whether socially constructed or not - is now a 'fact' - and this 
has consequences. And I think one should certainly direct attention to the 
power effects thereof. But one should also be careful not to preempt the 
debate by acknowledging that to talk about 'the economy' is nothing but 
an attempt to exercise power on economic subjects: after all, the dis-
course of social scientists tells precious little of the stuff from which the 
daily life of those concerned is made of.11 Indeed, most of the time 
economic subjects simply do not care about that what economists or 
sociologists have to say about them. In this respect, scientists' pipe-
dreams can in fact be read like an ironic reversal of Foucault's 
Panopticon. As Zizek (1991:92 ) sharply comments, in Foucault's writing 
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the horrifying efficacy of the Panopticon is due to the fact that the sub-
jects (prisoners, patients, factory workers) can never know for sure if they 
are actually being observed from the all-seeing central control tower. This 
very uncertainty intensifies the feeling of menace, of the impossibility of 
escape from the gaze of the Other. Conversely, in the economists' 
Panopticon workers, traders, housewives, and so on are actually observed 
all the time by the economist's watchful eye. But far from being terror-
ized (as Foucault suggests), the observed simply ignore this gaze and go 
on with their daily business. On the contrary, it is the economist himself, 
the center of the Panopticon, its all-pervasive eye, who is terrorized, 
constantly looking out of the window, anxious not to miss some crucial 
detail. 
In the end, the effect of essentialism is that it brings about a lack of 
fit between economic discourse on the identity of producers, consumers 
etc. and the discourses of economic actors themselves. Flesh-and-blood 
social actors always present economic discourse with a significant surplus 
of meaning -a surplus which cannot be explained away by elegant 
theoretical models. To name but two examples: informal sector studies, 
and the flexible specialization paradigm. Both stress the actual (informal 
sector) or ideal typical (flexible specialization) existence of formal and 
informal sectors, or of Fordist and Post-Fordist production regimes. Apart 
from the difficulties entailed in identifying particular enterprises as clear 
cases of formal/informal, or of mass production/flexible specialization, 
there is the problem of a misplaced emphasis on the transition from one 
'order' to the other - be it from the formal to the informal or vice versa; 
or a replacement of mass production by flexible forms of industrial 
organization. What we see here, again, is the operation of the same 
essentialist assumption made by classical economists and followers of the 
articulationist school. For them, it is a given that social order in the form 
of 'the formal economy' or 'mass production' exists. 
Next to essentialism, a second - and related - assumption often made in 
theories about the role of small firms in economic development is that 
two different types of economies exist within one single spatial configur-
ation. This is what is usually called dualism. Clear-cut examples include 
explanations that locate small-scale economic activities within the realm 
of 'the traditional' (Boeke 1953), the 'bazaar economy' (Geertz 1963) or 
the 'informal sector' (ILO 1972). Common in these dualist theories is the 
idea that each segment of the economy is homogeneous and possesses its 
own principles in the organization of production, distribution and ex-
change. This assumption, which leaves little room for the understanding 
of the interconnections between the 'traditional' and the 'modern' or 
'formal' sectors, lies at the heart of a number of critiques that have been 
levelled at the limitations of dualist theories (Breman 1976; Bromley and 
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Gerry 1979 ; MacEwen-Scott 1979 ; Moser 1978; Peattie 1987; for a 
critique in the Mexican context see Connolly 1985 ; Roldân 1985) . 
The case of the articulationist school1 2 is somewhat different 
because it sidesteps the pitfalls of crude dualism by treating capitalist and 
non-capitalist relations of production as relational categories. Neverthe-
less, the perspective remains dualist by taking capitalist and non-capitalist 
relations as a point of departure - no matter how relational its treatment 
thereof. Likewise, the flexible specialization model is essentially dualist in 
its aim to demonstrate the displacement of mass production by flexible 
specialization as the dominant technological paradigm. This, as Sayer and 
Walker (1992 :199 , quoted in Murdoch 1 9 9 5 : 7 4 1 ) argue, hinders recogni-
tion of the fact that "... industry has always combined flexibilities and 
inflexibilities" and that such combinations "cannot be grasped by inflex-
ible dualistic frameworks which counterpose the old as the inflexible to 
the new as flexible". Here, indeed, we find one more instance in which 
economic subjects (industry; firms) confront theoretical models with a 
surplus of meaning. 
It would certainly be fruitless to negate the impact that dualistic 
conceptualizations have had on social relations at a global level. Indeed, 
the divides are painstakingly enforced by international organizations, 
economists, bureaucrats and even the police. But the point is this: the 
divides created by dualist theories do not represent any natural bound-
aries. They may be useful for teaching or intervening in one form or 
another, but they certainly do not provide any explanation. On the 
contrary: these divides are themselves the very things to be explained (cf. 
Latour 1990:20) . 
Next to essentialism and dualism, another common assumption in need of 
démystification is that of reductionism. Reductionism is closely related to 
the modern-traditional dichotomy in the sense that, by splitting one pole 
from the other, one of them (often the traditional) is made remote or 
reduced. As Law (1994:12 ) explains, the usual argument in favour of 
reductionism is that it is practically effective: a few principles may explain 
a great deal, like the case of economics.13 However, as Law stresses, one 
should note what is entailed in reductionism: 
"First, you need to draw a line between two classes of phenom-
ena by distinguishing those that drive from those that are 
driven. And second you claim that the behaviour of the latter is 
explained -often you say caused- by the actions of the former. 
So the danger is this: that you ... [drive] a wedge between those 
that are doing the driving and the rest. And (this is the real 
problem) the former get described differently, or not at all. So 
reductionism often, perhaps usually, makes distinctions that 
may come to look strangely like dualisms." 
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Reductionism becomes apparent in the flexible specialization model and 
in most studies of the informal sector (cf. Laenen 1992) . In the case of the 
former, the 'driver' takes the specific form of the political, economic and 
institutional environment which has been constructed by large private or 
public enterprises, and which is rarely supportive and often discriminatory 
(Spath 1993) . Here the institutional environment is already identified as 
the driver, and the internal organization of the firm thus automatically 
becomes the driven. Similarly, most informal sector studies see informality 
as dependent and subordinate - or indeed a response to - the formal 
sector. Here, again, a wedge is placed between the driver (conditions in 
the formal sector) and the driven (economic behaviour in the so-called 
informal sector). In the same vein, within the commoditization thesis it is 
argued that market forces - in the form of commoditized relations -
increasingly shape individual economic decisions (e.g. Bernstein 1986 ; 
Cooodman and Redclift 1 9 8 5 ; Hart 1982) . Once again, here a lever is 
forced between the driver (market forces) and the driven (decision-mak-
ing). This is not inconsequential because such an assumption deals 
inadequately with the non-commoditized side of the equation and 
introduces an asymmetry in the analysis - which in the end leads to an 
unwarranted linear view of change. A related consequence of conceiving 
of commoditization as the motor of change and decision-making, as the 
wagon that automatically follows afterwards, is that the sphere of produc-
tion is prioritized over and above the work and the networks needed to 
sustain and reproduce household and/or enterprise labour, the social 
organization of consumption, or the importance of gender relations in the 
actual structuring of the labour process (cf. MacEwen-Scott 1986 ; Pahl 
1 9 8 5 ; Whatmore 1988:248) . Another effect entailed in reducing individ-
ual decision-making to 'market forces' is that much of the cultural and 
ideological dimension of petty commodity production, distribution and 
exchange is made invisible. Moreover, if commoditization is seen as the 
driving force, and actors are assumed to be no more than passive media-
tors in the process of commoditization itself, one can never bring into the 
picture what the commoditization of the different moments of production, 
exchange and consumption might mean for the enterprising practices of 
the actors concerned (cf. Long 1986) . Blindness to these issues leads to 
the unqualified conclusion that market integration opens the road to the 
individualization and atomization of the social environment of small-scale 
entrepreneurs (e.g. Friedmann 1 9 8 1 ) who, consequently, only maintain 
commoditized extra-household relations. In this case, reductionism 
prevents one from taking into account inter-household cooperative strate-
gies, or the way in which actors help one another in the organization of 
their respective enterprises, often through non-commoditized relationships 
(Smith 1989) . 
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It is not within the scope of this thesis to provide a full explanation for the 
assumptions made, and the divides created by social scientists who talk in 
the name of 'the economy' or of 'economic subjects' such as small-scale 
entrepreneurs. I leave that to others. At the risk of caricaturing, in this 
Chapter I nevertheless addressed these assumptions and divides because 
they are a part of the image I - like Andr6nido, that other iconoclast -
want to let burn in hell. In what follows, I try to evade the common traps 
every participant in the social sciences is faced with. I am aware that this 
is a difficult undertaking for, like all other social scientists, I myself also 
participate in an academic discourse that was constructed long before my 
arrival. But, like the entrepreneurs of the empirical Chapters of this thesis, 
I will try to re-associate, rethink some of the elements that are crucial for 
my own enterprise: to think differently about the phenomenon of small 
firms. And, perhaps - if only in a flash - by so doing I will let 
entrepreneurs' many - not one - voices be heard. You, the reader, are the 
final judge. Only if the stories that follow make a bit of sense to you will I 
consider my task accomplished. 
Notes 
1. See especially the flexible specialization literature on the Terza Italia 
(Becattini 1989; Brusco 1986), Baden Wurtemberg (Hausler 1992) and 
Scandinavia (Asheim 1992; Hakansson 1989). 
2. These programs included PRONASOL's Empresas en Solidaridad and 
NAFINSA's Empresas Integradoras. Their relative significance is evident if 
one considers the recent change of focus of the official Banca de Desarrollo 
(Development Bank). Up to 1993, this Bank channeled resources to the 
agricultural sector through BANRURAL and FIRA; but from 1993 onwards, 
the Development Bank directed most of its capital through Nacional 
Financiera (NAFIN) and the Banco de Comercio Exterior (BANCOMEXT) in an 
all-out attempt to make competitive micro-, small-, and medium-sized enter-
prises. To give an idea of the dimension of this endeavor: until 1993 all 
credit for the more than 2,000 paraestatales (government-owned enterprises) 
was disbursed through NAFIN. The amount credited to the former 
paraestatales is now being channeled to micro-, small-and medium-sized 
firms, and is being financed by the surplus on the national balance of 
payments obtained through the privatization of nearly 1,000 state-run enter-
prises during the Salinas Administration (including the largest company in 
Latin America, TELMEX, as well as 18 commercial banks). 
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3. My strategy bears more than a superficial resemblance to an actor-oriented 
perspective as formulated by Long (1992). Compare, for example, my points 
of departure with the following statement: "an actor perspective ...seeks to 
uncover the interactive processes by which social life is constructed, repro-
duced and transformed. It finds no place for the notion of 'structure' as a set 
of external forces or conditions that delimit or regulate specific modes of 
action. Instead it focuses on how so-called 'externalities' are mediated by the 
strategies, understandings and commitments of different actors and actor-
networks, thereby generating a variegated pattern of social forms that repre-
sent differential responses to similar 'problematic' circumstances". (Long and 
van der Ploeg 1994). The present study, however, differs from an actor-
oriented perspective in that the concept of agency is treated differently. See 
Chapter Two for a development of this difference. 
4. So, for example, we have postmodernism and poststructuralism. Neverthe-
less, one could argue that many so-called postmodern and poststructuralist 
authors find their raison d'itre in denouncing or exposing the basic beliefs of 
Enlightenment thinking - a critique of the Critique. This in no way brings one 
any further in coming to grips with the central problem of the Critique: its 
separation of the knower and the known. 
5. Although it does not lie within the scope of this thesis much, of course, 
can be mustered against both neo-classical and neo-liberal economic thought. 
Their account of behaviour, as Alexander (1992) argues, is derived from 
explicitly theoretical and reductionist models, which are not grounded, 
except by way of experimental simulation or anecdote, in empirical evidence. 
Such models clearly rule out alternative lines of interpretation that include 
any consideration of power and knowledge, or any conception of human 
agency that is not atomized or undersocialized. As Granovetter (1985) 
contends in an influential article, economic theory therefore vetoes a priori 
any impact of social structure and social relations on production, distribution, 
or consumption. Indeed, in the ideal markets of economists' thought, 
anonymous price-taking buyers and sellers equipped with perfect information 
need not sustain continuous social relations because neither of them is able 
to control aggregate supply or demand or, therefore, prices or the terms of 
trade. I thank Norman Long for the observation that the same may be said in 
the case of idealist sociological concepts such as 'petty commodity produc-
ers' used by e.g. Friedmann (1981). 
6. Much has already been written on the way in which this object was 
constructed, and I will not repeat the argument here. See Escobar (1995) for 
an excellent (though to an extent generalizing) study of the depoliticized 
construction of the duo 'development' and 'underdevelopment'. For more 
modest, ethnographically based examples, see Ferguson (1990) on Lesotho 
and de Vries (1992) on Costa Rica. 
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7. The term 'informal sector' was introduced by Hart a year before the 
publication of the ILO report. See Hart (1973) for a fuller elaboration of the 
term. 
8. See MacEwen-Scott (1986:98-99) for a discussion of the difference between 
these concepts. 
9. This point of view, of course, poses an additional problem. As studies in 
the sociology of science have shown, attempts to specify one or other criteria 
of demarcation (for example 'the economy' as something different from 
'society') ignore what turns out to be a fundamental characteristic of science, 
namely that it is constantly open to renegotiation and reclassification 
(Woolgar 1988:20-1). For a similar argument from the standpoint of econ-
omics, see Hirschman's The Passions and the Interests (1977). After Kuhn 
(1962), to claim to have 'discovered' new, fundamental economic behaviour 
cannot but elicit a big yawn. 
10. This essentialist idea underlies the writings of such disparate contem-
porary authors and institutions such as Schumpeter (1934), Rostow (1963), 
and the World Bank (1991). 
11. See Cicourel (1964) for a beautiful example of the gulf that separates 
contingent individual decisions that may lead to pregnancy, and indicators 
usually utilized in the discipline of demography. 
12. For the sake of brevity, I consider the commoditization thesis under this 
conceptual model. 
13. For important exceptions see the work of Schumpeter (1934) and Polanyi 
(1957). For more contemporary exceptions (of a social reductionist kind), see 
Granovetter (1985). 
CHAPTER 2 
BRIDGING THE GAP 
Inter-firm Co-operation and Collectifs 
As I suggest from the summary overview of studies on small firms (Chap-
ter 1), it is appalling to note that the vast majority of them offer explana-
tions that hinge on that ruthless triad of 'isms': essentialism, dualism, 
reductionism. Of course, differences between the studies exist and some 
of the explanations would probably be exonerated on one or two counts. 
Yes, there exist studies that bypass dualism by pointing to the 
interrelatedness of, for example, formal and informal activities.1 And yes, 
there exist other studies that skilfully dodge crude reductionism and make 
reference to the social, political and economic 'embeddedness' of small 
firms. And maybe there even exist instances of non-essentialist studies 
(although so far I have not encountered any). 
If, however, one wishes to reconceptualize small firms, then the 
first step is to look for explanations that avoid essentialism, dualism and 
reductionism of one form or another. Next, one would have to go beyond 
the debate between formalists - who maintain a preeminence for homo 
oeconomicus - and substantivists - who persist in championing the 
salience of homo sociologicus. This dualistic debate, which runs like a 
red thread through the discussion of the role of small firms in develop-
ment, needs to be replaced by a perspective that favours the continuity 
between the economic, social, and political 'domains' (as well as the 
technical; more on this below). These 'domains' or 'spheres' have to be 
analytically brought together again in order to open up new theoretical 
gateways. 
In line with my critique on 'traditional' ways of studying entrepre-
neurial projects, the examples of small firms in this thesis avoid the traps 
of dualism, essentialism and reductionism. To do so, 1 first discuss two 
theoretical frameworks that provide useful insights into the study of 
entrepreneurial activity: flexible specialization and the actor-oriented 
approach. Drawing upon their shortcomings, I then elaborate on actor-
network theory - a body of work developed in the context of the sociol-
ogy of science - to address the two guiding questions of this thesis: 
a. how can one account for the heterogenous processes that shape the 
projects of small-scale entrepreneurs in a rural area of Western 
Mexico, without recurring to dualistic frameworks and notions of a 
pre-established context or an autonomous content? 
b. under what conditions are durable (i.e. feasible) entrepreneurial 
projects constructed? 
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The small-scale variant of the flexible specialization approach 
As I stated in Chapter 1, during the past ten years or so sociologists and 
anthropologists have shown that the standard models of small firm deve-
lopment are flawed. Small firms rarely grow in a predictable and unilinear 
manner within a relatively stable social, political or economic context. 
Neither do they wither away in the context of increased 'capitalist' rela-
tions or globalizing tendencies. Models which assume this cannot explain 
small firms' radical, and sometimes revolutionary, character. Instead, new 
directions in the study of small scale enterprises suggest that small firm 
behaviour stems from interactions between a large number of diverse 
actors. One useful notion to understand these interactions is that of 
network - generally defined as a specific type of relation linking a defined 
set of persons, objects or events (Mitchell 1969; Perrow 1993). 
More recently, the idea of taking networks of firms as the analytical 
point of departure has gained currency in debates about the viability of 
small-scale enterprise forms.2 Of these, arguably the most advanced 
approach is that of 'flexible specialization' developed in the context of 
advanced economies by Piore and Sabel (1984). Flexible specialization 
may be defined as "... a technological paradigm or ideal-typical model of 
industrial efficiency: the manufacture of specialized goods using flexible 
machinery and skilled labour" (Hirst and Zeitlin 1991:2). The model was 
used by Piore and Sabel to contrast it to Fordist mass production in which 
mass goods are produced using standardized machinery and unskilled 
workers. The concept of flexible specialization has been used in the 
context of the debate on industrialization in the heart of capitalism itself, 
particularly in small firm industrial districts of the Third Italy (Becattini 
1989; Brusco 1986) and Germany (Hausler 1992), where small enterprises 
have shown their economic strength in times of crisis. Of late, a number 
of interesting studies that take flexible specialization as their framework 
have been carried out in developing countries (cf. Alba and Kruijt 1995; 
James and Bhalla 1993; Kaplinsky 1991; Pyke et al 1990; Sverrisson 
1994; Schmitz 1995; see also the volumes edited by Pedersen et al 1994 
and Spath 1993). The general argument is that the strength of small-scale 
enterprise cannot be comprehended by examining individual firms. 
Rather, their vitality lies in the trust engendered by networking, the effect 
of which is shown by collective efficiency through clustering, cooperative 
competition, and an increased ability to adapt and innovate. Flexible 
specialization thus offers the methodological advantage that the individual 
enterprise cannot be understood in isolation from the specific environ-
ment in which it is operated (Pedersen et al 1994). 
Flexible specialization, which is increasingly gaining space within 
international agencies (like the ILO) concerned with the support and 
development of small firms in underdeveloped regions, thus starts from 
the notion that small firms participate in a variety of networks that span 
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the economic, the social, the political, the technological, and so on. As 
flexible specialization suggests, small firms are an effect of these net-
works, while at the same time they influence and help shape them. In 
addition, flexible specialization makes the point that co-operation of some 
form may arise when there exists some sectoral and geographical cluster-
ing of the enterprises involved in the network. In fact - and this is the 
main argument of the flexible specialization approach - in such an 
environment competition may be tempered by co-operation, thus opening 
the way for flexibility and innovation processes which are both seen as 
crucial for the collective survival of enterprises in times of economic 
adversity (Schmitz 1 9 9 2 ; see also Piore and Sabel 1984) . Furthermore, 
clustering or agglomeration may be an actively pursued strategy "whereby 
producers ease the task of transactional interaction because proximity 
translates into lower costs and wider opportunities for matching needs and 
capabilities" (Scott and Storper 1992:17) . 3 Examples abound: whole 
regions or medium-sized cities that specialize in the production or 
marketing of specific goods, such as for example the shoe industry around 
the city of Le6n in Mexico (Morris and Lowder 1992) or the Sinos Valley 
in Brazil (Schmitz 1995) . Other examples would include whole neigh-
bourhoods in larger cities that cater for specific customers: automobile 
repair shops, textiles, and so on. 
The empirical evidence provided in these examples seems obvious 
enough, but the question is whether flexible specialization can come to 
grips - both theoretically and methodologically - with the dynamics and 
co-ordination of small-firm networks. Can it help one to identify the 
points within a network where accumulation occurs? Can it help one 
locate innovation? Is it useful to indicate which networks are able to 
reproduce their activities through time? Although the flexible specializ-
ation model represents a step forward in the debate around the role of 
small firms in development because non-dualistic emphasis on networks 
of firms as its main unit of analysis, some of their findings are difficult to 
generalize, if not untenable. So, for example, the empirical finding that 
"inter-firm collaboration between small firms generally requires some kind 
of external catalyst or brokerage role" (Pyke 1 9 9 4 : 1 2 1 ) brings us back to a 
rather crude form of reductionism. According to the flexible specialization 
model, this brokerage role is often located in State and regional agencies, 
technical institutes and service centres, or trade unions and associations. 
However, one should not take these conclusions at face value. Indeed, 
the suggestion that what makes the model of flexible specialization tick is 
to be located outside the firm proper seems to be an unwarranted one, 
and at least contradicts the evidence from my own fieldwork.4 In fact, to 
draw on some of the conclusions of this thesis, struggles and negotiations 
to separate that which is defined as 'context' and that which is defined as 
'content' are crucial for the operation of small firms. The final (though 
temporal) outcome of these struggles and negotiations may sometimes 
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incorporate the institutional environment into the 'content' of 
ities (that is, they are crucial), while at some other times this f 
ronment may be defined as 'contextual' (less crucial) or not relevant Q v 
Again, the problem with reductionist accounts of one form or the 
other is that they are not merely rhetorical but in fact may have conse-
quences. For example, locating 'prime movers' in the realm of State 
agencies could lead to policies that emphasize the role of these institu-
tions in the development of the potential of small-scale enterprise. 
Although there may be nothing essentially wrong with this, the question 
remains in how far these types of diagnosis are related more to theoretical 
constructs than to the actual practices of small firms. 
Studies on flexibly specialized small firms, then, at first sight seem to be 
well equipped to identify the prime movers of networks. Looking more 
closely at these studies, however, one could conclude that flexible 
specialization is less proficient in uncovering the dynamic processes 
leading to the emergence of these prime movers. 
An actor-oriented approach to the study of small firms 
The flexible specialization model, as suggested above, does not take the 
practices of entrepreneurs in earnest, and instead presupposes the exist-
ence of a context that is independent of the content of entrepreneurial 
activities. If one sees this as problematic (as I do) and wishes to overcome 
it, then clearly one needs to embrace a position that does not start from a 
dualist theoretical architecture while retaining what is useful in the 
flexible specialization model: its focus on networks. One such position is 
the actor-oriented approach (Long 1984 and 1989; Long and Long 1992). 
Like the work on the small-scale variant of flexible specialization, the 
actor-oriented approach posits that actors participate in networks or 
collectives which implicate a wide range of other participants. In addi-
tion - and this is the trademark of the approach - an actor-oriented per-
spective on small-scale enterprises reveals the dynamics of networks by 
acknowledging the diverse practices of the actors involved. These prac-
tices, or so the thesis suggests, may be differentially related to a so-called 
institutional environment. Furthermore, and contrary to flexible specializ-
ation, an actor-oriented perspective does not start by defining the charac-
ter, the shape, or the morphology of the networks in which actors partici-
pate. Rather, the approach allows entrepreneurs to do this definitional 
work. In this sense, the point of departure of the actor-oriented approach 
intersects with Latour's notion of following the actors (1987): no analyti-
cal imperatives or methodological precautions (e.g. in the form of correct-
ly carried out surveys) will enhance or replace this work done by entre-
preneurs themselves.5 
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By conceptualizing actors (such as small firms) as partaking in 
networks, and by focusing on practices, the actor-oriented approach is, in 
principle, a useful candidate to cast new light on the dynamics and 
feasibility of small-firms. But how useful is it in practice? To answer this 
question demands a short detour into its history and conceptual structure. 
At first, the actor-oriented approach ensued from the theoretical crisis 
which had come to impinge on the business of finding a definitive answer 
to the problems related to Third World development. These problems 
were either associated with the way in which the capitalist mode of 
production structured peripheral areas, or with the ways in which particu-
lar strata of Third World populations responded to specific structural 
conditions. 
In fact this theoretical crisis reflected a divide between, on the one 
hand, macro-sociological theory that dealt with aggregate structures, 
patterns of growth and the laws of capitalist development (e.g. moderniz-
ation theory and neo-Marxism) and, on the other hand, more 
anthropologically-oriented micro-perspectives that explored the local 
strategies and cultural dispositions deployed in the face of processes of 
structural change (cf. Long 1977, 1984; Booth 1985). The crisis was, of 
course, epitomized in the different sub-areas of the discipline. Depending 
on the specific interests involved (e.g. the discussion of state institutions, 
political cultures or social transactions), the grid of analysis invariably 
changed whenever macro- or micro actors were addressed. Consequently 
the study of human behaviour was all but ignored in macro-perspectives 
(Marxism, structural-functional ism) or, as in the case of micro-approaches 
(phenomenology, ethnomethodology), agency was denied to any type of 
composite actor. The reason was the a priori postulation of the existence 
of actors of different size. Hence, analysis of how variations in size were 
socially constructed in practice was not considered. Unawareness of 
actors' embedded practices thus seriously obstructed more promising 
theoretical insights and lines of research. 
Pinpointing this deficiency, Long (1989) and Arce and Long (1987; 
1992) set the first steps to reverse the trend. Both authors forwarded the 
need to focus on practices in order to seek a way out of the theoretical 
impasse, and showed a strong concern for empirical processes through 
the use of detailed ethnographic accounts. Focusing on the analysis of 
(interface) situations, Long explicitly addressed the importance of integrat-
ing actors' practices within an analytical framework that simultaneously 
problematized the relationship between micro- and macro-actors. To this 
end, Long utilized three central concepts: agency, knowledge, and 
power.6 
Although Long opened up new analytical ground with his 
approach, more detailed reading of his oeuvre brings forward an inherent 
tension between agency, knowledge and power - a tension that to a 
degree flaws the thrust of his perspective. This tension is due to Long's 
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recurrence to an essentialist notion of human agency. More specifically, 
Long's approach attempts to force a marriage between, on the one hand, 
a humanistic interpretation of agency and, on the other, power and 
knowledge which suggest an altogether different epistemological origin. 
This is evident in his approach to power (1992:27), which is 
"... not simply something that is possessed and accumulated. 
Nor can it be measured precisely in terms of some notion of 
quantity or quality. It emerges out of processes of social interac-
tion and is essentially a joint product of the encounter and 
fusion of horizons". 
A similar stance is taken on knowledge, which is conceived of as being 
jointly created through processes of negotiation in social encounters. 
Indeed, both knowledge and power closely dovetail in the actor-oriented 
approach. Supported by Foucault7, Long (1992:27) argues that it is 
scarcely possible to talk about knowledge without addressing power at 
the same time: 
"Knowledge encounters involve the struggles between actors who aim 
to enroll others in their 'projects', getting them to accept particular 
frames of meaning, winning them over to their points of view. If they 
succeed then other parties 'delegate' power to them." 
Some problems become evident, however, when trying to ground the 
power/knowledge duo on a humanistic version of the concept of agency. 
Let me illustrate this suggestion by looking more closely at Long's usage 
of the notion of agency. Building on Giddens' notion of agency, Long 
portrays individual actors as 'knowledgeable', 'capable', and proficient 
members of society able to process social experience and cope with life. 
To this Long adds Hindess' insight (1986) that individual actors are not 
the only entities able to reach decisions. Since decision-making entails the 
use of a variety of 'discursive means' that are drawn from a stock of 
available discourses, composite actors such as enterprises, political 
parties, and other forms of organization may also be seen as loci of 
decision-making. Long gradually builds up his notion of agency by 
incorporating the position that agency is composed of social relations. 
Consequently, Long warns us that one must not equate agency with 
decision-making capacity alone. Effective agency also requires the 
organizative capacity to manipulate social relations and the ability to 
'enroll' others into the agent's project. Pushing the argument further, Long 
advances the idea that social actor is a social construction rather than just 
another way of talking about the individual human being. 
It is at this point that Long is on the brink of formulating a non-
essentialist notion of agency. Yet after his treatment of the contributions of 
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Hindess and Latour, Long falls back to Ciddens' structuration theory. This, 
I argue, prevents Long from developing in earnest the full implication of 
Hindess and Latour's position. Why? Simply because there are serious 
epistemological difficulties involved in Giddens' answer to what he sees 
as the central problems of contemporary social theory8. Although 
Giddens declares to have transcended the agency/structure dichotomy by 
linking them in a 'duality', in fact the very dichotomy is the foundation of 
Giddens' reconciliatory approach. Thus instead of overcoming the dichot-
omy between agency and structure, structuration theory in fact presup-
poses it9. 
Through his eclecticism, then, Long carefully conceals this 
essentialist position in his treatment of human agency. A case in point is 
provided in a joint article on knowledge interfaces (Arce and Long 1992) . 
In the opening sentence, both make reference to Schutzian 
phenomenology10 - thus in fact accepting subjectivity and agency as 
given qualities of human beings. Later in the article this is subscribed by 
pointing to the necessity of focusing on individuals' cognitive maps and 
the issue of tying action and meaning. Although Long is careful to 
acknowledge the discursive character of the knowledge processes he 
wishes to elucidate (1989:225) , his focus on meaning and individual 
intentionality in fact reflects a belief in a knowable human rationality. 
Elsewhere (1989:237) this position is endorsed by referring to the issue of 
'interlocking intentionalities'11. 
Long's ideas on individual agency, then, can be traced back to 
Giddens' structuration theory. And, in analogy to Giddens, so can struc-
ture. Thus it is only logical that structure is the corollary of Long's individ-
ual agent. This he makes clear in his treatment of the unintended conse-
quences of social action (1989:228-9): 
"whilst it is true that institutional forms do not strictly speaking 
have a "life of their own" - somehow beyond the reach of 
human agency - and are deeply engrained in everyday social 
practice, they do nevertheless possess characteristics that cannot 
be fully comprehended by merely dissecting the minutiae of 
social encounters." / / 
In more recent interpretations (cf. Long and van der Ploeg 1 9 9 5 ; Fisher 
and Arce, forthcoming), a gradual shift away from the implications of 
Giddens' dichotomy agency/structure can be noticed. Nevertheless, these 
new interpretations still espouse the humanist asumption that agency is a 
property of individuals, and not of things. 
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Towards a new ontology: people and things as collectrfs 
In this thesis, nevertheless, I defend some of the insights of Long's actor-
oriented perspective. Thus I oppose the ideal ways in which sociologists 
learn about society (i.e. through statistical analyses, surveys, interviews 
and the like), and instead favour a focus on actors' everyday struggles and 
negotiations to achieve their projects. Like Long and the model of flexible 
specialization, I retain the idea of networks as a unit of analysis. And I 
certainly subscribe to the idea that power is not something an actor may 
possess, but rather a strategy that is exercised. Furthermore, I will not talk 
about power without talking about knowledge at the same time. What I 
discard from the flexible specialization approach, however, is its uneasi-
ness to accommodate anything other than social actors into its theoretical 
architecture - thus in fact fatally misrepresenting the practices that lead to 
the achievement of 'co-operative competition', the ability to adapt and 
innovate, or the building of 'collective efficiencies' and 'clusters'. In the 
same manner, from the actor-oriented perspective I abandon its specific 
notion of individual agency - which must ultimately assume the existence 
of an independent structure. Rather, my point is that by not according 
ontological primacy to either subjectivity or any background, (determi-
nant) social structure one may indeed complement both the flexible 
specialization and the actor-oriented approach. 
To develop such a framework, however, is not without problems. If 
we wish to retain what is good in flexible specialization and the actor-
oriented perspective, then indeed we need to unseam the social and the 
economic in order to set about weaving a new, seamless fabric. This is a 
difficult step, for it entails deconstructing a distinction that is more 
enduring than the one between Economy and Society. A distinction that is 
implicated by every turn of the skein. A distinction not between econ-
omic and social subjects, but a distinction between these very subjects 
and physical objects. A distinction between Nature and Culture. What 
does this mean in the context of a study on small firms? Quite simply, 
what it means is that one should try to seek a heuristic flattening of the 
differences between people and non-humans in order to understand the 
way things work together. In other words: it is not enough to look at the 
social (economic, political, religious) features of the networks that tie 
people together, but we must also look at the technical aspects that hold 
together these very networks of the social. 
The first line of my argument, then, is that the separation of the 
social (including the political, the religious, the economic) and the 
technical in the analysis of entrepreneurs is first of all in the minds of 
analysts - analysts who, instead of following entrepreneurs as they weave 
their way through a disorderly horde of human and nonhuman allies, 
prefer to make up a double register where, on one side, humans are 
paired with humans and where, on the other, all the nonhuman elements 
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of the strategies they have to explain are lumped together. This Chapter, 
then, lays out a way to get rid of these twin artifacts - Society and Tech-
nology - and suggests that one reconciles them by "following the actors", 
that is, by placing ourselves in entrepreneurs' shoes. 
To do so, in this thesis I rely on actor-network theory - a body of 
work developed in the context of the sociology of science. Following 
Bijker and Law (1992:12-13), this theory represents an attempt to find a 
neutral vocabulary to describe and explain the actions of what Law (1987) 
coins 'heterogeneous engineers'. The main idea is that these 
'heterogeneous engineers' - such as the small-scale entrepreneurs of this 
thesis - build disorderly networks composed of social, economic, political 
and technical elements.12 This means that actor-network theory avoids 
making assumptions about a backdrop of social, economic or technical 
factors: it says that the backdrop is something that is itself built in the 
course of building a network. The second line of argument of this Chap-
ter, then, entails a dismissal of essentialism. In respect to essentialism, 
actor-network theory suggests that it is a misconception to think that 
entrepreneurs operate in a world given by naturally occurring categories 
or essences such as "content" or "context". Also, it says that it is too 
simple to argue that context is shaped by, or influences, content (and vice 
versa).13 
As I argued in Chapter 1 , the danger of essentialism (i.e. the 
existence of a context and a content that set the stage for entrepreneurial 
activities and which can be known a priori) is that it easily develops into 
reductionism of one form or another. Thus context 'drives' content (agents 
can only make local adjustments in a context established long ago), or 
content 'steers' context (interacting agents continuously create unplanned 
events which cannot be explained by virtue of what happened before or 
what occurs elsewhere). A third line of this Chapter, then, argues that the 
notions of content and context (and the danger of reductionism they 
entail) can be effectively countered by treating entrepreneurial projects as 
'balancing acts' in which social and technical elements both from 'within' 
and from 'without' the project are placed side by side. 
By taking this position, actor-network theory avoids making the 
commonsense assumption that people (entrepreneurs) and things are nat-
urally occurring categories - the first endowed with agency, the second 
devoid of it. Thus, as Latour (1994:46) proposes, purposeful action and 
intentionality are not properties of objects, but neither are they properties 
of human actors. Rather, they are the properties of institutions, of 
co//ect;Ys14. 
To state that humans and non-humans do not have a different 
ontological status is not a call to throw the baby out with the bathwater. 
In fact, much un-seaming and re-weaving has already been achieved by 
the best in anthropology and by 'trespassing' economists such as 
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Hirschman (1977, 1981). Their work is indeed basic for beginning to 
overcome the Critique's division, and should not be overlooked. But the 
history of science does not stop here. W e have to push these insights 
further, to put back together what was never really apart. W e have to 
bring what Latour (1988a) calls a Copernican counter-revolution to a good 
end. Looking at the technical as well as at the social does not narrow an 
already interesting debate. On the contrary, it opens up infinite possibil-
ities. Just as the idiom of desire opened up a universe that had so-far been 
dominated by concepts such as supply and demand, so a new discourse 
that incorporates objects into its vocabulary may open up novel roads that 
political philosophers thought forever closed. To take such a step, how-
ever, we must be willing to acknowledge that we live in a theoretical 
moment in which objects and subjects can be seen as composite actors 
or, better, collectifs of people-and-things. 
To argue for the incorporation of non-humans into the analysis of 
collectifs, however, poses its own obstacles. Witness, for example, the 
debate between sociologists and economists on issues that have to do 
with the relationship between technology and society. This debate, driven 
by proponents of 'technological determinism'1 3 and 'social 
determinism'16, can go on forever as long as the common assumption is 
made that both society and technology exist independent of each other. 
Similarly, there are the debates in the sociology of science1 7 where there 
is a fierce battle between British and French sociologists over the issue of 
where to place the exact divide between humans and non-humans.18 If 
one assumes - with the French - that there exist no two different ontol-
ogical categories (people and things) but that, rather, humans and non-
humans are fused in collectifs, then surely 'traditional' definitions of 
collectives or of institutions (such as small firms) are of little help. Why? 
Because, as Latour (1994a:49) observes, 
"...we cannot rely on how social theory defines these [institu-
tions, collectives], since, for many sociologists, a social order is 
the source of explanation and not what needs explaining. These 
sociologists begin by delineating social phenomena, long-term 
socia^ contexts, global institutions, overarching cultures; then 
proceed with what they take to be their important empirical 
task, to trace developments and transformations. It is a given, 
for them, that social order exists." 
The problem here is that the 'social' order is taken to be just that: social. 
'Traditional' definitions of collectives - not collectifs - then, are of little 
help because they do not include the constitutive role of non-humans. 
These critical remarks open up new, challenging questions. Can we 
describe small firms without taking on board dualistic assumptions, 
reductionist accounts, or essentialist prescriptions? Can we write about 
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small firms without having to choose sides between formalists and 
substantivists? Can we, in addition, study hybrid institutions without 
treating them asymmetrically, that is, without tearing them apart and 
changing the grid of analysis whenever we shift from the humans to the 
nonhumans that constitute them? In other words, can we have our cake 
and eat it, too? More positively, can we fill the abyss between Economy 
and Society? Can we reconcile Nature and Culture? Can we bring these 
synthetic poles back together? My answer to these questions is a qualified 
YES! - an endorsement which thus sets the stage for this dissertation. 
Bridging the gap: global networks, local networks, and obligatory points 
of passage 
Let me provide a short vignette to make the notion of collectif more 
concrete. What, for example, does a commercial producer of plastified 
adhesive stickers in Guadalajara have in common with a proud father 
celebrating his daughter's quinceaftos™ (fifteenth birthday) in a hamlet 
in the Mexican countryside? The first is busy with an activity that could 
be termed 'economic', while the latter is busy organizing a gathering that 
could be termed 'social'. One could, of course, see these actors different-
ly by emphasizing other aspects of their identities. Thus one could see the 
producer of stickers as enmeshed in technological relations involving 
pigments, complex polyurethanes, epoxy and a machine that pastes these 
three elements on a spool of paper. And one could see the proud father 
as conforming to local cultural norms and values. At any rate, both actors 
seem to belong to quite dissimilar worlds. To that of the Economy, Nature 
or Technology in the case of the producer of stickers, and to that of 
Culture and Society in the case of the father. In practice however both 
actors are linked to one another: the drink that is served by the proud 
father at the party in the countryside comes in bottles that carry the 
stickers made in the megalopolis by the profit-oriented, technologically 
skilful producer. In the example, we are dealing not with different worlds 
of Economy/Society or of Nature/Culture, but with hybrid collectifs. The 
starting point for this thesis, then, is not so much that of attributing 
behaviour to the realm of Culture, or things to the domain of Nature. Nor 
that of projecting relations that are mediated through the exchange of 
things on the axis of the Economy, while filing all non-market behaviour 
safely away into that cabinet we call Society. Rather, the theoretical point 
of departure of this thesis can be summarized with a simple question: 
how is a common, unified space between these binary poles created? 
As stated above, the idea that one can follow entrepreneurial projects as 
they unfold in a given context that is separate from the content of the 
projects themselves is problematic. In analogy to one of the main findings 
BRIDGING THE GAP 2 9 
of the history and sociology of science, the strategies of firms often, if not 
always, turn first around the creation of a distinction between inside and 
outside, and second upon ensuring that whatever is inside becomes indis-
pensable for those on the outside (cf. Bijker and Law 1992:304) . What is 
needed is thus an analytical tool that allows for a description of the 
interrelatedness of the trajectories of firms and the co-evolution of their 
socio-technical context and content. Below, I develop a network meta-
phor to understand these processes. 
According to Law and Callon (1992:46) , the trajectories of projects 
can be seen as a function of three interrelated factors. The first function is 
the ability of a project to construct and preserve a global network that is 
intended to contribute resources to the project. These resources may be of 
various kinds: money, permits, political support, machinery and so on. 
The global network provides these resources because it expects a return. 
In case that a global network is successfully put together, the entrepreneur 
obtains a room for manoeuvre (a negotiation space) in which he or she 
can experiment at will - as long as the possibility of a return remains 
present. 
The second function is the capacity of the project to assemble a 
local network by mobilizing the means contributed by the global net-
work. 2 0 Again, the purpose of using these resources is to be able to 
reciprocate to actors from the global network (this may generally take the 
form of some sort of material or economic return, but need not be 
necessarily so: cultural objects of symbolic value may also flow from the 
local to the global network). If successfully constructed, a local network 
thus allows its originator(s) to experiment with and control the means 
provided by the global network, with the ultimate goal of offering a return 
of some kind to the different actors composing the global network. These 
first two factors (the construction of global and local networks) are thus a 
useful tool to answer the first research question of this thesis: how to 
account for the heterogenous processes that shape the projects of small-
scale entrepreneurs in a rural area of Western Mexico, without recurring 
to dualistic frameworks and notions of a pre-established context or an 
autonomous content? 
The third factor is the degree to which an entrepreneurial project 
succeeds in imposing itself as an obligatory point of passage between the 
global and the local network. This means that, if successful, the project 
should first have the ability to shape and mobilize the local network and 
that, second, the project is able to exercise control over all exchanges 
between the local and the global network. In other words, if actors from 
the global network count on or have an interest in a promised final 
return, then the producers of this return (and the material, economic, or 
cultural return itself) become an obligatory point of passage. If unsuc-
cessful, that is, if unable to impose itself as an obligatory point of passage, 
an entrepreneurial project cannot profit from the local network, and 
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neither has it command over the use and mobilization of resources from 
the global network (and which may ultimately be withdrawn). The notion 
of obligatory point of passage is thus a useful tool to address the second 
research question of this thesis: under what conditions are feasible 
entrepreneurial projects constructed? 
Defining feasibility in terms of global and local networks and obligatory 
points of passage offers the advantage that it permits one to avoid 
observer-defined accounts of it. Thus one can sidestep economists' defini-
tions of feasibility or viability which refer to a break-even point, or 
sociologists' cherished notions - difficult to operationalize - of 'social 
security' or the 'potential' of firms to reproduce themselves in time. And 
neither does one have to deal with tortuous definitions of 'sustainability' -
as is usual within 'green' circles. 
In addition to being useful tools to define feasibility, the notions of 
obligatory points of passage and global and local networks allow one to 
conceive of feasibility as a temporal condition: whenever support by a 
global or a local network is withdrawn a project ceases to act as an 
obligatory point of passage - which amounts to stating that the enterprise 
looses feasibility. 
Morphology of collectifs: convergence and momentum 
Global and local networks - collectifs - may stand in a specific relation-
ship with one another, that is, they may be differently articulated. Another 
way of putting this is to say that collectifs may have multiple morphol-
ogies. Thus the entities making up these collectifs may converge or 
diverge, be more or less standardized, and their relationships may be 
long- or short-lived to different degrees. 
A useful concept to estimate the morphology of a collectif is that of 
convergence21 or the degree of integration of a collectif. In a situation of 
convergence, for example, the activities of all actors from the global and 
the local networks can be easily linked to each other and each actor can 
in principle mobilize other actors. In other words, any actor belonging to 
the collectif, whatever its position within it, 
"... can at any time mobilize all the network's skills without 
having to get involved with costly adaptations, translations or 
decoding. The [collectif] as a whole is behind any one of the 
actors who make it up." (Callon 1992b:223) 
Convergence within a collectif, of course, does not mean that actors con-
sciously work towards a common objective. Rather, it means that actors 
have sufficiently fine-tuned their activities so as to make them compatible 
with those of other actors from the same collectif. This, of course, need 
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not always be the case. In such a situation, then, it would be more 
meaningful to speak of divergence. This latter situation - divergence - can 
be illustrated through the example of Carlos, a street vendor selling tacos 
in El Grullo (see Chapter 4 for a fuller elaboration). In this case, a client 
who has eaten tacos at Carlos' stall complains about intestinal disorder. 
Here Carlos has a choice between three modes of action. First, he may 
take responsibility for the damaged intestines by acknowledging the cause 
of the complaint. In most cases, however, Carlos will contest the accusa-
tion: what makes her so sure the tacos are responsible for this condition? 
Could it not have been something else? Did she wash her hands before 
eating the tacos? Here, the clients' definition of Carlos as the responsible 
party is contested, and does not converge with the definition of the 
problem according to Carlos. The translation is thus incomplete. The third-
alternative is for Carlos to accept the charge - for example because more 
customers have come to him with the same complaints - and delegate 
responsibility to others within the collectif. For example, Carlos can take 
the complaint to the abattoir. There, the criticism can only be translated 
into a solvable problem if there exists a management system that makes it 
possible to track down the origin of the meat sold to street vendors such 
as Carlos. Since this is not usually the case, turning the complaint into a 
solvable problem is ruled out, and the client's accusation simply does 
not find a target. Here the interdefinitions of the actors involved conflict 
with one another: the actors participate in a dispersed network. As a 
consequence, co-operation between them may be unlikely or limited. 
0 
To varying degrees, then, small firms participate in collectifs that may 
have different degrees of convergence. In order to gauge these degrees of 
convergence, one can use the related concepts of translation and co-
ordination (Callon 1991; 1992). By translation is meant the process 
whereby global and local networks are composed and obligatory points of 
passage created - in other words, the process that creates a shared space 
that was absent before the initiation of a project. 
Following Callon (1986), for analytical reasons the process of 
translation can be separated into four moments: problematization, 
intéressement, enrollment and mobilization. Problematization is the 
process by which a project becomes indispensable to global actors by 
defining the nature and the problems of the latter and then suggesting that 
these can be resolved by following the path of action suggested by the 
project. The next step, intéressement, are those methods by which the 
project attempts to impose and stabilize the identity of the global actors 
defined in the problematization. In other words, intéressement is the 
process of translating the images and concerns of a project into that of a 
global network, and then trying to discipline or control that translation in 
order to stabilize an actor-network (cf. Star 1991:33). As already stated, 
these actor-networks include people, the built environment, machines, 
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signs and symbols, inscriptions, etc. Intéressement, however, does not 
necessarily lead to alliances, that is, to actual enrolment. Intéressement 
achieves enrolment if it is successful. To describe enrolment is thus to 
describe the group of multilateral negotiations, trials of strength and tricks 
that accompany the intéressements and enable them to succeed. Enrol-
ment, in other words, is the successful distribution of roles as proposed 
(and most probably changed) by the project in the initial 
problematization. Finally, if intéressement is successful, that is, if enrol-
ment has been achieved, then one can speak of the mobilization of the 
network of entities involved. To put it differently, with mobilization is 
meant the successful translation of a network of entities: a global network 
provides resources for an expected return, a local network is created that 
allows for some room for manoeuvre for the project to supply this 
expected return, and the project itself becomes an obligatory point of 
passage, that is, it is able to exercise control over all exchanges between 
the local and the global network. 
Translation, then, involves all those methods by which a specific 
definition of a problematic situation - its character, cause and probable 
solution - is construed and made indispensable for others to follow. To 
visualize one and the other, let us take the case of Matilde, a small-scale 
producer of mezca/ who - back in the 1970s - sold his unbottled liquor to 
local customers and passers-by. When, in 1978, a federal health law was 
passed that prohibited the sale of bootleg mezcal, officials closed the 
distillery. To start operations once again, Matilde had to register with the 
Federal Taxpayers' Registry and the Ministry of Health, and provide 
evidence of this by displaying product stickers on sealed bottles. In this 
case, a local network (all the people and things needed by Matilde to 
actually distil mezcal) and a global network (mainly: consumers) existed 
prior to the enactment of the new law, and Matilde's mezca/ was in fact 
an obligatory point of passage between the global and the local network. 
The new law, however, put an end to this relationship, and demanded 
that Matilde problematized the situation differently if he were to succeed 
in selling mezcal once more. In this new problematization, Matilde could 
only convince consumers that his was still the best mezcal to soothe their 
thirsty throats if he could persuade authorities that his product complied 
to ongoing health standards, that he was wilful to pay taxes, that he 
would provide evidence of this through product stickers, and that he 
would henceforth sell mezcal in sealed bottles. 
Matilde's problematization of the new situation evolved into 
intéressement: within a few months, he obtained the permits needed, 
placed an initial order with a producer of glass bottles, and procured a 
couple of thousand product stickers. With these new allies, a new attempt 
to bridge the gap between an expanded local network (which now 
included federal authorities and producers of bottles and product stickers) 
and a global network (consumers) was made. Eventually, Matilde enrolled 
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enough customers to keep his business going (that is, intéressement was 
successful). 
Finally, the network of elements involved in the new setup was 
mobilized and mezcal once more became an obligatory point of passage 
for all actors involved in the local and the global network. In the new 
configuration however, mezcal (now in a bottle and provided with a 
sticker) was easier to transport, thus making it possible for distributors to 
find consumers in distant places. In effect, then, Matilde's new 
problematization was translated to involve a local and a global network 
that were much greater in scope than the prior ones. 
A second concept that is useful to measure the degree of convergence of 
a collectif is what Callon (1991, 1992) terms forms of co-ordination or 
translation regimes. By this is meant the existing set of rules and regula-
tions that have been produced in past interaction, and which impinge on 
the character of any collectif. So, for example, who or what is to count as 
an actor, or who or what may speak on behalf of others, is normally laid 
down in a series of rules and conventions that range from formal law to 
tacit and culturally specific practices. Some of these rules and conventions 
are of a general character. Examples could be the passing of a Federal 
Health Law, the requirements to obtain a loan from a bank, or the 
conditions of payment for merchandise that is provided in a contract. Yet 
other rules and norms are of a more 'local' character, that is, they lose 
their validity outside the collectif that produced them. Examples could be 
agreements between mezcal producers about pricing policy; the creation 
of local organizational forms such as associations or co-operatives; or the 
technical norms concerning the production of specific goods. 
The distinction between general and local rules and conventions is 
important because it helps one to discern the specific form of co-ordinati-
on of a collectif. So, for example, Callon {ibid, p.87) suggests to use the 
term weak co-ordination to "characterize a network which has not added 
on any local rules and procedures to conventions generally followed at 
any given moment." Inversely, the term strong co-ordination can be used 
to denote a collectif shaped by both local and general rules. 
From the above it should be clear that a combination of the concepts of 
translation and translation regimes can be helpful devices for 'measuring' 
the degree of convergence of a given network. Indeed, the stronger the 
translation and the form of co-ordination of a given collectif, 
"... the more the actors composing it work together in a com-
mon enterprise, without their status as actors being under con-
stant challenge. This does not mean that everyone does the 
same thing. Rather it quite simply means that any one actor's 
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activities fit in easily with those of the other actors, despite their 
heterogeneity." (Callon 1992:87; emphasis mine). 
Next to convergence, a concept that is of central importance to gauge the 
morphology of a network is that of momentum. This concept refers back 
to that of translation, and suggests that the latter has been 'locked into 
place'. According to Callon (1991:140-50), the momentum (which he 
terms 'irreversibility') of a translation depends on two factors: 
(a) the extent to which it is subsequently impossible to go 
back to a point where the translation was only one amongst 
others; and 
(b) the extent to which it shapes and determines subsequent 
translations. 
To exemplify the notion of momentum, let us take the example of a 
mezcal producer opening a credit line at a bank. Once the operation is 
legally sanctioned by some form or document, it becomes difficult if not 
outright impossible for the parties to withdraw from the agreement and go 
back to the beginning of the transaction - when multiple alternatives for 
obtaining credit may have been open for the producer. At the same time, 
the credit line may shape future decisions: specific goals that were 
impossible to achieve without credit can now be pursued.22 
In a sense, then, momentum denotes the way in which the past 
engages the future.23 More generally, momentum has to do with the 
evolutionary process in which a project passes from a stage of uncertainty 
to a stage in which certain trajectories stabilize. Put differently: how 
heterogeneity makes place for homogeneity. This is often the case when a 
project is successful, i.e. able to present a result (Nothnagel 1996): when 
ideas (which are debatable) make way for finished objects (which are less 
debatable). 
Prime movers, distributed action and black-boxed actors 
So far, I argued that the notions of global and local networks and obliga-
tory points of passage can help one to illuminate issues to do with the 
dynamics and feasibility of small entrepreneurial projects without having 
to resort to externalist explanations. 
One important additional point is that it is not necessarily people, 
but also things that could in fact be the obligatory points of passage 
between a global and local network - as I showed through the vignette on 
mezca/. This point - that both humans and non-humans may be the 
obligatory point of passage between two networks - can be generalized 
through the notion of intermediary. As the etymology of the word implies, 
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inter-mediaries mediate between two or more parties, thereby constructing 
a whole, a common space, a network or a collectif. 
The notion of intermediary is useful because it brings together the 
poles of Economy and Society (the separation of which, I argued, inhibits 
rather than illuminates the practices of small firms). How is this possible? 
As Callon ( 1 9 9 1 ) suggests, this can be achieved by juxtaposing the 
insights of economists and sociologists. For example, "The Economy", as 
defined by economists, is that domain in which people are brought into 
relationship with one another through the exchange of things. Translated 
into my analytical framework, a project often relates a local and a global 
network via a product. According to Callon (1991:134) , this situation can 
be generalized by means of the notion of an intermediary, which "is 
anything passing between actors which defines the relationship between 
them". Examples of intermediaries abound: tacos, bricks, mezcal, bottle 
stickers, skills, texts, money. The list is endless. Contrary to economics, in 
sociological theory "Society" (the behaviour of actors) can only be under-
stood when it is set in a context that has been build by the actors them-
selves. Thus sociologists speak of roles and functional prerequisites 
(Parsons 1977) , agents and fields (Bourdieu 1989) , etc. In fact, or so these 
disparate sociological theories suggest, no actor can be isolated from the 
relationships in which he or she is implicated. What does this mean in 
terms of creating a common space between Economy and Society? Here 
Callon (ibid. p. 135) presses the point to its logical consequence24: 
"Economists teach us that interaction involves the circulation of 
intermediaries. Sociologists teach us that actors can only be 
defined in terms of their relationships. But these are two parts 
of the same puzzle, and if we fit them together we find the 
solution. This is that actors define one another in interaction -
in the intermediaries that they put into circulation".25 
When successfully translated, actors are able to communicate through the 
intermediaries that circulate between them and which define both of them 
simultaneously. For example, a taco passing hands between a vendor and 
his client simultaneously defines the identity of both in that encounter: 
the vendor as the seller of a service, the client as the buyer of it. In this 
case, the degree of convergence is strong because the translations (both 
by the vendor and by the client) are relatively similar. Of course, 
successful translation need not always take place, or be only of a weak 
character. Taking the same example, this would be the case when the 
client doubts the quality or the value of the taco and refuses to buy it. 
To summarize: entrepreneurial projects try to construct and set in motion 
local and global networks, and they may become obligatory points of 
passage between the two networks through the circulation of intermedi-
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aries. This, however, leaves one with the question of who or what is the 
prime mover of the collectif. To stay with the vignette on mezcal: Who is 
the prime mover of action? Authorship of action can, as the vignette sug-
gests, be attributed to different entities. It may be attributed to the project 
(Matilde). But it may also be attributed to the local network (the Ministry 
of Health). Or to the global network (consumers). Action is, in fact, a 
polycentric process. Who or what the 'prime mover' is, is a matter of 
convention, and depends on who or what one chooses to follow. Like-
wise, within my framework the notion of 'actor' does not refer back to 
some fixed essence (such as, for example, the capacity to "have" agency). 
Rather, the identity of an actor is relational, and refers back to notions of 
sociality and materiality. Thus in the vignette on mezcal, the identity of 
the actor "mezcal" is different when it is bottled and provided with a 
sticker. In the same vein, the identity of Matilde changes when it is 
associated with bottles and stickers. He is not any more a producer of 
illegal mezcal, but a producer of legal mezcal that can be transported and 
sold in far-away localities. Another way of putting this is to say that 
Matilde is another subject because he is now associated with mezcal, 
bottles and stickers. And that bottles and stickers are now different objects 
because they have entered into a relationship with Matilde and mezcal. 
Indeed, as Latour (1994a:33) suggests, neither subject nor object are fixed 
entities. Both change their properties when they become a gathering, a 
collectif, a hybrid actor made up of people-and-things.26 The point here 
is that we must give full credit for action to those agents or actants which 
we normally call nonhuman (like mezcal, bottles or stickers).27 Responsi-
bility for action must, in other words, be shared, distributed. Indeed, 
action itself cannot be conceived of as being caused by a human (or by a 
nonhuman, for that matter). Action is a composition of relations between 
associated entities. Mezcal, bottles, stickers: they authorize, they enable 
Matilde's project just as Matilde, bottles and stickers allow mezcal to be 
consumed in far-off localities. As Latour (ibid. p. 35) succinctly puts it: 
"The attribution to one actor of the role of prime mover in no 
way weakens the necessity of a composition of forces to explain 
the action. It is by mistake, or unfairness, that our headlines 
read, 'Man flies', 'Woman goes into space.' Flying is a property 
of the whole association of entities that includes airports and 
planes, launch pads and ticket counters. B-52s do not fly, the 
U.S. Air Force flies. Action is simply not a property of humans 
but of an association of actants..." 
But how come we do not see these compositions for what they are, that 
is, impure hybrids of the social, the technical, the political, the economic 
and all the rest? Why is it so difficult to talk in terms of these collectifs? 
Why do social scientists speak of MatiIdes' and consumers, of micro- and 
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macro actors? How is it that we prefer to make reference to punctualized 
actions, to black-boxes, instead of describing the complexities that are 
part and parcel of collectifsl Following Law (1992) this is because, in 
practice, network patterns may become routines. For example, not all 
entities involved in exchange (Matilde, mezcal, consumers) need to be 
defined all over again in each routinized exchange encounter. The 
collectif behind mezcal can (and is) simplified, punctualized, black-boxed. 
All that matters is that the actor-network, the exchange, works. Once sim-
plified, the network can be assumed to act as a disengaged block - a 
punctualization that enables a language of 'prime movers', of 'causes' and 
'effects'. Apparently simple elements - Matilde, mezcal, bottles, stickers 
and consumers, to name a few - may, if only for practical purposes, 
masquerade as the collectif of which they are an effect.28 
To summarize this point: what is central to putting together global and 
local networks is 
"a concern with how actors and organizations mobilize, juxta-
pose, and hold together the bits and pieces out of which they 
are composed; how they are sometimes able to prevent those 
bits and pieces from following their own inclinations and 
making off; and how they manage, as a result, to conceal for a 
time the process of translation itself and so turn a network from 
a heterogeneous set of bits and pieces each with its own incli-
nations, into something that passes as a punctualized actor" 
(Law: 1992:386). 
How can we open up these punctualized compositions, these black-
boxed collectifs? My answer is: through description, through the opening 
up, the exposition, of the trajectories of networks that end up being 
punctualized. This means that one has to follow politicians, mezcal 
producers and so on, in their work of defining the characteristics of their 
objects (i.e. laws, liquor, consumers). It means that we have to follow 
actors' hypotheses about the entities that make up the world into which 
their objects are to be inserted. In other words, of how lawmakers or 
mezcal producers 
"... define actors with specific tastes, competences, motives, 
aspirations, political prejudices, and the rest, and [of how] they 
assume that morality, technology, science, and economy will 
evolve in particular ways" (Akrich 1992:207). 
Indeed, a large part of the work of entrepreneurs is that of inscribing this 
vision of (or prediction about) the world in the content of the intermedi-
aries they bring into circulation. The end product of this work, following 
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Akrich, can be termed a 'script' or 'scenario'. Of course, in practice it 
may be that actors do not wish to perform the roles set out for them by 
the entrepreneur, since they may define their roles differently. If this is the 
case, then the envisaged intermediaries never become real. So the point is 
this: to ascertain whether entrepreneurial projects become real or remain 
unreal. This problem can be approached by following the negotiations 
between entrepreneurs and potential users, and to study the way in which 
the results of such negotiations are translated and inscribed into another 
matter. That is, one should describe, in detail, the production of a rela-
tionship between both parties. The methodological consequence is that 
one 
"cannot be satisfied with the [entrepreneur's] or the user's 
point of view alone. Instead we have to go back and forth 
between the [entrepreneur] and the user, between the 
[entrepreneur's] projected user and the real user" (ibid, p.209). 
Let me return to the example of Matilde's mezcal and approach it from a 
different perspective. Here one can discern a trajectory from situation A in 
which the Ministry of Health has virtually no control over producers of 
distilled spirits, to a situation B in which autonomous Mexican producers 
of liquor have been transformed into more-or-less controllable subjects 
through the imposition of a law. What we have here is a chain of associ-
ations, but a rather odd one at that. It is a chain that does not take the 
form of language, but of signification. In effect, the associations have been 
punctualized, inscribed into objects that are of a different matter. A bottle 
and a sticker take us to a human lawmaker. A lawmaker that delegates 
(Latour 1994a) language and writing to bottles and stickers. Underlying 
this punctualization, this black-box, however, is a trajectory that impli-
cates a world of conflicts, accommodations and negotiations. A world 
which needs to be opened up. Which means that one needs to do the 
opposite of what the actors (inventors, entrepreneurs, manufacturers and 
so on) do: namely, to de-scribe inscriptions. In other words, it means that 
one has to follow the script and what happens to it when it is 'out there' 
in the real world, putting together a whole geography of responsibilities. 
One needs to de-scribe, to open up the complex of trials of strength that 
involve, in our example, bureaucratic rationalities, the definition of health 
problems, and the solution of both through the passing of specific legisla-
tion. To de-scribe is, as the verb suggests, to deconstruct what has former-
ly been constructed - that is, to follow the work of inscription. Work that 
is often laid down through heterogeneous means. 
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Summary: argument and organization of the thesis 
Following up on the previous Chapter, the present Chapter has as its 
starting point the challenge to sidestep the dangers entailed in most 
studies on small firms, namely dualism, essentialism, and reductionism. 
To do so, I first reviewed two theoretical frameworks - flexible specializ-
ation and the actor-oriented approach - that seemed promising for the 
analysis of the dynamics and feasibility of small-scale entrepreneurial 
projects. Both, however, were found lacking on a number of counts. In 
the case of flexible specialization, this was the separation of context and 
content and the externalist identification of 'prime movers'. For the actor-
oriented perspective, it was its essentialist notion of human agency which 
was found to be defective. 
After developing these points of critique at some length, I then 
argued that a useful framework that sidestepped these deficiencies while 
retaining what was valuable in flexible specialization and the actor-
oriented approach was that of actor-network theory. I then argued that this 
theory, developed in the domain of the science studies, offers a promising 
potential for accounting for the dynamics of small firms in general, and 
for their feasibility in particular. 
In a nutshell, the argument ran that an entrepreneurial project is 
feasible when it is able to act as an obligatory point of passage between 
the local and global networks it helps construct. To be able to gauge 
whether or not this is the case, I then suggested - again supported by 
actor-network theory - that projects are feasible when the global and local 
networks they put in place are convergent and have a momentum of their 
own. Convergence, I argued, could be operationalized as that situation in 
which translation is successful (that is, when problematization, 
intéressement and enrollment lead to mobilization) and where a regime of 
translation exists (that is, when local rules are added to global ones). As 
regards momentum, I argued that this is the case when it is impossible to 
go back to a situation in which a specific translation is only one out of 
many alternatives courses of action, and when subsequent translations are 
in turn shaped by earlier ones. 
Above, we have seen that the morphology of collectifs may be different in 
respect to their degree of convergence and momentum. Indeed, or so I 
argue, the dynamics and feasibility of small firms can be associated to 
both dimensions. In Chapters Four through Nine I spell out or describe in 
more detail these dynamics from the point of view of a number of small-
scale entrepreneurial projects. Thus in Chapters Four and Five I develop 
two in-depth case studies of relatively unsuccessful entrepreneurial 
projects, and argue that these participate in collectifs that are divergent 
and have no momentum of their own. In Chapter Six, 1 contrast this situ-
ation with one on the production of services in which convergence and 
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momentum are nascent. These cases are then compared with a series of 
cases that span the production and distribution of mezcal, and in which 
the degree of convergence and momentum is higher (Chapters Six 
through Nine). Finally, in Chapter Ten I draw a number of general 
conclusions that follow from the case studies. Also, in this final Chapter I 
return to the issue of why it is important to look at the feasibility of small 
firms in rural areas of developing regions. Here the focus is on the 
possible spin-offs that the analysis I propose might have for policies 
towards the so-called 'small-scale enterprise sector'. Before I present my 
case, however, in the next Chapter I present what I call 'the politics of 
research', that is, I describe the genealogy of the research, as well as the 
methodological implications that follow from the theoretical framework I 
utilize. 
Notes 
1. See, for example, Castells and Portes (1989:11) who state that the informal 
sector "... is a common-sense notion whose moving boundaries cannot be 
captured by a strict definition without closing the debate prematurely". A 
similar view is heralded by a recent report of the Dutch National Board of 
Advice (1989: 19), which refers to the informal sector as being a 'notifying 
concept' that cannot be clearly separated from other economic activities. In 
the same line of thought, Marcuse (1989:700) argues that formulations as 
'formal' and 'informal' sector put "... a layer of timeless muddy words over a 
set of very specific historical circumstances", and stresses the strong interre-
lationship between formal and informal activities in a 'multidimensional 
reality' which is specific for time and space. 
2. See for example the volume edited by Thompson et al (1991) which 
argues for intermediate theoretical categories such as networks that make for 
a less ambitious - compared to 'big-isms' such as liberal-pluralism, Marxism, 
structuralism, Fordism and their 'neo' equivalents - and more modest claim 
on how the social is organized. See also Perrow (1993) who argues that net-
works of small firms are diverse and possibly durable economic phenomena 
that deserve attention, and that conventional economic theories and leftist 
theories in particular have failed to grasp in their importance. 
3. Scott and Storper are careful to add that clustering alone does not necessar-
ily lead to the formation of efficient transactions, and point to breakdown in 
information exchange or failures of trust as examples that may work against 
the achievement of collective efficiency. 
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4. This, I presume, has to do with the theoretico-methodological architecture 
of most research on flexible specialization, which by its very (quantitative) 
nature is compelled to locate 'prime movers' in the networks of firms under 
study (cf. Sverrisson 1993; Morris and Lowder 1992). 
5. The advantage of this approach is the elegance of its relative simplicity: it 
obviates the need (as in flexible specialization or in systems theory) to legis-
late between what counts as part of the network, and what not, for this is an 
empirically observable matter. In addition, by following the actors one does 
not have to start with 'points of departure' or 'prime movers' in a network. 
Indeed, if we leave the issue of defining who co-ordinates the network in 
which small firms are inserted to the participating actors themselves, we may 
end up with different versions. Depending on who we decide to follow, each 
time we may obtain a distinct account. 
6. This position enables Long to offer, in principle, a conception of action 
that is consistent with the contingent nature of social life. Interestingly, in so 
doing Long provides a link with writers such as Foucault (1979) who much 
favour a nominalist position in which 'one-off' explanations enjoy preference 
over approaches that seek 'patterns' or 'trends' and explain everything from 
the perspective of the same 'general laws' and 'causes'. 
7. According to Foucault (1979:27), "We should admit rather that power 
produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves 
power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge 
directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does 
not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations." 
8. These problems are: interpretive sociology's lack of an institutional 
account; structural functional ism's lack of a theory of agency; and the lack of 
a theory that connects an institutional account with a theory of agency. 
9. I take this point from Hekman (1990). 
10. Based on an Enlightenment conception of the subject/object dichotomy, 
Schutz supports a humanist paradigm and its basic postulate that all meaning 
is constructed through the intentional acts of the individual ego. In other 
words, Schutz misunderstands how language operates in the constitution of 
the ego and thus seriously plays down the discursive character of social 
interaction. This is obviously antithetical to Long's conception of 
power/knowledge as being socially constituted. 
11. In this instance, Long makes explicit reference to the Theory of Games -
an example of subjectivist, hyper-rationalist discourse. 
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12. In a sense, actor-network theory has much in common with some 
versions of systems theory (cf. Hughes 1983). However, unlike systems 
theory, actor-network theory stresses that the elements (including the entre-
preneurs) bound together in networks are, at the same time, constituted and 
shaped in those networks. 
13. This line of thought, which is currently en vogue in much sociological 
writing, finds its expression in theories on globalization. So, for example, 
Giddens (1990:64) defines globalization as "the intensification of world-wide 
social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happen-
ings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vive versa." From 
an actor-network perspective, essentialist definitions of this kind can be held 
wrong on two counts. The first one is that globalization suggests that relations 
are social. This contradicts empirical evidence, which shows instead that 
every lengthening of a network in space and in time not only incorporates 
more and more humans, but also more and more non-humans. We may all 
be closely linked with Chilean kiwi producers, Japanese environmentalists or 
the struggle of Zapatista rebels. But take away the ships, the newspapers or 
the internet and time-space decompresses immediately. A second misunder-
standing has to do with tautology or the conviction that global society exists 
and that, hence, one needs to develop a vocabulary that accurately reflects 
globalization - as for example in the work of Wallerstein (1990) or Sklair 
(1991). This vocabulary is often of a deterministic kind and tends to render 
opaque the very processes through which heterogeneous socio-technical 
networks extend in time and in space. In other words, the terminology of 
globalization has the effect of folding or black-boxing the scope and scale of 
the reconfigurations it sets out to explain. 
14. The notion of collectif as developed by Gallon and Law (1995:487) differs 
from that of collective or collectivity in that the former is not an assembly of 
people who have decided to join some form of common organization. 
Rather, a collectif is an emergent effect created by the interaction of the 
heterogeneous parts that make it up. In other words, it is the relations - and 
their heterogeneity - that are important, and not the things in themselves. 
The notion of collectif also retains the main idea of Gallon's concept 
of techno economic network, which he defines as a "coordinated set of 
heterogeneous actors ... who participate collectively in the conception, 
development, production and distribution or diffusion of goods and services, 
some of which give rise to market transactions." (1992:73). 
15. Technological determinism is "the theory that technology is indeed an 
independent factor, and that changes in technology cause social changes. In 
its strongest version, the theory claims that change in technology is the most 
important cause of change in society". (MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985:4). 
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16. The position that technology is socially determined (e.g. Braverman 
1974). 
17. See the articles in the volume edited by Pickering (1991) for a presenta-
tion and discussion of these. 
18. As Star (1991:30) summarizes this battle, the British sociologists argue 
that there is, and should be, a moral divide between people and things, and 
that attempts to subvert this divide are dehumanizing ones. This position, of 
course, returns one to a primitive realism of the sort we had before science 
studies. The French, on the other hand, focus against 'great divides', and seek 
a heuristic flattening of the differences between humans and non-humans in 
order to understand the way things work together. 
19. A quinceanos is the celebration of a woman's fifteenth birthday. It is an 
important social occasion at which the woman is symbolically "presented" to 
society as a potential candidate for marriage. At quinceanos usually large 
amounts of money are spent on dresses, food, drink, and music. Also, 
quinceanos offer a good chance for the establishment of compadrazgo (co-
parenthood) relations between the parents of the woman in question and her 
padrinos (godfathers) and madrinas (godmothers). These latter often carry a 
part of the financial burden of the huge celebration. 
20. 'Global' does not necessarily mean geographically distant, and 'local' 
does not necessarily mean geographically close. 
21. And, in its absence, that of divergence. 
22. The courses of action that emerge from the issuance of a credit line 
cannot of course be determined a priori, but can only be decided by follow-
ing the producer in his actual practice. 
23. It is important to note, however, that momentum is a relational characte-
ristic: its outcome depends on the strategies that different actors may bring 
into play. 
24. Callon's attempt to bridge the gap between economics and sociology is 
certainly not the only one. See for example Vanberg (1994) who tries to 
associate the notion of norm- or rule-guided behaviour (homo sociologicus) 
on the one side, and that of rational, self-interested choice (homo 
oeconomicus) on the other. In this example, the very absence of things or 
intermediaries in the definition of behaviour takes Vanberg into a completely 
different direction. 
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25. Callon is quick to state that his solution for bridging economics and 
sociology is different from the notion of 'embeddedness' re-activated by 
Granovetter (1985), who sees networks as associations between humans only. 
26. A parallel of this position can be found in Daly (1991) who refers to the 
concept of radical relationalism. Radical relationalism advances the idea that 
"nothing can be defined independently, or outside a set of differential 
articulations." To take the example of the identity of commodities, this would 
entail starting from the assumption that goods do not have an intrinsic, or 
essential, value (either in use or exchange terms), but that value is socially 
created in and through interactions (e.g. situations of exchange) involving 
different calculative domains (and this includes important interfaces between 
socially, politically and/or economically differentiated actors). The identity of 
any good will thus depend fully upon how it is articulated with a set of cat-
egories and practices within a given situation. It is important to note that Daly 
connects the concept of relationalism with that of non-closure. By non-closure 
she suggests that the identity of any thing (or, for that matter, of any practice), 
"can never be limited, or closed"; it can always be rearticulated within an 
alternative system of relational order. Thus for example the category of 'debt' 
may be constructed differently in a relational sequence involving compadre, 
'brother', 'friend', and so on than within a loosely aligned network that draws 
together banks, wholesale markets, anonymous buyers at a supermarket etc. 
27. Latour here suggests that we replace the notion of agent by that of actant: 
"Since the word agent in the case of nonhumans is uncommon, a better term 
is actant, a borrowing from semiotics that describes any entity that acts in a 
plot until the attribution of a figurative or nonfigurative role." (Latour 
1994:33). Furthermore, the term actant "permits one to broaden the social to 
encompass all entities that interact within an association, thereby changing 
their properties." (Latour 1994b:601, my translation). 
28. Thus a seemingly 'simple' exchange encounter may disguise, blur, render 
invisible complex sets of relations - collective agents - made up of humans 
and nonhumans. Here I emphasize 'may' because, at any moment, the 
relationships between the different elements making up the collective may be 
problematized, questioned - thus opening up all the complexities involved 
and calling for new rounds of translation. See Chapter 6 for an example of 
this. 
CHAPTER 3 
CONSTRUCTING CASE STUDIES 
The Politics of Research 
In Chapter One, I maintained that studies of small firms can broadly be 
assigned to one of two camps: those that are theoretically driven, and 
those that are more policy-oriented.1 Common to both is the problem of 
'the small': what is to count as small-scale enterprise and what not? And 
how should they be classified? Although it is true, as Douglas (1992:2) 
comments, that a field of enquiry can only advance by deciding what is 
relevant and what is extraneous to it, there are several reasons to object 
to etic types of classification. The main reason is that such definitions and 
classificatory schemes often go hand in hand with epistemological abso-
lutism - an absolutism, I argue, which characterizes both policy-oriented 
as well as theoretically-driven research on small-scale enterprise. 
In the case of policy-oriented research, this absolutism entails that 
there is only one way of knowing, namely one that is instrumental, one 
that is geared to act upon the known from a distance (Latour 1987). It is 
an epistemology that produces a discourse on the economic. A discourse 
which, in Foucault's (1979) terms, attempts to construct and domesticate 
the identities of economic subjects. It is a discourse that is normally 
identified with the State, corporate agencies, NGO's and a range of other 
participants in rural development. To provide an example: the definition 
of small-scale enterprise given by the Mexican government is based on 
the type of work performed: remunerated labour, in cash or in kind, 
which adds to the national accounts. What effects are created by endors-
ing such a definition? First, the existence of different forms of work rela-
tionships is obscured. Hence, a wide variety of home-based economic 
activities (particularly those that engage women) is missed, thus rendering 
invisible much small-scale enterprise in national accounts and develop-
ment planning. A second, and arguably more important, effect is that 
categories and identities of economic subjects are thereby constructed. 
These are later used to intervene - i.e. to control the economy 'at a 
distance' - through tax legislation, specific accounting techniques, or 
structural adjustment programmes that impinge upon micro- and small-
scale firms. But this absolutist epistemology is not only a way of knowing 
that shapes its object in order to be able to act on it. As Law (1991:3) 
suggests in the context of studies of science and technology, it is also an 
epistemology that tells us - sometimes descriptively, more often 
prescriptively - about how we should go about gathering knowledge. This, 
in effect, implies taking on board normative "... 'tool boxes' consisting of 
frameworks for classifying data, procedures for conducting oneself in the 
field, and methodological instruments for data analysis that are not linked 
to crucial research questions and theoretical concerns" (Long, 1992: 
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footnote page 15). The danger of some kind of methodological empiricism 
looms large, then, in policy-oriented studies of small-scale enterprise - or 
at least the notion that 'reality' is out there for understanding with the 
right et/'c categories. 
In the same fashion, most theoretically informed research on small-
scale economic activity takes the side of the knower - though for different 
reasons. Here, methodological canons flow from the epistemological need 
to accord primacy to the 'external' forces that are seen to constitute the 
context within which small-scale enterprise develops. Generally, this takes 
the form of conceptualizing 'capitalism', 'industrialization', 'globalization' 
and the like as the driving forces, whilst small-scale enterprises are 
portrayed as being the driven and only able to 'fine-tune' to local intri-
cacies. The methodological implication of this determinist position is that 
scholars- tend to take the outcome (social order) as their starting point. 
Clearly, within this view small-scale economic activities only matter in so 
far they are connected, related, and translated in terms of their importance 
for supporting or refuting the 'laws' of grand narratives. And, like the 
epistemology of the policy-oriented camp, it tells us what the rules of 
method should be: the question of how, on an empirical level, small-scale 
entrepreneurs shape, and are shaped by their socio-technical environment 
is abandoned or, at best, relegated to a secondary level of analysis. Thus 
curious research questions emerge, and answers are sought for non-
existent problems: What is the relationship between traditional small-scale 
economic activities and the capitalist mode of production? What is the 
structural position of micro-enterprise in regimes of accumulation and 
regulation? What is the potential for economic expansion and employ-
ment of businesses operating in the so-called informal sector? Good luck 
to the crowd of economists, sociologists, anthropologists, historians and 
political scientists who feel propelled by these tormenting questions! 
I am not interested in this form of inquiry. I am not interested in 
what is, but in what comes about. Neither am I interested in replacing the 
absolutist epistemologies of practitioners and theoreticians by another 
absolutist epistemology. Rather, what I try to develop in this thesis is just 
one more way of knowing. Or, as Latour (1988a) encourages, a way of 
knowing that is not only on the side of the knower, but also on the side 
of the known. A way of knowing that respects the processes by which 
entrepreneurs cast (or fail to cast) an organizing web over those activities 
they consider important for furthering their projects. 
What then are the methodological consequences of this position? How 
did these, in turn, affect my research? Before answering these pressing 
questions, I will first give an account of the genealogy of the research 
proposal, that is, of why I chose to develop the theme of small-scale 
enterprise, what paths I had to travel to get the research funded, what 
CONSTRUCTING CASE STUDIES 47 
problems I faced when I arrived in the fieldwork area and, finally, how I 
came to adopt the position outlined above. 
A genealogy of the research proposal 
From the outset I must say that I was not born with any sort of natural 
interest in small-scale enterprise. It was an interest that slowly emerged 
during my first undergraduate years whilst reading the work by Long 
(1977) and Long and Roberts (1978 and 1984) on entrepreneurs in the 
Mantaro Valley in central Peru. What attracted me in this work was the 
commitment to integrate the local struggles to make a living by entrepre-
neurs within a framework that also paid attention to larger scale social, 
political, and economic systems. The answer, developed by Professor 
Long during the time I was an undergraduate student of his, pointed to 
the need to overcome conceptualizations that gave theoretical primacy to 
the capitalist 'laws of motion'. Long's argument is that such frameworks 
tend to impose an external, linear and deterministic view on the character 
of socio-economic change in general, and on the wheeling and dealing of 
entrepreneurs in particular. Instead, Long (1992:9) proposed an actor-
oriented approach which "... requires a full analysis of the ways in which 
different social actors manage and interpret new elements in their life-
worlds, [as well as] an understanding of the organizing, strategic and 
interpretive elements involved". To do so, the approach implied a shift 
from a conceptual toolbox that was dominated by political economy, to 
the understanding of social action, the negotiation and joint creation of 
knowledge, and the dynamics of power in interface situations. 
Long's approach reshaped the terms on which much thinking 
about rural development was cast, and provided me with an adequate 
framework to interpret three subsequent research experiences. The first 
involved a study of the impact of international migration in a community 
in Western Mexico. The second consisted of a study on local agricultural 
knowledge and its relation to the (non)adoption of an alternative agricul-
tural package in an e/'/do in Jalisco, Mexico (Verschoor 1989). And the 
last experience concerned the knowledge base of contrasting practices of 
plantain cultivation in the Atlantic Zone of Costa Rica (Verschoor 1994). 
By some vagaries of fortune, the common thread uniting all three epi-
sodes were dynamic entrepreneurs who were actively strategizing and 
organizing their activities in order to cope - not always successfully - with 
economic adversity. 
So when the time was ripe to chose a topic for PhD research, I felt that 
the theme of small-scale enterprise would give continuity to concerns that 
ensued from previous fieldwork. These concerns pointed, first, to the 
need to question conventional analyses of commoditization processes. 
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This entailed highlighting the local values and cultural understandings that 
served small-scale entrepreneurs as a backcloth for experiencing 
commoditization. Second, they pointed to the need to expel all 
essentialist notions of orthodox economism in order to understand the 
social meanings of the different moments of production, exchange and 
consumption. Third, they suggested a focus on strategic action - and thus 
on those discursive practices that reflect the ways in which multiple ident-
ities coexist, interpenetrate, or enter into conflict with one another. Last, 
these concerns entailed granting full weight to social networks and spatial 
relations (cf. Verschoor 1992) . 
The next questions I needed to address related to the what and 
where. What type of small-scale economic activities would be suitable? 
Where could I best undertake the research? The choice for an area in 
which to start the study fell on the Autlan-El Crullo valley in Jalisco, 
Western Mexico. The main motive for this choice was a pragmatic one. I 
had already carried out fieldwork there in 1987, in the context of a 
project on irrigation organization, farmer strategies and State intervention 
(see Long 1986 for a general account of the research). I was thus already 
acquainted with a number of key informants. These, I reckoned, could in 
turn help me set up a research network. In addition, a number of PhD 
candidates that were working from an actor-oriented perspective had 
already finished their fieldwork in the region.2 Their work would certain-
ly be an immense asset, and a backdrop against which I could interpret 
my own data. Last not least, a fellow PhD candidate from Wageningen 
was about to start her own fieldwork in the area.3 Indeed, the chance of 
being able to discuss my findings on a regular basis with someone that 
shared the same theoretico-methodological framework was a pleasant 
prospect. 
The next problem I faced was to further delimit the topic of 
research (the what question). After some brainstorming, I selected the 
theme of small-scale transport operators. The reason for this selection was, 
first, the centrality of commoditization processes in the research frame-
work. Transporters were crucial in this respect because they formed the 
link between different moments of production and consumption; that is, 
they mediated commoditization. A second reason for selection were the 
recent deregulatory measures taken by the Mexican government towards 
the transport sector -making it possible, so to speak, to fit the rhetoric and 
practice of liberalization policy heralded by the Salinas Administration 
into the research. 
My application for a grant, however, was not honoured. The main 
reason given by the selection committee was that the transport sector in 
Mexico was so pervaded by corruption, that any study of it would be 
severely hampered by the interests at stake. Another misgiving of the 
committee concerned the actor-oriented research framework, which was 
seen as 'relevant only for a small number of academics'. Although I wrote 
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a reply to the committee in which I countered the arguments, I felt other, 
more hidden reasons were also responsible for turning down the propo-
sal. I can only guess what these may have been, but suffice it here to say 
that writing, presenting and pressing through a proposal is indeed a very 
political undertaking. 
Still wanting to get the proposal funded, the next year I presented a new 
version of the proposal to the committee. This time, the focus was not on 
transport entrepreneurs but on trade and small-scale services. Otherwise 
the proposal remained roughly the same. To my surprise, a changed 
committee warmly accepted the theoretical framework and the proposal 
was put on the nomination list for funding. This I found interesting, 
because to be honest the proposal lacked the specific thematic focus of 
the prior proposal. But this reflection must have been heard beforehand 
by some members of the committee, because two conditions had to be 
met before receiving the grant. First, the committee argued that there was 
a lack of recent literature on small-scale enterprise in the reference list. 
After consultation with colleagues, and feeling I had covered most of the 
relevant literature, I wondered whether the reference list included in the 
proposal had been read at all - a thought which ultimately aroused the 
frustrating and bitter suspicion of once more being left on the sideline by 
political manoeuvring. The second condition put forward by the commit-
tee, however, made me more aware of the positivist underpinnings that 
run through the field of interpretations about small-scale economic activ-
ities. This condition centred around the lack of specificity concerning the 
sectors or subsectors of the economy in which I could safely position the 
enterprises I wished to study. Was I proposing to do a study of firms in 
the transport sector, as in the earlier proposal? Or was it the construction 
business that I was interested in? Or commerce and trade activities, 
mining or services? It was a stalemate situation. How could I a priori 
subsume small-scale economic activities into official, preconceived and 
'closed' sectors or subsectors if my own data from a preliminary study 
showed that, in practice, most small-scale businesses crosscut these 
categories? How can one compartmentalize petty enterprise into 'objec-
tive' categories if, like Fabian (1983:54-5), one takes the position that 
objective categorization is but a "taxonomic way of ordering cultural 
differences with the help of categories of contrast and opposition that -
like tables and diagrams - plot any and all cultural isolates in a logical 
grid"? Furthermore, how can one start with classifications which, as my 
preliminary fieldwork material showed, were actively challenged by 
small-scale entrepreneurs? Indeed (and this is one of the arguments of this 
thesis) the discourse on the economic did not correspond with the 
discourse of economic subjects - let alone their feelings, expectations or 
values. 
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The lesson I learned from all this was that one may get funds for the most 
radical anti-positivist or postmodernist proposals on a wide range of issues 
such as, for example, Andean collective memory or the role of local 
caciques in pre-revolutionary Mexico. But to obtain funding for a proposal 
that challenges the absolutist epistemological tenets of mainstream 
research on small firms is quite another matter. The point here is not that 
I want to legislate whether or not research - radical or otherwise - on 
collective memory or on heroic strongmen from the past should be 
funded. On the contrary, the more stories are told from different perspec-
tives, the better! Rather, the point I wish to make is that it is very difficult 
to enter the discourse on small-scale enterprise if one espouses an analyti-
cal framework that diverges from the hegemonic one of economists.4 
Research on small firms is certainly not (value) free! 
While waiting for a final funding decision, I was able to start research 
with a joint grant from the department of Rural Development Sociology of 
the Agricultural University Wageningen and the Dutch Society of Agricul-
tural Engineers (NILI). Thus from September 1991 to June 1992 I collected 
detailed case-study material on a wide variety of small businesses in 
Western Mexico. These included brick-makers, restaurant and shop 
owners, transporters, market stall vendors, carpenters and tianguis oper-
ators (more on this below; see also Chapters Four, Five and Six). While in 
the field, news arrived that my application for funding by WOTRO had 
again been turned down. 
Still believing in the potential of the study, I set out to produce a 
new application. This time, I tried to comply with what I felt was the 
main reasons for animosity towards my proposals: the accusation that they 
were excessively actor-oriented, and that they paid insufficient attention to 
the constraints of structure. For this reason, I added a new dimension to 
the proposal: the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
The agreement, which was expected to be signed before the coming U.S. 
elections of November 1992, was officially presented as a remedy to 
counter most of Mexico's maladies: the elimination of trade barriers 
would beef up exports, increase investment, boost employment, and raise 
the general standard of living. The argument I used for adding the treaty 
to the proposal was that small-scale enterprise was conspicuously and 
systematically left out of the NAFTA negotiations. This striking exclusion 
seemed puzzling since small firms were by far the largest employers in 
Mexico. Hence I proposed to analyze the impact of NAFTA on small 
enterprises in the Autlan-EI Grullo valley. In particular, the revised 
proposal focused on the link between the viability of small-scale enter-
prise under conditions of international economic integration and its 
underlying, differential organizational practices and strategies. 
For the third time, however, the proposal was dismissed by the 
funding committee. This time, the argument ran that the research was not 
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feasible because at the time (1992) NAFTA was not yet operational. And 
they certainly had a pointl In response, I mobilized the counter-argument 
that NAFTA had de facto been in effect ever since Mexico joined the 
GATT in 1986. This was clear to anybody living in Mexico during that 
period: officially a variety of products did not yet qualify for importation, 
and Customs' officials snowed a high degree of leniency in the imple-
mentation of duties and tariffs. Apparently, by taking such measures the 
Mexican government tried to demonstrate its good will towards free trade 
and thus positively to influence the US Senate in ratifying the treaty. 
Interestingly, it was petty entrepreneurs and tianguistas (ambulant sellers) 
who mushroomed in this situation by anticipating demand for specific 
foreign commodities in Mexico. But these arguments were to no avail: the 
type of research I was proposing was, for one reason or another, not very 
much appreciated. 
Eventually this same proposal did receive funding from the Wageningen 
Agricultural University and, five months later (October 1992) I was again 
undertaking fieldwork in Mexico. Upon returning to the research area, 
though, it appeared that out of the fourteen cases of entrepreneurs I was 
studying, only three were still carrying out the same activities. Of the 
remaining eleven, three had migrated within Mexico, two had crossed the 
border to California to seek a better future there, three had changed their 
field of activity and the remaining three were seriously considering doing 
the same. Apart from these changes, during the five months of my 
absence a general feeling of economic malaise had invaded the region, 
and now people referred to the crisis as much as the Dutch do to the 
weather. Although I had witnessed the progression of this perception in 
my earlier stay in the area, I could never have anticipated the dimensions 
it took in only a matter of months. Amongst the main effects of the crisis, 
people referred to the rapid succession in which shops changed owners, 
falling real estate prices, diminished consumption, unusually high migra-
tion numbers (despite more difficult circumstances in the US) and an 
increasing crime rate. Not unexpectedly, I encountered competing 
interpretations about the nature and meaning of the crisis. Most people I 
asked, however, concurred that there was a crisis, and that its causes 
were complex and varied. On a general level, culpability was often 
attributed to the far-reaching economic, social and political programs of 
the de-regulationist Salinas administration -even amongst fervent PRI 
admirers. More particularly, as I was often told, the causes of the crisis 
had to be sought in low minimum wages; plummeting prices of sugar 
cane (the most important crop in the region) and the move to alternative 
cash crops due to massive imports of foreign, often subsidized, agricul-
tural products; the privatization of credit, extension, and the production of 
agricultural inputs such as fertilizers; and the imminent collapse of tomato 
export production (and job opportunities).5 
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In a way, then, the neo-liberalism of the Salinas' Administration -
euphemistically labelled 'social-liberalism' - was blamed for the local 
crisis. On closer inspection though, the crisis, like so many other phenom-
ena, was unevenly distributed among the population. By transforming 
existing regulatory systems the Mexican government, it seemed, had 
actively promoted a series of processes whereby different social actors 
(individual or collective) were differently articulated with each other and 
with their resources. Consequently certain forms of behaviour benefitted 
particular social groups at the expense of others. 
This situation greatly influenced my research. As I stated above, the theme 
of my study concerned the viability of small firms. As my cases suggested, 
I had already made a start in exploring enterprise forms that had been 
negatively affected by the crisis. But the crisis was Janus-faced, and I also 
wanted to obtain the other side of the story - the story of those entrepre-
neurs who seemed to have successfully (re)organized their projects. In 
other words, the rhetoric and practices of the situation of crisis necessi-
tated a further sharpening of my research question. This now became: 
how is it possible that some enterprises are able to thrive in a situation 
referred to as 'generalized crisis', while others do not? 
At this point, I selectively searched for firms that seemed viable. 
Observing and asking around, I was more or less quickly able to identify 
such enterprises. Some of them -like the supermarket of Tarcisio Jimenez 
or the vegetable wholesale business of Jos£ Zepeda - owed their success 
to particular circumstances: they had no competition to fear and sold 
products that were basic necessities. Others - such as the Consumo or the 
Ca/'a Popular - owed their success to a mix of good management and 
cooperative effort. These firms however had one thing in common: they 
were all larger-scale businesses and co-operatives, and clearly not the type 
of 'small-scale' enterprise I had in mind. But other, perhaps more discreet, 
firms were highly successful as well. To give three examples from El 
Crullo: these included shoe shops, automobile repair shops, and small 
bars or mariscos. All three activities had in common that they were 
clustered, that is, that they literally operated next to each other. Thus, for 
example, most shoe shops were to be found along only one street, while 
most bars and repair shops were located along a relatively small stretch of 
the road that circumvented the town. Thus the answer to 'success' 
seemed to lie along two different variables: geographical conglomeration 
and sectoral specialization. The evidence suggested that clustering was a 
principle for success. This accorded with much of the literature on flexible 
specialization in Third World countries, the general argument being that 
small firms develop better in milieux where clustering of related enter-
prises takes place and where dense webs of interfirm linkages emerge. 
This is especially the case when a specific activity is carried out by a 
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relatively high number of enterprises operating within close proximity to 
each other.6 
In the end, though, I decided not to study these clustered enter-
prises in El Grullo but instead concentrated on mezcal. The production of 
mezcal, a strong liquor of which tequila is the most known variety, 
showed characteristics that were similar to those I found in the shoeshops, 
bars and automotive repair shops. But study of mezcal looked more 
promising to me for two other reasons. First, at that time I was reading 
some of Barthes' (1973) work on popular culture and the ways in which 
meanings are produced and circulated. This dovetailed closely with my 
original intention to question the commoditization process, the different 
meanings attached to it, and the centrality of the concept in helping me 
understand small-scale economic activity. In this context, mezcal looked 
like a good product to look at closely. Second, I felt an urge to study 
small firms in a region that contrasted as much as possible with the lush, 
irrigated and dynamic valley of Autlan-EI Grullo. Here too mezcal proved 
a good alternative, because most of it was made in the El Llano area -a 
desert-like, sparsely populated region of poor soils only half an hour from 
El Grullo. Although these reasons sound very rational, there was yet one 
more: the imprint that the fabulous novels Pedro Pdramo (1955) and El 
Llano en Llamas (1953) by Juan Rulfo had left on my mind when I first 
read them in the Mexico City of my youth. These mystic novels, together 
with the spectacular natural setting of the Llano -surrounded as it is by 
smoking volcanoes and the dramatic gorges of the Sierra de Manantlan-
made the choice an easy one. Indeed, logical rationality is not the only 
hallmark of the anthropological endeavour. Passion, romance, and 
adventure are also part and parcel of it. 
From explanation to description 
While studying mezcal enterprises, the issue of clustering became a 
central concept to understand viability -just as the absence of it seemed to 
explain why my other case studies were not so successful. As I already 
stated above, this was in accordance with a large part of the literature on 
flexible specialization (cf. Schmitz 1990, 1992; Spath 1992). However 
useful, this paradigm had a number of shortcomings. To summarize, its 
main weaknesses were, first, the ideal-typical portrayal of flexibly organ-
ized and specialized firms (cf. Murdoch 1995). Second, and more import-
ant from a methodological point of view, by establishing a boundary 
between the firm and its institutional environment, and by examining the 
success of small firms from 'without', the approach forebode the empirical 
question of what exactly is internal and what is external to the enterprise. 
This question had troubled my mind for quite a while, and was in fact 
nothing more than a disguise of the usual problem of the 'micro' versus 
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the 'macro', the 'context' versus the 'content', or 'structure' versus 
'action'. 
At this point - on a rainy summer afternoon, not wanting to get wet doing 
fieldwork - I read a paper by Callon and Law (1989) that has since 
become central to this thesis. The article refers to the methodological 
problem of distinguishing between context and content if one wishes to 
understand the relationship between innovation and entrepreneurship on 
the one hand, and economic markets and social structures on the other. 
Suggesting that a distinction between context and content is indeed 
relevant to the understanding of this relationship, in the article Callon and 
Law assert that the location and character of this divide cannot a priori be 
legislated by the analyst. Rather, they argue that this division is negotiated 
and renegotiated by the actors themselves (1989:57). Alternatively, they 
point to the importance of studying the way in which actors (in my case: 
entrepreneurs) ceaselessly try to create links between such pairs as 
producers and consumers, or the global and the local. In other words, 
Callon and Law propose that it is critical to outline the networks that are 
put into place by actors in order to be able to describe what counts as 
'internal', and what as 'external' to actors' projects. The notion of network 
utilized by Callon and Law, however, differs fundamentally from standard 
usage in sociology. In a programmatic statement in which they clarify this 
difference, they write: 
"[Thus] we are not primarily concerned with mapping interac-
tions between individuals. Rather, in conformity with the 
methodological commitment to follow the actors no matter how 
they act, we are concerned to map the way in which they 
define and distribute roles, and mobilize or invent others to 
play these roles. Such roles may be social, political, technical, 
or bureaucratic in character; the objects that are mobilized to 
fill them are also heterogeneous and may take the form of 
people, organizations, machines, or scientific findings." 
(1988:285; emphasis mine). 
What Callon and Law are arguing here is that these networks are empiri-
cally observable phenomena. If, as they suggest, one adopts the stance 
that the 'environment' of the firm is not itself a cause for its behaviour, 
but rather an effect of a whole complex of network relations, then it 
follows that this effect has to be explained from within this network by 
sticking to actors' own accounts. 
Analytically, Callon and Law's position took me a while to digest. To 
integrate their position within an actor-oriented perspective was indeed a 
huge challenge, as both operate from within a different ontology: the 
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actor-oriented paradigm sees networks and practice as essentially social in 
nature, while in Callon and Law's framework these are seen to be made 
up of heterogeneous materials, that is, of both humans and nonhumans. 
Methodologically speaking, however, this difference seemed to be no 
obstacle. Indeed, the idea that one should obtain detailed ethnographic 
data on practices (including discourse) was not new to me. Indeed, the 
maxim of following actors to wherever they might lead in order to under-
stand their actions is a cornerstone of the actor-oriented paradigm as well. 
Notwithstanding the methodological similarities between actor-
network theory and the actor-oriented approach, after reading Callon and 
Law's paper I became aware of the need to make some changes to the 
analytical set-up of my research. For example, if I chose to follow 
entrepreneurs' work of defining and distributing roles, and mobilizing or 
inventing others to play these roles, then clearly I had to step back from 
some of the sociological, anthropological and economic categories I 
cherished. Why? Because if I applied my own descriptive categories to 
entrepreneurs' actions, I would unavoidably be drawn into prejudging 
these - thereby emphasizing the 'black-boxing' of facts rather than re-
opening boxes that seemed black. Thus, for example, I decided to step 
back from the notion of 'culture' as used in the actor-oriented framework, 
and instead favoured a definition of it as the enactment, the mobilization 
of all things (social and material) in specific spaces and at different 
times.7 Thus I did start from given, shared norms and values in order to 
project actors' practices onto these. Rather, I followed the actors and tried 
to understand how differences and commonalities were produced in 
relation to specific projects. In other words, I was interested in the 
construction of homogeneity from a situation of heterogeneity, and not in 
the construction of heterogeneity from a situation of existing cultural 
norms and values (homogeneity). 
In more concrete terms, three methodological consequences emerged 
from the confrontation between an actor-oriented paradigm, and actor-
network theory as proposed by Callon and Law. The first one was that it 
seemed futile to try to reduce entrepreneurs' practices to social, or 
economic, or political, or religious attributes alone. Following this rule of 
method, it turned out that entrepreneurs hardly heeded sociologists' or 
economists' a priori distinctions between, for example, market transac-
tions and so-called external circumstances, supply and demand, produc-
tion and consumption, etc. Neither did they discern between the material 
world on the one hand, and society, politics, economy or religion on the 
other. In fact, the reality of entrepreneurs was much more messy. In the 
words of Hughes (1983), they would stitch together heterogeneous 
elements into a seamless web. This coincided with a conclusion reached 
by Callon and Law (1988:284-5) in the context of a study on the concep-
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tion, design and development of a technological artifact.8 Their sugges-
tion - probably counter-intuitive for many sociologists - is that we 
"must study not only the social but also the technical features of 
the engineer's work; in other words, we have to understand 
the content of engineering work because it is in this content 
that the technical and the social are simultaneously shaped. Any 
attempt to separate the social and the non-social not only 
breaks the original methodological principle of following the 
technologist. It is also, quite simply, impossible because the 
social runs throughout the technical and thus cannot be separ-
ated from it. We cannot, and should not wish to, avoid the 
technical".9 
This finding, or principle, is what actor-network theorists call symmetry. 
Negatively, it suggests that one should not distinguish, a priori, between 
natural, social or technical phenomena - treating each one differently and 
changing the grid of analysis whenever shifting from one to the other. 
More positively, it suggests that the researcher has to position him or 
herself at the median point where he/she can follow the attribution of 
both human and nonhuman properties (cf. Callon 1986; Latour 1993; for 
a similar position see Strathern 1980). 
The second methodological consequence was that I should abstain from 
seeking to elicit the exogenous factors that enabled, influenced, or deter-
mined entrepreneurs' actions. In other words, there is no need to 
privilege anything or anyone when looking for an explanation (or rather, 
an apt description - more on this below) for the feasibility of small firms. 
As Bijker and Law (1992) stress, the elements (including the entrepre-
neurs) bound together in networks are, at the same time, constituted and 
shaped in those networks. This means that one should avoid making 
assumptions about a backdrop of social, economic, or technical factors: 
the backdrop is something that is itself built in the course of building a 
network. 
This comes close to what Latour (1993) calls the principle of non-
reduction. Indeed, as Latour argues in this perspicuous essay, what lies at 
the core of epistemological absolutism is the assumption that a certain 
number of social and natural phenomena drive everything else. 
Reductionist practice, or so the argument goes, constructs a number of 
disparate dichotomies. Prominent 'theoretical' examples would include 
the structure/agency divide; the nature/culture abyss; the classical separ-
ation between subject and object. Less grandiose examples can also be 
found: the gulf between the rural and the urban; the segregation of that 
fashionable couple, the global and the local; the fragmented duo of 
producers and consumers; the exegetical contrast between capitalist and 
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non-capitalist modes of production; the enigmatic relationship between 
supply and demand, and so on. However elegant, all these attempts in 
finding a 'last instance' to which one can direct accusations does not 
withstand the ultimate test of practice. That is, at least, what I found when 
following the entrepreneurs of my case studies. Indeed, these actors were 
all busy trying to control the events they were faced with. They inter-
preted these events in order to account for what was happening. That is 
to say, they implicated a wide variety of social, technical, political, yes 
even supernatural entities. And - and this is the crux of non-reduction -
whenever the events refused to be accountable, that is, to be controllable, 
then an ever widening net of heterogeneous entities was cast over the 
events in question in order to make sense of, or to explain, all the rel-
evant features. As it turned out, most events resisted reductionist explana-
tions. More, not less, associations were needed all the time. The actors 
thus constructed a universe in which events took place and produced 
meaning. And, in the same movement, they also exposed a universe in 
which they were shut up, contained, punctualized by a series of determi-
nations that were external to themselves (cf. Akrich 1993:331). In other 
words, as Callon and Law (1989) suggest, actors produced content and 
context simultaneously. 
Finally, / refrained from making assumptions about the character of 
feasible or unfeasible enterprises. I thus abandoned a priori distinctions 
between categories of 'successful' and 'unsuccessful'. The particular 
reason was that these distinctions would rather hinder than facilitate an 
examination of the contingencies involved in the complex processes by 
which success was first defined and later achieved (or obstructed). 
Instead, I favoured detailed analysis of the tactics and strategies of the 
entrepreneurs I engaged with when they tried to mobilize heterogeneous 
elements - both human and nonhuman - in order to throw an organizing 
web around the world they deemed important for carrying out their 
projects. So what if I had not done so? If I had legislated between what 
was to count as successful, and what as unsuccessful? My answer to this 
is that I would obviously have concealed the way in which notions of 
success and failure are themselves constructed -and thus have taken a 
result for a starting point. In terms of Callon's (1986:200) principle of 
generalized agnosticism, I thus sought not to fix the identity of the 
implicated enterprises if this identity was still being negotiated. It was 
only at a later stage, when description had been pursued to the "bitter 
end" (Murdoch 1995:731), that an explanation of feasibility emerged. 
To summarize, during fieldwork I tried to challenge the methods of 
scientific procedure that have virtually colonized the language of sociol-
ogy and economy of development. I challenged this hegemonic discourse 
with the same commonsensical means used by the people I interacted 
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with while doing fieldwork. For the actors I followed did not use different 
vocabularies when referring to the things, natural and social, that sur-
rounded them. In fact they would mix up things, leaving me with the 
impression that their cosmology was indeed a democratic one. A cosmol-
ogy that could not be partitioned into the camps of docile objects and 
compelling forces. This thesis, then, is based upon the associations that 
these actors imagined, probed, and accomplished. 
Doing fieldwork however is only half of the scientific game. 
Following Mexican entrepreneurs and the associations they make is fine, 
but not my ultimate goal. I am also an entrepreneur, but deal not in tacos, 
tiendas, or mezcal. Not in Holland, at least. I deal in accounts. Accounts 
of small-scale enterprise in far away places. But not just any accounts. I 
try to deal in - excuse the immodesty - better accounts of small firms. 
Therefore I use a different analytical language. A language of heterogen-
eous networks. A language that seeks to find regularities in these net-
works. A language that tries to identify the practices that engender 
relatively strong, durable (or feeble, fleeting) enterprises, and the hetero-
geneous networks these practices de-scribe. A language that avoids 
asymmetrical and reductionist accounts. Finally, a language that does not 
stick to explanatory narratives cast in terms of causality. Here, I turn the 
entrepreneurs' method onto myself. I associate as many heterogeneous 
elements as I need to build my stories. Stories of work. Stories of work in 
process. Until the tactics, the strategies - in short, the practices - of the 
entrepreneurs I followed are displayed. Until the display is saturated. And 
then I stop. I do not look for additional causes to explain entrepreneurs' 
behaviour. Let description do the explanation! True, there will always be 
other ways of displaying - let them be welcome. But I agree with Latour's 
(1991:129-30) forceful statement that 
"[We] can certainly continue to follow actants, innovations, and 
translation operations through other networks, but we will 
never find ourselves forced to abandon the task of description 
to take up that of explanation.... Explanation, as the name 
indicates, is to deploy, to explicate. There is no need to go 
searching for mysterious global causes outside networks. If 
something is missing it is because the description is not com-
plete. Period." (Emphasis mine). 
Favouring description over explanation has the definite advantage that it 
offers a conception of process that takes account of contingency. 
Consequently, the explanations that emerge from saturated descriptions 
are of a 'one-off' character. Here, a link could be laid with writers such as 
Foucault (1979) and Serres (1995) who prefer nominalist ('one-off') 
explanations over essentialist approaches that seek 'patterns' or 'trends' 
and then proceed to explain these as a function of some 'general laws' 
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and 'causes'. An essential ism that sees 'patterns' and 'causes' as coherent 
entities that reflect the characteristics of an actual (transcendental) object 
called 'the economy' (or 'society', or 'science', and so on). Indeed, 
following Woolgar (1988:20ff.), one could propose that 'one-off' explana-
tions reject the quest for a definition of 'trends' or 'general laws'. From 
this point of view there is no such thing as, for example, 'patterns of 
development of small-scale enterprise' except that which is attributed to 
various practices and behaviours. Nominalism, in other words, thus 
suggests that features proposed as characteristic of these 'patterns' and 
'causes' stem from the definitional practices of the participants (econom-
ists, sociologists, entrepreneurs) themselves. 
On selecting cases for building up a theoretical argument 
Writing is a joint enterprise. It combines entrepreneurs' daily practices 
with my daily practice of writing about them - which is in turn related to 
my ethical and moral commitments, the books and articles I read, the 
colleagues I interact with, and the technical possibilities (computers, 
libraries) at my disposal to link all these elements in a meaningful way. 
With entrepreneurs I have in common that I try, as best I can, to order, to 
organize the world that I deem relevant for pushing through my writing 
project. This means that I have a tremendous room for manoeuvre, for I 
can choose the way I write (and what I write) about the entrepreneurs I 
followed. Such a statement, of course, potentially calls for a number of 
questions, the most important one concerning the relationship between 
the text and 'reality' or 'what actually took place there and then'. To this I 
would reply that 'what actually took place there and then' is not an 
objective and transcendental phenomenon. Rather, what I present as 
'reality' is intricately related to my theoretical and methodological choices 
and predispositions. What I mean by this is, first, that my description of 
events is always related to a question or set of questions I wish to answer. 
And second, by this I mean that description necessarily follows a set of 
epistemological presumptions - the appropriate ways, so to speak, of 
looking for, examining, and questioning the fieldwork material that will 
be used to answer the initial question(s). Here, of course, it could be 
argued that possibly I did not search for all the relevant material. In other 
words, I could fall prey to the accusation of being unduly selective, of 
picking and choosing as I pleased. From my perspective, however, I 
cannot but dismiss this reproach which I believe evidences the idea of the 
possibility to describe 'facts' independently from theory. Again, I empha-
size that 'what actually happened' and what counts as 'relevant evidence' 
is, to an extent, a theoretical and methodological matter. Indeed, any 
experienced anthropologist will acknowledge that there exist different 
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ways of knowing. Coherent descriptions written 1 in terms of diverging 
theoretical frameworks are always possible. Likewise, the theoretical 
frameworks one utilizes may change in time and still enable one to make 
sense out of the same data - that is, to describe in a meaningful way. 
As I stated in Chapter One, the question that runs through this thesis is 
that of the feasibility of small-scale entrepreneurial projects. In particular, I 
am interested in developing a vocabulary of analysis that allows a descrip-
tion of attempts to build durable, feasible enterprises. Accordingly, I 
gathered and organized my fieldwork material with this explicit purpose 
in mind. Thus during the first fieldwork period I concentrated on enter-
prise forms that appeared to be unfeasible. This turned out to be an 
important asset later, when I decided to concentrate on the dynamics of 
more successful projects. The reason for this, I argue, is that the struggles 
in which 'unsuccessful' entrepreneurs were enmeshed tended to expose 
processes that were more easily camouflaged in 'successful' cases. In this 
way, I turned 'failure' into a methodological convenience (cf. Law and 
Callon 1992). Symmetrically, following more fortunate entrepreneurs later 
helped me to cast a different light on the dynamics of 'failure'. The thesis 
reproduces this iterative process by fitting together both feasible and 
unfeasible projects into a whole. Whether entrepreneurial projects turn 
out to be feasible or not is, after all, determined within networks. So the 
idea is this: your reading of the successful cases will make more sense 
once you have read your way through the unsuccessful ones. The latter 
will, so to speak, put the former into perspective. And vice versa: 
accounts of feasible enterprise forms will add relief to unfeasible ones. 
Notes 
1. I am conscious of the pitfalls entailed in separating the camps in terms of a 
practical/theoretical demarcation line. Indeed, any practice devoid of theoreti-
cal assumptions is simply unthinkable. By the same token, the practice of 
theorizing is, as the verb implies, as practical as any other activity. 
2. See the Ph.D theses by van der Zaag (1992) on irrigation organization; 
Brunt (1992) on gender and land tenure; Guzman (1995) on the political 
organization of sugar-cane production; Torres (1994) on the everyday life of 
tomato workers; Gonzalez (1994) on export-oriented tomato production; 
Villarreal (1994) on issues of gender intervention. In addition, a number of 
MA-level studies had been carried out in the area, as well as a post-doctoral 
study on State intervention and peasant responses (Arce 1989; 1993). 
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3. Monique Nuijten's (forthcoming) Ph.D research on organizing practices at 
the ejido level. 
4. There is a vast literature on the subject by anthropologists and sociologists. 
Most works, however, do not challenge in any way the epistemological 
assumptions discussed above and in Chapter Two. 
5. This tomato disaster is attributed to a composite of factors: maladministra-
tion, virus diseases, water shortage and protectionist US measures. See 
Gonzalez (1994) for an elaborate account of the rise and demise of tomato 
production in the Autlan-EI Grullo valley. 
6. For an elaboration and critique of flexible specialization, see Chapter Two. 
7. Although the actor-oriented approach, like ethnomethodology, has the 
advantage of seeing 'culture' as embodied in social practice - that is, actors 
are not seen as 'cultural dopes' (Garfinkel 1967) following a more or less 
'fixed' set of internalized normative rules - it nevertheless sees 'culture' as 
inherently social and, hence, does not pay proper attention to the role of the 
non-social in the constitution of the so-called social. In other words, I equated 
'culture' with heterogeneous (social and material) practices. 
8. The TSR2, a British light bomber and reconnaissance machine that was 
planned in the late 1950's and cancelled in 1965. 
9. Reviewing Lynch's (1985) Art and Artifact in Laboratory Science, Latour 
goes one step further: "To be sure, scientific practice is social through and 
through, but this does not mean for Lynch that sociologists are well equipped 
to find such factors. Quite the contrary: they are unable to discover social 
factors as long as they do not realize that these factors are nothing but the 
technical work itself." (1986:543). 
CHAPTER 4 
HOLDING TOGETHER UNUSUAL BEDFELLOWS 
Tacos, Ice cream, and Public Transport 
In Chapter Two, I pointed to a central shortcoming of most studies on 
small-scale enterprise: their unqualified assumption that the content of 
economic activities is determined, limited or otherwise influenced by 
their context. Of course, some of the best studies (for example in the 
flexible specialisation tradition) do contest this position and maintain -
following authors such as Giddens - that context shapes, and is shaped 
by, content. There is certainly an element of truth in such statements, but 
entrepreneurs' practices of seeking to achieve some degree of autonomy 
from their operational environment are not explicitly addressed. If - and 
this is my argument - entrepreneurs' projects influence, and are influenced 
by, their context, then one needs to describe and explain the trajectory of 
these projects - not as naturally unfolding processes, but as an outcome of 
struggles, negotiations and contingencies. To do so, 1 argued, necessitates 
a vocabulary that enables one to come to grips with the co-evolution of 
the context and content of specific entrepreneurial projects. 
In this Chapter, I deploy such a vocabulary by interpreting the 
trajectory of two projects in the light of concepts such as global and local 
networks^, obligatory points of passage, convergence, translation, transla-
tion regimes and momentum.2 The basic question guiding the 
organisation of this Chapter is: Can Carlos' (the protagonist) entrepreneur-
ial projects become effective obligatory points of passage between the 
global and the local networks that he helps construct through his projects? 
To answer this question, I will first spell out the heterogeneous composi-
tion of these 'global' and 'local' networks. However, since the composi-
tion of these networks is not something that can be determined a priori, I 
will "follow the actors" and circulate smoothly between the entities 
making up the networks. The rationale behind this methodological devise 
is that one can, so to speak, peep over Carlos' shoulders to see how a 
boundary is built between the 'global' and the 'local' networks of his 
projects, and assess whether or not the projects succeed in becoming 
obligatory passage points between the two. 
In what follows, I describe in detail how this process of becoming 
an obligatory point of passage is no more than the product of the strat-
egies of translation, that is, of problematization, interessement, enrolment 
and mobilization.3 More concretely, these strategies can be seen as 
Carlos' answer to four pressing questions: Whom should he convince to 
carry through his projects? How strong is the resistance of those he 
chooses to convince? What new resources should he enrol to break this 
resistance? What transformations should his projects eventually undergo? 
In the narrative, I will address these questions sequentially. Finally, in the 
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conclusion I return to the issue of the viability of Carlos' projects (i.e. 
their capacity to act as obligatory points of passage) and assess how this 
relates to the morphology of 'global' and 'local' networks. 
An initial encounter with two projects 
I visit Carlos for a second time late at night in October, 1991. Carlos 
operates a faco stall on one of the sidewalks bordering El Crullo's main 
plaza. I greet him, and he introduces me to some five or six customers 
that stand next to his stall, eating: 
"Hey, look, this is Gerardo - that's your name, right? He's come 
all the way from Holland just to eat these tacos. How hungry 
are you tonight, Gerardo?" 
I order five head-meat tacos, as I am not in for the other items from his 
assortment: brain or lip tacos , or meat tortas. While I stand waiting to be 
served, Carlos asks me loudly, for all to hear: 
"So tell me, what are you doing here? Are you also studying the 
irrigation [scheme]? There were some Dutch here before you. 
Are you part of their team?" 
I explain that I'm not into water, but into small-scale enterprise and the 
informal market. While cutting some head meat on a wooden table next 
to his cart, Carlos replies: 
"So you are spying on me, eh? [laughter]. Don't worry, here 
we'll teach you whatever you want to know. Maybe we can 
open up a taco business in Holland, right, Julian?" 
Julian, a plump lad in his early twenties, is enjoying a brain taco 
drenched in green tomato sauce. He supports the idea but prefers to 
suspend judgement until more information is provided about the attract-
iveness of Dutch women. Carlos settles the doubt: addressing his wife 
Anita, who is cutting bread for the tortas, he proclaims: 
"Only beautiful women over there. Whether they speak Spanish 
I don't know. But if they do you may as well say goodbye to 
your husband... So tell me Gerardo, do they speak Spanish like 
you, or just bad words and albures [double-meaning words] like 
Juli&n over here?" 
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Julian, throwing some salt onto the open wound: 
Julian laughs and orders five more tacos, which he promises to pay for 
tomorrow. Carlos jokingly remarks: 
"Gerardo, you shouldn't make friends with these good-for-noth-
ings. No money, no tacos. You got to feel hunger once in a 
while..." 
Carlos passes the tacos to Julian. Without thanking him, Julian makes an 
observation about Carlos' three year-old son who is holding a taco: 
"Tell me Carlos: do you also give this shit to your own little son? Do 
you want to get rid of him, or what?" 
Carlos laughs heartily and replies: 
"No, cabron. These I only give to you and to the dog. For my 
son I go and buy tacos around the corner..." 
The matter is dropped when Jaime, a punk figure in his late teens, comes 
by to ask Carlos whether he should help attend the taco stall the coming 
weekend. Carlos: 
"I don't know yet. Come on Saturday morning and then I'll 
know if the minibus is already out of the garage. They said the 
spares were there but I don't know if Pascual can hasten them." 
I don't understand the meaning of this, but when I finish my tacos the 
picture becomes clearer. Transparency is provided by a customer who has 
so far concentrated on his dinner. He asks: 
"Are you still letting Pascual drive for you? That lazy good-for-
nothing sloth is going to be your calvary... Between him and 
your compadre who set you up with the minibus business 
you'll end up selling tacos all your life..." 
Carlos concurs with his customer's diagnosis. Turning to me he says: 
"I have a minibus4 in Guadalajara. But the other day the driver 
had to go full on the brakes and a calliper broke. Bendito sea 
Dios y santo su nombre [thank God] nobody was hurt, but now 
the garage has taken over two days to repair it and meanwhile I 
have no income." 
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"Well I wouldn't be surprised if Pascual just tells you the 
minibus is still in the garage. I think he's already out there 
driving and snatching the entradas from you. If I were you I 
wouldn't trust him for a second..." 
Seemingly preoccupied, Carlos nods. Addressing his wife Anita, he 
decides: 
"I think he's right, vieja [girl]. Maybe I should go to Guadalajara 
tomorrow and check on him. Jaime, can you be here tomor-
row? And the day after?" 
The show at Carlos' taco stall continues until well after midnight. Anita 
and Carlos' two children have already gone to bed, and I help him carry 
all the culinary attributes5 into the house. When I finally leave, three 
dogs scrutinise the setting for possible meat remains, but apart from some 
discarded chile sauce (which they lick without seeming objection) the 
sidewalk is clean. Next day, El Grullo's health inspector will have nothing 
to complain about. 
Carlos: genesis of two projects 
In what follows, I unfold Carlos' strategies to organise the two businesses 
referred to in the vignette. To do so, however, calls for a short description 
of how Carlos came to be engaged in tacos and public transport in the 
first place. 
Carlos was born in Autlan as an illegitimate son of Arnulfo P., 
offspring of one of the most influential families in the region.6 His occupa-
tional career starts at the age sixteen, when he picked up a full-time job 
with a maternal uncle selling clothes in the most remote corners of Jalisco 
and Nayarit. This experience forges later engagements, for Carlos likes the 
travelling (and the women and drink that go along with it). At twenty-two 
he gets a job as fare collector on a passenger bus operated by another 
maternal uncle. In four years' time, and working for different patrons, 
Carlos gets acquainted with a great many people in the bus circuit, and 
especially from Guadalajara's Alianza de Camioneros. These contacts 
prove instrumental later on, when setting up his minibus business. 
Due to health reasons Carlos quits the travelling and is forced to 
lead a more sedentary life in El Grullo. There he meets Anita, daughter of 
a well-to-do family7, whom he marries in 1985 . That same year Carlos 
sets up a candy bar at El Grullo's large movie theatre. This is made 
possible through some connections of Anita's father who knows the 
owner of the cinema and mediates a concession for Carlos to sell candies, 
popcorn and softdrinks inside the building. The candy bar proves to be a 
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little gold mine, and for a while enables Carlos and Anita to rent a large, 
fancy house in the centre of town and buy a brand-new pick-up truck. 
Through the venture, Carlos is able to obtain two stalls in El Grullo's 
newly-build central market, and employs two labourers to sell candies as 
well. Most of the money made, however, finds its way to parties and 
feasting, and in no time Carlos becomes one of the most popular persons 
in El Grullo. After a two-year bonanza business declines, taking with it 
the house, the market stalls8, and his friends. 
"The Reforma theatre, that's were I made my centav/tos 
[money]. In those years there were three films a day, and the 
place was packed full of chuntaros [Amerindians]. But then the 
tomateros moved and now there's only one film on Sunday's. 
There's even the anecdote that the Reforma [the movie theatre 
with a seating capacity of 1,800] is the largest theatre in the 
world, because it never gets filled." 
By 1989 Carlos and Anita have sold all their belongings and are rock-
bottom. With nowhere to go with their two young sons Carlfn (3) and 
Chava (1), they move into Anita's parental home facing El Grullo's central 
plaza - an idea suggested by Anita's mother9 - where they are allowed to 
use a large space that serves as a storage room to Alfredo's (Anita's 
brother) hardware shop. There, between plastic hoses and oil filters, 
Carlos and Anita forge a new plan: they will start a taco stall specialising 
in tacos de cabeza (head meat tacos) - a delicatessen not on offer in El 
Grullo at that time which Carlos knows how to prepare. The site they 
have in mind is the sidewalk in front of Anita's parental home. This is a 
very strategic location, especially on weekends when half the town 
promenades on the main plaa. Also - and this is important during the 
week - the location is only 30 meters away from the place where 6 or 7 
ambulant taco sellers settle each night. This means Carlos and Anita plan 
to plug their business into an already existing collectlf of customers, tacos 
and ambulant sellers. 
In theory, starting the stall seems a straightforward activity, and not 
much starting capital is needed: a cart, a table, plastic dishes, saucers, gas 
cylinders. These are all paid for by Anita's father. In practice however, 
running the stall turns out to be a complicated affair. For example, a range 
of permits need to be obtained at the municipality10, local butchers have 
to be convinced to deliver prime-quality meat only, and gas cylinders (of 
which there is a scarcity) need to be delivered on time. In addition, the 
running of the household has to be adapted, for Anita needs to cash 
customers' money (for sanitary reasons Carlos never touches it while 
preparing tacos). Also, calculations need to be made about the quantity of 
meat to prepare on a given day, and customers' satisfaction has to be 
ensured by offering a better service than the nearby competition. The 
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complexity of these organisational requirements increases when - ten 
months after starting activities - the business is expanded to include tortas, 
tacos de labio (lip tacos) and tacos de seso (brain tacos). This calls for a 
greater involvement on Anita's part as she is put in charge of the tortas. 
Moreover, since Anita cannot now touch the money, extra-familial 
labourers become necessary (one on week days, two on Sundays). 
The stall soon proves to be a success. Thus, after subtracting 
expenses, on an average weekly day Carlos is making between USD 35-
40, while on Sundays profits overshoot the USD 75 mark. Financially, 
then, the business is lucrative. However, 'success' also shows its dark 
side, and socially the venture has its disadvantages in that monetary 
success is openly attributed to Carlos' father-in-law. As Carlos once put it: 
"Even my in-laws would pester me. Take for example my 
brother-in-law Valente11. He would come to me and say in 
front of all my customers: "Quiobo pariente! [Hello relative] 
You really have a nice father-in-law. He's like the divine Provi-
dence to you: he feeds you, clothes you, shelters you and on 
top of that he even provides you with a woman..." That really 
hurt! I tell you, for a man that's a difficult thing to swallow!" 
These and similar remarks are a ground for much discontentment and 
push Carlos into thinking in terms of other, new ventures where he can 
be independent from his in-laws. Scanning for possible alternatives, Carlos 
is soon tipped by his compadre Lucho1 2 about the enormous possibilities 
that lay open at that time in Guadalajara's public transport system. As it 
turns out, in the late 1980s SISTECOZOME 1 3 is redesigning the city's 
transport system by replacing large, old and polluting buses with a 
subway network and introducing newer, cleaner and smaller minibuses 
with a maximum seating capacity of 24. In 1990, at the time Lucho tips 
Carlos, SISTECOZOME is issuing a large batch of permits to would-be 
minibus operators.14 It does not take long before Carlos realises the 
potential of the minibus alternative - especially since Lucho already owns 
one such minibus and shows Carlos the net gains to be made. 
Carlos decides to enter the business and sets out to look for possi-
bilities to purchase a minibus - which run at about USD 21,000 each. 
Again, he relies on the help of his in-laws who are in the process of 
asking for a large loan of USD 135,000 at the local branch of 
BANAMEX 1 5 . With the loan, Carlos' father-in-law plans to expand his 
small ice factory, while his brother-in-law Alfredo intends to substantially 
increase the stock of his hardware shop. The intended loan allows for 
some room for manoeuvre, and it is decided that part of it will be 
detoured to allow Carlos to make a down payment on the minibus. After 
some official paperwork, the bank's regional headquarters in Guadalajara 
approve the credit at a monthly interest rate of five percent. Problems 
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however surface when the local branch is about to disburse the sum. 
Carlos: 
"As it turned out, two or three people in charge of implementa-
tion at the local branch demanded a share of roughly five 
percent of the total amount to authorise the transaction. This 
was against my father-in-law's principles, and so he called the 
deal off."16 
Carlos now has to look for a loan elsewhere. He finds a willing party in 
his compadre Lucho, who advances USD 1,300 at a monthly interest rate 
of four percent. Since Carlos has outstanding debts all over, this money is 
given to Anita who in turn deposits the amount at her account at the Ca/a 
Popular. With it, she obtains a loan of nearly USD 4,000 - enough to 
make the down payment for the minibus, pay the obligatory taxes, and 
obtain an operation permit at SISTECOZOME. The latter is itself quite 
problematic, and to obtain the permit Carlos is compelled to sign a 
document that makes him a member of the drivers' Union. 1 7 
The next step involves choosing an appropriate minibus and 
finding a credit institution willing to finance the purchase. As for the 
choice of the vehicle, a range of possibilities exist, but in fact the choice 
is narrowed down to a 24-seater "Havre" since it is the only make that 
can be financed on the credit terms available at the time. 1 8 The next 
stage involves obtaining a good route to operate the minibus. This takes 
some time, but after negotiations with SISTECOZOME officials and taking 
a number of compulsory courses Carlos is granted a permit to join 20 
more minibuses on the profitable route number 47, from the outskirts of 
Guadalajara right into downtown.1 9 Everything now seems settled, and 
the project is ready to begin. However, one final but important hurdle still 
needs to be taken: Carlos is colour-blind and cannot differentiate between 
red and green - a great handicap in a city full of traffic lights. A trust-
worthy driver needs to be hired. This he finds in Rigoberto, a cousin 
living in Guadalajara. Finally, halfway through 1990, operations start. 
Like the taco stall, the minibus proves a financial success. On average -
after subtracting gasoline costs - Carlos is earning USD 85-100 a day with 
it.2 0 Setting up the minibus business, however, turns out to be quite a 
different matter than setting up an ambulant taco stall. As a street vendor, 
Carlos has a "face": he is one among few, and operates in a relatively 
small provincial town. In contrast, as a minibus operator he is one among 
many, operating more-or-less anonymously in a public transport system of 
a large metropolis. Likewise, the central problems of both businesses 
differ sharply. With tacos, the problematic hinges on Carlos' capacity to 
motivate clients to appear in sufficient numbers and eat suitable quan-
tities. The situation is the reverse in the case of the minibus, where 
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Gauging resistance: regional crisis, fiestas and disloyal drivers 
It is soon evident that resistance to Carlos' ventures abounds. Below, I 
will illustrate the most important (though not all) of these to put into 
perspective the strategies employed - that is, the elements mobilised- by 
Carlos to counter insurgency to his plans. 
As I spelled out in the foregoing section, the central obstacle to 
Carlos' taco business are clients. To be more precise: clients who do not 
appear in expected numbers. Carlos holds two elements responsible for 
this situation. The first one concerns the large number of fiestas held in 
the region from September through February. With the exception of the 
local carnival (which is held downtown El Grullo and thus brings many 
customers to his stall), the wide geographical distribution of these fiestas 
has the effect that clients with money to spend appear everywhere but at 
Carlos' stall. And, once the fiesta season is over, money is usually spent 
on other items such as agricultural inputs for the growing season - thus 
bringing about the cuesta (uphill battle from March through August) 
feared by most local entrepreneurs engaged in services and trade. Next to 
fiestas, the national crisis in the sugar industry is also blamed: under 
'normal' conditions, the cuesta can be delayed until the beginning of the 
rainy season in June, which indicates the end of the sugarcane harvest 
when potential clients such as farmers and sugarcane labourers receive 
their payments from the sugar mill. From 1991 until 1 9 9 3 , however, the 
financial circumstances of the local sugar mill are such that it incurs in 
huge debts with sugarcane growers, thus substantially slowing down the 
circulation of cash. 
Seasonality and the crisis in the sugar industry then are accused for 
the sin of obstructing clients.21 But so are the different days in the week. 
customers patiently wait in line at bus stops for his vehicle to appear. 
Here the main dilemma involves trusting the driver and persuading him to 
deliver all profits. The two collectifs {tacos and public transport) are thus 
qualitatively different - both in terms of their length and scale: whereas 
the street food collectif is basically composed of thirty thousand potential 
customers, local municipal permits or labour from El Grullo, the minibus 
collectif stretches out to encompass millions of customers and such 
dissimilar actors as arrendadoras in Mexico City or the minibus industry 
in several countries. To operate within these two distinct collectifs it is 
imperative that Carlos unfolds different strategies to cope with the 
specificities of the different fronts. Above, I highlighted the first of these 
strategies: who should he convince to start his new ventures? W e now 
turn to the next question: how strong is the resistance (potentially and in 
practice) offered by the actors Carlos needs to enrol for the organisation of 
his businesses? 
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Apart from Sunday in which a high turnover is often reached, Mondays 
and Tuesdays - along with Thursdays in which all shops close in the 
afternoon - are sloppy days sales-wise. On Fridays and Saturdays, the 
number of clients that can be expected may vary substantially, and force 
Carlos to make accurate estimates of the meat to be bought: too much 
entails direct losses, while too little means dissatisfied customers. The 
flexibility required by this situation is in turn resisted by many of El 
Grullo's butchers - to the point that it was a difficulty in itself for Carlos to 
secure meat on demand (let alone of the quality he wished). After all, by 
any local standards Carlos is a wholesale consumer of head meat, and no 
single butcher can afford asking for thirty kilograms of it at the abattoir on 
a given week, increase the order to forty the next week, and cut to fifteen 
kilograms the week thereafter without having Carlos' explicit word that he 
will actually buy. 
Procuring a stable and flexible supply of meat is thus a central 
concern. And so is that of securing access to the softdrinks that often 
accompany clients' tacos. 
For this Carlos heavily relied on David - owner of a store next door -
where he could drop in anytime at night and take with him all refriger-
ated softdrinks needed at that moment. The balance was always made up 
the next morning and, since no track was kept of the amount of bottles 
passing hands, trust was an essential component. This agreement, how-
ever, was a frail one, and a comment out of place could easily frustrate 
the organisation of Carlos' business, calling for complex negotiations to 
reinstall the crucial relationship. Such a situation ensued when, in the 
presence of Conchita Corona (PAN candidate for the municipal elections 
of 1992), David, and David's wife, Carlos made some ugly comments 
about David's virility. The foursome were talking about the issue of being 
allowed to carry guns, and of having them or not. David - on good terms 
with the candidate - jokingly remarked that the only gun he owned was 
the one he used to urinate with. All present (except David) heartily 
laughed, and Carlos added to the joke that it seemed unbelievable to him 
that David could still urinate with this 'gun' because he thought it had 
already dried out... David (58) did not reply immediately, but later angrily 
reproached Carlos in public that he should never again use these words 
in front of his wife. To add weight to his words, as a reprimand he 
stopped selling softdrinks to Carlos for close to three weeks, when matters 
were discussed and a cooled-down relationship was taken up once more. 
In the meantime, Carlos had to go to great lengths to satisfy his need for 
softdrinks. 
But not only do fiestas, clients, pieces of meat of different quality 
and softdrink suppliers cross Carlos' plans. Illness is a constant adversity, 
and a simple flu may cut profits by more than half. This happens with the 
regularity of a clock - especially during the winter months - and is prob-
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ably due to Carlos' front always being exposed to the heat and steam 
emanating from the stall, while his back is always exposed to the cool 
drafts of El Grullo's nights. When illness hits, only tortas are sold, since 
making tacos entails constant supervision or else the meat dries up and 
tortillas crumble if exposed to steam longer than strictly necessary. Due to 
gendered preferences (men - who abound on the streets at night-time -
favour tacos while women - who are scarce on the street after 10pm - pre-
fer tortas) turnover may thus sharply decrease in case of illness. Likewise, 
problems of labour control often surface, and rebel against Carlos' project: 
his aides may for instance unexpectedly leave him, chased by pregnant 
girlfriends or tempted by job offers in the US. Or they may pocket small 
change, invite their friends for free meals, or forget to bring along tortillas 
on their way to the stall. 
Partaking in this conspiracy are hard-needed gas cylinders. These 
do not always appear on time because gas companies prefer to sell their 
precious liquid to high-bidding North American customers, literally 
leaving Mexicans - taco lovers or not - in the cold. Add to this a munici-
pal president wanting a piece of the action;22 harassing customers 
fraternising with unwilling police;2 3 a competitor opening a pizza parlour 
next door;2 4 a newcomer selling American-style tacos around the cor-
ner;2 5 constant trips to Guadalajara to check on his minibus business, 
and it becomes obvious that quite a large number of interrelated factors 
work against Carlos' business. Indeed, Carlos is surrounded by resistance; 
nothing and no-one can be fully trusted, and even the slightest miscal-
culation may endanger a day's sale or indeed the whole taco enterprise. 
Carlos' adversaries are of course not only confined to his taco business. 
There are tricks to every trade, and in the minibus lengthy struggles have 
to be fought on different fronts. As in the case of tacos, resistance to the 
minibus project proliferate. The largest adversary is SISTECOZOME, the 
public transport system, which hinders Carlos by the simple fact that it 
demands a piece of the cake. So, for example, each month Carlos needs 
to pay "concession" fees of over USD 40 for which he gets no services 
whatsoever in return.26 Or additional expenses surface, such as manda-
tory training courses for drivers that cost over USD 330. Carlos: 
"The lessons took no more than two afternoons, and the only 
thing drivers were told was to behave courteously towards 
passengers, to dress well, and to drive carefully. And this in the 
very same week that [President] Salinas announced that so-and-
so many millions of State funds had gone to SISTECOZOME in 
order to train drivers: jpura madre! [bullshit]." 
On other occasions, bookkeeping "failures" allow SISTECOZOME officials 
to pocket permit contributions. In such a case it may happen that minibus 
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operators, unaware of the fact that their contributions have been detoured, 
continue operations until, inevitably, fines arrive through the mail. In the 
event that operators cannot produce evidence of their timely renewal - a 
difficult thing in a culture where receipts often land in the wastebasket -
then their operating permits are void. Carlos was involved in such a 
situation once, and made to pay for a new permit and fined USD 50. 
Meanwhile, the minibus is seized for 11 days. To make things worse his 
case is officially appraised, and a number of traffic violations surface 
which together add up to more than USD 350. On balance, the circum-
stance costs Carlos two operating permits (the old one for which he had 
already paid, plus a new one), USD 400 in fines and no minibus income 
for 11 days. 
But SISTECOZOME offers even more resistance to Carlos' business. 
In March 1993, the director of the public transport system (Lorenzo 
Quinones) announces that all minibus units have to make place for 
newer, larger (36 seats) midibuses. The argument for this compulsory 
change is that minibuses "suddenly" appear to have been built upon 
freight chassises, hence their suspension is not adequate for the transport 
of citizens. In order to avoid direct clashes with operators, the system's 
director proposes a phased (2 years) introduction of the new, compulsory 
models so that operators may be able to find a suitable solution to their 
new problem. 
Next to this form of resistance there exist other, less apparent ways 
in which SISTECOZOME obstructs Carlos' ambitions. For example, 
increased competition through the issuance of additional permits account 
for a fall in Carlos' income. Thus, while in September 1991 Carlos served 
his route together with 20 fellow operators, by January 1992 the number 
had increased to 24, and halfway through the next year 37 minibuses had 
already been incorporated into the same route. This allowed for departure 
hold-ups and, accordingly, a fall in income. Consequently, monthly 
payment to the arrendadora is endangered, and on more than one 
occasion Carlos is summoned to pay surcharges of 2.5% to his outstand-
ing debt. Add to this the dynamics of a system based on penalties27 and a 
virtual collapse of the Ca/'a Popular of El Grullo (which traditionally 
allows Carlos to fill one gap with another)28 and one can safely assume 
that SISTECOZOME is no little enemy. 
Although SISTECOZOME (through its director, its inspectors, the 
arrendadora) is a constant headache to Carlos, other resistances are 
apparent. For example, the driver (Carlos' cousin) is accused of not being 
loyal and keeping substantial amounts of fare money to himself. In this 
the driver is aided by passengers' obdurate habit of never asking for their 
tickets - making estimations of passengers transported next to impossible. 
As a way out a new driver is hired - Pascual, a cousin of his ousted 
predecessor - but after three weeks of noticeably higher profits passenger 
numbers again seem to decline, giving Carlos ground for new suspicions. 
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Wanting to get the full story on the disappearing act, Carlos resorts to two 
ways of assessing the situation. One involves a comparison of his driver's 
revenues with that of fellow drivers operating the same route. His driver's 
cunning beats him, though, because none of his colleagues seems to have 
a loose tongue. The other alternative open to Carlos entails checking with 
inspectors about the number of departures on a given day or period. This 
however soon also proves to be dead-end: inspectors seem to be very 
fond of 'deflating' the number of registered trips per driver if the latter are 
willing to cooperate in covering the 'high cost of living' of the former.29 
Not able to control the situation Carlos has to adopt a 'see-for-yourself 
strategy. After some driving on his own (and some spying on Pascual) 
Carlos finally obtains the full story: the driver seems to have his own 
interpretation of the amount of registered trips Carlos would find satisfac-
tory - then uses the minibus for his own benefit. This he is able to do by 
feigning a mechanical failure. The failure is reported to the 
SISTECOZOME inspector, who in turn (through the mediation of some 
pesos) issues an official permit to suspend services and visit a repair shop. 
After this, the driving goes on... but profits do not find their way to Carlos 
- a disconnected odometer doing the rest of the job. 3 0 Carlos: 
"He [the driver] would be making like five hundred pesos [USD 
160] and giving half of it to the one giving the salidas [depar-
tures] so that the minibus would not appear on the list. Maybe 
he [the driver] was tempted because I was paying him a salary 
and not a commission for each passenger that got on the mini-
bus. But how can I calculate how many passengers he drove 
around if he doesn't issue any tickets?" 
The bond - based on trust - between Carlos and his new driver is not 
sufficiently strong, and leaves ample room for betrayal. Pascual is 
replaced - this time with good results, as profit increases soon confirm. 
But after having temporarily solved this driver problem, a new one 
surfaces. This time it is not only the driver, but also drinks, a traffic light, 
and an electricity pole which oppose Carlos' plans. According to 
passengers' testimony, Carlos' driver appears to be drunk31, drives 
through a red light, and is nearly hit by an oncoming car. Reacting 
swiftly, the driver manages to dodge the obstacle, but cannot avoid 
bringing the minibus to a standstill against an electricity pole. Nobody is 
injured, but the driver flees and the minibus is seized. The outcome: two 
appearances at court for damaging federal property (the electricity pole), 
fees worth USD 75 for a lawyer, a settlement of USD 450 with the 
municipality of Guadalajara for repairs to the pole, a USD 300 fine at 
SISTECOZOME for letting a drunk driver into his minibus, a bill worth 
USD 1,250 for repairs to the damaged front end of the minibus, and the 
headache of having to hire another driver. 
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Problem-solving, Mexican style 
All down the line, Carlos' plans are defied by heterogeneous obstacles. 
Meat, fiestas, passengers, harvest seasons, SISTECOZOME, softdrinks, 
drivers, traffic lights and so on: they all seem to be obdurate parties. If 
Carlos wishes to succeed in his enterprises, then either he enrols them, or 
keeps them at bay. Can he achieve this in a desired way? Or rather, do 
resistances force Carlos to transform his goals? The answer to these 
questions entail a number of trials of strength on different fronts: can 
resistances be overcome? If so, what new resources should be enrolled? 
Let us examine these trials of strength. 
As we saw above, clients are the central obstacle to Carlos' taco 
stall. Responsibility for their lack of willingness to buy is attributed to 
fiestas, the sugar industry and the effect of different days of the week on 
sales. The crucial question thus becomes: Can these obstacles be 
removed? Clearly Carlos cannot change the order of the days of the week, 
or solve the crisis in the sugar industry - as much as would like to do 
both. Neither can he contest the presence of fiestas or the absence of 
customers at his stall during these. Carlos' total dependency on local 
consumers who live their lives in patterned sequences of days, attend 
fiestas and are affected by the crisis is a burden he has to live with. But 
Carlos can adapt to the situation. He can rework its parameters for action. 
Sure enough, a Monday is a Monday, and a Sunday a Sunday. Through 
time, Carlos learns how to calculate the amount of tacos and tortas eaten 
on a given day in a given time of year. His skills, his knowledge as taco 
seller thus increase. Only seldom do dissatisfied customers leave with an 
empty stomach or are meat and tortillas left over. He likewise devises 
new strategies to counter specific fiestas such as cuaresma (Lent) when 
people do not usually take to meat. So, for example, at one point he tries 
to sell fish tacos during this season.32 
Adapting, yet unable to break clients' resistance Carlos concen-
trates on other fronts. For example, resistance offered by local butchers to 
Carlos' idiosyncratic demand for head meat is soon broken. The first step 
to do so is to ask his affine Valente, the restaurant owner, to buy extra 
meat for him in Guadalajara (Valente has somebody buy meat for him 
every second week or so, depending on business). This construction has 
the disadvantage, though, that Carlos depends on the number of cus-
tomers visiting Valente and thus on the timespan between visits to 
Guadalajara by Valente's driver. To overcome this inconvenience Carlos 
purchases a 300 litre freezer, and decides to purchase imported Canadian 
meat himself whenever he travels to Guadalajara to attend to his minibus 
business.33 
Yet other, seemingly trivial but nevertheless important, problems 
are solved by heterogeneous means. So, for instance, the issue of protec-
tion against harassing customers and potential robbers is settled by always 
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having a .25 calibre pistol at hand. Or the 'betrayal' of his softdrink 
supplier is solved through the mediation of a softdrink distributor (Coca-
Cola, Fanta and Sprite) with whom a contract is signed. Some of the 
'social' resistances are thus countered through the enrolment of 'technical' 
means: molesters are kept at bay through a gun; softdrinks are still sold, 
but now Carlos acquires them through a written document, and not 
anymore through informal and potentially volatile agreements. Symmetri-
cally, 'technical' or 'medical' resistances are retaliated through the 
enrolment of 'social' means. Thus, in the case of gas shortage (a technical 
problem) a pool of neighbours and family is created to travel to Autlan 
weekly and stand in queue at the distribution agency from 5:30am 
onwards (a social solution). Or potential flus and other illnesses knocking 
out Carlos or Anita are answered by training a small number of youngsters 
who can be brought in at short notice to make tacos (though trust in them 
always remains a brittle thing). 
As noted above, Carlos also encounters political resistance. This he 
tries to break through different strategies, for example by helping attach 
the future municipal president's campaign posters on walls scattered all 
through El Grullo. 3 4 Because of this, people identify Carlos as a PRI-
diehard - a label he does not repudiate. Carlos: 
"OK the Party is corrupt. But I like to win, so I'm a priista 
[supporter of PRI]. It's wiser to be with them than against them, 
believe me! So it's either me who adapts, or I go under to 
competitors who are less scrupulous!" 
Other ways to break resistance by the municipality involve contributions 
to the local PRI, or offering free tacos and tortas to members of the police 
or the different members of the County Council. And sometimes it 
involves backing the municipal president who in turn needs^  to support a 
PRI-candidate campaigning for Governor of Jalisco by providing large 
numbers of supporters that will carry the official green-white-red banners 
(PRI's colours) at different political events. In return for these 'services' 
Carlos can procure all sorts of benefits such as lower sidewalk fees to 
establish his taco stall, a permit to close the street whenever he has a 
party, and so on. 3 5 Sometimes however Carlos' costs in providing this 
type of 'services' skyrocket, as is the case in the three-yearly end of 
campaign by the PRI's candidate for the municipal presidency. On these 
occasions, the PRI celebrates a huge fiesta complete with all sorts of 
popular entertainment (dance, bullfights) that is mounted on the basis of a 
cooperation. For example, the owner of the bullfight ring will not charge 
for the use of his installation, rancheros will provide bulls, and taco 
sellers members of CROC or CNOP (like Carlos) end up serving free 
meals to hundreds of customers. Carlos: 
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"It sure is a hell of an expensive evening. But then one doesn't 
do it just for fun. This way, we know we'll be protected for 
three years [the duration of the municipal president's term]. 
Gerardo, you just get along with us prifstas and we'll teach you 
how to run a business in El Grullo!" 
As we can see from the above, some of the resistances offered to the taco 
project can simply not be eluded. Hence Carlos needs to turn to those 
organisational areas where there exists some room for manoeuvre. In the 
case of the minibus, however, the matter is more complicated in the 
sense that less - not more - room exists for a flexible organisation of the 
venture. For example, SISTECOZOME has to be taken on board the way it 
is: no stratagems, no ruses can be developed to keep the system at bay. 
This is especially true in the case of SISTECOZOME's directives to 
introduce new midibuses. There is no way Carlos can escape from this: 
either he considers trading his old minibus for a bigger one within two 
years, or he can say goodbye to the entire business. In the same fashion, 
competition cannot be held off: added drivers congest Carlos' route, 
making the enterprise less profitable. At another level, however, some 
flexibility exists within the system, and Carlos does not hesitate to take 
advantage of the motto that "rules are made to be broken." Inspectors, for 
example, are often paid a "fee" in order that they do not issue too many 
fines for late arrivals, missed bus stops or - at one point - for letting Carlos 
drive, notwithstanding his colour blindness. 
Answers to operational costs are ingeniously found. For instance, 
Carlos obtains a cheap loan for USD 8,300 at the Ca/a Popular in 1992, 
which he uses to finish paying arrears with the credit institution. Or the 
minibus is sometimes rented out to private parties for a lucrative fee. Or 
gas equipment is installed in the minibus to cut down on gasoline costs. 
Despite all these efforts, however, net profits diminish. To be able to stay 
in business, midway through 1993 Carlos has to devise new strategies to 
keep afloat. 
What do these strategies look like? The first one involves circum-
venting untrustworthy drivers. The most obvious answer to this - paying 
drivers a commission - is, as we saw above, a practical impossibility 
because tickets are seldom if ever issued. Thus Carlos resorts to other 
tactics, such as taking his drivers out to dinner and to different night-clubs 
whenever he appears in Guadalajara to check on them - to no avail, as 
we saw above. Since Carlos' distrust is reinforced on every trip he makes, 
at one point it becomes imperative for him to operate the minibus 
together with his driver. This he first does on Fridays and Saturdays since 
he needs to attend the crowds at the taco stall in El Grullo on Sundays.36 
After some months however the situation grows unbearable for Anita -
especially after hearing gossip about Carlos' minibus "having a skirt" - and 
the decision is taken that she and the children will join her husband in 
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The firm is dead. Long live the firm! 
His strategies notwithstanding, Carlos cannot successfully accommodate 
the different demands involved in the minibus enterprise. Pressure to 
repay the minibus, Anita's familial demands (her family expects her to 
care for her ailing mother in El Grullo), exhaustion (of having to drive 15 
hours a day), a high rent and an expensive city-life take their toll. By 
December, 1993, Carlos sells his minibus40 and returns to El Grullo with 
his family. But before doing so, Carlos gets hold of an option on an 
operating permit for "Bing's" - a national ice cream chain - which he 
intends to purchase with money from the sale of the minibus and future 
savings from the taco stall.41 
The main bottleneck to be solved, though, is that of finding an 
adequate space to start the ice-cream parlour. At about the same time, 
however, Alfredo (Carlos' brother-in-law) rents a locale at the periferico 
(business road) on El Grullo's outskirts, and moves the hardware store to 
the new location. Alfredo's move thus dovetails closely with Carlos' new 
plans, as an adequate and strategically located facility for the parlour is 
now on offer. The idea of making and selling ice cream nevertheless 
introduces a set of related problems: how to obtain cash to buy the 
equipment needed and make changes to the space left vacant by Alfredo? 
How to acquire the knowledge necessary to produce and sell ice cream? 
To remove these obstacles, negotiations take place with a number of 
individuals. In the end, a strategy to start the ice cream parlour crystallises 
and a number of roles are laid out: Alfredo will let the space to Carlos; 
his compadre Lucho will be asked for a loan to buy all necessary equip-
ment42; Anita's father will offer expertise in the making of ice cream in 
exchange for a percentage of expected profits;43 and Carlos and Anita 
will attend customers and run the business. 
the city. The move is first seen as inconsiderate by his in-laws in El 
Grullo, who fear that they will run into trouble caring for Anita's diabetic 
mother.37 After some negotiations on the issue, Anita joins Carlos who 
therefore needs to rent an expensive house (USD 500 a month) and look 
for a suitable solution to the problem of who can take over the taco 
business during his absence. The latter is solved when Fernando, an old 
friend of his, agrees to run the stall and split the profit for at least a 
year.3 8 A third strategy to counter the pressure of SISTECOZOME, dis-
honest drivers, corrupt inspectors and the like involves the idea of open-
ing a series of taco stalls in Guadalajara - along the route of the minibus. 
This way, Carlos can control two things at the same time.3 9 The plan 
partially materialises when a first stall is opened in October of 1993. The 
stall however does not meet expectations (a "bad spot" is accused for this) 
and is discontinued. 
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The first step - buying the option on "Bing's" with income from the 
taco stall - turns out to be fraught with difficulties because of Carlos' 
spoken agreement with Fernando that the latter may run the stall for three 
more months. This obstacle is removed by ousting his associate Fernando 
on the ground that he is careless and closes the business if not enough 
customers appear by 7pm - damaging carefully build-up goodwill. 
Fernando is offended and does not want to make a big fuss about it. 
However he comes back one evening three days later, a small calibre 
pistol conspicuously protruding from his belt. I am there, casually visiting 
Carlos and Anita, who are in the (not so casual) company of their 
compadre Lucho and his wife, their comadre Lupe. Right away, Fernando 
demands that Carlos reconsiders his standpoint. After plenty of yelling 
'yes' and 'no' to each other, Carlos offers to let Fernando have a full 
week's profit. This does not stop the shouting, however, as Fernando 
seems not to be very charmed by the proposal. Then, just as I expect a 
gun to be pulled, Lucho gets up from were he has been serenely observ-
ing the struggle. With a sullen voice, he comes between the quarrelling 
parties: 
"Listen Carlos. Don't fight like that. You look like viejas 
chismosas [old gossiping women] this way! The thing is easy. I 
am going to sign you a cheque for one hundred thousand pesos 
[USD 33,000] so that you can get rid of your debts with 
Fernando and start that new thing [the ice cream parlour]. I just 
want to help you! But beware: I don't want to buy any con-
flicts. Either you guys settle this right here and now, or there is 
no deal." 
Immediately the 'conversation' takes a more congenial turn. Carlos and 
Fernando seem to understand what is at stake, and make great efforts to 
reach an agreement. First Carlos offers two complete weeks of earnings, 
including two Sundays. Fernando accepts. But then Anita makes a point: 
from what is the family going to live during those two weeks? After all, 
she needs cash to cover household expenditure, the children need to go 
to school (an expensive business considering the amount of candy and 
french fries an average child can work away in a day), etc. Finally, both 
Carlos and Fernando agree to share profits over a timespan of one month 
and three days.4 4 
After some drinks to celebrate newly-found harmony, Fernando 
leaves Carlos and Lucho to arrange their business. Some estimates are 
made, and in the end it is agreed that a contract for the loan will be 
signed with a notary public. About repayment, it is agreed that Carlos will 
make monthly transfers of USD 1,000 until the opening of the ice cream 
salon when a new compensation schedule will be figured out and negoti-
ated. More drinks are served, and before the third bottle of mezcal is 
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The transformation of Carlos' projects 
When I leave El Grullo halfway through 1994 Carlos' projects do not look 
the same as they did in 1991 when I first met him. At that time, tacos 
were a viable alternative for a falling income at the movie theatre's candy 
store, and the minibus business seemed to offer a way out of 
stigmatisation and promised a financially generous future. In between 
1991 and 1994 many changes had affected Carlos' enterprises and the 
relationship between them. For example, the minibus was first seen as a 
supplement to the tacos establishment, but in due time became relatively 
more important as taco-loving customers failed to appear at the stall in 
sufficient numbers. By the end of our story increasing competition, new 
legislation and illness had prompted the demise of the minibus venture. 
Once more, Carlos would channel his efforts towards tacos and new 
ideas. 
How should one conceive of these changes, these transformations? 
Can one hold Carlos' nature (his cognitive and management capacities) 
responsible? I presume not, for Carlos is not skilled or unskilled, intelli-
gent or stupid. Rather, he becomes a skilled, intelligent or foolish 
ambulant seller and minibus operator through the production of a set of 
specific relationships. How to evaluate this process cannot be determined 
beforehand for, in order to succeed, Carlos first needs to define the way 
to assess his businesses. Are these transformations, then, the outcome of 
insurgent customers, stigmatisation, or the power games of a public 
transport system. Wel l , yes, in a way. But only if all these heterogeneous 
elements are taken together and seen as a whole. For there is no one 
particular element that can be privileged when explaining the continuous 
shifts in Carlos' strategies. Indeed, he incorporates in his networks such 
seemingly foreign actors as legislators, in-laws and financiers, providing 
they can functionally contribute to his business' goals. Thus tacos are not 
just tacos, and minibuses are not just minibuses. Sure enough, take away 
tortillas or meat, and a taco will not be. Take away tires or a steering 
wheel, and the minibus is inoperable. But less obviously, tacos will cease 
to exist without legislators and a father-in-law, and the minibus will only 
remain a dream without financiers. Carlos' strategies, then, are of a 
heterogeneous nature. 
Having said this, we now have to turn briefly to the issue of 
'strategy'. For in the above account, the suggestion is made that 'strategy' 
can be held responsible for that which cannot be explained by social, 
cognitive, technical, economic or other factors on their own. So what 
status should one accord to the concept of 'strategy'? For example, can 
finished, Carlos' compadre suggests discussing the possibility of becoming 
associates in the "Bing's" business... 
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Conclusion 
Were Carlos' projects successful? Did his projects succeed in becoming 
obligatory points of passage between localized and contextualized actors? 
Did the actors from the global networks have an interest in the products 
and services offered by Carlos' projects? Did Carlos effectively mobilize 
local networks, and control the transactions between these networks and 
the global ones? To provide an answer, we first need to recapitulate on 
the character of these local and global networks: of what were they 
composed? 
In the case of the taco venture, the global network is constituted by 
diverse actors such as distant and close-by fiestas, politicians, or hungry 
customers desiring tacos. These elements coalesced to let the project 
create its own 'inside': a local network geared to offer some economic or 
culinary return to actors situated in the 'outside'. Put differently, the 
global network allowed the project to put together a number of local 
elements (tacos, softdrinks, political alliance, and so on) successfully: to 
the extent that the 'outside' could expect a return, the 'inside' became an 
obligatory point of passage. Thus in the taco business Carlos was able to 
create some 'room for manoeuvre'. He succeeded in building a context 
and a content that enabled him to sell tacos for a profit. In more theoreti-
cal terms, the taco stall allowed Carlos' project to act as an obligatory 
point of passage - even though, in the end, this point of passage proved to 
be a weak one. But can we hold the 'context' (i.e. a dwindling number of 
customers as an effect of decreasing economic opportunities in the El 
Grullo valley) responsible for bringing about this weakness? Not really, for 
then this same 'context' would make Carlos' plans to start an ice cream 
salon - involving the same local, paying customers - look absurd. Rather, I 
propose that the obligatory point of passage was frail simply because 
Carlos does not love selling tacos enough. Other ideas, other expecta-
tions, other associations emerged which offered the opportunity to engage 
in an alternative activity. Starting a business then - or giving up one - are 
Carlos' struggles to run parallel branches of economic activity be seen as 
a conscious risk-avoiding strategy? From the point of view of a detached 
observer, such an argument may indeed be made. But does Carlos see it 
this way as well? No, since emphasising one branch instead of the other 
(and vice versa) is an effect of a collective in which inspectors, drivers, 
consumers, PRI cadres etc. become differently articulated with each other. 
An effect which cannot be reduced to an initial strategy - in fact an effect 
that is not desired by Carlos in the first place. So perhaps one should 
conceive of the rises and slumps in Carlos' businesses as a more fluid 
phenomenon. A phenomenon which Carlos tries to master through the 
mobilisation of heterogeneous means. 
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not clear-cut events, but rather incidents that have a trajectory of their 
own. A trajectory that cannot be reduced to the machinations of 'context' 
or to economistic notions of success or failure. What these events require 
is an account of how the heterogeneous elements make up these events, 
and how these are in turn sorted out, ordered, and related to each other 
differently in each translation attempt. 
The case of Carlos' minibus enterprise differs from the taco project 
in that here we witness a shift from a situation in which the minibus acts 
as an obligatory point of passage to a situation in which it ceases to do 
so. In contrast with the taco business, however, the global network that is 
essential for the operation of his business has already been put into place 
by other actors. In fact, then, here Carlos only participated in maintaining 
a global network that provided legal, material and economic resources, 
and which allowed him some degree of manoeuvre to operate the 
minibus. The global network made up of inspectors, permits, directives 
etc. proved to be too solid, too powerful for Carlos to manipulate at will. 
All Carlos could - and did - do, was to dedicate his energy in finding 
ways to 'soften' the impact of a public transport system that eventually 
brought his minibus to a grinding halt. Thus Carlos found enough room to 
'experiment' with the minibus and make private arrangements 'inside', 
that is, he could associate heterogeneous actors such as his taco stall, the 
Ca/a Popular, drivers, inspectors, his mother-in-law, etc. in different ways. 
Despite some difficulties in holding together the local network - especially 
concerning treacherous drivers - the project was first successful as it 
compelled elements from the 'outside' (especially: passengers) to partici-
pate in the exchanges going on between elements of the 'inside'. In due 
time, however, changes in the global network (an addition of minibuses 
on the same route; requirements to switch to newer, safer and larger 
buses) made modifications in the local network necessary. After some 
trials of strength in which different elements were re-articulated, the 
'inside' turned out not to be durable enough to withstand the pressure of 
dissident drivers, a mother-in-law, or an expensive city life. The minibus 
project thus stopped acting as an obligatory point of passage between the 
global and the local network, and finally collapsed. Care, again, should 
be taken not to blame the 'system' or the 'context' for this failure: thou-
sands of minibus owners - day-in-day-out - still provide transport for 
Guadalajara's population. Like the showdown of the tacos, then, the 
collapse of Carlos' minibus enterprise cannot be attributed to any one 
single factor. In the end, the selling of the minibus follows a trial of 
strength, a trajectory, that is not exclusively dictated by a corrupt public 
transport system. Rather, the end of Carlos' excursion into public transport 
is a complex liaison involving a mother-in-law with diabetes, taco stalls in 
El Grullo and in the megalopolis, hungry customers, passengers in a 
hurry, as well as a corrupt public transport system. Carlos does not sell 
his minibus because he is squeezed out of business but, as in the case of 
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the tacos, because he does not love his minibus project enough - when 
Carlos' objects of passion turn from run-down minibuses and hot tacos to 
cold ice cream. 
To different degrees, Carlos' projects temporarily succeeded in 
becoming obligatory points of passage. How did Carlos achieve this? 
How did he enrol the different actors from the global and local networks? 
As stated in Chapter Two, to address these questions I use the concept of 
translation - that is, the methods of problematization, intéressement and 
enrolment which eventually lead to the mobilization of the global and 
local networks. In the case of the taco stall, these methods (and their 
consequences) are laid down or inscribed in a set of intermediaries that 
circulate between the two networks and which define the identity and the 
relationships between the actors involved. So, for example, intermediaries 
such as tacos, softdrinks and money circulate between Carlos and his 
clients, while at the same time they define the identity of the actors 
involved: Carlos as a seller of tacos; clients as buyers thereof. The degree 
of translation is weak, however, and the collectif is fragile. Fiestas, 
problems with the sugar industry, Lent or strong competition translate 
Carlos' clients in a more compelling way. By comparison, in the case of 
the minibus, translation is more successful. Passengers wish to travel; 
Carlos is willing to transport them; an arrendadora voluntarily grants a 
loan; SISTECOZOME has enough room to incorporate Carlos' project. Of 
course, here intermediaries also circulate: credit agreements, operation 
permits, a minibus or corrupt inspectors all participate in defining the 
nature of the relationship between the different actors. 
Yet why were translation attempts weak in the case of the taco 
project, and relatively stronger in the case of the minibus venture? Here 
the notion of translation regime is helpful for sorting out these questions. 
As I argued in Chapter Two, translation regimes refer to those general and 
local rules that impinge on the character of any network. In the case of 
Carlos' taco stall, the translation regime is vulnerable. Neither the inside 
nor the outside of the project can be said to be strongly regulated, and 
the taco business did not create any rules of its own which could be 
added to conventions generally followed: the calendar of fiestas did not 
change because Carlos sold tacos. In the case of the minibus, the situation 
is different: the project was indeed able to create a series of customary 
practices - drivers buying off inspectors being the most notorious one -
and add these to the general regulatory framework. No doubt, the oper-
ational mode of SISTECOZOME would crumble to pieces without the 
addition of these local rules: if passengers demanded a ticket on each and 
every trip, if inspectors were not corrupt, or if counterfeit repair invoices 
did not exist then surely SISTECOZOME would be a different animal 
altogether. This dependency, this reliance of the public transport system 
of Guadalajara on local, culturally specific rules indeed account for a 
strong translation regime. 
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Notes 
1. In the sense in which I use them, 'global' and 'local' networks are not 
based upon a geographical metaphor. Thus some 'global' actors may actually 
be close-by to the locus of a project, while a number of 'local' actors may be 
in distant places. 
2. See Chapter Two for an elaboration of these concepts. 
3. See Chapter Two for a definition of these concepts. 
4. A passenger bus seating 24 people. 
5. These consist of a taco cart, a torta cart, a wooden table, knives, napkins, 
two gas cylinders, a rack of softdrinks, a large, 10 litre jar with horchata (a 
drink made from rice), saucers, a bucket with tortillas, a bucket with meat, 
plastic dishes, a bucket for trash, a bucket with used dishes and a metal 
container with the day's turnover. 
6. Carlos' father was a brother of Marfa Perez Pelayo, wife of Tarcisio 
Jimenez (largest store-owner in El Grullo.) Marfa has kept her economic 
activities separate from those of her husband. She owns real estate and 
Using the concepts of global and local networks, obligatory points 
of passage, translation and translation regimes let us now summarise the 
morphology of the networks in which Carlos' projects are involved. As I 
spelled out in Chapter Two, a useful concept for describing the morphol-
ogy of networks is that of convergence or degree of integration of the 
network. The degree of convergence, in turn, can be gauged through a 
combination of the above concepts. Thus, the more aligned (translated) 
and the stronger a translation regime, the more the constituent actors of a 
network can be seen as working together in a common enterprise. 
Carlos' taco stall, however, cannot be conceived of as forming part of a 
convergent network. The project thus operates within a collectif that is 
not strongly integrated, that is, not many rules, regulations or cultural 
arrangements govern interactions within the network. Even though the 
project acts as an obligatory point of passage, the low degree of conver-
gence endangers viability. The situation is different in the case of the 
minibus business, were convergence is relatively strong and viability is 
enhanced through stronger translations and translation regimes. The fact 
that the minibus enterprise collapsed cannot be attributed to the morphol-
ogy of the network, but was the result of a failure to sufficiently control 
interactions with the local network. 
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jewelry shops in Guadalajara, and operates a fleet of trailers with which she 
transports many goods her husband sells from Los Angeles, California. Both 
the Perez and the Pelayo clan from Autlan have united their capital through a 
number of parallel cross-cousin marriages. Because Carlos was born from an 
illegitimate relationship he was never recognized as part of the clan. Accord-
ing to Carlos, this was done in order to keep him away from inheritance 
claims he may have laid on the family's wealth. 
7. Anita's family was originally from El Grullo. They lived a year in 
Guadalajara, a year in Tijuana, and 18 years in Autlan .where Don Beto -
Anita's father- owned an ice cream parlor in the centre of town. In 1981 the 
family (together with a sister of Anita's mother) moved to El Grullo, where 
they bought a large house on the main plaza. There Don Beto opened a 
small ice-block factory and a rental agency for Public Address Systems, while 
his wife started a hardware store (of which later Anita's brother Alfredo later 
became co-owner). Anita's background is quite different from that of Carlos, 
as she was sent to a private nun's school to finish her high school (Carlos in 
contrast was raised in a poor neighborhood and attended a government 
school). Anita has travelled extensively, including Rome where Anita's other 
brother Carlos (a teacher at Autlan's seminary) finished seminary in Rome. 
This brother is the family's pride, especially after he officiated Holy Mass 
together with Pope John Paul II in 1984. 
8. The market stalls never turned out to be profitable, as it took customers 
quite a while to get used to visiting the relocated new market. 
9. Anita's mother suffered from diabetes, and her foot had been recently 
amputated. She needed Anita to be around in the house to take care of the 
household which comprised herself, her sister Licho, and her husband Beto. 
10. These included a tax form, a license from the Health Ministry, and official 
affiliation to the local CNOP - next to the CROC and the CTM, one of PRI's 
three corporatist organizations. 
11. Valente (Pastor) is a well-known singer in Mexico. He owes his reputation 
to Vicente Fernandez - the country's most celebrated interpreter of rancheritas 
(traditional mariachi tunes - with whom he has appeared on television on a 
number of occasions). When not out on tour Valente lives in El Grullo, 
where he owns a restaurant. He is married to a sister-in-law of Anita. 
12. Lucho was Carlos' first son's baptismal godfather. The relationship 
between them dated from the time Carlos was working on one of Lucho's 
two buses. 
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13. Sistema de Transporte Colectivo de la Zona Metropolitana, a state-run 
organ which, together with the Alianza de Camioneros, is responsible for 
Guadalajara's public transport system. 
14. SISTECOZOME initially issued a batch of 200 permits for a nominal fee of 
USD 65. A second batch of 400 permits soon followed, but this time the fee 
increased to USD 230. By the time Carlos considered entering the business, a 
third batch of 600 permits was being issued for a fee of USD 230 each, but 
word was out that a next generation of permits was going to cost over USD 
1,600. If Carlos wanted to join, it was thus imperative to do so quickly. 
15. Banco Nacional de Mexico, Mexico's second-largest commercial bank. 
16. Alfredo eventually negotiated a loan for USD 66,000 with a local 
moneyshark who charged 10% a month. However, the loan did not find its 
way into the hardware store, but was instead channelled to finish building his 
house at once (according to Anita, this he had done in order to please his 
wife from Guadalajara who was seen as being "very demanding"). At the time 
of my fieldwork, Alfredo had finished paying the debt (and building the 
house, which eventually cost him double the amount of the loan), but in the 
process the hardware store was hurt badly as money was taken out of it to 
service the debt and not to restock the inventory. 
17. According to Carlos, the smallprint of the document contained many 
irregularities. Although he made a point about this, he was simply told to 
"sign or forget about the minibus". 
18. The total price for the minibus was USD 21,000. After the down pay-
ment, a credit line for USD 17,000 was obtained through "Arrendadora 
Havre" from Mexico City. This arrendadora was itself a subsidiary of 
"Arrendadora BANAMEX", a branch of BANAMEX. The terms of credit 
determined that Carlos had two years to repay, at an annual interest rate of 
35%. In the end, Carlos would thus have ended paying close to USD 30,000 
for the USD 17,000 he initially borrowed. The director of SISTECOZOME 
himself had made the purchase of "Havre" minibuses mandatory. Apparently, 
through this manoeuvre the director had obtained two "executive" minibuses 
(with 16 plush seats and air conditioning) as a present from the company that 
builds the bodies and mounts upon Chevrolet chassises and engines. 
19. The franchise, to be renewed every second year, cost Carlos an additional 
USD 500. Considering the high demand for profitable routes, it was common 
practice that only the highest bidders could obtain one. 
20. This figure, however, does not include the servicing of the loan, deprecia-
tion of the unit, repairs and driver's salary. 
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21. Another example of this seasonality is the Lent, which is a big thing 
locally, and many would-be customers stick to eating fish instead of meat. 
22. Ambulant sellers needed to pay a fee for each square meter of sidewalk 
they occupied. In El Grullo, this amount ranged from USD 1.50 per square 
meter per day as in the case of Carlos, to USD 8.30 for tianguistes, to USD 
5,000 (!) for setting up an attraction stand for a fortnight at El Grullo's 
carnival. 
23. Annoying customers were always a part of the picture, but little could be 
expected in terms of protection from the police. This I observed on an 
occasion when a drunkard -playing with a knife- was pestering Carlos. Carlos 
had a boy go and fetch the police. The boy returned with the message that 
Carlos should kick the drunkard away himself. 
24. The parlor only opened on Sundays, the most profitable night. As I 
observed myself (I was cashier at Carlos' on a number of Sundays) sales 
decreased by nearly 25% immediately after the pizza parlor started operations 
in December 1992. 
25. "Tres Hermanos" was a relatively large undertaking. It was "American-
style" in that filling for the tacos (meat, poultry, fish, sauce, cilantro, etc.) 
were displayed in hygienic aluminum containers built into a large wooden 
bar and covered by glass shelves. Customers only needed to point to the 
object of their appetite and an attractive, young female attendant with a white 
hat, plastic overall and polyethylene gloves would come to their aid and 
carefully carry out the request. 
26. With some 1,500 buses driving around for SISTECOZOME in 1992-93, 
monthly concession fees added up to a lofty USD 60,000. This figure was 
supplemented by fees (USD 3) asked for every changing of drivers if the 
minibus was operated for longer than 8 hours (a common practice). 
27. For example, the departure times of minibuses (at the starting point of the 
route) as well as the arrival times at certain junctions had to be strictly 
followed by drivers. In case of early departures, "non-arrivals" at uncrowded 
(unprofitable) bus stops, or delays on the route (which could in principle 
always be because of the chaotic nature of Guadalajara's traffic flow) a fine of 
USD 3 had to be paid to SISTECOZOME. 
28. As from October 1993, the Ca/a Popular stopped extending credit to all 
but a few of its members. The argument for this policy was that the rate of 
repayment of credits had fallen from over 93% in 1992 to a mere 57% 
halfway through the next year. 
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29. Minibuses needed to have a minimum number of official exits per day. 
On Carlos' route, this minimum was five. 
30. Visits to repair shops were difficult for Carlos to confirm since mechanics 
and drivers connived to 'beating the system' by exchanging counterfeit 
invoices and money or favors. (These practices, though, were made more 
difficult through the issuance of standardized invoices made mandatory by 
Hacienda in 1993). 
31. Officially, drunken driving or driving with a heavy hangover was an 
impossibility because SISTECOZOME took alcohol tests on its drivers every 
day. In practice however the test could be circumvented through a mordida 
(bribe), or by drinking en route. 
32. Demand however was not enough for the innovation to be profitable and 
the experiment was soon discontinued. 
33. This entailed some arrangements with friends owning a vehicle (I myself 
had to help out on a number of occasions), since the trip with the bus would 
take too long and the meat would start thawing. Also, buying meat in 
Guadalajra entailed new difficulties, the most important one being the possi-
bility of buying on credit - which was more difficult in an anonymous whole-
sale market. 
34. Campaigning is a big thing in Mexico, and can be pretty expensive as 
well. For example, in El Grullo a regular campaign for a municipal president 
can cost up to USD 65,000 - not including political support. 
35. Sometimes Carlos - member of the CNOP - did not attend to the meetings 
himself, but instead 'hired' a tianguista (ambulant market seller) to do the job 
for him. In such a case, besides paying for the lost income and trip costs 
(including food), possible resistance by the tianguista was overcome by 
offering tacos, tortas and softdrinks from time to time (and of course by 
covering the expenses of the 'representation'). One of the main mechanisms 
of PRI staying in power for such a long time is that it is supported in this way 
by small-scale traders, tianguistas, ejidatarios and the corporatist unions: 
CTM, CNOP, CROC, CNC and CNPP. 
36. In Guadalajara, Carlos was living in a house of an acquaintance from El 
Grullo who had been trying to sell it for over four years. In return for clean-
ing, taking care of the house and showing it to potential buyers, Carlos was 
allowed to live there free of rent. 
37. Beto, Anita's father, did not do much for his wife since he left home daily 
after breakfast to pass most of the day with another woman with whom he 
had a longstanding relationship. Anita's mother, grudgingly went along with 
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the situation. To make clear to the outside world that she was still number 
one, however, she put forward one condition: that her husband be at home 
for breakfast, lunch and dinner. 
38. The arrangement had not been without effort. In June 1993 Carlos looked 
for Fernando in his rancho to propose the deal. Fernando had to think over 
things twice, since he had been offered a steady job at a taquerla {taco shop) 
in Anaheim, California where he could make USD 350 a week. Carlos even 
visited Fernando a second and a third time to beg him. The last time 
Fernando consented. For Carlos, the deal implicated that he had to provide 
all the meat, while Fernando would pay for the softdrinks, bread and tortillas. 
The revenue would then be split as follows: 40% for Carlos (who provided a 
strategically located stall with a good number of clients) and 60% for 
Fernando. The deal, however, was never put on paper. 
39. For reasons to do with trust, Carlos initially thought to employ colleagues 
from El Grullo only. To cut down on living expenses, the operator of the stall 
-a friend from El Grullo- would be living at Carlos'. 
40. The minibus was sold to a car dealer for USD 8,200. Of this, nearly half 
went to the arrendadora to finish servicing the initial credit. 
41. This was quite a costly business. Apart from the USD 14,000 he would 
have to lay down for the concession, Carlos also needed to finance a market-
ing study to be carried out by "Bing's" headquarters. 
42. This involved various ice cream machines, refrigerated counters, a glass 
front to the store, air-conditioning, a new floor, tables and chairs. 
43. Anita's father had virtually been into ice-cream and ice-block making all 
his life. Carlos' plan to get involved in this line of business as well was, 
however, unrelated to his father-in-law's profession. 
44. The three 'extra' days were included in the agreement because of the 
nearing Lent (no sales on Fridays) and Mardi Gras, when the stall would be 
closed because Fernando and Carlos planned to visit the carnival of Autlan 
together. 
CHAPTER 5 
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Strategies, Resources, and a Bar 
It is a cold December night. I have just moved to this specific neighbour-
hood - not far from the centre of town - and am out 'checking' for poss-
ible shops with which to start my case studies. Out of the six tiendas 
(shops) on our block, there is one that calls my attention straightaway. It is 
located next to a dentist's office, and just opposite to a huge pile of 
garbage waiting to be collected early in the morning. Outside, two 
brightly-lit commercial advertisements strongly solicit customers' attention. 
One displays a huge yellow star, surrounded by the brand name of a 
beer: Cerveza Estrella, which it seems is intended to seduce thirsty 
clients. Another one beautifully depicts a rooster and a dentist, the latter 
in the process of pulling out one of the rooster's teeth. Just below a pool 
of blood in which the rooster stands, I read a slogan in buoyant red 
letters: Aqul le sacaron la muela al gal to (here the rooster's tooth is taken 
out). This appears to be the name of the shop. No doubt, the advertise-
ment is designed to tempt price-conscious patrons. I fall prey to the 
inviting displays and enter the store. Inside Chabelo, a plump man in his 
fifties, welcomes me with a charming smile: 
[CHABELO]: Good evening. What will it be? 
[GERARD]: Cigarettes. Marlboro. And do you have matches? 
[CH]: Here we carry all you may need... Are you the one living in Pedro's 
house? 
[GE]: Yes, we just moved in last week. 
[CH]: So were do you come from? 
[GE]: Holland. That's close to where the Pope lives. 
[CH]: Ah, Holland... Very good football team you've got there! That nigger 
son of a bitch, I think Gullit is his name. What a player! Tell me: I thought 
that over there everybody would be tall and blond like yourself and that guy 
working at the SARH [Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources]. Is that 
not so? Why is Gullit playing with the Dutch team? 
[GE]: Well, his dad came from a Dutch colony, so now he has Dutch nation-
ality. 
[CH, puzzled]: / never thought about that... 
Chabelo reaches for a five-litre plastic bottle containing mezcal: 
[CH]: Here, so that you may warm up a bit! It's damn cold tonight, isn't it? 
I accept, and ask for a soft drink to dilute it. Chabelo serves me a glass 
which he gets from behind the counter, gives it to me and asks: 
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[CH]: So how much are you paying for Pedro's house? 
[GE]: Six hundred 
[CH]: ujule! That's a lot, my friend. He must have thought you were Ameri-
can. You'd better come and see my place: I'll rent it to you for just a little 
more, but it's nearly twice the size, and it's got a beautiful garden full of 
coconut trees and mangoes. Nice and fresh! 
[GE]: Well that's very kind of you... but I've just signed a contract with Pedro 
for a year. 
[CH]: Never mind that contract. That Pedro is just as crooked as he can be... 
First you should come and see my house... Anyway, I'm new in this godfor-
saken neighbourhood as well, so that makes two of us! 
[GE]: You mean you just got started? 
[CH]: That's right. I rented the place a month ago and got me some chivas 
[things] to sell... 
[CH]: ... but I still have to clean up the place. If people buy food with me, it 
should be clean, right? And the fridge still has to come. Son of a bitch... why 
do they always like to keep one waiting? Here, have another mezcalazo, you 
and I are going to improve this neighbourhood, you'll see! 
W e all take another mezcal, and move some chairs outside the shop and 
onto the sidewalk. There we continue our conversation. Two dogs inspect 
the contents of a garbage sack while Chabelo, now in a negative mood, 
starts cursing about a two-week old city council ordinance which states 
that all shops should close by 9 p.m. and not by 1 0 p.m as was habitual. 
Chabelo: 
"I'll be losing my income! Is the council going to pay me for 
the difference, or what? And where do people get their milk 
and bread from if they can't shop before nine? That's just not 
fair! I know what it's all about: it's the Mandamus1 who is 
behind this move. After all, he does not benefit when he closes 
at eight while all others stay open. But I'll just keep open until I 
like. If others want to close earlier because they are afraid of 
the police: that's up to them. If they get tough on me I'll get a 
lot of signatures and send them to the proper authorities in 
Guadalajara; just wait and see!" 
What can one infer from the casual encounter described above? "Not 
much", some would argue. "A window to power exercised on local policy 
by large store owners", others would say. And maybe others would 
remark that spirits bring about a relaxed conversation in which all sorts of 
anecdotal information is exchanged. 
To me, the episode is interesting enough to start writing a book. 
For the small exchange of words already draws, delineates and de-scribes 
an actor-network. A collectif in which all sorts of heterogeneous 
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elements - both distant and close, and related to the past, the present and 
the future - are freely associated with one another. Thus the small vignette 
de-scribes a world made out of watchful shop owners that keep an eye on 
their neighbours and assign a reputation to distributors of consumer 
goods; innocent researchers paying excessive rents and attributing geo-
graphical ignorance to their research subjects; global media matching 
countries to the qualities of football teams but banning windmills, 
wooden shoes, or colonial and racial relations from their broadcasts; 
hierarchical relations between shop owners and their friends; legal 
arrangements that curb the sale of spirits under the counter; changing 
political relations that make room for collective action mediated through 
signatures. Add a few lines to the above account, and the list of associ-
ations would increase, taking one into the realm of Chabelo's household, 
the domain of his emotions, or the province of his love-life. In short, more 
associations take us into the field of practice. 
Descriptions such as the one presented above provide, in principle, 
a window on whatever terrain we wish to study. But this is a methodo-
logical point. What I am interested in, rather, is to provide a statement 
about the character of the collectif of which Chabelo is a part, and to § 
relate this cfiaT^gr^^e^feasjbii jtylof his enterprise. To make such a 
statement, I need to follow and describe Chabelo's projects as they 
unfolded from the end of 1 9 9 2 to halfway through 1994 when my 
fieldwork ended. This, however, is an arbitrary moment in time. To fully 
understand the problems Chabelo faced in carrying out these projects thus 
necessitates some degree of historical qualification. So let us delve briefly 
into Chabelo's past. 
Chabelo: the emergence of a project 
Chabelo can be characterised as an eloquent, outspoken man with a 
strong inclination to have things his way. This was already apparent at 
school-going age when, against his father's orders, he preferred hanging 
around the local mechanical repair shop to attending school. His aversion 
to school was such, that his father - an ejidatario from Ayuquila - bought 
1 2 0 goats for Chabelo to take care of. Chabelo: 
"But I always disliked, and still dislike agriculture. My father would hit 
me for it... But still I didn't take care of the animals properly because 
they quite simply didn't interest me." 
Chabelo had other plans. He takes up a mechanical apprenticeship at a 
shop in Autlan, where he learns enough skills to join a passenger bus 
company doing the Manzanillo-Autlan route to attend breakdowns. With 
the income, Chabelo rents a house in Ayuquila, where he marries Victoria 
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his neighbour. The marriage does not function, and after a year the young 
couple divorce - leaving Victoria with a daughter. Because of the incident, 
Chabelo is more-or-less forced to leave the community. He moves to 
Colima, where he earns a living driving 20-litre drinking water gallons 
around town. 
By 1965 Chabelo's father develops an eye ailment that prevents 
him from working full-time on his e/ido fields, and Chabelo feels obliged 
to support his parents financially. This entailed that a higher income was 
needed. Looking for a more remunerable job, Chabelo ends up working a 
3-year period in Indio (California) where, together with his older brother 
Margarito, they dig ditches for a local cable-TV company. Chabelo earns a 
fair bit of money while in the US, and is able to send some remittances 
back to his parents. However, billiards, dancing parties and women see to 
it that not much is left when his father's condition deteriorates and 
Chabelo is summoned to stay "close to home" for any eventuality. So by 
1970 Chabelo returns to Colima for good, and financially supports his 
parents through his income as a passenger bus driver. After two years of 
driving Chabelo gets tired of the irregular driving timetables, and takes on 
a job as milk collector for a local dairy firm. He supplements earnings 
working for a distributing agency, supplying grocery shops with a number 
of basic products.2 
At about this time Chabelo marries Juana, daughter of a shop 
owner in Armerfa and client of his. With the help of Juana's father, the 
young couple builds a house on a plot close to Juana's parental home. 
The situation remains unchanged until halfway through 1973, when the 
distributing agency goes out of business. It takes Chabelo a while to find 
some new source of income, but by the end of that year he is again 
driving - this time a taxi in Colima. The job is discontinued when, a year 
later, Chabelo's mother dies. Since none of Chabelo's brothers or sisters 
feel responsible for taking care of their nearly blind father, Chabelo and 
Juana move to Ayuquila to help. There Chabelo borrows some money 
from friends and from his baptismal godfather Goyo, and buys a taxi 
which he operates in nearby El Grullo. The activity is short-lived, though: 
because of Chabelo's extrovert attitude, he soon builds up a wide net-
work of influential friends and is elected municipal traffic delegate by way 
of the taxi driver's Chapter of the Union (CROC). This assignment brings 
Chabelo into close contact with local PRI cadre, who in turn are instru-
mental in offering him his next - very 'profitable' - assignment: that of 
inspector of the 'Melchor Ocampo' sugar mill. His main duty is to inspect 
the state of farmers' sugarcane and assess whether or not it is mature, 
enough to be harvested and sent to the mill. Chabelo keeps his position 
for two administrations (six years), in the process amassing what could be 
called a little fortune by local standards.3 Most of this is spent on women, 
bands and drink, but a part of it nevertheless finds its way into an expens-
ive house in El Grullo. By 1983, when he is removed as inspector, 
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Chabelo has already shifted the bulk of his activities into usury and 
growing sugarcane on his father's 6-hectare ejido plot - which by that 
time has been registered in his name. 
Between 1983 and 1991 there is relative tranquillity in Chabelo's 
life. He attends his moneylending business and his sugarcane, while his 
wife Juana takes care of Rodolfo their son and her father-in-law. In 1987 
Chabelo increases his real estate assets when one of his clients cannot 
repay a loan and exchanges a 700 square-meter urban ejido lot in El 
Grullo for the outstanding debt. By 1990 Chabelo grows tired of the sugar 
mill - which is having difficulty in paying sugarcane producers - and rents 
4.5 hectares of his land to Carlos who, as local head of the CNPP 
(National Union of Private Landholders) does not seem to be bothered 
much about the lack of liquidity of the mill.4 Tragedy, however, strikes 
Chabelo and Juana in July 1991 when their only son Rodolfo is murdered 
at age 12.5 To make things worse, Juana's mother develops an illness 
only months later and, with nobody to attend her, Juana leaves for 
Colima. Meanwhile, Chabelo is left alone with his father who has already 
moved into his place in El Grullo. 
When I meet Chabelo at the end of 1992 he is living with his father, Rosa 
and her twelve-year old daughter Sol. Rosa has been hired in mid-1992 to 
cook, clean the house, and take care of changing Chabelo's father's 
diapers, and is initially living in a side building at the back of Chabelo's 
garden. However, after a few weeks a relationship engenders between 
Chabelo and Rosa, to the effect that she becomes pregnant and takes up 
quarters inside the main house. According to Chabelo, his wife Juana 
officially knows nothing about the affair, "but surely some gossip must 
already have reached her." As for Juana herself, she never travels to El 
Grullo, rents a house in Colima for herself and her mother, and runs a 
small grocery shop. Once a month Chabelo pays them a visit, bringing 
along USD 650 to help cover her expenses.6 
Chabelo's main source of income is still the interest he charges for 
lending out money, but profits seem to be decreasing because of the 
general economic crisis which more and more often prevents his 
'customers' from fulfilling obligations.7 In addition, Chabelo is receiving 
an income from the rent of his plots and from the shop which he has 
recently opened "out of boredom". As it seems, the idea to open the shop 
is given to him by his godfather Goyo, one of El Grullo's largest shop 
owners. Apart from giving Chabelo the idea, Goyo also contributes by 
providing the initial inventory and necessary contacts to open accounts 
with softdrink and beer bottling companies (which in turn provide the 
refrigerators), as well as a permit to sell beer. All Chabelo needs to do is 
to look for a suitable locale for the shop (and for which he pays a month-
ly rent of USD 260, including electricity). Otherwise, Goyo supplies most 
canned food and detergents, Eulalio Zamora (a local wholesaler in 
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perishable goods) provides fruits and vegetables, and different distributors 
sell the remaining merchandise (mainly candies, softdrinks, beer, bread 
and potato chips). A number of products Chabelo buys at "La 
Companfa" - El Grullo's largest supermarket - because its prices are often 
lower6 than those offered by official distributors (such as stationery, 
deodorants and other drugstore goods, diapers and baby food, chilies and 
mezcal). Chabelo does not exploit the shop fully (depending on his mood 
it may open or remain closed), but he is certainly operating with a profit: 
on most products (except beer, softdrinks and a number of subsidised 
'basic needs' goods such as sugar, toilet paper or bread) he makes 20%. 
Chabelo does not keep track of daily trade, but according to my own 
calculations daily sales of over USD 125 are not uncommon.9 Except for 
perishable goods and the products he buys at "La Companfa", Chabelo 
pays taxes over all his invoices. 
Two months after I first meet Chabelo new plans are taking shape in his 
head. These are centred around his new lover Rosa, an ambitious woman 
in her late thirties. She has proposed that Chabelo open a centra botanero 
familiar™ (bar) and let her operate it. Rosa has plenty of experience in 
this line of business, and persuades Chabelo that a well-run centra may 
earn him many times that which he is making from the store, renting out 
land or lending money. Chabelo: 
"Well of course I know that a centra botanero [bar] can be a 
little gold mine. The thing is, you have to take account of two 
things. First, it must be a place that can be frequent by families 
to attract as many clients as possible. If you start having whores 
and loud music inside, neighbours will always find a way to 
have your business closed down in a year or two. I've seen that 
all around, I know what I'm talking about. And the second 
thing is that you need someone you can really trust to run the 
place. If not, soon everybody will be eating and drinking at 
one's expense." 
Ejido councils, landowners and beer companies: possible collaborators? 
To push through his plans, though, a number of actors have to be 
enrolled. Let us now turn to these actors, and the reasons why they 
should be enrolled. In the first place, Chabelo sets out to seek a suitable 
place to start the centra. It does not take long before he finds one: a plot 
just over 1,000 square meters that is on sale close to the business road 
skirting El Grullo and near the exit to Tonaya. The main reason he gives 
for liking the plot is its specific location: 
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"I don't know why, but lately everybody is starting business in 
that area of town: two centros botaneros, Ramona's canteen, 
Valente's restaurant, the tyre shop and the electrical garage, the 
car wash and "El Mariachi" [a large hall]... there's something in 
being all together, I guess, because the business of one attracts 
customers for the business of the other." 
The owner of this specific plot, Rafael, is selling for USD 60 ,000 . The 
problem however is that Chabelo cannot pay cash. Rafael, then, has to be 
convinced to trade the plot for something else. This turns out to be 
Chabelo's six hectares of ejido land in Ayuquila. All of Chabelo's friends 
try to convince him of the "foolishness" of the exchange, but Chabelo 
argues that he wishes to get rid of it because it reminds him of his 
murdered son with whom he often killed the hours on the plot. A second 
reason for the exchange is that Chabelo is tired of being a farmer - a 
profession he never liked anyway. Indeed, Chabelo is always complaining 
about the difficulties entailed in sugarcane production (or, for that matter, 
in agriculture generally): no availability of credit, low prices, no incen-
tives, worsening terms of exchange between industry and agriculture, and 
so on. Chabelo: 
"What Mexico needs to progress is to pay attention to its agri-
culture. But since nobody does, then doing so oneself is like 
trying to swim against the tide." 
Since ongoing prices for one hectare of irrigated land run at about USD 
10 ,000 , in terms of economic value the properties are comparable. The 
crucial question at this point is: will Rafael accept the deal? 
A second party Chabelo needs to interest in his plan is the ejido council. 
Officially, ejido land can now be legally sold after the changes to article 
27 of the Constitution. Nevertheless, a majority of the council needs to 
endorse the transaction and there is no guarantee whatsoever that they 
will do so. The ejido council is thus one more riddle to be solved. In the 
event that the council and Rafael can be enrolled into Chabelo's plan, 
then the next problem involves Carlos who is renting part of the land 
Chabelo wishes to exchange. The agreement is that Carlos will rent for at 
least three harvests (or nearly five years, of which two have already 
elapsed). An additional problem is that Carlos has paid the total rent in 
advance (USD 9,000, or USD 4 0 0 per hectare/year). The agreement was 
formalised in the form of a contract, thus if Rafael becomes the new 
owner, then either Chabelo must convince Carlos to withdraw from the 
agreement, or he must persuade Rafael to let Carlos carry on renting. 
But not only does Chabelo need to interest Carlos, Rafael and the 
ejido council. As the project takes shape, other actors need to be involved 
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Testing resistances: demands, expectations and strategies 
To enrol all the heterogeneous actors involved in his scheme is not a 
straightforward activity. In order for his plan to function properly, Chabelo 
must confront their resistance. The first and most elementary party 
involved in the project is Rafael, owner of the plot Chabelo wishes to 
too - thus increasing complexity. For example, before being able to open 
the centro botanero Chabelo will need to obtain a building permit, 
different municipal licenses to obtain water, sewage and electricity, and 
authorization to sell alcoholic beverages and food. Of these, the most 
difficult to obtain is the liquor license. However, things are made easier 
because Chabelo can still count on political support at the municipal level 
through Lucio1 1, an old friend of his and at the time alderman of El 
Grullo - and who he may convince that the bar will be familiar (no 
whores, no overt noise). At any rate, and even if Chabelo succeeds in 
procuring all the necessary permits for the operation of the bar, a crucial 
problem in need of resolution is that of securing enough cash to build the 
centro. To this end, Chabelo puts pressure on a number of his debtors, 
and decides to sell his urban plot in El Grullo to an interested party.12 
Apart from these preliminary needs, there remains the issue of the 
organisation of the centro itself. Chabelo reckons Rosa will be in charge 
of preparing snacks and running the business, while a young lad will take 
care of the Michoacan-style carnitas (a meat dish) which he plans to sell. 
Rosa of course does not have to be enrolled in the project, and neither 
does Chabelo have to go into difficult negotiations about the procurement 
of the meat as he had already contacted a man in Ayuquila willing to 
deliver at least one pig a week for the carnitas. As for the infrastructure, 
the main problem to sort out concerns the tables and the chairs. Superior 
(a beer company) delivers them free of charge if the brand is sold on the 
premises. From experience, however, Chabelo knows that the local 
population prefers Corona beer over Superior. Unfortunately for Chabelo 
Corona does not normally offer the same service as its competitor. Since 
Chabelo is not willing to compromise on the quality of the beer to be 
served, negotiations with the regional head of Corona in Tecolotlan are 
put on his agenda as well. 
One final and important hurdle Chabelo needs to take concerns his 
family: his father, his brothers and sisters, and his wife. They are all very 
much against the trading of what they see as family property, and there-
fore argue that it is not up to Chabelo to make critical decisions such as 
the exchange of the ejido property. Chabelo's position on this, however, 
is that there is no need to consult his family on the matter. After all, he 
argues, his father has officially put the property title in his name 1 3 and 
hence the family may not interfere in his decision. 
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exchange for his e/7cfo property. Is he willing to exchange his urban plot 
for another property, not cash? Eventually, and after many drinking 
sessions with Chabelo, Rafael is convinced of the opportunity to own 
agricultural land, and agrees to the exchange. 
The exchange itself is not unproblematic, however. According to 
the new Article 27 of the Constitution, the transfer of e/7do property is in 
theory sanctioned by law. In practice, however, PROCEDE (an institution 
in charge of issuing formal titles to e/'/'do-plot owners) is still in the 
process of measuring plots and has only made a head-start in turning over 
State-owned property to individual ejidatarios. Since PROCEDE officials 
assure both parties that - in the case of the ejido of Ayuquila - the process 
of ratification is nearing completion, Chabelo and Rafael concretize their 
agreement and sign an "in principle" deal in the presence of a notary 
public.1 4 
More substantial obstacles only appear some days after the signing 
of the deal, and center on the pension, the thirteenth month of nearly 
USD 1,000 - both paid by the sugar mill - and the automatic access to 
Social Security (IMSS) which by federal law covers medical expenses for 
the wife, children and parents of owners of land on which sugarcane is 
grown. These benefits have been left out of the deal and, - apart from 
Chabelo's pension - Rafael assumes they will automatically be passed on 
to him. Chabelo however thinks differently about the matter and argues 
that, since PROCEDE has not yet finished regularizing plots, he is still the 
official holder of the property and thus qualified to make use of these 
benefits. 
Although the agreement with Rafael is rounded off in principle, the 
deal hinges on another party: the ejido council. Officially, once individual 
property titles have been handed over by PROCEDE, a majority of the 
council, as we have seen, still needs to agree to let Chabelo sell his 
property to an outsider. This is by no means a certitude, especially in light 
of the fact that Rafael has a long-standing conflict with Moi, the present 
president of the council (and a cousin of Chabelo) which involves alleged 
fraudulent practices committed by Rafael.15 Uncertainty thus 
characterises Chabelo's project at this stage. 
Another uncertain factor concerns Carlos, who is renting the plot. 
So far, Carlos has been convinced to withdraw from the renting agree-
ment. To this end, however, Carlos puts forward two conditions. First, he 
insists that Rafael can only start growing sugarcane in nine months, after 
Carlos' next harvest. Secondly, he demands that Chabelo refund half of 
the rent that was paid in advance. Both conditions prompt a temporary 
stale-mate of Chabelo's project. For one thing, Rafael is not very keen on 
waiting nine months before he can start sowing his own sugarcane. Also, 
Chabelo is in no position to repay Carlos, as the sum advanced has 
already been spent. The situation is thus as follows: if Chabelo wishes to 
succeed in his project, then resistance by disparate elements such as 
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benefits, ejido councils, Carlos's demands and Rafael's expectations 
should be overcome. 
Yet, on other fronts a diversity of ingredients also defy Chabelo's 
plans. For example, the pending issue of freeing cash to start building the 
centro. On this front, strong opposition is offered to Chabelo's project. 
His debtors - most of them women who have borrowed from him to buy 
durables such as furniture, T V sets or refrigerators - present all sorts of 
excuses for not paying their arrears. When pressed, they will avoid 
walking past Chabelo's house in order that they are not seen. Or they will 
not themselves buy at his store but instead send their children to do the 
errands. Other debtors will seek alternative ways of dodging Chabelo, for 
example by hiding.16 In any event, it proves very difficult for Chabelo to 
obtain anything from broke debtors. But this is not all. In addition to 
benefits, councils, demands, expectations and unwilling debtors, 
Chabelo's creditors potentially endanger his strategy. In the past some of 
them have offered him to condone their debts in return for a part of 
Chabelo's ejido land. Chabelo always referred to the legal impossibility 
of this construct, but now, with changes in the legislation, and with his 
creditors knowing about the possible deal with Rafael, they may suddenly 
jump on his back and demand their outstanding money. Chabelo does not 
seem to be very disturbed by them, but I often see him playing the same 
game his debtors play: avoidance, hiding and feinting amnesia are ruses 
he masters with perfection. At any rate, Chabelo cannot deny the fact 
that, as soon as his creditors get wind of him having some cash (e.g. to 
start building with), they will immediately jump on his back. 
On yet another front - that of building and running the centro 
itself - hindrances soon show up. Chabelo's initial idea is to build a 
conical pa/apa (wooden structure), for this is an inexpensive alternative to 
other, more costly types of building. In addition, a pa/apa is much cooler 
than corrugated iron roofs, and is easy to clean. Here, however, resistance 
comes from unexpected parties. Fireworks, for example, have been 
known to have a predilection for thatched roofs - which they can easily 
set afire. Likewise, envious neighbours, passionate family members or ill-
tempered creditors can burn down a pa/apa in a matter of minutes. In this 
case both humans and non-humans are thus potentially conspiring against 
Chabelo's project. 
As for Lucio, the alderman who is expected to help out with the 
liquor permit, things look fine as he seems willing to co-operate. How-
ever, other official business lying outside Lucio's field of competence may 
oppose the building of the bar: social security for workers at the work 
site, the Commission of Land Tenure (CORETT), Hacienda (Ministry of 
Taxes), Asentamientos Humanos (Human Settlements) and the Depart-
ment of Ecology. Apart from the time that needs to be invested in procur-
ing these permits from official instances, these hindrances can in principle 
be worked out. 
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Of a more serious nature are issues concerning the brand of beer to 
be sold at the centro, and the control of labour. Concerning the beer, the 
problem seems to be that, through his store, Chabelo is registered as a 
wholesale seller of Corona beer. This means that Corona is not willing to 
deliver if the centro opens in Chabelo's name since he can then buy 
cheap as a wholesaler and sell at a much higher price (at the centro). This 
runs against Corona's policy which adheres to a differential pricing 
formula: one for wholesellers and one for restaurants, centros and the 
like. Concerning labour, potential complications soon surface. On more 
than one occasion Rosa and her daughter Sol -whom Chabelo wants to 
help out at the centro as waitress- has a row with Chabelo and leaves the 
house for a number of days. The background of the fight is related to 
Chabelo's womanising inclinations. Thus Rosa tells me that Chabelo is a 
"good for nothing", and seriously doubts the future of their relationship. 
What is at stake here, then, is Chabelo's idea to let the centro be run by a 
knowledgeable, trustworthy and reliable person whom he could totally 
control. This same basic uncertainty applies to Sol, as Chabelo already 
has had some bad experiences with her because she - when attending the 
shop - prefers to close early and enjoy the rest of the day with her 
boyfriend. 
Although these human (creditors, labourers, ejidatarios) and non-human 
(fireworks, permits, beer) entities possibly endanger the implementation of 
Chabelo's project, the strongest resistance comes from within his family. 
This resistance has been building up ever since Chabelo inherited the 
ejido land, but is now specifically focused on trying to stop Chabelo from 
trading. The initiator of the resistance is Marfa, married to Chabelo's 
eldest brother. She has always argued that it is her husband, not Chabelo, 
who should be the 'natural' inheritor of the property. Marfa's claim, 
however, is not honoured and the land is officially registered in Chabelo's 
name. Ever since then, Marfa allegedly sets up her husband and her eldest 
son Primo against Chabelo. Primo, out to punish Chabelo, in turn con-
vinces his half cousin Mario - a son of Chabelo born out of wedlock - that 
he (Mario) should try to lay a future claim on the ejido property. One 
way, Primo tells Mario, to ensure that the land will later be registered in 
his name and not in that of his half-brother Rodolfo (Chabelo's legitimate 
son with Juana), is to make sure that Chabelo has no legal successor other 
than Mario. Mario, with the doubtful reputation of being "crazy"1 7 and at 
that time enlisted in the Army, takes his half-cousin's suggestion in earnest 
and strangles Chabelo's son. Mario, aged 22 at the time of the crime, is 
incarcerated but released after only two months in prison.18 
The problem at this stage is that Mario, who seems to be up to date 
with Chabelo's plan to sell the ejido land, allegedly starts slipping menac-
ing notes under Chabelo and Rosa's door. The content of the notes is 
always the same: it is of no use Chabelo trying to sell the land. He 
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Enroling new resources, catharsis, and transformation 
Even though Mario is his son, Chabelo considers that he is a scorpion in 
need of extermination. To bring about this, Chabelo puts a price on 
Mario's head. An interested party shows up but, upon learning of the 
context, backs off from the deal by arguing that Chabelo will appear as 
the main suspect. The only possible alternative, the man proposes, is to 
follow Mario's steps and murder him in some far-away locality where 
nobody knows the intended victim. This operation is dismissed by 
Chabelo on grounds that it is too expensive to have Mario followed, and 
for a time the matter is put to rest. Menacing notes, though, keep arriving 
at Chabelo's address. 
Meanwhile, problems with the deal with Rafael are being ironed 
out. Rafael reckons that it is impossible for him to lay a claim to 
Chabelo's pension, and it is agreed that the issue will not be a part of the 
deal. The discrepancy over social security benefits is also dropped after 
the notary public makes clear that only the person (and family) whose 
name appears on the property title will be covered. Thus it is agreed that 
Chabelo will be covered by social security until the title deed has offi-
cially been transferred to Rafael. Likewise, the issue of the thirteenth 
month is straightened out formally: Chabelo drops his right to it and lets 
Rafael claim the thirteenth month for 1993. However, Chabelo intends to 
charge Rafael at some other point, when the latter asks for Chabelo's 
signature to be able to have access to common ejidal property - a concern 
which was left out of the original understanding. 
The problem with Carlos' demand is of a more complicated nature, 
and entails some manoeuvring before it can be solved. Carlos has already 
rented for two years, thus he should in principle be compensated USD 
5,400 for the remaining three years. Since Carlos still has to wait an addi-
tional 9 months for the harvest, a proportional part of one year's rent 
should go to Rafael, who agrees to wait with planting his own sugarcane 
until Carlos finishes his own zafra (sugarcane harvest).20 Finally an 
agreement between all parties concerned is reached: Chabelo will reim-
burse Carlos a total of USD 4,000, and pay Rafael the equivalent of 9 
months' rent (USD 1,350). Since money has to be paid in cash, there is 
no alternative for Chabelo but to sell the only thing he has left to sell - his 
carefully maintained 1981 Dodge pick-up truck - for USD 5,000. This 
sum, however, is first used to repay an outstanding debt of USD 3,300 at 
(Mario) will always find Chabelo and his new family, and kill the off-
spring.19 Since the notes invariably make reference to Chabelo's latest 
moves, at one point the situation becomes so tense that Chabelo no 
longer sleeps in his bed but guards the door, and even suspects his 
closest friends of passing on information. 
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the Ca/'a Popular. To preclude interference by possible creditors who are 
quick to notice that Chabelo has sold his pick-up truck, that same day 
Chabelo deposits the remaining USD 1,700 in his account. Using this 
deposit as collateral, he then asks for a credit of three times that 
amount.21 After ten days the loan is authorised by the Ca/'a Popular and 
disbursed, and Chabelo immediately pays Carlos and Rafael. 
Uncertainty concerningjhe e/7do council's acceptance of Rafael as 
a new member is dispelled during a drinking session between Chabelo 
and his cousin Moi, who is president of the e/7do Assembly of Ayuquila. 
Moi is initially adamantly against letting Rafael become an ejidatario 
because of his long-standing dispute with him, but Chabelo seems to 
soothe him: 
"I told him that he was damaging me because he had a quarrel 
with Rafael. I said to him: 'Don't be so resentful. Later, when 
the centro is finished I'll treat you to some vino [alcohol] so that 
your anger is lessened." 
Having sorted out these heterogeneous problems, for a time Chabelo's 
project seems to be heading in the right direction. One of the remaining 
obstacles - freeing cash to start building - is solved after reaching an 
agreement with Manuel Robles, a long-time acquaintance of Chabelo's 
and owner of El Grullo's largest hardware store. Both agree that Manuel 
will provide all necessary building materials in advance without Chabelo 
having to pay any interest at all for two months. This is a crucial turning 
point in Chabelo's project, especially in light of Chabelo's refusal to build 
a cheap but rickety and potentially fire-prone palapa. With the agreement, 
Chabelo can now build a more durable structure of bricks and cement. 
Thanks to Manuel's help, the remaining resistance to Chabelo's project -
apart of course from the insoluble problem with his son Mario - comes 
from two sources: that of the beer distributing agency and that of labour 
control. Negotiations on the free provision of tables and chairs by Corona 
do not materialise. Furthermore, Corona appears to be unwilling to sell its 
product at wholesale price, the reason being that Chabelo already pays 
wholesale prices for Corona beer at the store, and the bar is not eligible. 
This hurdle is later resolved by having the operating permit for the bar put 
under Rosa's name 2 2 - not at all a risk-free enterprise considering the 
degree of conflict that exists between them. 
The issue of tables and chairs Chabelo solves by asking Valentin, 
owner of El Grullo's largest tortilleria (tortilla shop), who agrees to furnish 
Chabelo with some 1 5 tables and accompanying chairs until Chabelo can 
buy some himself. As for labour control - that is, ensuring that Rosa will 
remain faithful to the project - matters are complicated. On the one hand, 
Rosa seems to be very ambitious and willing to work full-time on the 
project (after all, it was her idea in the first place). Yet Chabelo cannot 
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fully trust her, especially as she does not accept being subordinate to 
Chabelo's wheelings and dealings with other women. In fact, Chabelo's 
friends strongly advice him not to rely fully on Rosa. As one of them put 
it: 
"Chabelo is crazy. He bartered his fertile e/7do soil for a piece 
of barren earth. He just did so to please this whore [Rosa] 
who's already got four children with three different men. He 
[Chabelo] is letting himself be led by his women. But when she 
[Rosa] gets fed up with him the business will go to hell." 
The relationship between Chabelo and Rosa is inherently a brittle one, 
and Chabelo cannot control the alliance without a change in his own or 
Rosa's behaviour. All Chabelo can do is try to calm down Rosa whenever 
she suspects a new affair - something which Chabelo is not always 
successful in achieving. 
The drawbacks involving Rosa and Mario call for substantial changes in 
the project. These prove difficult to devise, but finally an unexpected 
solution is found. In September of 1993, Chabelo's father dies.2 3 After 
the burial, Chabelo launches into heavy drinking for four days. Suffering 
from a hangover, in the presence of some close friends, Rosa and myself, 
Chabelo simply declares: 
"From now on I want to straighten out my life. My life is in 
Colima. There I can get a job. There I have my wife. What am I 
doing here? This is all finished..." 
W e all try to cool Chabelo down. W e recommend he should wait for 
some days and reconsider his decision, especially in light of the fact that 
plans for the centro are going in the right direction. The next day, though, 
Chabelo is more determined than ever to give up his life in El Grullo and 
move to Colima. To add weight to his decision, Chabelo has already 
spread word that the store is for sale (the inventory, that is). More rad-
ically, he decides that plans for the centro are over. As regards the urban 
plot he has exchanged for fertile soil, he will either try to sell it in its 
entirety or try to partition it in equal parts and put them on the market. 
Even more drastically, he announces that his relationship with Rosa is 
over. From then onwards, he will rent or sell his house in El Grullo, move 
Rosa to a smaller one, and send a little money each month from Colima 
so that Rosa can take care of their young, recently-born daughter Aidé. 
Rosa of course protests, but Chabelo seems to be final about his decision: 
"Well, you as a woman may want many things. But I don't have 
any responsibility whatsoever towards you. Are we married, 
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then? In any case it will hurt because of the girl. I have my life 
over there. And the arrangement with you was that you would 
attend my father. And my father isn't here anymore. So it's a 
pretty clear thing to me!" 
In the end, the soup is not eaten as hot as it is served. Rosa moves to El 
Tuito (near Puerto Vallarta), where Chabelo rents a house and a restaurant 
for her. Chabelo himself never returns to Colima, but moves between El 
Grullo and El Tuito. After some months, Chabelo rents out his house in El 
Grullo and himself takes the small room at the back of his garden as 
living quarters. Meanwhile, the transaction with Rafael is completed by 
the end of June, 1994 , when the Procuraduria Agraria (Bureau of Land 
Affairs) furnishes Chabelo and some 5,000 other ejidatarios from all over 
Jalisco a title deed. When I leave El Grullo a month later, Chabelo has 
already sold two partitioned plots from the land on which he originally 
intended to build the bar. 
Conclusion 
The crucial question to ask in the foregoing case is: were Chabelo's 
projects successful? This is tantamount to asking: have Chabelo's projects 
become obligatory points of passage between the local and global 
networks they helped build? Did the actors composing the global net-
works of Chabelo's projects depend or have an interest in the products 
and services they provided? Was Chabelo able to shape and mobilise a 
set of local networks (one for each project) and control transactions 
between these and their respective global networks? To answer these 
questions, let me first summarise the character of the local and global 
networks put together by Chabelo's projects. What did they look like? 
Who and what was part of them? 
In the case of the store, the global network is of a very heterogen-
eous character. It is mainly made up of customers, but dissimilar elements 
such as police ordinances, creditors, or tax forms are very much part of it 
as well. These elements generate a space and a time frame - a negotiation 
space - in which Chabelo's project is built. Likewise, the project entails 
the elaboration of a local network made up of softdrinks, labour, beer, 
distributors, diapers, refrigerators and so on which Chabelo is able to 
successfully manage. Chabelo's shop thus acts as an obligatory point of 
passage: it orchestrates the local network and controls transactions 
between the local network (softdrinks, beer, etc.) and the global network 
(consumers,etc). Chabelo thus profits from the local network in the sense 
that he achieves some degree of control over global resources: if con-
sumers decide to spend their money at Chabelo's shop, then they have to 
pass through a wide array of actors held together by Chabelo. 
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The case of Chabelo's centra botanero differs from the shop project 
in that the bar never becomes an obligatory point of passage (in fact, the 
project never becomes real because the bar does not materialize). Yet the 
project gradually builds a global network, i.e. it contextualizes a number 
of elements needed for the venture to become real. Thus permits of all 
sorts, potential customers, the sugar mill, PROCEDE and so on participate 
in creating a negotiation space for Chabelo's endeavours. Similarly, 
Chabelo laboriously constructs a local network, i.e. he localizes a number 
of elements he needs to orchestrate if the project is to materialize. Thus 
ejido councils, a patch of irrigated land, debtors, and so on are carefully 
associated with one another. The project, however, remains unreal 
because Chabelo cannot become an obligatory point of passage between 
these global and local networks: some of the actors involved define their 
interests and roles differently, and make off on their own - leaving 
Chabelo empty-handed. Thus Rosa cannot passively give in to Chabelo's 
womanizing behaviour; Chabelo's kin is not ready to accept the exchange 
of ejidal land for an urban plot; creditors stand in the way, and so on. 
Next to the concept of obligatory point of passage, which refers to 
a projects' ability to regulate exchanges between an inside and an out-
side, the concept of translation describes the process by which a shared 
space is created where initially there was none. Thus in the case of 
Chabelo's shop, actors from the global and from the local network can 
communicate through a set of intermediaries that circulate between them 
and define their relationships. So, for example, intermediaries such as tax 
forms, softdrinks, permits, canned food, etc. circulate between Chabelo, 
clients, distributors, the municipality, the Ministry of Taxes, and so on. 
The degree of translation, however, is weak: that is, the collectif is fragile. 
Fiestas, a nearly bankrupt sugar mill, strong competition by wholesale 
merchants: these elements withhold clients to purchase all the products 
Chabelo would like them to. In the case of the bar, however, successful 
translation is not achieved. This is so because there is an absence of 
intermediaries circulating between the bar's local and global network.24 
While the notions of obligatory point of passage and translation are 
useful to describe relationships between local and global networks, the 
concept of translation regime is helpful to refer to those general and local 
rules that impinge on the character of any network (see Chapter Two). In 
the case of Chabelo's shop, the translation regime is weak. Neither the 
inside nor the outside of the project can be said to be strongly regulated, 
and the project itself has not created any rules of its own which can be 
successfully added to conventions generally followed: Chabelo's shop will 
not alter the consumption pattern of people living in El Grullo. In the case 
of Chabelo's intended bar the situation is different. Here the global 
network is strongly regulated (think of building permits; health insurance; 
reforms to Article 27 of the Constitution which allow ejidatarios to sell 
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their land) and reinforced by local rules and cultural arrangements (e.g. 
illegal land rental; barter). However, as in the case of the shop, the bar 
project cannot itself generate internal or local rules or conventions - let 
alone add these to the general regulatory framework. 
Finally, a word on momentum. Is it possible for Chabelo to go 
back and 'undo' what has been constructed through his projects? Do his 
projects 'determine' or shape future translations? In the case of the bar, 
transactions have indeed gained momentum in that Chabelo cannot go 
back to a situation similar to the one he found himself in before the start 
of the failed project. Land has been exchanged, contracts have been 
signed, and the urban plot has been partitioned. In the future, Chabelo 
will need to base his plans on this new configuration. 
Let us now summarize the morphology of the networks which 
Chabelo's projects help construct, and assess whether or not they were 
viable. The concepts of global and local networks, obligatory points of 
passage, translation, translation regimes and momentum, as I spelled out 
in Chapter Two, are useful tools to describe whether or not the conver-
gence or degree of integration of networks exist. Thus, the more success-
ful a translation, the stronger a translation regime, and the higher a degree 
of momentum, the more the constituent actors of a network can be seen 
as working together in a common enterprise. In Chabelo's case, his two 
enterprises cannot be conceived as forming part of a convergent network. 
These projects operate within a collectif that is not strongly integrated, 
that is, not many rules, regulations or cultural arrangements govern 
interactions within the network. Moreover, translation is weak. Even 
though the shop acts as obligatory point of passage, the low degree of 
convergence of the networks in which it is inserted endangers its viability. 
The final outcome of Chabelo's projects is that collectif made out 
of houses, buyers, plots, e/7'do councils, sugarcane, shops, pick-ups, 
permits, sellers, alcohol, or even the Army implodes like a cathode. For 
once, if even for a fraction, these elements go their own way and deny 
their preceding relationship with Chabelo or their previous fraternity. 
Some elements, however, will not left unscathed: they will show the scars 
of struggle. Divided plots, envious relatives, or disappointed lovers will 
never be the same again: they carry in them - visibly or invisibly - their 
fraternity with other epochs, other places, other ideas. But this state of 
affairs will probably not be a very durable one. The remnants, the bits 
and pieces of what is no more: they will soon be picked up again by 
close and distant wills, other entrepreneurs, other collectifs which will 
order or relate them differently. 
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Notes 
1. Owner of the largest supermarket in El Grullo. 
2. Apart from his double earnings, Chabelo managed to increase his income 
by handing out free promotional merchandise such as cigarettes or new 
products not to stores -as supposed- but to dairy farmers. As a result, dairy 
farmers filled their 4-litre iron milk containers to the very top, in the knowl-
edge that Chabelo would skim part of it and put it into his own milk contain-
ers. Chabelo: "Of course I even added a bit of water to the milk. This way I 
was getting something like two additional litres per container". According to 
Chabelo, in time these 'extra' earnings represented quite an important part of 
his total income. 
3. The job left Chabelo with many 'extras': permits to cut the cane were (and 
are) in very high demand especially at the end of the zafra (sugarcane 
harvest) when farmers whose sugarcane does not fully comply with the 
glucose content specifications of the sugarmill have to wait until after the wet 
season (half a year) for their cane to be cut. In these cases, an inspector 
willing to turn a blind eye (for a fee) is a very welcome factor. 
4. Chabelo, though, retained the fringe benefits of being a sugarcane grower: 
social security and the yearly thirteenth month paid by the sugar mill as 
dividend. 
5. Chabelo and Juana had two other children, but the first one was stillborn 
and the second died at four months of pneumonia. 
6. In addition, Juana received USD 260 from a niece for the rent of the house 
in Armerfa; income from the shop was negligible as she only operated it 
whenever she felt like doing so. 
7. Although Chabelo at one point had owned enough capital of his own, he 
often accused feasting and women for the fact that he now actually had to 
borrow money himself in order to lend it out again. This worked as follows: 
Chabelo - who had a credit line at the Ca/a Popular - borrowed at an interest 
rate of 2,5-3% a month. This he later lent out at an interest rate of 8% a 
month. In order to have a hold on his customers, Chabelo always made them 
sign a contract. According to two of his best friends, however, Chabelo 
himself already owed close to USD 10,000 to different acquaintances apart 
from the amount he owed the Ca/'a Popular. 
8. The reason for this was the special status of "La Companfa": it was affiliat-
ed to the Union (CTM) and did not charge the 15% IVA (value added tax) to 
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Union members. A Union membership card, however, could be bought at 
the supermarket itself for a nominal fee of USD 0,70. 
9. According to Chabelo - and corroborated by myself - a conservative guess 
of daily profits (without discounting rent and electricity, that is) would be 
some USD 20. To put this in perspective: daily (real) minimum wages in the 
area were nearly USD 9. 
10. Locally, the term centro botanero (literally: a snack centre) means a place 
opened during daytime only, attended by whores, and where one can chat 
with friends while drinking alcoholic beverages, and consuming simple 
seafood dishes (which are said to improve potency) with a loud backdrop of 
sensuous music which often has a sexual connotation and double meaning. 
The difference with a centro botanero familiar is that the latter is "familiar": 
one may take the family along, no whores are present, less emphasis is 
placed on alcoholic drinks, food is a bit more elaborate and music is less 
loud, less provocative and often performed by live bands or interpreters. 
11. Lucio had a job at the mill, loading bags of sugar on to trucks, at the time 
that Chabelo was inspector. He climbed all the way to the municipal office 
because he has always been a member of the PRI and the Union. 
12. The owner of the neighbouring plot had previously shown some interest 
in expanding his car-wash facility. 
13. The land was put in his name because he was the only one amongst his 
siblings who took responsibility for his parents when they were no longer 
able to care for themselves - even though one sister and one brother lived 
virtually next door to them! 
14. The reason for this "in principle" deal was that, officially, ejido land 
could only be transferred until the owner had an ownership title which, at 
the time of the deal, was not yet in Chabelo's hands. Furthermore, for tax 
reasons, the transaction was officially to be recorded as a permuta or barter of 
plots. Notary fees for this type of "in principle" transaction were USD 100 for 
each of the participants to the transaction. The final fee is a percentage (1 %) 
of the sale sum (thus a total of around USD 600). This fee only concerns 
Rafael's private plot. For Chabelo's ejidal plot a different route has to be trod, 
as the SRA, the Procuradurfa and the sugar mill charge fees for new ejido 
members. 
15. According to the president of the Assembly, Rafael had once reached a 
spoken agreement about the rent for his plot. After an inferior harvest of 
maize, Rafael had refused to pay the price, arguing that the soil had been 
'poisoned' previously by intensive use of pesticides. According to the presi-
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dent, the poor harvest had to do with Rafael not attending to the maize 
properly, and not to the condition of the soil. 
16. To give an example: Jose, who borrowed some USD 1,500 which he 
needed as a bond to enter the U.S. officially, could not repay him because he 
did not get the promised job in California. He had even stopped paying inter-
est and, as a result, his debt with Chabelo had already increased to nearly 
USD 2,700. After several visits to his place, we finally managed to get hold of 
Jose in a canteen. Pressed, he answered that he intended to pay Chabelo 
back by getting a mortgage on his house from the bank. Chabelo was able to 
check on this through the notary public, but it was evident that the matter 
would take a long time to be settled. 
17. It was generally understood that Mario had always been loco (crazy) 
when he, aged 8, had set fire to the cradle of his younger half-sister who died 
before her mother could save her. 
18. As gossip had it, somebody from within the Army paid a bribe to get 
Mario out of jail. 
19. Chabelo did complain to the police, but since there was no evidence that 
it was Mario who was sending the notes no further action could be taken. 
20. Rafael had to wait to sow anyway because it would take some time 
before he was officially registered at the sugar mill as a sugarcane producer. 
21. This credit was for a period of 6 months at a monthly interest rate of 3%. 
22. It was again Lucio who would aid Chabelo to make these changes in the 
operation permit. 
23. From one day to the next, Chabelo's father had decided to refuse food. 
Rosa insisted on forcing him to accept food, but Chabelo understood his 
father's wish and let him die. Not many people attended the funeral, and it 
was very telling for the familial relationship that Chabelo's eldest brother and 
his wife were not present. 
24. This failure however is turned into a methodological convenience: after 
all, failure tends to reveal processes that are more easily hidden in the case of 
successful projects (cf. Law and Callon 1992:22). 
CHAPTER 6 
THE BRITTLE BOND OF BLOOD 
Family, business, and a will 
It is my first day in El Grullo. I have just bought a bed and a mosquito net 
at "La Companfa" - the largest (and cheapest) store in town. Once outside, 
I realize that I need a cord to attach the net to the walls. Not wanting to 
enter the large (and busy) store once again, I ask the first passer-by where 
I might find the item. 
- "Over there, at Don Manuel's", is the answer. 
"Over there" turns out to be a strategically located store on one of the 
corners of El Grullo's main Plaza. The shop is of considerable size by 
local standards, and seems to specialize in just about everything. In one 
big room of some ten-by-ten meters a wide array of items is on display: 
from chilies to papayas to brooms and pet food. Fortunately, there is also 
a small corner with ropes and cords coming in all colours, materials, and 
prices. While scanning the inventory, a man in his late fifties who seems 
to be the owner of the store carefully approaches me. Shyly, he mutters 
some English words which probably stand for "What do you want?" When 
I answer in fluent Spanish, the shy expression on his face vanishes. 
Seizing my arm, he cordially invites me to sit down and drink a softdrink. 
He introduces himself as David and, in a rather blunt way, asks what I am 
doing there, since El Grullo is not at all a tourist place. I explain: I am a 
Dutch sociologist, carrying out fieldwork on small-scale enterprises. His 
face brightens up as he exclaims: 
- "So you're a professional, like me! That's great! It must have been Cod's 
will to send such a prepared person to this place! I know that we will 
have a lot to say to each other in the time that you will stay here!" 
- "You bet we will", I remember thinking. 
Indeed, in the two years to come David and his wife Chela became part 
of my daily life. I would walk into their shop nearly each time I went into 
town. In the beginning, we would chew over a range of topics that inter-
ested David: geography, Mexican literature or - David was a religious 
zealot - discuss issues of Faith or 'forbidden' books about the death of 
Pope John Paul I. In time, David and Chela involved me and my wife 
more and more in their lives. Before I knew it, I was already immersed in 
the intricacies of family strife, invited to participate in national religious 
gatherings, or to give counsel on future business plans.1 In the process, 
while 'hanging around' the store I was introduced to most of their regular 
customers. With some of these - especially El Grullo's elite - they had a 
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Genealogy of a project 
La Tapatfa - or "The store of Don Manuel", as the shop was commonly 
referred to - had been a fruitful business, competing with La Azteca and 
the shops of M. Negrete and R. Mendez for the virtue of being the largest 
store in town.2 La Tapatfa flourished even more when, in the early 
1970's, Tarcisio Jimenez (alias El Mandamus or "the boss") took over a 
neighbouring store (La Companfa) from his father-in-law Primo Perez, 
turning it into the largest store in the region.3 In the twilight zone 
between cooperation and competition, Manuel Zepeda (Chela's father) 
increased his business by attracting extra-local customers who came from 
as far away as San Gabriel or Autlan to shop at la Companfa. At its peak -
in the late 1970's - Manuel Zepeda employed five workers at the store 
(three to take care of fresh fruit and vegetables and two in charge of 
groceries), and two more employees at a canteen owned by him opposite 
the store, on a corner of the old municipal market. Manuel's store and his 
canteen were traditional meeting points for Grullenses - the canteen being 
the preferred spot for,males; the store, a much appreciated site for 
women. This situation changed in 1979 when permits where required to 
operate a canteen. Don Manuel could not get hold of one, and so the 
canteen closed. One year later, the municipal market was relocated to 
make place for a pompous plaza worthy of a much larger town. With the 
market gone, the number of customers visiting the store also dwindled. 
Shortly thereafter Don Manuel became seriously ill, to the point where he 
could not attend the store any more. The store thus had to be taken over 
by one of his three children: Jose, Conchita or Chela. 
Jose, the eldest, declined the favour and started his own enterprise 
in fruits and vegetables - a line of business he knew well, as he always 
travelled to Guadalajara's Central Market in the company of his father. 
Jose first opened three stalls at the new, relocated market (two for the sale 
of fresh produce, one for the sale of candies) and build a huge, refriger-
ated storage room with which he initiated a retail business in fresh 
vegetables and fruit (and, later, groceries). By 1992, Jose (and, increasing-
ly, six of his eight sons who were all bachelors between 20 and 30) 
mobilized some 40 tons of fresh produce a week with a net monthly 
profit of around USD 8,500 - making him the largest wholesale merchant 
of fresh produce in the region. Since Jos6 bought wholesale from pro-
good relationship as Chela was the 'poor branch' of one of the three most 
influential families (the Zepeda's) of El Grullo and David had an engineer-
ing degree (which gave him much status). Frequent contact with them and 
with their godfather Father Carlos - the local ecclesiastical head - certainly 
taught me to see El Grullo's society from a different perspective. 
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ducers on the coast of Jalisco, on a number of products he could compete 
with prices offered at Guadalajara's Central Market. 
Conchita, for her part, was unable to take charge of the business 
since she was slightly mentally retarded. As for Chela, who was at that 
time living with David in Colima, the prospect of taking over the family's 
enterprise was not that attractive, especially in light of the fact that Jos6 
had taken with him the most profitable part of the business. As a conse-
quence Gaby - Conchita's daughter and Don Manuel's favourite grand-
daughter - ran the store under the supervision of her uncle Jose. 
When Manuel Zepeda died4, he left behind him a will. In it, he 
stated that the store, the house in which it was located, as well as the plot 
on which the house was build should be split among his three children. 
At first, Jos6, Chela and Conchita considered the possibility of selling. For 
emotional reasons, however, the thought was dropped and Gaby was 
allowed to run the business fully. The understanding was that all three 
children would have equal shares in the profits, with Gaby taking her 
mother's share and the burden of looking after her. Also, a document was 
drafted and signed before a notary public shortly after Manuel Zepeda's 
death. In it, it was agreed that no changes would be made to the property 
by any one of the siblings without the explicit consent of the others. 
Moreover, it was accorded that Conchita could continue to live in the 
parental home behind the shop. 
As it turned out, Gaby was not able to manage the store properly. For one 
thing Gaby (by that time 2 1 years old) seemed to lack a crucial asset of 
merchants: the ability to get along well with customers. The clientele Don 
Manuel had carefully built up during the years thus slowly waned. In 
addition, her lack of expertise brought her into financial trouble, to the 
point where she was not able to repay the merchandise she bought on 
credit with her uncle Jos6 and others. Jose started to complain openly, 
and one of his sons (Gil) demanded that the shop be turned over to him. 
Jos6 however was of the opinion that turning the enterprise into a profit-
able one once more was an uphill battle, and dissuaded his son from 
taking over. As an alternative, Jose suggested selling the store and the real 
estate, but the plan was opposed by Chela on moral grounds. Jose had 
ears for his sister's arguments, but insisted that neither he nor his sons 
would invest their time or money in saving an enterprise that seemed to 
be inevitably doomed to failure. As the only way out, he suggested that 
Chela and David take charge of the shop. 
The suggestion placed Chela and her husband David before a 
dilemma: should they stay in Colima and neglect Chela's endowment of 
part of the store? Or should they move to El Grullo to rescue what was 
left of it? The difficult decision was somewhat eased by David and 
Chela's prevailing circumstances. At that time, early in 1989 , David had a 
job of considerable importance at the Ministry of Agriculture and Water 
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Resources (SARH) in Colima, some 150km from El Grullo. However, the 
economic policies of the time did not augur well for SARH personnel. As 
a consequence of the neo-liberal policy of the newly inaugurated Salinas 
Administration, from the beginning of that year it was made known to all 
SARH personnel that one of its traditional mandates - extension to farmers 
- would be partially privatized.5 Also, a restructuring of the Ministry at all 
levels was under way. This meant that the stability of David's career was 
under pressure, as he and others within the Ministry forecast the imminent 
discharge of at least 40 percent of personnel. David understood that the 
only way to secure his position would be to play a political game he had 
never liked: 
"Within SARH the only way to advance or defend your interests 
is by always saying 'yes' to one's superiors, or by stealing. It is 
a place where a secretary can earn more than an engineer 
because she's dating the boss." 
A man of solid moral beliefs, David felt that other ways had to be trod. In 
his struggle to retain his position, he mobilized all possible means6 -
without success. From David's perspective, then, the prospect of taking 
over the store was not such a bad idea, especially as he saw that fellow 
engineers were already being fired - ending up selling goods at Colima's 
tianguis. Moreover, David had always had a passion for trade. He pos-
sessed crucial virtues such as eloquence (as a student he had earned some 
money as a radio broadcaster) and persuasiveness, and had already shown 
his competence in the field when he worked for a goat-skin merchant 
from Guadalajara in his early twenties - to the point that the merchant 
offered him to become his business associate after David had succeeded 
in controlling the goat-skin trade in the South of Jalisco and the rim of 
Lake Chapala.7 In addition, David knew El Grullo well: he had already 
spend a year there as a student while doing his social service in 1959, 
and was well integrated into local society through his wife's kin and 
networks. 
For Chela the situation was the reverse of David's. A frail but resolute 
woman with a clear talent for commerce, she had never acquiesced to 
David's conviction that the hearth was the proper place for a wife. This 
she had learned from her father, who took her from school at age eleven 
and made her attend his store - giving her full responsibility for a number 
of tasks. During the twenty years she had been living in Colima with 
David, Chela often fought for her autonomy, and indeed was able to 
undertake a number of ventures - among them taking a secondary school 
degree as well as a course in business administration. By the time lose 
asked her to take over the nearly bankrupt shop, Chela was selling home-
made pies and pineapple cakes on assignment. This was a profitable 
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business, as she was earning around USD 1,300 a month (a little more 
than her husband) on the basis of a daily turnover of 6 0 to 70 pies. For 
her, the choice to move back to El Grullo was a hard one, especially as 
she also felt that the educational future of their only daughter Mimf (then 
aged 9) would not be enhanced by the family's resettlement. In addition, 
managing the store in El Grullo meant they would have to trade their 
new, comfortable, USD 100 ,000 home in well-liked Colima for an old 
adobe building without modern amenities in provincial El Grullo. 
Global network of the project 
After lengthy discussions, by July 1989 Chela and David had taken the 
decision to move to El Grullo to run the store. Some negotiations pre-
ceded the move, such as procuring that David was discharged from SARH 
in order to obtain a monthly pension.8 In order not to burn their boat, 
the house in Colima was not sold but left vacant in case they should 
decide to retrace their steps. 
At first the task of David and Chela seemed to be quite uncompli-
cated. The store existed within a relatively stable global network (made 
up of Gaby and especially Jose, clients, but also of creditors and suppliers 
with whom agreements had been made earlier). This created a space, a 
time, and a set of resources - what Callon and Law (1989) call a negoti-
ation space - within which David and Chela were allowed to develop 
their project, that is, elaborate a local network that would enable them to 
make the store flourish once more. 
To set up the local network, a first and foremost requirement was 
knowledge to operate the store. Of course, Chela had been brought up 
attending clients, and to an extent knew what it took to do so. On the 
other hand, product prices changed constantly due to high inflation, and 
this did not facilitate operations. While David lacked the interest to keep 
track of price fluctuations, Chela was often too busy buying supplies and 
doing the administration to be constantly on top of the changes. Fortu-
nately, along with the store David and Chela had taken over Nena - a 
clerk who had worked at the store for the last nine years. Nena was very 
competent in translating supply costs into client prices, and had the ability 
to calculate quickly - in her head - the amount customers were due for 
the diverse items they had bought. These virtues, then, made Nena 
essential in the operation of the store. At the beginning though - due to 
the outstanding debts - Nena proved to be a burden for the new managers 
since the financial room to pay her salary and official benefits (in total 
some USD 4 0 0 a month) could hardly be found. Besides, David had 
developed a deep mistrust towards Nena from the time he used to visit 
his father-in-law, and accused her (though never directly) of charging 
clients differently: especially Nena's friends and relatives were suspected 
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of obtaining 'bargains' whenever they shopped at the store. Nevertheless, 
both David and Chela felt that Nena was indispensable. As David put it: 
"Nena is a necessary evil". This situation had implications for the organiz-
ation of the store: Nena was never allowed to touch money or the cash 
register, hence either Chela or David had to be constantly present at the 
register to receive customers' money and give them their change.9 More-
over, lack of trust meant Nena could not run the store on her own, and 
each time David and Chela were away doing errands, buying supplies or 
attending a school meeting then either the store had to be closed or a 
suitable person to take care of the register had to be found. Nena, in turn, 
had to be monitored closely so that her skills outweighed her pricing 
policy. As to Jos6 and other distributors: they were hungry to continue 
supplying the store, but only if David and Chela honoured their financial 
obligations towards them. 
At first, then, the negotiation space was quite limited. What Chela 
and David had actually taken over were a full-salaried worker and debts -
some USD 3,000 with Jos6 and an additional USD 2,700 with other 
creditors. Thus the new managers had to adopt a step-by-step approach: 
their needs, Nena's salary, and a steady stream of supplies had to be 
guaranteed. As to the first requirement, this meant tightening the belt 
somewhat. David: 
"We went through some rough times, and had to postpone 
holidays or visits to friends. We couldn't even allow ourselves 
to buy a television or a radio for the house here in El Grullo, 
imaginel It was just like having shoes size twenty-eight and 
buying new ones size twenty-seven-and-a-half..." 
After ten months of operations, and through tight management and 
accountancy by Chela, all debts were cancelled. However, just as the 
creation of David and Chela's project went ahead, complications surfaced 
with the global network on which the project depended. For example 
Gaby, who had been temporarily left without an income after the take-
over 1 0, kept taking groceries from the store at will. Chela would not 
complain about this, as Gaby was her favourite niece and godchild. Thus 
some first frictions unfolded between David and Chela on the issue of 
Gaby. David: 
"Chela and I had the first serious argument of our lives. At first, 
she kept on letting Gaby take groceries for free. So I told her 
[Chela] that I would take care of the cash register and that 
nobody but me would touch it. This was difficult because Chela 
has got a lot of relatives here... But I argued that in the eyes of 
God the family was just Chela, Mimf, and me. Period. And 
nobody else." 
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After some quarrelling Gaby promised to pay for all errands in future. 
However, in exchange she put forward a demand. The demand was 
linked to her wedding present: at marriage, Gaby's father-in-law (owner of 
one of El Grullo's three drinking water bottlers) promised to give her a 
monthly supply of 1,000, 20-litre bottles of drinking water - the profit of 
which she could keep herself. Since Gaby had no place of her own to put 
the bottles on sale, she suggested that David and Chela make some room 
to display the bottles in the store. Gaby was backed in her demand by 
Jos6, who accused Chela of being heartless towards her niece.1 1 Event-
ually a metal rack fitting 20 bottles of 20 litres each was installed in the 
store. This proved to be an enormous hindrance: although the footprint of 
the structure was relatively small, the structure of the rack nevertheless 
occupied nearly a tenth of the store's space and hid a number of products 
from view. Worse, the rack required enough room (about a meter) in front 
of it for the bottles to be brought in and taken out. In addition, Gaby did 
not pay any commission to Chela on water sold - though she did so at 
other outlets. Since no profit could be made on the water by David and 
Chela (the price for bottled water was fixed and thus illegal to sell above 
the maximum of USD 1 Gaby was already charging), the episode of the 
rack set the stage for continuous strife between Gaby, Chela and, 
especially, David - who sold the water only with great reluctance (at a 
rate of 10 to 20 bottles a day), and who never even touched the 20-litre 
bottles12. In a sense, then, the water rack was a materialization of family 
relations: through it, Gaby and Jose were assured of their continuous 
presence in the store. 
These initial conflicts were exacerbated when it turned out that 
Jose - the main supplier of fresh produce and groceries - did not sell the 
merchandise at cost, but at retail price. Thus a 20kg box of mangoes 
which Jose would buy wholesale for USD 20 each was passed on to 
Chela for USD 33. This meant that Chela had to bargain on most products 
on each and every delivery by her brother, which was seen to be morally 
illegitimate. Chela: 
"Jose goes over the top by charging us the same as his own 
clients. Really, if you take into account his turnover then it 
wouldn't hurt him to sell to us at the same price he's paying. So 
he's not helping us. Of course, I'm grateful that he did not sell 
the shop and let us take over. But actually it's my brother who 
is doing himself a favour because we are repaying Gaby's debt. 
In fact he sees us as a franchise of his own business." 
The consequences of Chela and David's failure to establish a satisfactory 
relationship with Jos6 and Gaby made themselves felt and limited the 
room for manoeuvre at their disposal to develop the store in the way they 
wished. 
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What strategies did David and Chela need to unfold in order to develop 
their project in face of these constraints? As is apparent from the fore-
going, there existed a tension in the relationship between the store and its 
global network. The most serious of these developed after David and 
Chela managed to pull the store out of the red. From that point onwards, 
both Gaby and Jos6 claimed their share of profits, as stated in the signed 
inheritance agreement. The agreement was very complicated, though, for 
"profits" were understood to be only those revenues made on the sale of 
products supplied by Josg (most notably fruits, vegetables, and groceries). 
Of the profits on these products, 75% belong to Jos6, Chela and Gaby (in 
representation of her mother) as part of the inheritance, and 25% 
belonged to Chela and David for the running of the store. On profits 
made on products other than those supplied by Jos6, the agreement was 
that Chela and David could keep them all. 1 3 
The agreement, although initially accepted by all parties, in time 
became more and more contested by David and Chela. After all, the latter 
argued, Gaby was not taking care of her mother any more (Conchita lived 
at Chela and David's, who also paid her expenses), and Jose was already 
making a profit on the store through his pricing policy. It is here that the 
second stage in the elaboration of Chela and David's project started. 
Wanting to break open the agreement, Chela and David get involved in a 
series of considerations about what strategy or combination of strategies 
can best be deployed. These considerations are in turn shaped by Chela's 
and David's ambitions - both in terms of the store and in terms of the 
level of comfort they were used to while living in Colima. In the case of 
the shop, this entails a total remodelling of it; in the case of comfort it 
entails making improvements to the adobe (mud bricks) house. As to the 
development of their negotiation space vis-a-vis the global network, a 
twofold strategy was pursued. The first involved becoming less account-
able to Jos6 - which amounted to looking for alternative supply channels. 
The second strategy concerned their relation with Gaby, whose claims 
they sought to keep at bay through a renegotiation of the inheritance 
agreement. Let us now turn to how these strategies evolved in practice. 
The idea to remodel the shop and make improvements to the 
house was borne out of a mix of David's religious beliefs and a notion of 
'progress' as something which it is one's responsibility to achieve. Accord-
ing to David - and in this he was more-or-less followed by Chela - God 
had created Man as a naked creature without television, cars, space 
shuttles and the like: 
"So He made Man to be in charge of the Earth, to dominate it 
and to make it a livable place... Man is not perfect, but he can 
make progress... Progress is such a beautiful thing!" 
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The idea to remodel the store was thus first of all based on a notion of 
progress. For Chela, here 'progress' means increasing the store's turnover. 
This can be achieved by offering something that clients were more and 
more getting used to: self-service.14 This however called for relatively 
high investments such as changes in the physical structure of the store, a 
wall with refrigerators with glass doors, new shelves, automatic weighing 
scales and a computerized cash register. 
As to the home improvements: for the otherwise materialistically 
oriented David, moving into the adobe house in El Grullo was a giant 
leap backwards. So when the store made profit for the first time, plans to 
improve the house were high on the agenda. This involved replacing the 
old electric circuitry, building a new kitchen, and adding two rooms on 
the roof. The latter necessitated major changes in the foundation of the 
house, since the adobe construction would never support the weight. 
As concerns David and Chela's strategy to become less dependent 
on Jos6, a number of obstacles had to be removed. For one thing, switch-
ing to alternative supply channels was difficult, because even official 
distributors could not match Josh's prices due to the latter's magnitude of 
orders. The alternative entailed specializing in products Jose could not 
provide. To the extent that David and Chela would succeed in enroling 
new suppliers, clients interested in the new products had to be sought. 
Some of these came 'naturally', that is, they shopped at the store because 
they had always done so, or because of their longstanding friendship with 
David and/or Chela. If the project wished to increase its feasibility, 
however, then more clients needed to be convinced to buy at the store in 
order to increase turnover substantially. 
The situation with Gaby, in turn, was difficult but not wholly 
irresolvable. Chela and David wished to break open the inheritance 
agreement and renegotiate Gaby's claim and - or so both supposed -
perhaps her demands could be dodged through some other form of 
material reward. In any event, if Chela and David wished to increase their 
negotiation space then Gaby had to be persuaded to renegotiate the 
agreement. 
Next to the above actors who needed to be enrolled, other poten-
tial allies included local and regional authorities, the chamber of com-
merce, the tax inspector, the accountant, and so on. These had already 
been put in place long ago - in the sense that no extra effort was needed 
to obtain their support. With others, however, support had to be 
(re) negotiated. 
Resistances to the project 
To develop their project, David and Chela thus needed to enrol a number 
of actors from the global network, and to coordinate the activities of the 
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local network. As we saw above, the negotiation space to developing a 
local network was limited because the project was in constant tension 
with actors from the global network. Nevertheless, within their limited 
negotiation space David and Chela continued with their work of localiz-
ing and contextualizing. As stated before, this entailed the mobilization of 
heterogeneous actors such as Jose and Gaby, clients, alternative suppliers, 
an adobe house, the infrastructure of the store, and Nena. In order for the 
project to become feasible these actors needed to be locked into place, 
that is, they had to function according to the specific roles that were 
attributed to them. Thus suppliers had to be willing to sell their products 
at low cost; the house had to meet modern expectations of comfort; the 
store had to be updated to attract more customers; Nena's skills had to be 
retained (yet her moves be checked carefully); and Jos6 and Gaby's 
demands had to be kept at bay or renegotiated. The identity attributed to 
these heterogeneous actors, however, so far remained unreal. Their 
identity thus needed to be reconstructed or remoulded so that they 
performed the roles assigned to them. This, of course, entailed breaking a 
series of resistances to which we now turn. 
The most important resistance that needed to be overcome involved Jose 
and Gaby's claims. To this end, a range of suppliers willing to substitute 
Jose needed to be enrolled in the project. The most obvious replacement 
of Jose was Tarcisio Jimenez, owner of La Compafiia. Tarcisio was 
approached, and it turned out that he was willing to provide groceries 
and candies (which sold best of all) at competitive prices. This move 
enabled David and Chela to become less reliant on Jos6. However, after a 
few months David and Tarcisio broke off their deal after a row, 1 5 and 
Jose was asked to supply once again. This Jos6 did, but not without first 
making it very clear that the move had damaged the trust that he suppos-
ed existed between himself, his sister, and David. The incident notwith-
standing, David and Chela continued their search for alternative suppliers. 
However, large suppliers able to undercut Josh's prices were not.to be 
found in the region, and consequently it was mainly petty traders who 
provided David and Chela with a variety of goods such as flower arrange-
ments for the Day of the Dead, caffeine-free shrub coffee, raw sugar, 
bread and bizcochos (sweet bread), or lichens from Mazamitla for the 
Christmas cradle. Also, on his frequent trips to visit relatives and friends 
in Guadalajara and Colima, David brought back with him all sorts of 
goods ranging from brooms to eggnog and dry, salty cheese. Indeed, 
David and Chela's mind was always set on identifying new suppliers of 
anything that could be sold at the store. 
Next to suppliers, an essential resistance to the feasibility of the 
project were clients. Clearly, their resistance to shop at the store was 
directly related to the presence of the neighbouring La Companfa (which, 
with the exception of fresh produce, offered lower prices on most of the 
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goods that David and Chela also sold) as well as other nearby stores such 
as Josh's and the local co-operative mart. Although David and Chela's 
strategic location ensured a flow of casual patrons, if business was to 
improve then the flow had to be increased. This was a complicated matter 
that required some keen strategizing in terms of product supply,16 and 
which was related to diverse, resisting actors such as the agricultural 
cycle, migrants' behaviour, or local and regional fiestas which often 
resisted (though sometimes aided) the advancement of Chela and David's 
project. Chela: 
"During the fiestas people will eat only tortillas, beans and 
chilies at home, and then go and spend it all on drinking and 
dancing. That hurts us because we have our constant costs with 
Nena. But then comes Christmas and all is better because fam-
ilies come home from the United States and their relatives here 
buy what they usually don't to treat them kindly and let them 
see that they are doing well." 
Another obstacle opposing the project was the brittle relationship with 
their employee, Nena. Nena, as we saw above, was a crucial element for 
the running of the store. This Nena was well aware of, and exploited this 
knowledge to claim full-time employment - even though she was not in 
fact always needed.1 7 Inflexibility in the organization of paid labour, 
then, restricted the room for manoeuvre needed to adapt to fluctuations in 
consumer demand. 
The physical improvements to the store and house proved to be 
large hurdles as well. Improvements, let us recall, called for changes in 
the inheritance agreement. )ose however was strongly opposed to any 
alteration to the agreement; that is, he agreed with the improvements, but 
insisted that the added value of the property should also be passed on to 
Gaby and him. David and Chela thus felt that every peso invested in the 
house and the store would be a waste, since it would also belong to 
Chela's kin, even though they would be making the investment. 
Mobilization 
To overcome resistances in both the global and the local network, David 
and Chela had to mobilize a number of resources. As a first move, David 
questioned Gaby's claim to a share in the profits by moving back to 
Colima, arguing that he was tired of having to split earnings with her.18 
While doing so, David warned Chela that he would not come back to El 
Grullo until the issue had been settled in their favour. Not wanting to lose 
her husband, Chela offered Gaby a deal: she would set up a small 
cremerfa (cheese shop) for her on part of the store's premises, in 
120 TACOS, TIENDAS AND MEZCAL 
exchange for her share of the store's profit. This way, Chela argued, Gaby 
could run her own business in the future. Not without a fight, Gaby 
finally gave in and went along with the deal. Nevertheless Chela put 
some moral pressure on Gaby, letting her know that she would have to 
contribute in some way for her mother's sustenance. In the end, it was 
agreed that Gaby would pay a monthly rent of USD 100 for the cheese 
shop to David and Chela, who would in turn open a new bank account, 
deposit the money in it, and name Conchita (Gaby's mother) beneficiary. 
Jos6 and, eventually, David sanctioned the deal and by the end of 1992 
the store was remodelled to harbour Gaby's cheese shop (a small room of 
2.5 by 3 meters with its own private entrance).19 
Renegotiating the inheritance agreement was a costly business for 
David and Chela. The final bill of remodelling the store and buying 
adequate equipment for Gaby added up to a lofty USD 5,500 (plus USD 
5,000 Gaby's husband also invested in it), not including the store space 
lost to the cheese shop. From an financial point of view, however, the 
investment could pay itself off in due time, as part of the store's profits 
would not longer accrue to Gaby. In a sense, then, the global network 
had been (partially) reshaped, and David and Chela's could now enjoy 
more room for manoeuvre to develop their own, local network. 
Though successful in their negotiation with Gaby, Chela and David 
never managed to reach a new agreement with Jose. Improvements to 
both the house and thus the shop could not be realized. As a conse-
quence, David and Chela once again intensified their search for alterna-
tive suppliers, to the point that by the end of 1992 most groceries (not 
fresh produce) were purchased with official distributors and no longer 
with Jos6. This clearly increased the exploitation costs of the store, but it 
was felt by both David and Chela that their independence was worth the 
price.2 0 To narrow down the gap between prices offered by Jos6 and 
those offered by official distributors, Chela opened an account at the Ca/a 
Popular in which she deposited around USD 65 a week. The idea was 
that, with these savings, a pick-up truck of around USD 5,000 could be 
bought within half a year. This would enable Chela and David to travel to 
Guadalajara and stock the shop for a lower price. 
Apart from issues of cost, switching to alternative suppliers had 
additional disadvantages and a host of new problems surfaced. One of 
them concerned storage space. Whereas Chela and David could always 
buy whatever quantity of produce they wished from Jose, with alternative 
suppliers this was not always the case. For instance, when buying squash 
seeds from farmers directly, often a large number of 30kg sacks had to be 
bought to obtain a reasonable price. The seeds would sell well (people 
bought up to 4-5kg at a time to make p/p/an (a local dish from Yucatan) 
but until all was sold sacks of squash seed or other agricultural products 
filled the house and obstructed the main pathway in the store - much to 
the annoyance of David, Chela, Nena, and customers. 
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But other, puzzling problems also emerged. For example, Nestl6's 
distributor would only deliver 'Nido' powdered milk (which was preferred 
by consumers) if David and Chela also acquired Nestles 'Maggi' sauce 
(which was not liked by consumers, who much preferred 'Knorr'). Since 
many distributors only sold 'packages' of products, sometimes difficult 
decisions had to be made. Thus, as with the example of 'Nido', con-
sumers would be satisfied, but only at the expense of shelve space for 
'Maggi' and the dissatisfaction of clients wishing to buy 'Knorr'.21 Chela 
and David solved these problems, for example, by obtaining 'Knorr' sauce 
with Jos6 - who, because of the scale and scope of his enterprise could 
not be manipulated as easily by official distributors and carried all poss-
ible sauce brands. This however went against their quest for indepen-
dence from Jos£, and made Chela and David acutely aware of their 
impotence vis-a-vis Jose and factory distributors. Indeed, it is clear that, by 
not being able to shape their global network through a renegotiation of 
the inheritance agreement, David and Chela were compelled to make a 
huge detour which in fact proved to be decisive for the configuration of 
their project. 
The gradual turn away from Jos6 and in favour of new suppliers not only 
induced the organizational problems referred to above. It also called for 
an increase in the complexity of administrative tasks and for a more 
finely-tuned orchestration of relations with the Ministry of Taxes, regula-
tory agencies, and local political factions. Before switching to new 
distributors, for example, administrative tasks such as accountancy were 
relatively straightforward (although complicated because of profit-sharing) 
because Josd supplied with closed books.22 Thus it was enough for 
Chela to keep (internal) track of purchases, while towards the Ministry of 
Taxes she only needed to account for the relatively few invoices of 
official distributors (softdrinks, beer, bread, cooking oil) which could 
easily be covered through the sale of products for which no invoice was 
issued. With the change of supply channels, however, this situation was 
altered sharply. In general, official distributors were obliged to deliver a 
standardized, numbered tax invoice for products sold. As the number of 
official invoices grew relative to the amount of unaccountable products, 
massaging profit figures became increasingly complicated. Consequently, 
some form of sales registration was needed at the store so that - for tax 
reasons - purchases could be matched with sales. The whole operation in 
turn required careful 'guesstimates' of sales (clients never required receipts 
for products bought) for different categories of products, and demanded 
the services of an accountant. As an effect of their decision to become 
less dependent on Jose, David and Chela's room for manoeuvre vis-a-vis 
other actors from their global network (i.e. the Ministry of Taxes) 
dimisnished. 
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A related problem of not buying their assortment with Jose 
involved the sale of products from the so-called canasta b&sica (basic 
needs basket). By law, prices for products such as sugar, cooking oil, 
sardines, powdered milk, rice, toilet paper and the like had an official 
ceiling, which was enforced and checked by PROFECO 2 3 . Suppliers, 
however, already provided most of these (subsidized) products above 
these ceiling prices, and consumers had to pay an even higher price. By 
doing this David and Chela risked the imposition of a hefty fine or the 
closure of the establishment by PROFECO: it only took one single 
customer's complaint for these measures to be taken. At the time that 
most of the inventory was bought at Josh's, the whole problem was non-
existent: Jos6 simply placed his orders directly at the factory and thus was 
not hindered by intermediaries who boosted prices. Given the new 
situation, David and Chela were forced to seek a solution to this problem. 
An obvious way out was to 'hide' basic needs products from clients' 
view, thus preventing high demand for them. But then it was mandatory 
(by law) that basic need products be openly displayed. Inspectors - who 
dropped by at least once a month - could be 'bribed' if they noticed the 
products were sold at too high a price or were hidden from view. Yet, 
bribing was not always possible, and encountering an 'inflexible' inspec-
tor could prove deleterious for business. It was thus much easier to reach 
an 'overall' agreement with the municipality and be "shielded" against 
sudden audits from the Ministry of Taxes or the idiosyncrasies of individ-
ual PROFECO inspectors. And these could - to a degree - be kept at bay 
through the mobilization of political allies and good relations with the 
municipality. 
On this issue, however, Chela's and David's strategies diverged. 
For example, during the 1992 municipal election campaign David strong-
ly backed PAN's (a rigth-of-the-centre political party) candidate (Conchita 
Corona) by giving a number of speeches on her behalf. In particular, 
David backed Conchita's plan to eradicate all street vendors from El 
Grullo's Plaza.24 These peddlers David (like Conchita) blamed for pro-
viding unfair competition to established businesses like his and Chela's. 
After all, the argument ran, ambulant sellers did not pay official taxes, did 
not employ extra-familiar labour, and had little overhead costs. Hence 
their products were cheaper. Moreover, peddlers gave El Grullo's main 
plaza the appearance of an informal tianguis - which conflicted with 
David's ideas about proper decor and 'progress'. Chela - somewhat more 
opportunistic - opposed the plan to remove ambulant sellers from the 
Jardln, and argued that all vendors, taco carts and others that carried out 
their businesses on the sidewalk next to their store attracted many cus-
tomers and were thus to their benefit. According to Chela, to chase 
peddlers away was tantamount to slaughtering the hen that laid the 
golden eggs. Hence Chela (who by the way had always voted PAN) 
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openly supported PRI, and sought its support, for example, by offering PRI 
to paint its political slogan on the outside wall of the store.25 
From the above, we can see that David and Chela had to mobilize a set 
of elements in order to overcome resistances to their project. This way, 
their local network gradually took shape. One crucial prevailing factor, 
though, concerned clients: without increasing numbers of them the 
project would be unfeasible. Not unlike the fronts involving suppliers, 
labour, Jos£, Gaby, regulations or political alliances, a variety of strategies 
and resources were brought to bear on clients in order to induce them to 
buy items from the store's line of articles. Here, the most noticeable 
stratagem involved flexible opening times. Thus, when business was low, 
the shop would close doors for a larger part of the afternoon, then reopen 
until late at night. This had to do with the store's strategic location next to 
the place where taco vendors installed their stalls at night. As a conse-
quence, vendors themselves but also their clients used to buy anything 
from softdrinks to napkins and cigarettes at David and Chela's. On other 
occasions, such as during the Christmas and fiesta seasons, the store 
would open its gates early in the morning (7am), only to close at mid-
night.26 
Next to flexible opening times David and Chela attracted their 
clientele through personalized attention: charming remarks, passing on 
gossip, or doing little extras like helping the elderly to carry their goods 
were conscious ruses to seek clients' preference. However, although both 
David and Chela knew the effect of these tactics, they nevertheless were 
extremely selective in their treatment of clients. Thus for example David 
showed a strong predilection for clients with whom he had extra-business 
relations,27 and tried to keep his dealings with some other categories of 
customers to a bare minimum.28 To keep the latter at bay he treated 
them harshly - for instance by not noticing their presence or by using 
derogatory language to address them. In this, David often collided with 
Chela, who took the position that "business is business" and that therefore 
one should not be too picky with clients. Although more pragmatic, Chela 
would also in effect discourage some of her customers through her 
moralizing tendencies.29 
Apart from opening times and relations with clients, the most 
apparent strategy for enrolling customers involved seducing them by 
offering merchandise below ongoing prices, for example before Christmas 
when the store's entrance was decorated with strings of little flickering 
lights that were sold under cost price. While deliberately losing on these 
types of products, the strategy was often deployed as a means to increase 
the volume of sales. As Chela put it: 
"Once in a while it's good to hurt oneself a little. I go to the 
market, compare prices, and then offer lower ones. People do 
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notice these things. News is passed on and then clients come to 
me. It is much better to sell large quantities cheaply, than to sell 
only a little for higher prices." 
On other occasions, information about a specific product was adapted to 
suit customers' desire. Thus local fresh cheese was sometimes advertised 
as coming from Tapalpa - a place known for the high quality of its dairy 
products - or eggnog from Guadalajara was claimed to be 'home made' 
by nuns at Zapotlanejo's convent. Of course, buyers end up paying a 
price to satisfy their lust for these genuine products. 
But lowering prices and providing false product information were 
not the only means to captivate patrons. The way in which products were 
sold was equally important. So, for example, many (known) shoppers 
bought on credit. This was not a practice David or Chela themselves 
advocated since - apart from the difficulty in recuperating the money -
selling on credit entailed administrative complications.30 Nonetheless it 
was a practice they had to cope with for the simple reason that buyers 
would otherwise turn to other grocery stores. Similar to selling on credit 
was the system of apartado: for a small down payment, a specific product 
(e.g. Levi jeans) would be set aside for a customer until he or she had 
enough cash to finish paying.31 
Of a different kind altogether was the resale of products on com-
mission. For example, trustworthy peddlers would come to the store and 
take with them an array of products such as brooms, petates (straw 
mattress) or candy, and sell these on the sidewalk (either at the plaza or 
at the alameda) or from house to house. These ambulant sellers generally 
sold at store's prices, and were given 10% of sales upon return. Interest-
ingly, Chela and David themselves also marketed a variety of products on 
commission, such as illegally imported microwave ovens from the US, 
and jeans or clothes which were sold under the counter. In case these 
products did not sell then jackpots of around USD 2 per ticket were 
organized - the number of tickets transacted depending on the price of the 
product. 
To a certain extent, these practices were effective means to increase the 
store's clientele. Moreover, in part they concealed turnover from Jose's 
view, thus increasing the autonomy of David and Chela's project - that is, 
their negotiation space vis-a-vis the global network. However, when put 
into perspective, the store's success was relative. Average (net) weekly 
profits surpassed USD 200, but after sharing benefits with Jos6 not more 
than a monthly USD 700 was left over. This figure was about a third of 
what David and Chela had been earning in Colima, and clearly did not 
meet their expectations. 
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Transformation of the project 
It was at this point that the project entered a new phase. Given the room 
to negotiate with their global network, David and Chela had tried nearly 
all means at their disposition to make the store more successful. All sorts 
of resources - human and nonhuman - had been mobilized to this end, 
but eventually it became clear that the functioning of their local network 
was incompatible with the requirements of the global one (and, especial-
ly, Josh's demands). 
David and Chela considered various solutions to their predicament. 
Continuing on the same line - that is, persisting in their strategy of shap-
ing their project within the boundaries set forth by its global network -
was not a prospect David and Chela coveted much. Indeed, the limit of 
what could be achieved through their approach was in sight, and both 
were aware that through their persistent, painstaking efforts maybe an 
additional monthly USD 100-200 could be earned. And this was not seen 
as a substantial improvement. 
A second solution that was considered involved expeditions into 
new product areas, or the purchase of the desired pick-up truck32. This 
lead to a series of calculations, especially on David's side. In principle, 
David had the means to invest in the store. He owned a two-bedroom 
house in Guadalajara for which he received a monthly rent of USD 2 2 0 . 
So far, he had used this income for covering his passenger car's expenses 
and for paying his daughter's school fees. What was left he deposited in 
his own bank account, in which he had savings of around USD 6,700. In 
addition, David could potentially mobilize part of the money he had 
obtained in 1989 from SARH as liquidation33 (a remuneration paid to 
laid-offs). Also - if needed - the house in Colima could be sold for 
cash. 3 4 Although theoretically feasible, this second solution - investing -
was rejected. The reason for this was that David feared investing his own 
money in the project, as the relationship between him and Chela had 
been deteriorating since the takeover of the shop - to the point at which 
both recognized their marriage was, after 2 5 years, not that stable any 
more. In David's words: 
"I guess it has to do with this store business and the sacrifices 
we've been through. We've been working in El Grullo for 
nearly five years now. And where are the material rewards? 
Gerardo, I'm fed up with this thing! I'm an engineer, and look 
at the type of job I'm doing. How can one expect a good 
marriage under these circumstances?" 
In light of this - and considering the fact that the store was on Chela's and 
Jose's name - David was not very inclined to invest. Moreover, new 
investments would require David and Chela to have influence over 
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Conclusion 
Can we say something about the feasibility of David and Chela's store? 
Was their project able to turn into a obligatory point of passage between 
suppliers of new products (i.e. buying on good terms), or the contacts 
necessary to stock for lower prices at Guadalajara's Central de Abastos 
(wholesale market). As things stood Chela and David had insufficient 
control over the elements involved, thus making these investments 
unrealistic. 
A final solution that was pursued involved the modernization of 
the store. As we have seen above, this required making substantial 
changes to the physical infrastructure of the building - something Jos6 was 
adamantly against. No matter how often David and Chela tried to per-
suade him to accept the purported changes, Josh's line on the issue was 
that the real estate (the plot on which the store was located) was worth 
many times the value of the business. Indeed, Jos6 was increasingly of the 
opinion that it was preferable to sell the property and divide the money 
(the plot on which the store was build was valued at over USD 75,000 by 
the bank - which was a low estimate considering its strategic location) 
than to obtain a monthly rent of around USD 250 - a negligible amount if 
compared with the profit of his own wholesale business. Thus Jose 
repeatedly tried to persuade Chela with his calculative, economically 
rational argument that selling out would not be the same as betraying the 
memory of their parents. 
No matter what David and Chela did, there seemed to be no way 
out of the impasse. This in turn led to a complete rethinking of the 
project. When it became clear that the store could not construct and 
control its global network, Chela (but especially David) lost all interest in 
it and gradual distancing towards the shop became apparent. Thus 
scapegoats were sought to justify losing interest: Mimf's school was 
accused of not being good enough (for instance, she was called a num-
ber, not a name - which David found degrading); life in El Grullo was too 
provincial, and so on. Also, David would take on small projects that were 
unrelated to the running of the store, and which involved his engineer's 
knowledge. So he started making drawings for houses of acquaintances 
both in El Grullo and in Colima. And he invested his time in an old 
hobby of his: building japanese-style lamps (which took him about three 
months each to finish). Chela, on her part, was discouraged by her 
brother's attitude, and seemed to comfort herself with the idea of the 
probable sale of the store. Her merchant's blood, though, was too strong 
to simply accept the prospect of becoming a retired tradeswoman, and 
before I left El Grullo Chela had already mobilized her network in Colima 
to obtain information about well-located stores in the center of town. 
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its global and local networks? As we saw in Chapter two, the degree of 
feasibility of a given project is a function of its ability to become an 
obligatory point of passage between the global and local networks it helps 
construct. This in turn can be appraised by the degree of convergence -
that is, the success or failure to impose a given translation and a transla-
tion regime - of these networks, and by the momentum the project is able 
to gain. 
In the case of David and Chela, the project never really gained 
momentum. That is, at no point was it not possible for them to go back 
on their steps, and neither were their future activities determined by the 
actions taken since they had taken over operations. Thus David and Chela 
never took decisions concerning the store that proved irreversible: apart 
from setting up Gaby's cheese shop,35 no substantial investments were 
made - either in terms of desired infrastructural changes to the shop, or in 
terms of home improvements. Likewise, the initial moral attachment to 
the store slowly waned. In fact, at any time David and Chela could have 
given up operations, sell the store, and go back to Colima. 
The project, then, did not gain momentum. But how about conver-
gence between the global and local networks put in place by the store? 
From the case, we can infer that David and Chela did not succeed in 
adding any local rules to already existing ones: the general rules - the 
initial agreement with Jos6 and Gaby - were only partially modified, and 
from their negotiations with new suppliers of goods one can conclude 
that the possibility of adding local rules to those followed by official 
distributors was at best remote. 
Likewise, one can conclude that David and Chela's translation 
efforts proved unsuccessful. Their problematization of the situation was 
straightforward: if their project was to become successful then a) Jose and 
Gaby's claims needed to be kept at bay through new supply channels; b) 
the shop and the house required remodelling and improvement; and c) 
more clients would be needed. To concretize this problematization, a 
heterogeneous network of actors would have to play the roles set out for 
them by David and Chela: Jos6 would have to be willing to renegotiate 
the initial agreement so that investments in infrastructure could be made; 
Gaby would have to swap her claim on profits for a cheese shop; new 
suppliers would have to offer their goods on the same terms as Jos6; 
clients would have to be interested in new product lines, and so forth. 
Were these actors willing to play these attributed roles? As we saw in the 
case, some of these actors were successfully enrolled into the project. 
Thus Gaby - after lengthy struggles - acquiesced to David and Chela's 
wishes, and clients - to a degree - seemed to be interested in the new 
products sold. Other actors, however, only fulfilled their roles partially. 
Thus, for example, new suppliers of goods turned out to be willing to 
participate in the project, but only under unfavourable conditions and at 
the cost of excessive complications. Finally, one crucial actor - Jos6 - had 
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different thoughts on the agreement, and could not be made to obey the 
project's problematization. Enrolment of actors, then, was only partially 
successful. Hence, the project did not take the direction proposed in the 
initial problematization. In other words: the degree of convergence 
between the actors involved in the project was low, and the collectif did 
not act as one enterprise. 
To return to our initial question (can we say something about the 
feasibility of David and Chela's project?): the project did not act as an 
obligatory point of passage between its global and local networks. 
Although the project was able to provide some of the actors of its global 
network with a timely reward (i.e. Jos6 and Gaby were given their share 
of profits; new suppliers were paid for their goods; clients could buy the 
products they were interested in), difficulties in a successful 
contextualization of the project stood in the way for obtaining enough 
room for manoeuvre to construct a durable local network. In other words, 
problems with the 'context' impeded David and Chela from turning their 
project into a locus of control over transactions between the local and the 
global networks. 
Notes 
1. David and Chela never knew I was doing a study on them. 
2. See also Gomez (1992) for a historical account of the rise of local, family-
run firms. 
3. As of this writing, El Grullo is the most dynamic commercial centre in the 
region, and customers from a wide area come to town to shop - not least 
because of the scale and scope of "La Companfa". 
4. In some circles, the story circulated that Don Manuel started the business 
after having found a tesoro (a trunk full of gold) near the river in El Lim6n, 
his place of origin. The treasure, which at first brought him prosperity, 
eventually also cast a spell on him. As the anecdote went, his wife Norberta -
known for her stinginess - once started to count the gold left in the trunk 
when a client dropped into the store. Trying to hide the trunk, Norberta sat 
on it. Harmful gasses were released from the trunk, killing her some months 
later. Don Manuel never recovered from the loss of his wife in 1983, became 
ill for a long time, and eventually died in 1987. 
5. According to the new policy, farmers would have to pay for extension 
services themselves. Some financial assistance could be provided by SARH, 
but personnel would have to be hired from consulting agencies, not SARH. 
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6. David went all the way to the Governor of Jalisco - Guillermo Cosfo 
Vidaurri - to make his case. David knew Cosfo from high school, and had 
met him once on the street when the latter was major of Guadalajara. Cosfo 
recognized David, who addressed the former with the formal 7/'cenc;ado'(lit.: 
lawyer). The major then asked why David had called him by his title, adding 
modestly that he still remained "Guillermo" for him. So when problems at 
SARH loomed at the horizon, David decided to call on the Governor. 
Although David was never able to get an audience with him, Cosfo neverthe-
less appointed (through his personal secretary) David to SEDUR (Ministry of 
Urban Development). However, the salary offered to David (USD 400) was 
only a third of what he was earning at SARH. David said 'no thank you' and 
never returned to the Governor's office again. 
7. David however declined the offer, taking an engineering degree instead. 
8. This amounted to some USD 2 0 0 of benefits. 
9. If more than four or five products were bought Nena would normally write 
down the amount to be paid on a note, and pass this on to David or Chela. 
This was always the case with fresh produce which first had to be weighed. 
10. Gaby had married two years before the takeover of the store. According 
to David, her fall in income should have been no problem because she could 
depend on her husband's. Moreover, as David reckoned, it had been through 
Gaby's mismanagement that debts had been incurred in the first place, so it 
was only 'natural' that she should be punished for this. 
1 1 . The accusation of heartlessness was returned by David, who charged 
Gaby of first having been 'spoiled' by her grandfather who gave her every-
thing whenever she wanted, but then shamelessly married barely 1 7 days 
after her grandfather died. 
12. Clients would have to unload the heavy bottles from the rack themselves, 
as Gaby was seldom in the store and as they were too heavy for Chela or 
Nena to lift. 
13. This setup of course introduced tensions to do with accountancy (Chela) 
and control (Jose and Gaby). The room for manoeuvre between the project 
and a part of its global network was thus under constant pressure. 
14. Due to their migration experiences, many customers were used to 
shopping at fully-equipped marketas (self-service shops catering mostly to 
Latino migrants) in the US. In El Grullo, successful stores were also applying 
this formula, which clients seemed to prefer. 
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15. The content of the row was as follows: David wanted to build a structure 
on his roof to dry clothes. David saw that Tarcisio had some metal tubes 
lying around unused in a property of his. David, who could not find Tarcisio, 
then spoke to the latter's son who agreed to sell whatever unused tubes 
David could find. As David (together with his neighbour) was collecting the 
tubes, Tarcisio showed up and screamed that David was a thief, that he had 
nothing to do on his property, and so on. David tried to calm him down, but 
to no avail. Meanwhile, passers-by packed the scene to hear what was going 
on. David felt very embarrassed by the situation and has since kept his 
distance from "Mandamas". 
16. Sales were distributed around the calendar which meant that suppliers 
often faced peak demands for specific products. To keep their customers 
satisfied David and Chela had to make sure they were not sidestepped by 
suppliers at crucial moments. Careful estimation of consumer demand thus 
called for advanced planning of purchases - especially of perishable products. 
17. Nena (36 years old and mother of 7) added weight to this claim by 
arguing that she did not really need the job at David and Chela's. To an 
extent this was certainly so. For one thing, she was entitled to a monthly 
pension of USD 240 from the US because two of her children had been born 
in California. Also, Nena sold jewelry and trinkets on commission when not 
at the store - a door-to-door business that left her a profitable 20% on each 
item sold. 
18. The house in Colima was not rented out because David and Chela 
reasoned that it would be legally difficult to get the tenants out in case they 
decided to move back to Colima. 
19. Setting up the cheese shop however did not smooth out problems with 
Gaby. For example, a huge row developed between David and Gaby when 
the latter bought a matress from a friend - paying in kind from products she 
took from the store while Chela and David were away, and never repaying 
the debt. Though Chela seemed not to care too much about the incident, 
David went as far as not talking to Gaby for over a year. 
20. Also, and in order to have Jose interfere as little as possible with their 
affairs, Chela and David fully took care of Gaby's mother - paying all her 
expenses (including her social security premium). 
21. Knorr, on its part, would only sell its sauce if David and Chela agreed to 
buy Knorr's powdered milk as well. 
22. David and Chela never asked for an invoice when stocking at Jose, and 
most products sold at their store were thus invisible to the Ministry of Taxes. 
Jose, for his part, could easily camouflage his sales to this Ministry as many of 
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his wholesale purchases were booked under the category of non-processed 
agricultural produce (no payment of taxes is required for these products in 
Mexico), even if they were not. Needless to say, since this practice of 
escaping governmental control is widespread, the Ministry of Taxes is 
obviously left with a caricature or, at best, a deflated view of the sum total of 
economic transactions. 
23. Procuradurla Federal del Consumidor, the Federal Consumer Agency. 
24. Besides proselytizing against street peddlers, David's four speeches 
always carried an anti-PRI tone, for example by accusing prilstas of being a 
"bunch of lazy bums living off the people". If the PRI wins, the people lose." 
Interestingly, as an effect of the speeches, PAN voters increasingly shopped at 
David's. 
25. David opposed the idea, and instead offered PAN use of the wall. Since 
David and Chela could not draw a common line on this, Jose and Gaby - as 
co-owners of the property - were called to cast their vote on the issue. Gaby 
did not care, but Jose insisted that the wall should be utilized by PAN -
which eventually painted its slogan. 
26. This strategy, however, was not purely based on a profit-maximizing 
rationality. Indeed, on many a profitable moment the store would close, for 
example on Sunday evening when both David and Chela attended Mass (the 
plaza would then be literally full of potential customers) or on Mother's Day 
(the most profitable day of the year) when Chela visited the local cemetery to 
pay tribute to her loved one and David did the same in Guadalajara. 
27. An example of this was the local cadre of PAN (National Action Party) in 
which David had an active input. Also, customers who followed religious 
courses with David enjoyed his favours while they shopped at the store. This 
category of clients was quite large, as David participated in a host of local 
and regional religious meetings where he would meet fellow Grullenses. The 
meetings provided an opportunity for David to get acquainted with people 
that did not belong to the circle of his in-laws. 
28. These David actively tried to dissuade from buying. This category was 
composed of those he did not consider 'good Catholics' - as was the case of 
Amerindian sugarcane cutters especially from the States of Guerrero and 
Oaxaca. David considered these Amerindians to be heretics not willing to be 
brought on the right track as they did not wish to follow the word of Christ. 
In addition, David reasoned that although chuntaros were strong ["like all 
pure races"] and good sugarcane cutters, they had a general lack of morals, 
were filthy and thus not worthy of one's friendship. As an example he 
mentioned that there was a shelter in El Grullo were these cutters met their 
physical needs just where they pleased - despite the fact that sanitary installa-
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tions were available on the premise. Or they made love by just turning their 
back to those present in the room they were in. 
29. So, for example, Chela would often try to dissuade sugarcane cutters from 
buying candies or beer, alleging that they could better invest their money in 
healthy products. 
30. Some of the creditors were very much disliked - especially by David: 
"These are millionaires with tens of hectares full of sugarcane who in a very 
matter-of-fact manner buy stuff at the shop and then just walk away saying: 
'oh well, I just don't have money on me right now. Write it down for me, 
will you?'" 
31. Clients were never given more than a month to pay, and a fee worth 
10% of the price of the product was charged for the 'service'. 
32. Initially some money had been put aside at the Ca/a Popular to buy the 
truck. However, it soon appeared that the rate at which savings could be put 
aside was lower than expected. The idea of buying the truck had thus been 
temporarily put on ice. 
33. David obtained nearly USD 6,500 as a remuneration. This sum however 
he lent to his brother Manuel in Guadalajara, who in turn lent it to a friend 
who owned a stall at the Central de Abastos (wholesale market) there. As 
collateral, this friend left Manuel a cheque worth USD 9,300 (the sum of the 
loan and the interest due at the time he planned to repay the debt). In turn, 
Manuel would give David a monthly 8%. However, after some time the stall 
operator went broke and no money at all could be rescued at first (the man 
owned a house in Guadalajara but it was on his wife's name). Manuel did 
reinstall part of the debt to David - USD 3,300 - and by the end of 1993 
David was still counting on his brother to honour the remaining arrears. 
34. No mortgage rested on this property, which was in David's name. Its 
value was estimated at USD 100,000. 
35. The capital involved in setting up Gaby's cheese shop had - to a great 
extent - already been recuperated because part of Gaby's profit share subse-
quently belonged to Chela. 
CHAPTER 7 
PRODUCING MEZCAL 
Controlling mezcal consumers at a distance 
As I am musing about how to write these opening lines, my eyes meander 
accross my room. They stop at a particular "trophy" I brought home with 
me from Mexico: a now framed cardboard poster of Reserva del Abuelo 
mezcal.1 The bottom line of the ugly icon displays the company's 
slogan: "ideal para combinar con todo" (ideal to mix with everything) and 
the name of the producer: Le6n Gomez. I have to sigh. The poster 
pictures a tranquil, agave-filled mountainous landscape which transports 
me back to El Grullo, where I collaborated with Le6n in distributing his 
mezcal. I remember it being a rather 'easy' job, participating in a well-
established distribution network. But has this network always been the 
way it is? Clearly not. For one thing, when Leon's great-grandfather 
started distilling mezcal in Toliman around 1880, he was one out of 
nearly twenty local producers that were catering for a very limited 
assortment of clients, most of whom never left the extremely secluded 
area. In fact, in Toliman mezcal seems to have been obtained for fiesta 
and working-party arrangements rather than for commercial purposes. The 
small amount of mezcal that did leave the community in dried pumpkins 
enjoyed a good reputation in far-away places such as Colima and 
Zapotlan (see map). However, selling the at times illegal drink in these 
cities entailed a long, difficult undertaking only carried out by the more 
experienced and risk-taking traders and smugglers. Also, the distillation 
process was very rudimentary if compared to today's more 'technified' 
methods. For example, no stills were used, and converting fermented saps 
into distilled spirits was a time-consuming process in which alcoholic 
vapours slowly condensed against a wooden, water-cooled bell. 
Things have indeed changed. A paved road now connects Toliman with 
vital infrastructural arteries, and the passage of now legal drink to distant 
places has become commonplace. At the tavema (distillery), new technol-
ogies make possible distillation on a larger scale. Also, a larger chain of 
people and things are now directly related to the process by which agaves 
are transformed into mezcal, and mezcal into happiness, drunkenness, 
fights, and hangovers. A chain that spans, for example, State level offi-
cials, alcohol inspectors, federal police, distributors, and agave producers 
just as it contains bottles, bars, and Alka-Seltzer. 
In this process of transformation mezcal allowed for the build up of 
a considerable fortune. It was Lebn's grandfather, who inherited the 
distillery as well as some 20 hectares of land and a few head of cattle, 
who laid down the building block of family wealth. He did so by selling 
all his assets and putting all his eggs in one basket: the production of 
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mezcal. This coincided with a period (around 1905) when mezcal 
became increasingly commercialized in the pre-revolutionary boom towns 
of Colima, Manzanillo and Zapotlan (now Ciudad Guzman). 
After the Revolution, and especially during the Cristiada years 
(1926-29), possibilities for commercialization of mezcal were scarce. In 
these years, many distilleries stopped operations. During this period, 
Ledn's grandfather, for financial reasons, rented out the distillery for 
some years, only to seize it back when he saw that his tenant was again 
making money with mezcal.2 By the time Rodolfo, Le6n's father, took 
over the enterprise as the sole heir, the distillery was already well-estab-
lished and boasted a "good name". With him, the distillery flourished for 
more than three decades. In these years, Rodolfo was able to successfully 
push his competitors out of business - to the point that, at his death in 
1989, "Las Palmas" (as Rodolfo's enterprise was officially registered) was 
the only distillery left in Toliman. With the money made on mezcal 
Rodolfo was able to buy El Mezquital (100 hectares of fertile land along-
side the Tuxcacuesco river) as well as over 700 hectares of land that was 
ill-suited for agriculture but large enough to accommodate his 300 head 
of cattle. This clearly made him an influential person in the community, 
to the extent that some still remember him as a cacique (strongman). The 
success of "Las Palmas" was thwarted when mezcal distilleries from 
neighbouring Tonaya (especially that of Federico Paz, presently the largest 
producer in the region) boosted their production in the mid 1970s.3 In 
the wake of increasing competition, the quality of mezcal decreased, to 
the extent that nowadays so-called 'commercial' mezcal is by far the most 
important product of the several distilleries in the region. However Don 
Rodolfo, a stubborn character, did not follow this route and stuck to the 
production of high-quality mezcal.4 In economic terms, this did not turn 
out to be the best bet, and Rodolfo slowly lost ground to the inferior (but 
cheaper) alternatives coming from Tonaya. 
After Rodolfo's death a huge fight over inheritance ensued 
between his eleven children. To complicate matters, no will was left and 
the four eldest children who had already received - and spent - their 
inheritance shares while their father was alive again requested a share.5 
Thus barely a year after Rodolfo's death, the estate was effectively taken 
apart by his sons and daughters. The Benjamin of the family, Leon, 
managed to inherit 20 head of cattle, 70 hectares of land for grazing 
purposes, 4 irrigated hectares next to the river, the parental home, as well 
as the distillery - though curiously not the plot on which it was located. 
As a consequence, Le6n was forbidden access to his own distillery. 
Hence, mezcal production stopped for nearly two years. The problem was 
solved when Le6n bought a plot on the opposite bank of the river, hired a 
large crew and eventually moved all things from the old distillery at 
night - when his brother the owner of the plot was sound asleep. To-day, 
Le6n still does not get along with any of his brothers.6 
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At the time of my fieldwork, Ledn's main dilemma concerned the expan-
sion of sales: how could he do so in the context of an increasingly com-
petitive situation? In this Chapter, I follow Le6n in his attempts to enlarge 
the market for his product. What tools, however, do I have at my disposal 
to describe and explain these attempts? Can one draw upon mainstream 
sociology? In a way, the answer is yes, since sociological theory provides 
ample room for the study of, for example, the organization of production. 
It tells us that one may visualize the production of goods as a process in 
which people put together resources. According to this view, people play 
specific roles in a given, gendered division of labour, and are accommo-
dated into the categories of management, labour, capital, or land. How-
ever, mainstream sociology advises us to limit the study of production to 
specific periods in discrete locations - that is, to those confines where 
people actually mix resources. Thus there exist studies of Fordist factories, 
manufacturing homes, agricultural plots and modern offices. Sometimes 
the picture becomes a little more diffuse, as is the case for the production 
of services, or in the literature on flexible specialization. Yet what these 
studies all have in common is the neat separation between objects, 
people, places, and time. 
I object to this separation. For good analytical reasons, the main 
difficulty with this position is that mainstream sociology - no matter what 
its intellectual fathers proselytised - does not take practice into account. 
And I think that if we want to address critically Ledn's dilemma one has 
to do just that: take practice seriously, and not surrender it in a bout of 
purification. If we want to remove the smoke screen that mainstream 
sociology has cast upon the activity of producing goods, we must not fear 
to tread other paths. W e must be able to switch from offices to agave 
plots, or from supermarkets to copper stills. W e must be willing to 
associate - like Ledn - consumers of mezcal with oak barrels and product 
stickers. And we must be willing to jump from yesterday to today, as 
many times as need be. And to tomorrow. Why? Because producers of 
mezcal also do so in practice. Only then will we be able to provide an 
alternative; an alternative that addresses the question of how consumers 
are first made in order to be subsequently controlled; an alternative that 
emphasises the way Le6n struggles to keep potential enemies and collab-
orators - whether they be consumers, input suppliers, competitors or his 
own workers - in line; an alternative that makes visible how Leon goes 
about ordering this collectif made up of close and not-so-close actors, of 
how he succeeds in making them obey him - or keeping them at bay in 
case he fails. In short, an alternative that shows how Ledn struggles to put 
together heterogeneous actors in such way that they do not make off in 
all directions - leaving him literally empty-handed. It is these practices, 
this work, which I describe in this Chapter. 
1 3 6 TACOS, TIENDAS AND MEZCAL 
Seducing consumers through a technical innovation 
Leon's main concern is to convince consumers to buy his product. This 
is not an easy task though. Indeed, a market for mezcal already exists, 
and encouraging consumers to buy his mezcal is analogous to snatching 
them away from his competitors. Le6n's competitors, however, are not 
innocent doves: they also try to seize Ledn's (potential) clientele through 
all sorts of devious stratagems. For Ledn, the old adage that the best 
defense is a good offense certainly holds true. 
What means must Ledn employ to enlarge his clientele? How must 
he bring these to bear on the potential buyers of his product? How can he 
finally convince them? Because of the contingent nature of this enterprise, 
there exists no straightforward, a priori strategy on which to rely. What-
ever strategy Ledn adopts, it will be one that takes account of these 
contingencies. One central resource, though, upon which Ledn can start 
to build his strategies concerns his knowledge about the distributed nature 
of the mezcal market. For example, Ledn knows that tequila is the un-
disputed king of the hill north of Guadalajara, while mezcal is hard to 
beat on its home turf to the south of the megalopolis. Also, he knows that 
anejo ('commercial' mezcal that has been coloured yellow to resemble 
mezcal aged in oak barrels) does well in the states of Colima and Micho-
acan as well as in nearby Ciudad Guzman, while bianco (white mezcal) is 
fancied in the region where mezcal is produced, as well as in the vicinity 
of Guadalajara.7 Equally, Ledn knows that the ups and downs in sales are 
related to fiestas and funciones (rodeos) in both local and more distant 
places. Thus sales skyrocket in the post-harvest season8, while during 
Lent, the hot season9, and all through the agricultural cycle 1 0, a drop in 
sales is evident. Indeed, based on this knowledge, Ledn ascribes a geogra-
phy and a topography to the market of mezcal. 
Whatever means Ledn mobilizes to enlist latent admirers he does 
so based on some categorization of who likes what, where, and when. In 
the same fashion, would-be mezcal buyers make their decisions based on 
their knowledge about producers in general, and about the specific 
qualities of mezcal in particular. This knowledge, of course, is not a 
The next section concerns the local(ized) construction of consumers. I do 
so in order to illustrate the central point that, if a producer wishes to 
control consumers' desire from a distance, then first consumers need to 
be 'designed'. Thus in the remaining part of this Chapter I explore the 
way in which Ledn tries to construct consumers - principally by way of 
technical innovation in the cooking of agaves, the prime material of 
mezcal. As the narrative shows, a host of other actors - competitors, 
workers and nonhumans - play crucial roles in this construction effort or 
'script' (Akrich 1992) . 
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neutral element at the consumers' disposal. It is a knowledge that 
distributes the characteristics of mezcal (including its quality) and its 
producers. It is a knowledge that imputes, a knowledge that cuts like a 
double-edged knife. And producers are very much aware of this. Thus, 
when producers unload inputs at the distillery, it is expedient that some 
of these inputs are never seen by onlookers. Anybody, for example, 
seeing a 50kg bag of sugar entering the distillery may easily speculate it 
to be a bag of ammonium sulphate (a fertilizer) to boost fermentation (a 
practice consumers often attribute to producers of inferior quality mezcal). 
Although both sugar and ammonium sulphate may be used - and in fact 
they are - to increase the speed of the fermentation process, adding 
fertilizer to mezcal is generally taken as a sign of the producer decreasing 
his costs at the expense of poisoning his clients. This type of gossip 
spreads quickly, and may have a detrimental effect on sales. 
How gossip can affect business is illustrated when Leon, El Chato 
(a distributor of his) and myself visit Chava - owner of the only store in 
Los Chivos, a hamlet in the vicinity of Toliman. The reason for our visit is 
Chava's sudden decision to stop buying Reserva del Abuelo. El Chato 
notified Leon about this, and we want to catch up on the story. Upon our 
arrival Chava - alderman of Toliman from 1989 to 1 9 9 2 - immediately 
serves some cold beers. After some general and polite comments Chava 
accuses Le6n of not making any more the mezcal his father was 
renowned for. Also, he discloses that it was his customers who had 
imposed the decision not to stock with Le6n, as they had gradually turned 
their backs on the brand. More specifically, Chava's customers had told 
him that Le6n was adding sugar to the fermentation tank, and thus in fact 
degrading the mezcal. Chava then confides that he is now buying mezcal 
from Carlos Ortfz, a producer from Tonaya. And, according to Chava, it 
seems that his clientele is happy with the change. 
As the example suggests, variations in taste - changes in the 
attributed qualities of a product - may turn the (potential) customer into a 
reluctant one. 1 1 Luckily for Le6n, complaints about a quality dip do not 
often surface. It is clear, however, that the heftiest battles between 
producers and consumers of mezcal axe fought out in the domain of taste. 
If a producer of mezcal wishes to be successful, then knowledge of what 
consumers fancy is crucial. One way of obtaining such knowledge resides 
in the existing terminology consumers use to refer to mezcal. Indeed, a 
vocabulary exists to address variances in the taste and composition of the 
liquor. This vocabulary ranges from the pejorative hinchapatas (literally: 
mezcal that causes inflammation of the feet) to the less offensive bravo 
(harsh) or zarco (tangy). These vernacular categories also encompass terms 
such as v/no12, tequila13, and mezcal puro de o//a14 which is con-
sidered the very best and is elaborated on the basis of mature agaves 
cooked in a traditional basin, fermented without any additives or artificial 
boosters, aged in oak barrels, and with an alcohol percentage of close to 
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50°GL. Le6n's clients classify his 'commercial' mezcal as belonging to 
the first category (v/no), but his more expensive variety is said to have the 
taste of mezcal puro de olla because the agaves are still cooked in the 
traditional way, that is, in a basin. This last product has three important 
properties that differentiate Leon's mezcal from that of his competitors: it 
matches the taste of mezcal puro closely, it is not extremely expensive, 
and it does not resemble tequila too much. 
Knowledge about folk categories is thus a valuable asset, and has 
collaborated in making Le6n's mezcal a well-liked product - the popular-
ity of which, as we have seen above, can be contested any time. But 
knowledge of folk terms is not sufficient. A host of other elements need to 
be incorporated, translated, delegated into Le6n's mezcal. These include 
distinctive, stylized glass bottles that come with new, plastic product 
stickers as well as new packaging material to differentiate his 'premium' 
type of mezcal from his 'commercial' variety. To add weight to their 
message, these means are escorted by marketing. Thus logos on all of 
Le6n's pick-up trucks state that "La calidad esta en Tollman" (quality 
comes from Toliman). Or beautiful models wearing short dresses hand out 
free samples of Le6n's mezcal to visitors at cockfights, rodeos and 
bullfight rings, where free T-shirts and aprons portraying the brand name 
are also distributed. Also, posters are hung at small shops and liquor 
stores to charm customers in places where mezcal is known to be in 
demand. If a bottle of Le6n's mezcal is able to draw together these 
heterogeneous elements at all, it is because of Le6n*s complex strategies 
and formidable work. 
Yet, despite his strategies, Le6n's success is relative. He keeps dreaming 
of a larger market - irrespective of whether or not the clientele is willing 
to expand. A larger market however entails a greater output. Le6n's pro-
ject, then, is to expand production without making noticeable sacrifices in 
taste, and without having to re-configure his clients from scratch. How 
can he achieve this? Two answers are possible. One involves increasing 
the output per unit of agave. This ultimately involves improving the 
quality of the raw material, e.g. the sugar content of agaves. But this 
proves difficult as mature agaves are hard to come by. A second alterna-
tive entails maintaining output per agave but shortening cooking and 
fermentation time to increase turnover. The latter case would require effi-
ciency improvements, for example through an increase in the temperature 
of the fermentation tanks - which is quite an expensive business since it 
involves fossil fuels. In the case of shortened cooking time of agaves, an 
equally expensive caldera (cauldron) would have to be built. What road 
did Le6n take? Initially, the cheapest answer to increase production was 
to switch from agaves normally used to distil mezcal to the variety of 
agave that is used for the production of tequila (agave tequilana weber 
azul). The reason was simple: the relation between weight and 
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fermentable sugars is much higher in agave tequilana than in the local 
agave limeno - which is normally used because of its strong flavour which 
is much liked by consumers. This strategy, however, backfired when cus-
tomers complained that Leon's mezcal tasted like tequila (a 'bad' 
attribute for mezcal) and so the experiment was discontinued. The second 
alternative, shortening cooking time through the introduction of a caul-
dron, was not deemed a good solution since the process affected the taste 
of mezcal - again making it resemble that of tequila. 
After his failure with the tequila agaves, Le6n opted for a third 
alternative: an increase in efficiency through an innovation in the cooking 
process. The innovation consisted of a chamber (much like a cauldron) 
fitting 6-7 tons of agaves. These are brought into the chamber through a 
heavy, metal door that seals the chamber from the outside. Inside, the 
brick and cement chamber is shielded by tiles that can withstand 
17,000°C. Underneath this chamber there is another room containing 
stones that spread the heat generated by burning wood located in yet 
another compartment below. Metal grids separate the three compartments 
to prevent agaves coming into direct contact with the stones, and the 
latter with the burning wood. The lower compartment is below surface 
level, and can be accessed through a stair that connects to a tunnel and a 
metal door15. The main advantage of this system over the old basin 
setup is that agaves can be brought in and out of the chamber without 
having to cover and uncover them with nylon sacks and sand, while at 
the same time retaining the 'woody' taste of mezcal made in the basin. 
This relatively complex function has been effectively delegated to the 
metal door. In addition, stones do not any more need to be taken in and 
out of the basin in order to clear burnt charcoal and ashes from the last 
tatema or cooking of agaves, and load the basin with new wood. Again, 
these difficult tasks have been delegated to a simple design involving 
metal grids, a metal door, a tunnel, and a stair. Overall, the amount of 
time saved by this innovation is considerable: in the old setup, loading a 
basin would take two persons a full day, and unloading the basin would 
take two full days because the hot stones have to cool down before they 
can be removed. With the innovation, the process of loading and unload-
ing can be achieved in a matter of hours. An additional advantage of the 
new setup is that one can check on the degree to which agaves are 
cooked because saps will start flowing onto the lower level as soon as 
hydrolysis is complete. In the basin system, this could not be controlled 
entirely because saps would start flowing to an area that was viewable by 
eye. 1 6 
The innovation, then, was of a hybrid nature. It was an artefact that 
operated on other nonhumans, but at the same time it was utilized to 
lessen the burden of humans since it allowed Le6n to increase control 
over the quality of the final product, shorten the cooking time of agaves 
to increase productive efficiency, and cut labour costs. (Interestingly, 
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Leon's labourers did not object to the innovation, especially because it 
made their work much lighter.) 
Obviously, the innovation was not easy to introduce. In fact 
'technical' questions related to the operation of the new artefact preoc-
cupied Leon most of the time for months on end. During this period, 
Ledn tenaciously experimented over and over again until the innovation 
slowly became a worthwhile investment. In the process, many a load of 
agaves was partially lost. For example, a solution had to be found to stop 
agaves from burning due to the higher temperatures reached in the 
oven. 1 7 Other problems also often plagued Le6n, such as the uneven 
distribution of heat inside the oven which accounted for some agaves not 
being fully cooked. 
These and related problems were a function of a more critical one: 
would the innovation help Ledn to better control consumers? Put differ-
ently, could the innovation help him expand his business? There was no 
easy answer to this, because in the end success would be measured by 
the consumer buying - or not buying - mezcal elaborated from agaves 
cooked in the new oven. The success of the innovation was thus difficult 
to evaluate not so much because Ledn did not have the means to assess it 
(after all, Ledn could easily keep track of increases or decreases in sales), 
but because the innovation redefined the evaluation tool itself: the con-
sumer (was he willing or not willing to buy the 'new' product?). In other 
words, the innovation set its own parameters of success. 
So far, I have suggested that Leon's main concern - to enlarge his clien-
tele - was initially addressed through an innovation in the process of 
cooking agaves. To this end, a considerable number of elements were 
brought together in a complex sociotechnical mix. The stage was thus set 
for the next step: to actually enrol clients into buying the new product. 
Therefore, Ledn needed to mobilize a number of additional actors who 
were not 'natural' allies to his concerns. To align these actors - that is, to 
keep them together and stop them from going in their own directions -
entailed intense struggles and complicated negotiations on a number of 
fronts. What did these fronts look like? How were all the heterogeneous 
actors made to play the game orchestrated by Ledn? These are empirical 
matters, and involve what Callon and Law (1989) call 'trials of strength'. 
In the remaining part of this Chapter, I will address these trials of 
strength as they develop on a number of different fronts: that between 
Ledn and his fellow competitors; that between Ledn and his (potential) 
collaborators; that between Ledn and his workers; and that between Ledn 
and his own, competing parallel activities. 
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Friends and foes I: keeping competitors at a distance 
"Persuade consumers to choose your product!" This is Ledn's deceitfully 
simple motto. Yet this guiding principle is shared by fellow mezcal 
producers. Ledn tries to snatch consumers away from his rivals, but his 
foes in turn are busy designing ways to capture Ledn's clients. This 
situation is clear to all producers of mezcal. So what strategies are 
deployed in the face of these circumstances? For Ledn, two possible 
alternatives exist. Either he convinces his contenders to take his side - for 
example by joining in a common objective, in which case he will have to 
ask whether colleagues will be honest and not out to betray him - or he 
tries to keep them at bay. In both cases, a good deal of resources needs to 
be mobilized. 
Let us turn to the first alternative. What initiatives has Ledn taken to 
convince fellow competitors to work towards a common goal?18 First of 
all, let us consider that Ledn does not get along with all mezcal producers 
equally. Between producers of mezcal there exists a clearly demarcated 
geography of friendship, and out of 27 mezcal producers in the region, 
Ledn is only on speaking terms with six of them. This means that poten-
tial joint initiatives can only be realized with these producers. Indeed, 
with them he tried to reach a common objective - such as participation in 
the so-called 'Integrated Enterprises' program. This programme, supported 
by NAFINSA (a national financing institute that supports small businesses) 
was geared to unite producers of specific sectors in order to enable 
collective trust while maintaining the autonomy of individual enterprises. 
Thus the program facilitated the acquisition of common computing 
facilities, financial and accounting services, quality control mechanisms, 
and export possibilities. In the end, however, a joint venture between 
Ledn and some of his competitors was never took off (see Chapter Nine 
for the different reasons that were said be accountable for this failure). 
Since joint action proves to be difficult to achieve, Ledn has to prevent 
competitors from pushing him out of business. Although a difficult enter-
prise, this is the strategy he more often pursues. In particular, Ledns's 
efforts concentrate on keeping his 'business secrets' from falling into the 
hands of his competitors. One way to achieve this is by not engaging too 
much with individuals who can pass on gossip quickly. Take for example 
Sergio, Ledn's main distributor. Prior to working for Ledn, Sergio distilled 
mezcal for close to four years for the Arias brothers in nearby Apulco. 
Bored of working at the distillery, Sergio asked his employer to let him 
distribute mezcal together with his brother who was already distributing 
Arias' products. However, the company was not at that time in need of 
more distributors, and so Sergio looked elsewhere - ending up with Ledn. 
In due time, an ongoing flow of information started coming in Ledn's 
142 TACOS, TIENDAS AND MEZCAL 
direction, especially since Sergio's brother and best friends (who still live 
in Apulco, 20 kilometres from Toliman) work for mezcal Arias.1 9 Ledn, 
aware that a dog that will fetch a bone will carry a bone, minimized the 
amount of information he let Sergio have access to (for example by never 
letting him actually see how the taste of mezcal was 'improved': Sergio 
knew that Ledn played around with chemicals, but he did not know 
which ones, or in what amounts), and took the utmost care in ensuring 
that his other distributors did not get too "close" with competitors.20 
Another strategy followed by Ledn to prevent others from gaining 
access to crucial information was to obtain exclusive access to certain 
resources. Thus, for example, Ledn used water from Tollman's only well 
for the fermentation of his mezcal. This way, and unlike most producers, 
he was free from water distributors from El Grullo who supplied different 
distilleries and were thus a potential hazard since they could pass on 
gossip - for example about the amount of water delivered (an indication 
for the volume of production) or the time of delivery (an indication of the 
state of the market at a given time). Also, Ledn had recently started to sow 
his own agaves on rented plots. This would enable him, in the long run, 
to become independent from middlemen passing information on the level 
of his purchases to others; also, this strategy would make him less 
dependent on competitors bidding higher prices for an increasingly scarce 
resource.21 
Friends and foes II: recruiting allies into the collectif 
The old adage that the world is composed of friends and foes holds true 
for Ledn, for you, and for me. As long as goals are not mutually exclusive 
no problem exists. What happens though if goals are mutually exclusive? 
If the business one is engaged in interferes with the business of another? 
W e must then - not unlike Ledn - ask (and answer!) the question: are you 
with me, or against me? Are you friend or foe? As Machiavelli taught us 
long ago, in competing situations rivals are better excluded from one's 
projects. But then, to run an enterprise, one needs not only to exclude 
enemies, but also to enlist allies. This is a complicated matter, since these 
can always make off on their own, or join new forces that oppose your 
interests. So how does Ledn handle these potentially untrustworthy allies? 
As will be made clear in Chapter Eight, distributors are the most 
obvious collaborators in the construction of a common space between 
producers and consumers. This is no different in the case of Ledn, who 
distributes mezcal in different ways and through diverse arrangements. Six 
distributors, for example, directly work for Ledn, and each of them 
operates a different route. They load mezcal into their trucks and cars, get 
an invoice and have to account for their sales upon their return (which 
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may take anything from 1 to 3 days, depending on the route). Two of 
these distributors (Sergio and EI Muerto) drive pick-ups owned by Ledn, 
but have to pay for the operating costs. The other four (Barragan, Ramdn, 
Benito and EI Papas) have their own transport. All get paid a commission 
of around 15% on gross sales.22 
The bulk of Ledn's production finds its way to the consumer 
through these six distributors whose total sales account for more than 
50% of Ledn's output.23 In addition, Ledn has six resellers who obtain 
the mezcal through the direct distributors. Six other distributors working 
in more or less distant areas resell Ledn's mezcal, which they obtain 
through the intermediation of Ledn's direct distributors. This type of 
'relay distribution' accounts for the circulation of a huge part of Ledn's 
production (anywhere between 500 and 1,500 litres a week, depending 
on the season, the proximity of fiestas, etc.). Other, small-scale distributors 
operate on an independent basis and pay cash or kind for whatever 
amount of mezcal they take from Ledn's taverna. None of these distribu-
tors buys over 50 litres a week, but the total amount they distribute 
(between 200 and 300 litres weekly) is certainly not negligible. 
Although in principle these distribution modalities look straight-
forward, in practice they are the outcome of complex negotiations. For 
one thing, not just anybody can become a distributor of mezcal. As I 
argue in the next Chapter, a bottle does not sell itself, however seductive 
it may look. Skills are needed to entice customers. But other factors may 
be crucial as well. For example, Sergio got the job (and the pick-up) not 
only because he had the skills to sell - which he learned through his 
brother - but mainly because Ledn benefitted from Sergio's kin: after all, 
Sergio's uncle in Cihuatlan was Ledn's second-largest reseller.24 Other 
distributors are only needed on specific occasions - for example when 
fiestas are coming up. Also, the relationship between Ledn and his 
distributors varies from harmony to distrust. Such is the case with 
Primitivo, a part-time distributor from El Grullo who was once cheated by 
Ledn's brother at the time when Ledn's father ran the distillery. 
Primitivo now insists that whatever mezcal he buys at Ledn's distillery is 
bottled in his presence (even though he himself is the biggest cheat 
among Ledn's distributors!). 
Just like himself, Ledn's competitors are constantly vying for 
'good' distributors that not only bring with them their salesmanship, but 
also - their most important asset - acquaintance with their last employer's 
clients. So how can one stop distributors running away to join the com-
petitors, giving away your secrets (and your income)? Conceive shrewd 
ruses, and mobilize whatever is at your disposition to stop distributors 
from betraying you! As we saw in the case of Sergio, the pick-up is a 
powerful means of control: a distributor without a pick-up is of no use to 
competitors (until, of course, competitors put a pick-up at the distributors 
disposal - in which case the initial attachment is loosened). But this type 
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of material contraption alone does not prevent distributors from outwitting 
Le6n - for instance by selling other brands as well. This is an open secret, 
so Ledn has to be tolerant yet at the same time think of new stratagems. 
And it is here that he makes diligent use of an old cultural artifice: he 
enrols his distributors on moral grounds through the institution of fictive 
kinship {compadrazgo). For example, the relationship between Ledn and 
his most important reseller, Roberto (good for more than 400 litres of 
mezcal a week), was solidified when Ledn became godfather to 
Roberto's son. This compadrazgo relationship is cherished by both 
parties - a relationship that was immediately concretized in the acquisition 
of joint property.25 
Ritual kinship relations are used by Ledn to prevent his distributors 
from running away to adversaries. But it also serves to put a wedge 
between fellow mezcal producers and their distributors. A case in point is 
Pablo, the protagonist of Chapter Eight. After acknowledging that his 
credit line with his employer (Benigno Covarrubias, a mezcal producer 
from El Grullo) was running dry, Pablo slowly (and secretly) considered 
exploring fresh sources for mezcal. One of these was Ledn, whom he 
started visiting more and more often - not least because Ledn's mezcal 
was a hot item among his clientele, furnishing him with a huge profit 
margin. Nearly two years after initiating business with Ledn, Pablo - who 
also kept working for Benigno - asked him to become his compadre by 
baptizing his newly born daughter.26 Ledn at first accepted, but the co-
parenthood relationship never materialized because of the exigencies 
involved in becoming baptismal godfather: he would have had to go all 
the way to El Grullo (60km away) to follow a course at El Grullo's parish 
church. Nevertheless the move proved crucial for their relationship, for 
ever after both made recourse to compadrazgo terminology, i.e. address-
ing each other by compadre and the formal usted (you) instead of the 
more informal (but more indifferent) to" (you). In this case, fictive kinship 
was instrumental for Ledn in enroling a new distributor (and, symmetrical-
ly, for Pablo to enrol a new supplier of mezcal). Obviously, the same 
strategy may be used by Ledn's adversaries. Although he did his best to 
prevent this, Ledn can never be sure his distributors will remain faithful to 
him, and the fear of loosing them is a constant one. To control consumers 
at a distance, Ledn - and, likewise, fellow producers - must pass through 
their distributors. 
While distributors are his most obvious collaborators other, equally 
important, allies need to be aligned to keep Ledn's business running. 
Who and what are these allies? Here, the list is considerable, and con-
tains both 'human' and 'non-human' elements. To name a few: the nearby 
Biosphere Reserve from which wild varieties of agaves can be collected; 
agaves of 10 different varieties (together with their producers and middle-
men); local and regional politicians; suppliers of alcohol; accountants; 
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promotional T-shirts; telephones; wells; a five year old paved road that 
makes economies of scale possible; water from Tollman's only well, and 
so on. In fact, it is difficult to separate humans and non-humans in the list: 
a supplier of agaves would still be a human without the agaves, but no 
longer an agave supplier. Things and people are nothing on their own. So 
when I talk about 'collaborators' I talk about things-and-people, about 
collectifs. Ledn preoccupations, of course, do not center on this seemingly 
endless list. What is important for him is to organize, to order, to enlist all 
these different human and nonhuman elements into a coherent whole that 
will obey his orders. As we already saw in the case of distributors, to 
enlist them a variety of heterogeneous means must be mobilized. 
A vivid example of this 'heterogeneous engineering' (Law 1987) is 
the water needed for the fermentation and production process. The water 
Ledn utilizes comes from Tollman's only natural well. This is an advan-
tage for him, because his competitors in Tonaya have to bring water all 
the way from El Grullo, 30km away - a costly affair. But the water from 
the well is not a natural ally. Ledn needs to mobilize it, to find a way of 
getting it to his distillery. Here, nonhumans such as pumps and tanker 
trucks mediate. But that is not all. The well is not there only to satisfy 
Ledn's needs: it is a scarce public resource whose utilization is regulated 
by the municipality through pricing and a series of permits. So what extra 
means does Ledn employ to access it? First, Ledn mobilizes 'tradition'. 
Thus he continuously argued that customary rights apply because his 
great-grandfather was already making unobstructed use of the well to 
produce mezcal. This line of reasoning however was not legally sanc-
tioned. 
So what other means - apart from an argument - are at Ledn's dis-
posal in order to circumvent the insufficient quota of water apportioned to 
him? By chance, I happened to be present on one occasion when this 
issue was resolved in Ledn's favour. W e were chatting at about 9pm at 
his taverna when the telephone rang. It turned out that an important 
broker in agricultural produce was in town, and was interested in buying 
watermelons. Since Ledn has some four hectares of watermelon, meeting 
this individual in the only restaurant-bar/canteen in Tollman's plaza, just 
opposite the church, looked attractive to him. 
Once at the restaurant, I am amazed by the people gathered 
around the main table: next to the broker there is the ex-mayor of 
Toliman together with half the local aldermen and the treasurer of the 
municipality, the judge of San Gabriel and head of the municipal agents 
of five contiguous municipalities - including Toliman. Ledn and myself are 
introduced to the broker, and after a while the first bottles of Solera (the 
most expensive variety of Bacardi rum) start to circulate (no mezcal was 
served). In the meantime, business was done with the broker (Ledn did 
not show much interest) and, in between joking, important decisions were 
being made. At that moment, Toliman was effectively being run from the 
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inside of a concealed canteen. At one point, a comment was made about 
the scarcity of rain, and of how this affected the agricultural businesses of 
most present. The treasurer, directing an oblique joke to Le6n, remarked: 
"Well the only one here that seems to be getting enough water 
is our friend Le6n. Hey [Leon], give us that recipe: how do you 
turn water into mezcalV 
Le6n, a grin on his face, addressed the audience: 
"I'll tell you how to do it if you give me the water." 
The treasurer takes up the issue and answers: 
"I guess nobody will get angry with you taking the water you 
need. Does anybody object?" 
Then, making a gesture with his hands that implies the drinking of 
alcohol, the adds: 
"But of course that's going to be an expensive business for 
you, keeping all these thirsty throats happy!" 
All laugh, and nothing more is said on the issue. Apparently, the last com-
ment makes it crystal clear that Leon will have to start circulating some 
bottles of mezcal in order to maintain his claim on public resources 
(water). 
So far, we have been dealing with collaborators that, at first sight, seem to 
be either human or nonhuman. Yet other actants are of a composite 
character. One such example is the bank, a crucial collaborator in Le6n's 
business. Indeed, without a preferential loan for USD 33,000 in 1991 at 
1 8 % a year Ledn would probably never have continued with his father's 
business. But to convince the bank into becoming an ally was not a 
'straightforward' negotiation between the banks' project evaluators and 
himself. Instead, it was a complex negotiation involving bankers and 
Ledn, nonhumans such as the house, cattle, the distillery and land that 
served as collateral for the loan, but also mediated by human/northuman 
collectifs such as a business plan drafted by Ledn's accountant, or 
ownership titles signed by the notary public. Likewise, intangible actants 
such as 'the State" (in the form of Hacienda or SECOFI) were incorpor-
ated into the project through the mediation of operating permits and 
friends that had easy access to these institutions. Of course, keeping 
institutions on one's side entails making transformations in the mode of 
ordering. So today the relationship with Hacienda is mediated not only 
PRODUCING MEZCAL 147 
through official permits but also through massaged invoices. And - if only 
to meet the demands of the Ministry of Health - in the near future new 
mediators such as more hygienic polypropylene bottles will be added to 
the collectif. 
The enrolment of each new collaborator into the collectif entails change: 
the project is transformed, and will never be the same again. Let me give 
an example. Ledn used to buy 96% alcohol with a befriended competitor, 
Chuy Arias from Apulco, at USD 14 for a 20 litre jerrycan. Acquaintances 
in Ciudad Guzman however tipped off Leon that the Tamazula sugarmill -
which distils 96% ethyl-alcohol - was offering the same jerrycans at USD 
13. Consequently Le6n changed his supply source27, considerably alter-
ing his business in the process. Leon was now able to buy cheaper 
alcohol, but this resulted in seeing the Apulco producer less frequently -
and thus obtaining less, potentially important, information. Also, it 
entailed that one of his pick-up trucks would be on the road for a longer 
period (the distance to Tamazula - 60km - was greater than to Apulco), 
thus making changes in the mode of distribution indispensable. 
Friends and foes III: romancing the home front. 
In this section I describe the actual production process of mezcal. This 
entails a portrayal of the collectif of workers-and-things that compose the 
process. However, I will diverge from the received notion that in order to 
control the production process one needs to control labour through 
technology. Indeed, I argue that there is no need to separate the 'techni-
cal' from the 'social' or the 'political' any further. 
Basically, mezcal is obtained through a process in which the sour 
saps of the agave plant are hydrolysed, fermented and distilled. Clearly, 
the higher the sap content, the higher the amount of saccharose to be fer-
mented. Ideally, agaves should be harvested when they are between 10-
12 years of age, shortly before their flowering stage, as their potential 
saccharose content is then at a peak. Although the growing cycle can be 
shortened (eg. through fertilization) to something between 6-8 years, high 
demand has led to a situation in which most commercially grown agaves 
are harvested before reaching full maturity.28 Ledn buys most of his 
agaves from local intermediaries, which are delivered at the distillery 
gates after the jima or harvest. Once in the distillery the biggest agaves 
are first chopped into pieces and placed in a deep hole in the ground, 
where they are cooked at some length in order to make available their 
saccharose content. In Ledn's tavema, this arduous task is performed by 
Gualo and Agustfn, who are both in their mid-sixties and have formed a 
team for the last 15 years. After the slow burning process the agaves are 
left to cool down, and are then ground with the aid of a two horsepower, 
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belt-driven electrical mill. Both men sometimes have to perform the 
milling operation twice or even three times in order to obtain finely-
ground agave fibres and thus a greater fermentation surface. 
The fibres are then carried to the fermentation tanks (five in total) 
where they are left between five and seven days in order to obtain a dead 
ferment with less than 1° Brix or one percent of sugar in the solution; the 
state of the fermentation process is measured through a scaled 
hydrometer.29 Basically, what is needed for the fermentation process is 
water, the sugar-rich agave fibres, and the ferment (a bacteria). To deter-
mine the exact quantities of the main ingredients, however, requires some 
very specific skills, especially because it is during this stage that most 
problems (if any) appear. For example, one must carefully assess the 
amount of sugar to be added to the fermentation tank in case the sugar 
content of the agave fibre is low. By the same token, if the state of the 
fermenting bacteria is poor, yeast or ammonium sulphate are added to 
boost the process. A little bit too much or too little of one of the compo-
nents can mean a noticeable change in the flavour of the distilled prod-
uct. Both Agustfn (who worked most of his life for Ledn's father) or Ledn 
are in charge of 'calibrating' and monitoring the fermentation process. 
The actual distillation process commences after fermentation is 
complete. To this end, Gualo and Agustfn carry the fermented product to 
a 450-litre cauldron with 10-litre buckets. Once filled, the cauldron is 
sealed off with a cloak, and heated from below with a burner connected 
to a gas cylinder. After some time, the ferment starts to boil and the 
alcohol steam concentrates at the top of the cloak. From there - by means 
of a pipe - the steam is led into the alambique (still) which is constantly 
filled with cold water. There the alcohol condenses into a small, steady 
stream of warm mezcal which is finally filtered through a cotton cloth and 
collected in 19-litre jerrycans. The first distilled fraction (5-7 litres) is very 
rich in methanol (a deadly product) and is kept separately to help boost 
distillation in a next 'run' of the still. The next distilled fractions deliver a 
mezcal ranging from 50°GL in the first jerrycan (punta.) to 10°GL in the 
7th and last jerrycan (cola). This mezcal is called ordinario or 'ordinary'. 
After the last jerrycan the burner is closed and the cauldron is allowed to 
cool down. Then the cauldron is cleared of debris and refilled with new 
ferment. On average, three runs (roughly 400 litre) are produced daily. To 
achieve this, Agustfn - who lives in the distillery - needs to start the gas 
burner at 4:30am, and finishes filling the next day's cauldron between 4-
5pm. 3 0 
The jerrycans of 'ordinary' mezcal with a content of 10-15°GL are 
kept separately and later used to obtain 'commercial' mezcal (see Chapter 
Eight for a description of how this is done). The content of the rest of the 
jerrycans is then mixed in a 2,500 litre plastic container to obtain a 
product that has a homogeneous alcohol percentage of close to 40°GL 
and which sells as an 'intermediate' quality, white mezcal for USD 2 per 
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litre. High-quality mezcal is obtained by distilling the intermediate-quality 
mezcal one more time. This mezcal ranges between 40-75°GL (depend-
ing on whether it is a first or a last fraction) and is mixed to obtain an 
average potency of around 55°GL. For tax reasons, this mezcal is then 
downgraded with clean well water until it has a potency of around 40°GL 
(all percentages are monitored through the use of an alcoholometer). 
Depending on the production batch ('commercial', 'intermediate' or 
quality mezcal), the mezcal is then pumped to an adjoining room and 
into a 1,100 litre, plastic container. From there, again with a pump, the 
mezcal is filtered31 into two different containers of 1,100 litres each for 
further treatment. In the case of 'commercial' mezcal, an artificial colour-
ing chemical is added to one of the containers to produce the anejo 
variety. The white (untreated) mezcal is left untouched. 
The above activities are carried out mainly by Agustfn and Gualo, 
but Le6n may also help out. The filling of bottles and the packaging is 
carried out mainly by Rosa who works full-time (8 hours a day). In the 
case of large orders, a number of part-time workers are taken on. Bottling 
consists of pasting the self-adhesive product stickers to either plastic or 
glass bottles and filling them with mezcal. In the case of 'commercial' 
mezcal the plastic bottles need to be cleaned first (this is achieved by 
passing a bit of mezcal from one bottle to the next until a batch of, say, 
200 bottles is prepared). In the case of intermediate quality or high quality 
mezcal, the glass bottles need to be checked for cracks as well. After 
cleaning, the bottles are filled directly from the container through a hose 
and a spile, closed and sealed with a quality control sticker. The last step 
consists of packaging the bottles into 12-litre carton boxes, and carrying 
these into an contiguous storage room. 
From the above one can gather that in order to produce mezcal a lengthy 
list of elements have to be mobilized. Labour and the objects of labour 
are, as Marx observed long ago, relational concepts. One presupposes the 
other in the same way as a kingdom prescribes the existence of a king. To 
separate one from the other for analytical purposes would be an excellent 
exercise in futility. Worse still, it would negate the way in which Le6n 
stitches together both humans and nonhumans in the running of his enter-
prise. What or who may resist the production process is a very complex 
question - one that in practice is never really addressed as being either of 
a technical or of a social nature. And it is also a question whose solution 
presupposes quite a bit of heterogeneous engineering' - both on the part 
of Le6n and of his labourers. As one may imagine, a great many things 
can go wrong in the production process of mezcal. For example, there 
may be a shortage in the number of agaves that surface at the doors of the 
distillery. Or they may not be of high even quality, even if appearing in 
sufficient quantities. Likewise, yeast may resist the role attributed to it and 
fail to ferment agave fibres. These and other problems will impinge on the 
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quality of the mezcal, which may consequently refuse to conform to the 
expectations concerning taste and presentation that consumers have. 
So what new resources does Ledn enrol in order to break these 
possible resistances? To counter the downward trend in the availability of 
raw material, for example, he started sowing agaves and is presently 
looking for additional renting arrangements to further expand.32 Or he 
may decide to add a certain amount of sugar to poor-quality agave fibres 
in order to feed the yeast bacteria in the fermentation tanks. Or add 
ammonium sulphate when, for a variety of reasons, there is not enough 
yeast. Or glycerin to increase mezcal's stickiness in the case of a poor 
relation between higher and lower alcohols in the final product. Or 
almond essence and saccharin to improve taste. And so on. Are these 
new resources human or nonhuman? Wel l , they are both. Or, more 
exactly, they may be partially human, partially nonhuman. Ledn does not 
know this difference in quality in advance: they are an effect, so to speak, 
of the action undertaken to solve the problem at hand. Thus planting 
agaves pre-scribes a whole network of people-and-things: land and the 
relations necessary to rent it, or the documents required to claim it; seed-
lings that have necessarily been provided by somebody; the labourers 
needed to plant them; fertilizers and the human and mechanical parapher-
nalia that go with them; skills and knowledge originating in tequila fac-
tories and passed on to Ledn through consultants. 
As I already argued, it would be impossible to separate all the elements of 
this chain in order to ascertain the relative importance of labour control, 
or the objective requirements of a piece of technology. Ledn, at least, 
does not. This, of course, is not to imply that Ledn does not care about 
Luddist workers. He does. And he must. Indeed, the single most import-
ant feature of the relationship between Ledn and his labourers can be 
summarized in one word: trust. Trust however is not a natural state of 
affairs. It has to be constructed, cherished and, once existent, maintained. 
Here, new strategies come to the fore. How to construct and implement 
trust? These questions take Ledn to a number of arenas that fall outside 
the strict domain of mezcal production, and take him to the realm of the 
village. Thus, for example, each year Ledn (following the tradition of his 
father) organizes two huge fiestas: one to honour himself (his birthday), 
and the other to commemorate the hijos ausentes (absent sons and 
daughters in general who are mainly working in the US). Especially on 
the latter occasions he provides a traditional meal (birria) for all 
Tolimenses (I witnessed nearly a thousand people showing up for one 
such meal), pays for different bands to play during the afternoon, and 
quenches everybody's thirst with soft drinks, beer, or special-purpose 
mezcal (52°GL). The feast, which is sanctioned by the religious author-
ities as part of the festivities to celebrate Tollman's patron saint, the 
Vfrgen de la Asuncidn, provides a chance for everybody to dance, 
PRODUCING MEZCAL 1 5 1 
quarrel, and get drunk in public. In the process, new alliances are forged 
between people who barely see each other in normal, daily affairs. Also, 
invitations to baptize sons or daughters circulate, and Ledn certainly 
makes use of these opportunities himself as well. For example, at this 
specific fiesta Ledn invited Julio, a labourer of his with whom he 
sharecropped watermelons (see below), to become godfather to his 
youngest son (aged 2 months). This unusual invitation33 could not be 
turned down by Julio, and in fact both became compadres ten days later, 
on the exact day (August 15) of the Virgin of the Asuncidn. This highly 
symbolic transaction, however, had the effect (or so it was commented) 
that it committed Julio to Ledn. 
Establishing this type of relationships with his labourers through 
religious festivities is not uncommon for Ledn. Although the above 
example is somewhat extreme, other cases equally well illustrate the 
point. For instance, whenever there is a pilgrimage or a wake, Ledn is the 
first to offer his (financial) services for contracting a band or helping 
organize it. But although money is one of the most important means to 
'bind' people, it is not the only one. Whenever Ledn's stratagems cannot 
be achieved with money, they usually can with mezcal. 
To give an example: early in the morning I am at the distillery 
together with Ledn and Sergio, his distributor. W e are engaged in a 
conversation about how to make a debtor and customer of Sergio pay his 
arrears when suddenly Tonino, an old-time friend of Ledn's father, drops 
in. He informs us that a far relative of Ledn, Felipe (26), died the day 
before after a football match due to heart failure. Apparently, Felipe had 
been on prescribed drugs, but had taken to drinking to celebrate his 
team's victory. Ledn commented: 
"Oh, his starter engine failed! He got an edge over us! I hope 
it wasn't my vino he was drinking?" 
Some more laconic comments are made, but after a minute or two Ledn 
summoned Cualo to go to Felipe's family and take enough mezcal with 
him for the wake and the burial. Here, as with fellow villagers, mezcal is 
a powerful means of building up 'social capital' that can be brought to 
bear on situations in which Ledn may need the help of those he 'helped' 
before. In this sense, through mezcal Ledn can also ensure that Gualo and 
Agustfn keep faithful to him. So, for example, they are both allowed to 
sell mezcal to casual visitors at the distillery at the price they deem 
convenient. Some of these visitors come from outside Toliman and are 
not up to date with prices, thus providing Gualo and Agustfn with some 
margin for negotiation and thus the opportunity of supplementing their 
income. With fellow Tolimenses the enlistment mechanism is somewhat 
different, but the effect the same. This is made clear over and over again, 
for example at the distillery itself, which is nearly always filled with a 
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number of friends who drop by for all sorts of reasons (and especially for 
free mezcal whenever Le6n is present). On these occasions information 
that may prove crucial to Leon's business is exchanged, and loyal 
networks are constructed. Indeed, Le6n can mobilize a lot of people 
because they are all indebted to him for the free mezcal. And these 
networks come in handy, especially when there is a shortage of labour for 
the harvest of agaves.34 
Multiple enterprise: supporting mezcal production 
Leon's main activity is the production of mezcal, and his goal is to sell it 
to ever larger audiences. As we have seen, this straightforward but 
demanding objective entails the strategic mobilization of heterogeneous 
resources on a number of fronts. So far, I have addressed those fronts that 
directly impinge on the activity of mezcal production and distribution. But 
Ledn is engaged in many more fronts. Some of these derive from his 
responsibilities as member of the board of the primary school's parents' 
association; others stem from his position as president of a privately-
owned irrigation unit (Unidad de R/ego). And so on. Many of these fronts 
need not interest us in the context of this Chapter. Some, however, do 
need to be discussed since they bear upon, or feed into, Ledn's mezcal 
enterprise. I wish to emphasize that one could never understand the 
flexibility of Ledn's mezcal business without taking into account these 
activities, and how he makes them fit together. So what are these parallel 
activities Ledn engages in? How and in what way do they support Ledn's 
mezcal business? 
Ledn operates three small-scale ventures that are a contingent 
outcome of his producing mezcal. The first activity directly related to the 
operation of the taverna is the resale of 96% alcohol bought in Tamazula 
and which is used for manufacturing 'commercial' mezcal. Before resell-
ing it to third parties, though, this alcohol is first downgraded to 85°GL 
(Ledn: "Something must be earned with it, right?") and then sold for USD 
1.60 a litre - more than 100% profit. Although Ledn himself could not tell 
how much alcohol he was selling, from my own observations I conclude 
that 200 litres a month is a close approximation.35 
A second parallel activity is the resale of gas cylinders. This 
activity was started in 1991, once the taverna was back into production. 
As Ledn explained, gas distributors used to come from Ciudad Guzman 
on a monthly basis. This was problematic for many Tolimenses who, for 
one reason or another, complained they had to go back to cooking on 
firewood towards the end of the month when their cylinders were empty. 
When this moment was reached, Ledn always received a visit by worried 
Tolimenses who counted on him still having an extra cylinder or two 
(Ledn of course was seen as an 'industrial' consumer of gas for local 
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standards). So the idea germinated that he could easily buy an extra 
quantity of gas which he could then resell for a profit towards the end of 
the month. Talking things over with the gas company, it soon appeared 
that the company itself was actually looking for a local reseller, since its 
chauffeurs always complained about the work of having to sell and 
deliver the 30-litre cylinders on an individual basis. In time, the resale 
business grew, to the point that Ledn nowadays covers a large part of 
Tolimenses' demand for gas. Apparently, his customers prefer to carry 
the burden of the extra costs involved (Ledn makes USD 2 or 20% on 
each of the nearly 100 cylinders he resells monthly) but be assured of 
continuous supply. 
The third source of income that is related to the distillery is Ledn's 
liquor store on Tollman's main town square. The store is operated by 
Ledn's niece, and is certainly a modest gold mine.3 6 The main product 
sold -next to all sorts of tequila, rum and brandy- is, of course, Ledn's 
own mezcal (other brands are also carried in case dissenters drop by). The 
store has a license to sell cigarettes and beer, and also functions as an 
official ticket outlet for Autocamiones del Pacffico -the only bus company 
in town. 3 7 
Apart from this vertical expansion of activities, Ledn has also 
diversified the range of his projects to include agriculture. The resources 
that have to be mobilized to this effect are very heterogeneous. For 
example, Ledn may access land through renting and sharecropping 
agreements -although he himself owns a six-hectare, irrigated plot that 
permits year-round production. The extent in which land is rented or 
sharecropped with others is a function of the type of crop to be culti-
vated. To give an example: if Ledn's connections at Guadalajara's Central 
Market expect that chides will fetch a good price that year, then a tract of 
well-drained, rainfed land is sought -which is not a difficult undertaking 
because of the little demand for this type of field in the barren area 
surrounding Toliman. In the case of chilies (as well as tomatillos) the total 
area Ledn rents or sharecrops is rarely more than 10 hectares. This limit is 
not set by financial or labour considerations, but is a built-in safety mech-
anism to skirt economic adversity in case the crop drowns or dries up. In 
the case of horticultural products such as tomatoes or watermelons 
irrigated fields are sought. However, this type of plot is more difficult to 
come by because of the higher demand for it (watermelons and tomatoes 
are potentially good profit makers) - although a few boxes of mezcal may 
give comparative advantage over competitors. At any rate, Ledn is never 
able to rent or sharecrop more than a total of four hectares of irrigated 
land, mostly from different owners. Since the market for irrigated plots is 
virtually 'closed', the only way to access them is through kinship or 
compadrazgo relations. Ledn only utilizes this last type of relation to rent 
or sharecrop land. The type of agreement reached between him and the 
owner varies a lot, and may entail negotiations about payment before or 
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after the harvest, in cash or in kind (mezcal; a part of the harvest), the 
amount of labour and inputs to be brought into the venture by each party 
in case of sharecropping, and so on. 
In what way does agriculture support Ledn's mezcal business? Apart from 
the agaves that he sowed recently, the crops Ledn cultivates cannot be 
utilized directly in the production of mezcal, but need to be detoured. 
Thus, in order to supplement the activities of the distillery, agricultural 
produce has first to be converted into effective resources. This may or 
may not be money. The final form that agricultural produce takes before it 
enters into the orbit of mezcal is not something Ledn knows beforehand. 
Rather, it is the outcome of struggles and negotiations. 
Let me elaborate on this through the example of a new crop, 
watermelons. Why did Ledn choose this crop? The reason is straightfor-
ward: ever since his field had been incorporated into the irrigation unit in 
1989, Ledn had only sown tomatoes. The first season he lost money on it 
due to low market prices. The second year the figures swung over to his 
side, but in the third and fourth seasons he again suffered ill-fortune. 
Speculating on a tip given to him by Octavio - a befriended, medium-size 
exporter of horticultural products - and tired of the ups and downs of the 
tomato market, Ledn decided to bet on watermelons. How did he organ-
ize production? First, he chose two different locations: his own irrigated 
plot, as well as two additional hectares which he rented in the contiguous 
ejido of San Pedro Toxfn from a compadre of his father. On his own land, 
he entered into a sharecropping agreement with Julio, who lived with his 
family in Ledn's cottage to watch over the property. The agreement 
entailed that Ledn would furnish land and water, as well as fertilizers, 
pesticides and insecticides - which he traded in part for mezcal in neigh-
bouring San Gabriel. His associate, on his part, would put the watermelon 
seed and his labour into the venture. With his compadre in San Pedro a 
sharecropping deal was agreed upon. The terms of the partnership 
however were different. Apart from paying for the rent of the land (both 
in cash and in mezcal), Ledn was supposed to contribute the seed (which 
he exchanged for mezcal with his other associate), while his counterpart 
agreed to provide fertilizers, pesticide, herbicide, water as well as his 
labour. In both cases profits, if any, would be split between them. 
Halfway through the season it became apparent that the agree-
ment in San Pedro Toxfn was unsatisfactory. For some reason or another, 
Ledn's partner failed to fertilize the crop properly and hence the harvest 
was a financial setback -in fact Ledn only recovered his initial investment 
(USD 1,000). On his own plot, however, business was healthier, and the 
watermelons were harvested on three different occasions: 27 tons at the 
first harvest, 21 tons at the second, and another 21 tons at the third. The 
product was sold to a wholesaler from Guadalajara's Central Market who 
promised to pay USD 0.33 per kilo for the first harvest, USD 0.30 for the 
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second, and USD 0:27 for the last. In total, the wholesaler owed Leon 
and his partner USD 10,000 each. As payment, the merchant sent Leon 
three cheques worth USD 3,300 each, to be cashed at the CREMI bank in 
Guzman in intervals of 2 weeks, on specific dates. The cheques, however, 
bounced and Le6n spent the better part of a month chasing down the 
wholesaler. Finally, the wholesaler deposited the first USD 3,300 in 
Leon's bank account. The remainder, the merchant offered, could be 
settled by trading in his luxury sedan (a '88 Grand Marquis) for the two 
cheques. Leon did not accept this offer on the grounds that a passenger 
car was of no use to him. After some negotiations, the wholesaler pla-
cated Ledn by furnishing him with a 1984 Dodge pick-up truck.38 
What lessons can be drawn from this example? How do Ledn's agricul-
tural activities relate to his mezcal business? For one thing, watermelons 
certainly mediate between Ledn and the collective of humans and 
nonhumans that need to be enrolled in order to make and sell mezcal. 
First, watermelons are converted into cheques. These are later transformed 
into a pick-up which in turn translates the relationship between Ledn and 
one of his distributors. In other terminology: the network described by 
watermelons (sharecropping agreements, agricultural implements and 
inputs, water, land) is first black-boxed. When it opens up again, it shows 
different actants: cheques, wholesalers, banks. At a later stage, the same 
box is reopened -to show a pick-up, distributing strategies, organizing 
practices. Can one pull watermelons and mezcal distributors apart? That 
would be quite an insensitive proposition -as perverse maybe as insinuat-
ing that mezcal does not mediate in the organization of Ledn's agricul-
tural activities. This, at any rate, would be an argument utilized by a good 
many social scientists - a form of reasoning that Ledn, in his practice, 
proves untenable by associating (and exchanging!) a world composed of 
fertilizers, labour, pesticides, watermelon seeds, or land, with a whole 
network that has mezcal as its effect. 
The same point can be made for the last one of Ledn's various 
entrepreneurial activities: brick-trading. His engagement in this line of 
business goes back to the mid-1980s, when he inherited the six-hectare 
plot that is now irrigated. With the river nearby, Ledn decided to give 
brick-making a try since it filled a gap in the market. To this effect all 
necessary implements and a skilled craftsman had to be found. The latter 
proved difficult, but by 1987 the first bricks were rolling out of the brick 
shop. However, it soon turned out that the composition of the soil was 
inappropriate and the undertaking was put to rest. The idea of selling 
bricks in Toliman however remained, and so it was that Ledn contacted 
brickmakers from El Grullo -the home town of his wife, 60km away. 
These were willing to transport bricks to Toliman for a reasonable price 
and, after some mathematics, Ledn calculated that it was cheaper to have 
bricks come from El Grullo than to import them from Sayula or Ciudad 
1 5 6 TACOS, TIENDAS AND MEZCAL 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I developed a case study on the production of mezcal and 
showed how, to succeed in selling a product one makes, it was expedient 
for Ledn to a) create potential customers and b) control them at a distance 
(Latour 1987) . Both steps were achieved through the mobilization of a 
variety of heterogeneous actors on a number of different fronts. 
Like in the cases of Carlos, Chabelo, and David and Chela, Ledn 
had to assemble a local and a global network to support his activities. The 
global network of his project consisted of consumers, local authorities, 
fellow mezcal producers, and a host of actors involved in his parallel 
activities. By obtaining the resources from these actors, Ledn's project 
successfully built a negotiation space within which it could construct a 
local network geared to satisfying the demands and expectations coming 
from the global network. Thus, for example, Ledn's project was able to 
control consumers of its mezcal by at the same time controlling the local 
network de-scribed by the liquor. In effect, then, the project became an 
obligatory point of passage. Also, the degree of convergence between the 
actors of the local and the global network was relatively high. That is, 
Ledn succesfully mobilized heterogeneous actors into playing the roles set 
out for them in his initial problematization - to enlarge his market. This he 
successfully achieved, since consumers liked the taste of his mezcal 
cooked in an innovative way. To this end, the project had to rearrange -
translate - a host of other actors either by incorporating them, or by 
Guzman - where most Tolimenses wanting to build bought their 
bricks.39 And so it was that a modest brick-selling business grew. This is 
all very well. But how does it relate, in practice, to mezcal production? 
For example, Leon buys a thousand bricks for USD 0 .07 a piece in El 
Grullo. This amount, however, is never paid in cash. It is bartered for 12-
litre boxes of 'commercial' mezcal on the basis of the market value of 
mezcal at production cost (USD 1 0 for a box). Ledn then pays a lorry 
driver (a neighbour of the brickmaker) USD 100 in cash to transport 
3 ,000 bricks (the lorry's capacity) to Toliman, where they are sold for 
USD 0 . 1 5 each. Translating the transaction into monetary terms, the deal 
is fabulous for Ledn: on each brick-trip, the potential income of 2 3 boxes 
of mezcal is converted into the income that he would obtain from the 
sale of 3 5 boxes through the intermediation of brickmakers, USD 1 0 0 for 
the transport, and clients. In this way bricks, so to speak, add flexibility to 
Ledn's mezcal enterprise by, on the one hand, offering him the possibil-
ity to market his product through an alternative channel. On the other 
hand, the profit that is made from bricks (but through mezcall) helps Ledn 
to absorb the ups and downs that are inherent to the market for mezcal 
(eg. volatile demand during the agricultural cycle). 
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keeping them at bay. The project, though, never managed to add any 
local rules to the general ones affecting the relations between producers 
of mezcal and their customers, or those between producers, distributors, 
and suppliers of inputs. Nevertheless, the project achieved a momentum 
of its own, as decisions to invest in certain areas were irreversible and 
shaped future paths of action. 
Notes 
1. Mezcal is a popular and widespread distilled drink, tequila being its best 
known variety. Basically, to make mezcal, mature agaves between six and ten 
years of age are first harvested. The hearts of the agaves are then taken to a 
taverna or distillery, where they are split, cooked and threshed. After this, the 
debris is put into a basin of water and left to ferment for a week to ten days. 
The fermented product is then distilled once or twice, depending on the qual-
ity of the mezcal. The final product is a potent liquor ranging between 35° 
and 55°GL which is eventually bottled and marketed - or sold in bulk as is 
the case of tequila sent to the US. 
2. The way in which Le6n's grandfather snatched away the distillery from the 
legal tenant is still remembered with hilarity to this day. Although 
anecdotical, it points to the devious ways utilized by mezcal entrepreneurs to 
keep their adversaries at bay. It seems that, once "El Abuelo" (as Leon's 
grandfather is referred to) wanted to operate the distillery again, he sent some 
of his men to play cards with the tenant. As the latter got drunk, "El Abuelo"s 
men cunningly plucked the ownership document from his trousers. A few 
days later, when "El Abuelo" dropped by the taverna, the tenant informed 
him about his latest expansion plans. "El Abuelo" stopped him short, counter-
ing that he had other plans for the distillery, now that he wanted to work it 
himself again. The tenant protested, and pointed to the document which was 
in his hands. "El Abuelo" replied that he did not know about any written 
piece of evidence suggesting the tenant could operate the place indefinitely, 
and politely asked for some proof of the alleged document. Since the tenant 
could no longer produce the paperwork, "El Abuelo" had him removed 
through a restraining order in a matter of days. Interestingly, many people 
with whom I interacted in Toliman respected this type of "cheating", which 
somehow has the effect of adding to the mystical character of mezcal. 
3. This was largely an effect (or so I was told) of the construction, in 1974, of 
a highway connecting Tonaya with Autlan and Ciudad Guzman. 
4. According to the bottle stickers, Rodolfo made a potent, unadulterated 
mezcal of 50°GL. Whether or not consumers were able to enjoy what they 
were paying for, of course, is a matter of discussion. For example, one of the 
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sons of Rodolfo is still remembered in El Grullo for cheating practices 
involving the alcohol percentage of the mezcal he sold. 
5. The altercation went so far that one of Ledn's brothers, Rigoberto, suc-
ceeded in sending his eldest brother Jos6 to jail in neighbouring San Gabriel -
on the grounds that he had committed a fraud. A surrealist touch to the 
whole affair was that Jose could leave jail by day to play billiards and cards 
in San Gabriel's main square. By night though he had to sleep in his cell. 
6. Nor, for that matter, with a part of his maternal family. Indeed, family 
disputes run deep - not least because of heritage issues. 
7. There seems to be a relationship between the knowledge about vino 
(mezcal, tequila) and the colour of mezcal bought. For example, customers 
living in the immediacy of producer centres generally acknowledge that aged, 
yellow mezcal anejo has been tampered with, unless it is expensive, and 
therefore prefer white mezcal that comes directly from the still. On the con-
trary, consumers that are more distant from the production centres are often 
'fooled' into believing that yellow mezcal is indeed aged in oak barrels (and 
thus made to pay a higher price for the addition of a dye). 
8. From September through February patron-saint fiestas and funciones 
(rodeo-like happenings complete with cock-fighting and dancing) are com-
monplace all over Mexico. They are occasions to spend. The first type of 
celebrations are not always known as opportunities for collective (and 
excessive) drinking. Funciones however offer young and old, man and 
woman a chance to openly enjoy a drunk. Other sales peaks occur during the 
national holidays in September, Christmas, New Year's Eve, and Carnival. 
9. From the end of April to June. During the hot season (before the rains 
arrive) people prefer to drink cold beer. Of course, 'hot' and 'cold' are 
relative categories: on the coastal areas mezcal is never really a favoured 
drink, while in the high Sierra (mountains) its consumption is more-or-less 
stable year-round. 
10. From the end of May through September. Of course, there may be 
considerable variation concerning the length of this period. Whether or not 
less mezcal is consumed during the agricultural cycle depends on the amount 
of cash at the rural population's disposal. This is, in turn, a function of the 
costs entailed in the specific type of agriculture practiced, the presence of 
irrigation, the type of crops, arrangements made to sell one's crop(s), the 
amount borrowed to sow, etc. 
11. This is readily acknowledged by Ledn who blames this situation on the 
nonexistence of a NOM (Norma Oficial Mex/cana) or standard to calibrate 
the quality of mezcal. 
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12. The term vino is generally used to refer to the cheaper, often down-
graded, types of mezcal. See Chapter Eight for a description of how this 
downgraded, 'commercial' type of mezcal is made. 
13. The prime material of mezcal referred to as tequila is cooked in so-called 
calderas (cauldrons). Most larger mezcal producers utilize these to cook their 
agaves. The cauldron is a hermetically sealed room that may contain as much 
as 30 tons of agaves. Compressed steam is injected into this room in order to 
convert the acids of the agave into fermentable sugars through hydrolysis. 
The main advantage of the cauldron over the traditional o//a is that larger 
amounts of agave may be cooked in a shorter timespan (22 hours instead of 
72). Taste however is altered through this process, as mezcal looses its 
characteristic "woody" taste. Since large tequila factories also utilize this 
method for cooking agaves, the taste of mezcal obtained from agaves cooked 
in cauldron resembles that of tequila. Hence the name tequila for this type of 
mezcal. 
14. The association of these terms with a specific mezcal is, as I show in 
Chapter Eight, always open to negotiation. Thus a little known brand sold at 
an astronomical price may be categorized as being mezcal puro even if it is 
of inferior quality. It all depends on what is brought to bear on the definition 
of the product: the text on the sticker; the type and presentation of the bottle; 
the colour of the liquor; its taste; its propensity to make long lasting bubbles 
when shaken, and so on. 
15. Unlike a cauldron where agaves are cooked in 20-22 hours, Le6n's setup 
does not diminish cooking time. The main advantage of the innovation, 
though, is that taste is not affected because its agaves are still cooked with 
wood, and not with steam. This way, Ledn's product retains mezcal's charac-
teristic, strong flavour. 
16. The amount of time agaves should be cooked varies between 60-72 
hours. In practice, this range is problematic: if cooked too long agaves start 
burning -thus affecting flavour. In the o//a setup, the exact time agaves should 
be cooked is a matter of knowledge. For instance, what is the relationship 
between mature and immature agaves in the o//a? (mature agaves take longer 
to hydrolyse; immature ones are cooked more quickly). 
17. This specific problem was solved by installing a valve on top of the oven 
through which water could be added. The water would find its way to the 
hot stones and evaporate, thus inhibiting the burning of mezcales. 
18. It would be the same to turn this question and ask: what have Leon's 
rivals done to include him into their projects? 
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19. The type of information that is considered crucial refers to the "contacts" 
needed to buy agaves, the "recipes" used to obtain the final product, as well 
as the chemical "secrets" mobilized to "improve" taste. 
20. This in fact allowed ground for negotiating commission on sales: Le6n's 
distributors were indeed a little better off than distributors working for other 
mezcal producers. 
21. From an entrepreneurial point of view, this strategy was in itself a 
beneficial one: with a crop density of 5,000 plants per hectare, a growing 
period of 6 years, and an average of 30 kilograms per agave at harvest time, a 
gross profit (that is, without labour and transport costs) of US $5,000 per 
year/hectare is possible. In addition, the seedlings of the agave plant may be 
sold or utilized - a very labour-intensive activity though. If sold, profit rates 
increase in the order of 100% per hectare/year. With fertilization and irriga-
tion other (higher) profit rates apply, although one has to take into account a 
relative loss in the sugar content of the agaves cultivated this way. 
22. Prices at the gate of the distillery are the same for all, and customer price 
is set by Le6n. So, for example, the price of a box of 12 litres of commercial 
mezcal for consumers is N$35 (USD 11.75), while Le6n wants N$30 (USD 
10) back from his distributors upon their return. Of course, prices are always 
open to negotiation, and often the profit margins for distributors average way 
above the "official" 15%. This however mainly applies to independent 
distributors who have to carry the full burden of their operational costs and 
often visit more remote places. 
23. The distillery has a daily output of close to 300 liters of 'commercial 
mezcal' and a little over 40 liters of 'special' mezcal. 
24. Le6n's strategy in hiring Sergio backfired, however. When I left Jalisco -
one year after Sergio had been assigned to the job - the uncle already owed 
Leon USD 7,000 in arrears. 
25. Barely half a year after becoming compadres Leon bought half a hectare 
of land in El Izote, next to a National Park and midway between Guzman 
and Toliman. Soon after, Roberto started building a small ranch on it to enjoy 
barbecues and pristine mountain air together with Le6n and their friends. 
26. This move was preceded by a great many hesitations, the main one being 
that Pablo considered it inappropriate to ask Leon such a thing. After all, he 
reckoned, "Le6n is of another calibre; he is rich, and I'm only a poor bugger. 
How can I ask this of him? It is clearly out of place". 
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27. Le6n was in fact the first mezcal producer to obtain alcohol from the 
Tamazula sugar cane distillery. Prior to this most alcohol came from 
Guadalajara because all of Tamazula's production was bought well in 
advance by Bacardi. 
28. Most agaves utilized by Le6n are of the Vmeno variety. However, some-
times fully grown exemplars of wild varieties are added to make a blend. 
29. The length of fermentation is a function of temperature. At 28-30°C all 
sugars will ferment in 72 hours. Temperature in the fermentation tank 
however is lower, and in the colder months (November through February) the 
contents of a tank may take between 12 and 18 days to be fully fermented. 
30. Some days, however, both men do not finish before 7-8pm. This 
depends, amongst other factors, on the initial temperature of the cauldron in 
the morning as well as on the distillation speed. Distillation speed itself is a 
function of the gas pressure of the burner. In order to increase pressure, hot 
water exiting the still is used to warm up the 30-litre gas cylinders. Depend-
ing on the outside temperature, two to two-and-a-half cylinders are used each 
day. 
31. This filtering needs to be done because sometimes the still is too hot and 
thus loses some particles of its copper plating; sometimes there may only be 
some dust particles from the jerrycans into which the mezcal is collected. 
32. Although not new, this strategy has only become interesting for mezcal 
producers in the last 5 years. Before, prices of mezcal varieties of agaves (in 
contrast to tequila varieties) were so low that production thereof was econ-
omically unattractive. 
33. Traditionally a baptismal godfather is an important character with the 
means to bring up his godchild in case some mischief should fall upon his 
parents. Hence a padrino de bautixo is nearly always somebody with a 
relatively high economic status. Since a labourer of Le6n can never provide 
the education that is considered suitable for a child of his boss, the move was 
considered troublesome in this respect. 
34. Sometimes an agave middleman may have bought a product which still 
needs to be harvested. In such situations it is not uncommon for Leon to 
provide the labour. This condition often emerges at the beginning of the rainy 
season when everybody is busy attending their own or someone else's plots, 
or during maize harvest time. 
35. The sale of 96% alcohol to consumers is illegal, but difficult to check by 
the authorities (if they are interested in eradicating it in the first place). The 
drink is mainly utilized for canelitas (hot cinnamon tea in the early morning), 
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medicinal purposes, and to get drunk. This type of alcohol is very popular 
among poor alcoholics since it produces more "bang for the buck". 
36. Leon calculated that the liquor store produced a net profit of USD 11,000 
- 12,000 on a yearly basis. 
37. Ledn managed to become the local representative of the company, and 
makes 2 % on the fare of all passengers that crowd the five daily trips to San 
Gabriel, Ciudad Guzman and Guadalajara. This activity grants him an 
average gross monthly income of USD 240. 
38. The value of the pick-up was estimated at USD 4,000 but Ledn obtained 
it on an exchange basis of USD 3,700. The remaining USD 2,900 of the debt 
would be paid at another date. Since these negotiations were going on at the 
time of my departure from the fieldwork area, I do not know whether Ledn 
finally got his money or not. Neither do I know the fate of the cheques 
handed over to Ledn's associate. 
39. Tolimenses have always had closer contacts with Sayula and Guzman 
than with Autlan and El Grullo. The mountain separating Toliman from 
Sayula, and the volcanoes separating it from Guzman, however, makes 
transport much more expensive. 
CHAPTER 8 
LOCALIZING CONSUMPTION, CONTEXTUALIZING PRODUCTION 
Interfaces, Networks, and Mezcal 
In Chapters Four through Seven I plotted a number of entrepreneurial 
projects against each other, and showed the different ways in which these 
may (or may not) become obligatory points of passage through the 
continuous work of localizing and contextualizing. However, one difficult 
theme that was developed only to a degree in these cases involved the 
relationship between the projects themselves and crucial actors in their 
global networks: namely, the consumers of their products and services. In 
this Chapter, I explore the relation between a project and its clients 
through a case study on the distribution of mezcal in Jalisco, Western 
Mexico. Before addressing the work needed to generate a suitable context 
and a content for this distribution project, I first sketch 'traditional' notions 
on the relationship between producers and consumers - most notably that 
of the binary opposition between them assumed in most theories on the 
circulation of commodities. 
To distribute mezcal is to bring into circulation an object that de-scribes a 
productive domain. To talk about the distribution of mezcal, then, is to 
talk about its production as well. But it is also to talk about its consump-
tion, for it would be senseless to deny that the production and distribution 
of mezcal do not simultaneously trace a needer. This very simple under-
standing, however, is not reflected in the vast literature on the production 
and consumption of food and drink. Indeed, in most readings the starting 
point is that of the separate existence of the categories of 'producer' and 
'consumer'. 
Of late this divide, this dualism, has been imported integrally into 
the debate on globalization processes (cf. Miller 1995). This move leads 
to the entrenchment of a position we all know too well. To summarise 
this position, the argument generally mobilised (cf. Bonanno 1994; 
McMichael and Buttel 1990) is based on the assumption that producers, 
consumers and distributors can be conceptualised as being different in 
essence, that is, they exist independently of how we perceive them, or of 
how they perceive themselves. Thus these authors tell us stories about the 
way in which producers transform resources into commodities, about how 
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these commodities circulate through the intervention of distributing 
agencies and, ultimately, about the final users of the product - with supply 
and demand mediating between the production/consumption poles. This 
essentialist and idealist position is, however, highly problematic. Why? 
Because it hides the everyday struggles, negotiations and accommodations 
going on between producers and consumers in defining each others' 
identities. Indeed, as the case below shows, producers, consumers and 
distributors pay little heed to the a priori distinctions made by sociologists 
or economists. Consumers (but also producers and distributors) simply do 
not care if their interactions are of a global or of a local character. Neither 
do they make a difference between the material world on the one hand, 
and society, politics, economy or religion on the other. In fact, their 
reality is much more messy and heterogeneous. In other words, by reduc-
ing the practice of produc/ng and consum/ng to the analytic concepts of 
product/on and consumpt/on, political economists make invisible the way 
in which producers and consumers relate to one another, bringing about 
their specific identities in the process. 
I agree with Arce and Marsden (1994:3) when they suggest that we 
need to bypass traditional notions of the circulation of commodities and 
"... link more creatively [food] production, supply and consumption with a 
reappraised set of notions concerning food regimes and systems." In 
accordance with these authors, I question in this Chapter the pre-exist-
ence of a duality between consumers and producers that is de-linked from 
the practices that help shape the identities of both: A duality that is often 
treated asymmetrically, that is, that accords primacy to one side or other 
of the equation - thus automatically catapulting the idea that production 
drives consumption, or vice versa - as Miller (1995) suggests. Accordingly, 
my point of departure will be not to assume, a priori, that there exist driv-
ing and driven parties. This allows me to show that the distinction 
between producers and consumers is an emergent, relational one. In other 
words, I propose that the contrast between producers and consumers of 
mezcal can best be seen as an effect. An effect of the distribution of ident-
ities through the mobilization of a range of entities (both human and 
nonhuman) that are implicated in the production, consumption and, 
crucially, distribution of - in this case - mezcal. 
This Chapter, then, aims to make visible the way in which the identities 
of producers and consumers of mezcal are simultaneously constructed. To 
do so, I emphasize the organising practices associated with the circulation 
of the liquor. To make my argument, I first introduce Pablo, an indepen-
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dent mezcal distributor, who made bricks until 1987 when Benigno, 
owner of a mezcal distillery in El Grullo, solicited his services. Initially 
regarded by Pablo as a little gold mine, mezcal distribution allowed him 
to work only one day out of seven, buy a new pick-up truck, rent an 
adequate house, and start building a small cottage. In 1992, though, 
Pablo's new-born child fell ill for months, eventually dying. In the 
process, hospital bills sent Pablo into bankruptcy. In these months, cut-
throat competition drastically decreased profit margins for independent 
mezcal distributors like Pablo. Hence, in order to keep his business afloat, 
Pablo needed to open up new markets in localities that were so-far 
unknown to him. 
The main body of the first part of this Chapter provides an ethno-
graphic account of this endeavour. The idea, here, is to give the reader an 
image of the couleur locale. I also try to make the reader familiar with 
some of the work, knowledge and skills involved in the construction of a 
network of controllable customers that will obey Pablo's main message: 
buy from me! As I show, this - otherwise unsuccessful - attempt involves 
the enrolment of a variety of people and things that are normally required 
for the operation of a mezcal trader's route. In the second part of the 
Chapter, I present an analytical framework that help one to sort out 
Pablo's localizing and contextualizing practices. Then, in a third part, I 
develop a number of vignettes that are built around the operation of an 
already established trade route along the road from El Grullo to 
Guadalajara. This leads me to explore a number of interface situations 
involving actors that are all busy trying to define each other's identities 
through the mediation of a diversity of heterogeneous resources - both 
present and far-away. 
The Pacific Coast route 
June 11th, 1993. It is a cold, damp morning, around four am. Pablo drives 
by my place and I jump into the cabin of his twenty year-old, American-
made Chevy pick-up truck. W e are on our way to 'try out' the Pacific 
Coast route of Jalisco for the second time. Accompanying us are 30 boxes 
of twelve-litre bottles of mezcal each, and 42 five-litre canisters of 
mezcal. On the first trip, three weeks ago, Pablo had been accompanied 
by his neighbour (an unemployed engineer). On that occasion, with the 
neighbour's money, Pablo had bought USD 650 worth of the liquor at 
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Benigno's distillery on the understanding that the profit would be split by 
half. Although the investment was recovered, the joint venture had not 
been fully satisfactory. Apparently, Pablo's neighbour had been in a great 
hurry to get to Puerto Vallarta on the first day, and wanted to be back in 
El Grullo on the second. This left little time to talk to all possible tienda, 
canteen and liquor store owners along the road. On our trip, we intend to 
do just this. This time, however, I am the one up-fronting the money for 
the mezcal. 
W e are on the road. Nothing but the mountains lie between us and the 
coast. On our way, I ask Pablo if he has ever sold mezcal in the places 
shown on the some of the scarce exit signs: Villa de Purificacidn, 
Cuautitlan, Pabelo. Pablo: 
"No way. Too dangerous. It's full of drug traffickers. Robbers 
all over the place! I'm married and my wife has children..." 
W e climb and descend the winding road for two hours in the dark. La 
cobija de los pobres (the poor's blanket, as the sun is often called) hits 
us in the face at the intersection with the Pacific Coast Highway. Tourist-
filled Barra de Navidad and Melaque lie ahead of us, but Pablo decides to 
head towards Puerto Vallarta instead, leaving the bathing resorts for the 
return trip. W e make our first stop at 'Villa Polinesia', a thriving bus-
stop/restaurant annex liquor store at the cross-roads of the coastal highway 
and a track connecting to the chique Club Med. After breakfast, Pablo 
asks the lady in charge of the place if there is any need for Cordobe's - the 
brand we sell. Alas, the owner of the place is not in and she cannot make 
a decision on her own. First try, first miss. But the incident does not rock 
our boat. With a full stomach and a high esprit de corps we head for the 
first major place on our route: Tomatlan. Beer and liquor stores dot the 
road, but we pay no heed to them now: 
- "We will pay those bastards a visit on our way back" boasts Pablo in 
belittlement. "Tomatlin, that'll be our lucky spot today!". 
Tomatlan. Pablo had set his mind on it. 
W e arrive in Tomatlan. Both sides of the main street are strewn with 
liquor stores heavily protected by steel bars. Pablo stops in front of one of 
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them. Three weeks ago his neighbour had managed to sell four boxes (48 
litres) of mezcal here. And with a profit: on that occasion, the client paid 
USD 16 per box (Pablo bought each box at Benigno's for USD 10). Once 
inside the store, we get a forecast of things to come: the shelve is full of 
bottles - Benigno's brand. The client informs us that the brand is not 
selling well: he has only sold one box so far. W e walk to the next shop. 
The owner is not in, and the lady at the cash register is not supposed to 
do the restocking. On the shelve we see the competition's product {El 
Mezcalito and Tonayan.) Pablo talks her into buying some Cordob6s, and 
after a lengthy negotiation in which she is clearly not at ease because of 
my presence (a tall, blond foreigner), she agrees to buy six one-litre 
bottles. At USD 1.70 each, a 50%-profit over cost-price. W e visit two 
more shop owners who had bought some Cordob6s three weeks ago, but 
again we are confronted with the story we heard before: the brand does 
not sell well. Pablo concludes that TonayAn and El Mezcalito are prob-
ably undercutting the price. W e then try our luck in the centre of town, 
which radiates a flourishing commercial atmosphere. To no avail. Time 
after time we are told either one of four stories: "the owner is away, I 
cannot make this decision"; "the bottles you left last time haven't sold"; 
"we already have plenty of Tonayin and El Mezcalito"; "drop by on your 
way out of town, I have no cash now"... 
Fearing the worst, we pay a visit to the red light district. It is still before 
noon, and most bars are closed. One of them seems open, judging from 
the screeching music coming out of the narrow entrance door. W e enter. 
Once inside, the madam has us drink coffee with her. Little by little the 
main room/dancing floor/bar comes alive. Before we finish our coffee, the 
urine-smell filled place is crowded with women of easy virtue coming out 
of their rooms and complaining of hangovers. Meanwhile, children wash 
clothes and blankets and an elderly woman cooks menudo (cooked 
tripe)... But here, too, we seem to be loosing our time: the madam tells us 
that her customers stick to brandy and rum. "No mezcal, sorry." 
All other canteens seem deserted. A middle-aged man, still drunk from 
lasts night's feasting, intercepts us in front of the Chevy: 
- "Do you sell vino?"1 
- "Of course we do!" 
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W e show him our ware, and he throws an eye on a five-litre gallon. It's 
flashy sticker tells would-be customers that it is of 48° GL (although I 
could never myself measure more than 36° GL with my alcoholometer) 
and made from 100% agaves. The man, pointing to a plastic bottle 
containing five litres of mezcal: 
- "How much for that fat lady" 
- "I'll give it to you cheap because you're our first customer today. Thirty 
pesos, plus five for the bottle [USD 11.50] and it's all yours!" 
The man does not negotiate the price Pablo suggests, and winds up 
paying for his embriagated condition (Pablo only pays USD 2.60 for this 
type of mezcal - which is actually more of a mixture of water, dyes, and 
alcohol. I later tell Pablo that the price seems somewhat unfair to me: 
- "Inside the brothel he'd paid three times that! 
Despite this last episode, by now our morale is pretty low. It is already 
clear to us that Tonaya"n and El Mezcalito's distributors 'own' the route. 
The task ahead of us is to 'break open' their route. W e decide to leave 
Tomatlan and come back the next day or the day thereafter to entice 
absentee owners into buying some liquor. 
W e are now on our way to Puerto Vallarta. I now take over 
command of the gasguzzler because Pablo is afraid of the Highway Patrol 
in this unknown territory. The reason: his driver's license expired ten 
years ago2... W e refill the Chevy as we again hit the Pacific Coast high-
way, and I mention the pick-up's thirsty habit (nearly 53 litres for a total 
of 200 kilometres!) Pablo: 
"Yes a Japanese truck is more economical. But then you cannot 
load as much on it and you have to suffer every time you climb 
a hill in first gear. But the truth is that Benigno owns the 
truck's papers because I still owe him four million [USD 
1,300] for the truck and some other four million for vino. So 
he's got me hooked. I cannot sell the truck because I don't 
have the papers. And I can't start working for somebody else 
because then Benigno will Just start charging interest on all I 
owe him..." 
I am not surprised. Lending money and selling on credit is common 
among mezcal producers, and one way of making sure distributors stay 
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'loyal' to them is precisely through this type of practices. Benigno, for 
example, has six distributors. They all pay cash for the liquor they take 
with them on their selling routes. Each distributor has a different route, 
and all are supposed to sell Cordob6s only. In return, Benigno - who does 
not pay his distributors' social security, SAR 3 or INFONAVIT 4 - provides 
the registered invoices and the special permits needed to transport alcohol 
(and which are needed in case of being controlled by police or inspec-
tors), in fact hiding his distributors' activities from Hacienda (Ministry of 
Taxes). This is generally seen as a 'favour' by his distributors, who would 
otherwise have to apply for the special permit themselves and register at 
Hacienda as independent traders - thus ending up paying taxes. The 
invoices, on their part, are always deflated and serve their purpose for 
multiple occasions. On this particular trip, for example, we carried a 
three-week old invoice mentioning USD 2 1 0 worth of mezcal, whereas 
the merchandise we carried was worth the USD 6 5 0 mentioned above. 
As we talk about these issues we reach Pino Suarez, a small hamlet 
where Pablo sold six boxes to a 'good' client on his prior trip. W e go to 
his store, only to find out that just two boxes have sold. Pablo makes 
awkward faces while swearing about our bad luck. The owner - who 
seems to be sympathetic towards us - agrees to buy one more box for 
USD 16. W e thus make more than 5 0 % profit. It is clear, however, that 
we need not come back in a month or so. W e are now in a really bad 
mood. This, and the mounting heat, make Pablo change plans drastically: 
we are returning to El Grullo. The idea of opening a 'new' market in this 
area seems unfeasible to him; Ten kilometres and a dozen or so liquor 
stores further, we become more laconic. Our anger subsides and we 
decide to keep on trying. Thus we enter the road that leads to the beauti-
ful beaches of Pe>ula. Our luck seems to turn when we stop at the first 
and only store. There, the wife of the owner agrees to buy two boxes at 
USD 1 6 each. More importantly, she provides some precious information: 
her husband sometimes buys up to fifty boxes of Tonayin and El 
Mezcalito in one go. The reason for this seems to be that heavy drinking 
at burials is becoming a hype. And, since her husband's store is the only 
game in town, people come to stock with him. 
This is good news. After all, if Pablo can win her husband over on 
a next visit then the trip to Pemla alone would make the route 
worthwhile. In a good mood now, we invite ourselves to delicious 
oysters, shrimps and some beer on the beach, underneath the shade of a 
pa/apa. W e then continue our trip back to El Grullo and reach the ejido 
of Venustiano Carranza. There, in a shop where Pablo sold two boxes 
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Questions and concepts 
The foregoing narrative, of course, begs the question of how to interpret 
it. Is the account merely a tool to make clear to you that opening up a 
new market is not a straightforward activity? Is it an instrument to display 
three weeks ago, we are given less optimistic information. As the owner 
explains, some of his customers bought CordobGs once but returned to 
drinking Tonaya"n. Besides, Tonayin delivers at USD 1 2 per box of twelve 
litres - substantially less than Pablo's price for Cordob6s. Without even 
bargaining, we go back to the Chevy. Pablo turns on the engine and kicks 
the accelerator, in the meantime swearing against Federico, the producer 
of Tonayin: 
"Son-of-a-bitch! Federico has his distributors drive his trucks for 
a salary! So now he can sell for the same fucking low price 
everywhere... I tell you that it's not nice to go around like this. 
It's humiliating! I don't like to beg anybody to buy my vino. 
OK, I guess it's only a matter of people getting used to 
Cordob6s' taste. But how can they get used to it if I don't sell 
a damn?" 
While swearing and musing about the future of mezcai, we arrive at the 
intersection where the sun greeted us this morning. Now the Sun King is 
about to leave us. I ask Pablo whether we shall enter Barra de Navidad 
and Melaque. "I'm tired. Let's go home". I press on - after all I need to 
get my investment back. But Pablo argues that we are not dressed appro-
priately for the occasion and people will start making fun at us: "Somos 
pobres y vivimos a la orilla" [We are poor and live on the edge of town]. 
I know Pablo and I understand his reluctance. Coming from a provincial 
town, he feels inferior in the presence of cosmopolitan tourists spending 
huge amounts of money in trendy bars, shopkeepers casually dressed in 
expensive beach wear... I notice that he is angry with himself now. By the 
time we reach El Grullo I have already made up the list of sales and 
expenses. Clearly, we have lost money on today's enterprise. Once at 
home, Pablo tries to cheer me up with a drink, stating that 
"Para todo ma/, mezcal. Para todo bien, tambien." 
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the materially heterogeneous character of a trade route? The answer is: 
both. So, on the one hand, I have acquainted you with the heterogeneous 
elements - both social and technical - that inhabit a mezcal trader's 
world. These elements seem to be hostile to Pablo's efforts to expand his 
business, that is, they cannot easily be aligned and converted into trust-
worthy, controllable allies. Thus the route is replete with dangerous drug 
traffickers, recalcitrant shop owners not wanting to buy Pablo's brand, 
police officers preying on invalid documents of all sorts, hesitant madams, 
cosmopolitan tourists, aggressive competitors selling cheaper mezcal, 
brittle glass bottles that may break when confronted with potholes, 
burials, expensive gasguzzlers that cost a fortune to operate. 
But what should we make of these materially heterogeneous 
elements peacefully coexisting with one another? What should we make 
of Pablo's efforts to reconfigure these elements and bring about reliable 
clients? Do we start from the perspective of the laws of accumulation and 
reduce Pablo's relative failure to sell mezcal to social or economic 
factors alone? Would it be sensible to bracket out the things that make up 
a potential trade route? My answer to this is blunt: no! 
I have another proposal. I suggest that one does not start by 
assuming that producers and consumers exist as fixed entities. Rather, I 
suggest that both are constructed through the mediation of mezcal - an 
object which may best be addressed by what Latour (1993) coins a 
'sociotechnical hybrid': a mixture of people and things that are not 
strictly the product of either 'the social' or 'the technological'. In other 
words, the practice of establishing a distribution network entails referring 
to social, technical, and discursive elements that cross the boundaries of 
established disciplines. But it is also about transgressing the (analytical) 
boundaries between consumers and producers. For whatever Pablo does, 
he is going to and fro between them. And so will I when I take you with 
me and follow Pablo on his next trip. Thus when I talk about the work, 
the skills, or the knowledge necessary to distribute mezcal, I talk about 
the heterogeneous materials that cross the boundaries between producers 
and consumers, constituting a common space between them in the 
process. A common space in which, following Callon (1991:34-5) "... 
actors define one another in interaction - [through] the intermediaries that 
they put into circulation." 
For methodological reasons, by interaction I understand interaction 
in interface situations. Although I retain much of Long's (1989) original 
formulation of interface5, I define 'interaction in an interface situation' as 
the process in which an actor X (in our case, Pablo) attempts to localize 
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and define an actor Y (clients) through an intermediary Z (mezcal).6 In 
other words, interfaces stand for relationships, while the content of these 
relationships is inscribed in intermediaries. In this definition, interfaces, 
interactions and intermediaries are thus relational concepts. 
With this definition in mind, I aim to develop the argument that 
'production' and 'consumption' cannot be conceived as separate entities. 
Rather, I maintain that producer and consumer identities are inscribed in 
the intermediaries that circulate between them. Put differently, I argue that 
the identities of consumers and producers can be seen as an effect of 
organising the circulation of intermediaries. Producing and consuming are 
thus an effect of practice - the practice of defining what is a producer, and 
what is a consumer. 
Starting from such a perspective, of course, entails asking an 
altogether different set of questions. Thus we should not any more be 
interested in why Pablo succeeds or fails in selling mezcal, or who or 
what should be held responsible for it. Rather, the question becomes that 
of how all the heterogeneous elements that make up a network of reliable 
customers are held together, thereby enabling the emergence of a trade 
route. (Clearly, the corollary question of how it is that these elements 
resist recruitment, thereby limiting Pablo's endeavours, is equally incum-
bent.) The problem however is that one does not normally 'see' this 
activity of 'holding together' all these bits and pieces. Why is it so 
difficult to talk in terms of these compositions? Why do social scientists 
speak of producers and consumers? How is it that we prefer to make 
reference to punctualizations, to black-boxed producers and consumers, 
instead of describing the complexities involved in their construction? This 
is because, in practice, complex action may become routinized. Indeed, 
black boxes such as 'production decisions' or 'consumer tastes' are, 
metaphorically speaking, like facades hiding complex dynamics of their 
own. For example, not all entities involved in exchange (Pablo, mezcal, 
consumers) need to be defined all over again in each routinized exchange 
encounter. All that matters is that the exchange works. Once simplified, 
exchange - or, rather, the network of elements which bring about the 
exchange - can be assumed to act as a disengaged block. Thus apparently 
simple elements - Pablo, mezcal, bottles, consumers, to name a few -
may, if only for practical purposes, masquerade the collectif of which they 
are an effect.7 
So how can we open up these punctualized compositions, these 
black-boxed networks? My answer is: through description, through the 
opening up, the exposition, of the trajectories of networks that end up 
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Interfaces: networks and facades 
Saturday morning, around seven a.m. Pablo honks in front of my place. I 
get my jacket, my notebook and my wallet (one never knows with Pablo) 
and get into the truck. As I say hello to him, I quickly inspect the contents 
of the cargo area. The idea crosses my mind that he was not able to buy 
as much mezcal as the 'normal' Saturday route would demand. Indeed, 
after automatically asking about my health and that of my family, Pablo 
instantly starts complaining: 
"Let's see what destiny has to offer us today. I asked my broth-
er-in-law Antonio for some pesos but he only co-operated with 
one hundred. And then Alejo didn't have more than two-fifty... 
Nooo, Gerardo, this business is slowly going down. Imagine, I 
even had to ask my wife for another hundred!" 
being black-boxed. As I stated in Chapter Two, this means that one has to 
follow Pablo in his efforts to define - to localize and contextualize - the 
characteristics of his objects (clients, mezcal, producers). It means that we 
have to follow Pablo and see how he attributes actors with specific tastes 
and competences. Indeed, a large part of Pablo's work consists in inscrib-
ing these attributions into the mezcal he brings into circulation. 
How to make sense of what you have just read? Let us once more follow 
Pablo - this time along one of his established routes: from El Grullo all the 
way to Acatlan and back via Soyatlan. Let us again climb into the big-
block Chevy. But let us not take off in the company of Pablo and his 
embriagating mezcal only. This time around, we will take some unusual 
passengers with us: the concepts and principles of actor-network theory. 
Wil l we see them, at the end of the trip, as useful allies that enable us to 
say something substantial about the character of Pablo's enterprise? Wil l 
they help us to expose the social and technical elements Pablo brings to 
bear at every interface situation he is involved in? Can they tell us 
something about the work, the skills, and the knowledge needed to hold 
together the hybrid elements of the trade route - effectuating, en passant, 
producers and consumers? 
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W e stop by the bank to see if I can draw some money from the teller ma-
chine. But I have to deceive Pablo: a line is probably down, so I cannot 
contribute this time. W e have to make do with what we have: 31 five-litre 
canisters, 5 twelve-litre boxes of Cordob6s and two boxes of a new brand, 
Reserva del Abuelo. 
Around eight-fifteen. W e reach the summit of the Sierra. From now 
on we will not have to climb long, steep stretches any more. That is a 
comfortable thought, since it would certainly not be the first time that the 
yellow gasguzzler would abandon us: some part of the engine does not 
seem to like arduous, long slopes very much. Three more curves and we 
make the obliged stop at the little chapel of the V/rgen de Guadalupe, the 
patron saint of El Grullo. Pablo I its a candle and deposits some coins in 
front of the Lady. W e say a little prayer, hats in hands, then go. Enough 
mezcal or not: today's enterprise will at least be a blessed one. W e drive 
by Unidn de Tula, the first larger town on our way. Pablo has no cus-
tomers here because this is the exclusive domain of the district's tax 
inspector, who has a local monopoly on the distribution of Tonayin: 
potential clients of other brands risk an 'unexpected' (and certainly not 
inconsequential) 'visit' from him. To quiet complaints - and luckily for 
locals - the tax inspector 'only' makes 15% profit on each bottle he sells... 
By ten-thirty we reach our initial destination, San Martfn Hidalgo. 
W e go straight to our first customer, an older man owning a shabby 
canteen just around the corner from the main colonial church. W e find 
him leaning against the outside wall of his property, as if expecting us. 
W e greet him. After some words about last night's rain, Pablo jokingly 
asks: 
- "how many thousands of litres will it be today?" 
- "Only one box of Cordobes. And give me four canisters. One white, 
three yellow. "8 
Pablo and I unload the mezcal and carry it inside the little canteen. Its 
walls are plastered with blonde pin-up girls. In one corner, there is a large 
fridge for the beer. On the opposite side, a small shelf where a half dozen 
plastic mezcal bottles of different brands stand on display next to an equal 
amount of football trophies. The finishing touch is provided by a set of 
four metal chairs and a corresponding table (all with a beer logo engraved 
on them), some ten crates of Coca-Cola and Seven-Up, and an ice chest. 
Pablo empties the content of the glass canisters into four plastic bottles 
furnished by the client.9 In a quasi-ritualistic way, Pablo asks: 
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- "You sure that'll be it, my friend?" 
- "Well... I don't know. It hasn't stopped raining so the harvest will be 
late this time. You see, farmers have no money right now..." 
- "People prefer vino to beer when its cold and dreary like this..." 
- "... yes, but then there's the crisis..." 
- "Yes, there's no money. I know. These are hard times... That's why we 
should help one another!" 
- "OK let us help one another. Get me one more box" 
- "Only one?" 
So far, we can say that what we have observed entails action in an inter-
face situation: Pablo and the customer exchange mezcal for money. Of 
course, matters are much more complex than in the situation sketched 
above. Nothing has been said about the amount of money for which the 
bottles eventually passed hands. Nor do I touch upon economic profit -
either obtained or expected - or the value attached to this by the parties 
involved. Neither do I talk about the knowledge, the skills necessary for 
the transaction. Also missing is the degree of freedom open to Pablo or 
the canteen owner for exchanging X litres of mezcal for Y amount of 
money. An important observation at this point, though, is that mezcal and 
money participate in the construction of the interface by defining the 
identities of the parties involved. Thus Pablo is defined as a seller, and 
the client is defined as a buyer - with money and mezcal mediating 
between the two. Money and mezcal are thus intermediaries. Put differ-
ently, we can say that the identities of Pablo (as a distributor of mezcal) 
and his customer (as a buyer of mezcal) are inscribed in mezcal and 
money. What's more: mezcal and money do not 'simply' stand at the 
interface of two known worlds. Rather, mezcal and money construct these 
worlds by bringing them into relation: in the absence of mezcal and 
money both men would probably never have come into contact with one 
another (cf. Hennion 1989). 
But there is more to it: mezcal and money are not alone in bring-
ing together Pablo and his client. Indeed, money and mezcal map out a 
host of other intermediaries that are crucial in allowing for an uncompli-
cated transaction at the interface. I refer to some of them in the narrative: 
kin relations, automatic teller machines, a pick-up truck, steep mountain 
slopes, patron saints, tax inspectors, competing mezcal brands, canteens, 
jerrycans, refrigerators, glass bottles, rain, crops, beer, farmers, economic 
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crisis, solidarity notions. And this is only a very partial list of all that is 
brought to bear at the interface between Pablo and his customer. And all 
these elements stand in a certain relationship to one another, that is, they 
are aligned in a specific way. In fact, one could see them as a network, 
an actor-network. A network that took time, effort, skills and knowledge 
to construct. 
Interfaces thus involve networks. Networks which, for all practical 
purposes, are black-boxed - that is, in practice one is only seldom aware 
of the complexities that are part and parcel of these networks. In 
routinized encounters distributors and customers (and their networks) 
need not be defined all over again at each and every exchange. The 
networks behind distributing mezcal, can be (and are) simplified: all that 
matters is that the network functions, and that mezcal is exchanged for 
money. Thus apparently simple elements - mezcal, money, a distributor, a 
consumer - may, if only for practical purposes, masquerade the networks 
that have spawned them. Interface situations, then, may disguise net-
works, showing only facades in the process. Paradoxically, as we will see 
next, they may also open them up. 
Interfaces, networks, and facades: localizing an operational context 
The networks referred to above are made visible when we drive around 
the block to our second customer. On the way, I see Pablo nervously 
watching his mirror, and I ask him what is troubling him. He comments: 
"I'm trying to figure out the guy in the red pick-up behind us. 
In this business you can expect anybody to follow you just to 
see where you are selling. When I was working for Armando 
[third largest mezcal producer] he asked me where exactly I 
was selling. I didn't tell him the details, but he must have had 
me followed because on my next trip I found that he had 
already send a camioneta ahead, and was selling for just a little 
above factory prices. So he really took advantage of me! Of 
course I stopped working for him..." 
The memory of the incident still angers him. W e ride past our second 
customer, and drive around the block to make sure we are not being fol-
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lowed. The red pick-up disappears from sight so we can now 'safely' 
park in front of Romualdo's, owner of the largest convenience store in 
the locality. Inside, Romualdo tells us to unload 100 litres of white 
mezcal - about two thirds of all the mezcal we carry in canisters, and 
about double the amount he usually buys. The deal itself looks good, but 
when looked at closely it implies a huge problem. Why? Of Pablo's 
customers, Romualdo - who resells the mezcal in Guadalajara - is the one 
that buys for the lowest price: Pablo only makes one peso (USD 0.30) per 
litre on him. When Pablo carries enough mezcal, all sales to Romualdo 
are welcome. But in a shortage situation like the one we are in, the 
exchange suddenly takes on a different meaning and creates a difficult 
dilemma for Pablo: with 100 litres already going to Romualdo, there is 
little mezcal left to sell to higher-bidding clients and thus turn the trip into 
a profitable one. This implies that we will have to skip the clientele 
paying a lower price and only sell to those customers willing to pay a 
higher one. This tactic however is self-defeating because lower prices are 
an historical outcome: they apply to Pablo's most reliable clients. Those -
like Romualdo - with whom there exists a long-standing relationship. And 
Pablo would not want to risk losing their business (and their friendship) 
by failing to supply them. Thus Pablo now has to make some very 
strategic and careful calculations.10 For example, it certainly means we 
will have to let fall the Soyatlan part of the route. This is financially 
damaging because Pablo will have to make an extra trip there the next 
day. 
Of course, Pablo could have anticipated the situation, for example by 
taking enough mezcal with him in the first place. His failure to do so, 
however, was not borne out of short-sightedness, but out of a lack of 
money for stock. In a highly competitive field such as that of mezcal sell-
ing, independent traders like Pablo earn enough to make a precarious 
living, but they are certainly not in a position to accumulate.11 In fact, 
most mezcal traders I met complemented their commercial venture with 
other entrepreneurial activities. In the case of Pablo, the situation was 
pretty woeful: his wife and three children were only able to make ends 
meet through the sale of home-made cenas his wife sold on the street. 
Otherwise Pablo was pretty much broke, and in fact ever more indebted 
each day (his total outstanding debts were close to USD 20,000. ) Finding 
a source for financing his weekly delivery route was thus an expedient 
task. 
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Indeed, in the year and a half I interacted with Pablo I traced quite 
an extended borrowing network. Apart from Benigno and myself, major 
sponsors included Alejo (a sugarcane producer), Juan Arias (co-owner of 
the second-largest mezcal factory and who also helped with the 
downpayment of the Chevy), Pablo's brother-in-law Antonio (a 
brickmaker), his sister (married to a wealthy family), David (a neighbour 
and truck owner/operator), an uncle (shop owner and sugarcane pro-
ducer), and his wife. From this set of people Pablo borrowed interest-
free - although once in a while he would pass on a good bottle of mezcal 
to them. A problem, however, was that Pablo could not always count on 
their help. For example, when the economic crisis hit the California 
construction industry (which employs hundreds of thousands of Mexicans) 
there was a discernible decline in remittances sent to El Grullo. This 
resulted in reduced local construction activities, which in turn induced a 
temporary crisis in the regional brickmaking sector. The consequence for 
Pablo was that his brother-in-law Antonio struggled with a negative cash 
flow for quite some time and was thus unable to lend Pablo any money. 
Likewise, David (the truck owner) would be absent for months on end 
working near Tijuana with his equipment: Pablo could count on him, but 
only upon his return. Or else Alejo, his main sponsor, would not get paid 
on time by the sugarmill and hence stop backing his friend and 
compadre. With all this "noise", more often than not alternative borrow-
ing instances had to be found. These consisted mainly of the Ca/a Popular 
and, in extreme situations, a variety of local moneylenders charging 4.5-
5% a month. Pablo always made sure he paid back the latter in time -
which sometimes presented a problem for those who lent him money on 
an interest-free base (such as myself or his kin). 
What can we make of this all? Can we find prime movers in the above 
interface situations? What status do we attribute to the 'general' or 
'structural' economic malaise affecting Mexico? Can the 'tendencies' and 
'countertendencies' of global capital accumulation be our scapegoat for 
explaining Pablo's predicaments, as some authors (cf. Fine 1994) would 
suggest? Can the story above be made to hinge on the prosperity of the 
local brick industry, or on the local agricultural context? Not exactly. I 
want to approach the issue differently. There is nothing esoteric about 
'context', or about the 'global': in the end, the interface situations above 
unfold networks of people and things that may not be physically present, 
but which in fact link the distribution of a relatively 'simple' commodity 
to 'complex' and 'distant' actors such as a crisis in the California con-
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Interfaces, networks, and facades: localising producers and consumers 
Interfaces make visible the way in which operational requirements for the 
distribution of mezcal are localized and contextualized. In the same 
fashion, they also picture the networks that trace out its buyers and its 
makers. Put differently interfaces, via intermediaries, localize and 
contextualize producers and consumers. How can this happen? Let us 
visit a 'good' client from Acatlan: one paying a relatively high price for 
mezcal. As soon as we get off the gasguzzler, it appears that the owner 
does not want to buy anything today. On the contrary, he returns a full, 
20-litre jerrycan of mezcal that Pablo delivered last week. In a rather 
hostile manner, he mutters: 
- "Hey Pablo! What the fuck is this? Look at this vino! Are you trying to 
poison me?" 
As I gather from Pablo's expression, he understands the reason for the 
animosity. What is happening here? The story runs as follows. A fortnight 
ago, Benigno (the mezcal producer) had some trouble with the taste of a 
batch of the spirit. Different stories circulated about this problem. Benigno 
himself accused the sun: according to him, the plastic jerrycans contain-
ing around 450 litres had probably been left standing in the sun for too 
long so the taste had deteriorated appreciably. Another version was given 
by the person in charge of the actual fermentation process at Benigno's 
distillery. This person pointed to bacteria as the main originators of the 
damage: the somewhat sour taste and fetid smell had been caused by 
faulty fermentation due to insufficient sterilisation of the fermentation 
tank, letting unwanted bacteria add an undesirable flavouring to the 
brewage. Yet other interpretations charged the type of agaves utilised: 
they had been of poor quality due to a wrong mix of climatological and 
edaphic conditions in which they had been grown. At any rate Pablo, 
upon hearing that Benigno was about to throw the mezcal down the 
drain, paid him a visit to avoid such a 'disaster'. He persuaded Benigno 
not to commit the 'monstrous' sin, and in the end got the jerrycans for 
struction sector. And here is a methodological point: from my perspective, 
the visualisation of this 'context', this network of heterogeneous materials, 
can be effectively opened through the de-scription of interface situations. 
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free - although Benigno did warn him that he should "... sell it in places 
where you won't come back".1 2 
With the sour mezcal Pablo then paid a visit to Le6n - a mezcal producer 
from Toliman. Ledn, on good terms with Pablo, promised to help by 
'fixing' the taste and the smell of the 'bad' mezcal. This he did by empty-
ing the jerrycans into a huge container and, since the alcohol content of 
the 'bad' mezcal was very low (close to 20°GL), added 60 litres of 96% 
alcohol to boost alcohol percentage to somewhere near 30°GL - just 
enough for consumers not to notice that the drink was not up to the 
'normal' standard of 36 degrees.13 Then, passing the drink through active 
charcoal filters, the pungent smell of the mezcal had been 'domesticated'. 
Finally artificial colouring and almond essence were added for visual and 
bouquet purposes, as well as a few drops of glycerine to make the mezcal 
'stickier'. The end product was a soft-tasting, yellowish liquor that closely 
resembled tequila, mezca/'s cousin. The booze was then sold by Pablo -
but unluckily for him not only where he was not known. So far, not one 
single customer had protested. Until now. Apparently, Pablo had forgotten 
to take one of the jerrycans to Ledn to be 'treated'. And this specimen 
had now surfaced with this client. 
The interface situation illustrated above links one, again, with a network 
of elements (the sun, bacteria, fellow mezcal producers, almond essence, 
soil conditions) which, in turn, localize both producers and consumers. 
For example, divergent forms of producers' social and technical 
organisation are here made apparent. Thus Benigno does not have the 
skills, the knowledge, nor the technical means to 'domesticate' a batch 
turned sour. In case of failure, he can flush the mezcal down the drain, or 
give it away. Le6n on the contrary possesses the skills 'soften' the taste of 
mezcal. He can also count on the technical means to do so. Symmet-
rically, consumers are localized either directly or indirectly. Directly when 
they complain about a batch that was mistakenly smuggled into the trade 
route. And indirectly by the mere fact that (some) mezcal producers know 
how to 'fix' a spoiled batch of drink (which entails knowledge of the 
consumer). 
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Interfaces, networks, and façades: constructing consumers and pro-
ducers 
The vignette above shows how interfaces and intermediaries may on the 
one hand localise producers and consumers, while on the other they mix 
up elements that are normally attributed to either the 'consumption' or the 
'production' domains. Thus we can venture to say that both production 
and consumption of mezcal are interlinked. W e are now left with an 
image of production and consumption as the two faces of Janus, each one 
linked to different actor-networks, yet united by a single intermediary that 
circulates between them and constructs them both. The producer is what 
he makes. And what the consumer drinks. The consumer is what he 
drinks. And what the producer makes. 
One clear example of this arises in a canteen in Miraplanes, far from the 
main road. The owner, some customers and I are chatting about the 
quality of different brands of mezcal: Tonayân, Arias, Très Coronas. Sens-
ing the moment, Pablo goes to the pick-up and comes back producing a 
plastic bottle of mezcal. Without having to insist too much, he lures both 
customers and the owner into savouring it. 
Pablo: "/ want you to taste this vino. It's not a very well known brand, 
but I assure you it's a very fine mezcal. It's been aged three months in 
an oak barrel" 
Customer A (reading the sticker on the bottle): "Réserva del Abuelo. From 
Tollman. Son of a gun, that's pretty far away.'" 
Customer B: "Tolimàn, Tolimàn... The best agaves come from those 
places" 
Pablo: "From there and from Tequila" 
So the brand is not well known, but its place of origin is: common knowl-
edge has it that the better agaves come from either Tequila or Tolimàn. 
After tasting it, all present agree that it is much better than Cordobés, 
Pablo's house brand. Indeed, they even coincide that the product is even 
better than that of his main competitors. Several canteen customers agree 
that the taste is 'soft' as it does not hurt the throat at all. Pablo explains 
that the reason for the soft, 'special' taste is to be found in the careful 
blend of mature agaves of the lineno and cuauhquisoca varieties. These, 
182 TACOS, TIENDAS AND MEZCAL 
he continues, are still cooked with wood in the old-fashion barbacoa 
(buried under ground) style.14 
Customer A (apparently trying to establish rapport with Pablo for some 
more free drink): 
- "Well, mezcal is like beans. After all, beans also taste better when 
cooked slowly with wood in an earthen pot" 
All present laugh in approval. An older client demonstratively pours some 
of the mezcal on his hands, rubbing it in. He then takes his hands to his 
nose, and smells. Everybody seems to wait for an answer. The man 
remarks: 
- "This is one-hundred-percent mezcal with no alcohol added. Sweet. It 
smells of cooked mezcal. I can tell you this because I used to work at a 
taverna myself when I was young" 
Pablo adds: "This vino fias not a single drop of alcohol added to it. It is 
as you say. Look at the way it sticks to your glass. Just try and do that 
with Tonayân! Réserva del Abuelo [Grandfather's Reserve]: The name says 
it all..." 
One patron, by way of argument, comments that he hopes that this 
mezcal does not follow the trajectory of mezcal Arias, which was of very 
good quality a year or two ago. It conquered a huge share of the market 
by offering a good price/quality relation. But now that the Arias brothers 
are successful they have neglected the quality of their mezcal. So now 
people are turning their back onto the product. 
Pablo: "No, no. I tell you: the producer of Réserva del Abuelo is a good 
friend of mine. He would not even think about staining his family's 
name by adulterating the vino" 
The matter seems to be settled now; all present agree to the high quality 
of the product, and the subject is changed. W e open another 'promotion' 
bottle and drink from it with the owner of the place. While talking about 
football, the killing of Guadalajara's cardinal, and the physical aspect of 
a lady walking past the canteen, the owner plays around with the mezcal 
in his glass. He smells it, tastes it. He also shakes his glass, and bubbles 
appear on the surface of the liquor. He points this out to me, explaining 
that good mezcal should make bubbles when shaken. Later, to do busi-
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ness, the owner discreetly accompanies us to the truck and asks about the 
price for the 12-litre box of Reserva del Abuelo. Decidedly, Pablo asks 
seventy-two pesos (USD 2 3 ) but adds that, since this is an introductory 
promotion, he will settle for sixty pesos (USD 20) . The canteen owner at 
first hesitates, arguing that his customers like quality but are not at all 
blind to the price. Pablo explains: 
"Well I'm not going to beg you to buy the vino. Only 
women are there to be begged. But you have to see it this 
way: a bottle of Cordob6s is costing you three-thousand-five 
hundred [USD 1.15]. This good vino is just fifteen hundred 
[USD 0.50] more. That's nothing once people start drinking! 
This Reserva you can easily sell for two-thousand-five hun-
dred [USD 0.80] a shot.15 You just saw how they liked it in 
there. Per bottle you'll make a lot more, I assure you!" 
The canteen owner laughs and swears at his interlocutor's cunning. He 
tries to negotiate the price, offering fifty five pesos (USD 18) for the box 
of twelve, but Pablo sticks to his price. Finally, the client succumbs to his 
desire, and pays the sixty pesos (double the amount paid for it by 
Pablo).16 
The vignette unfolds a network of heterogeneous materials that brings us 
directly into contact with the realm of mezcal production and consumer 
taste and desire. So far the network links the producer and the consumer 
through the mediation of the distributor. But I wish to further the point, 
and argue that the product itself already contains the consumer the 
minute it leaves the distillery. Indeed, the producer tries to incorporate his 
hypotheses about the characteristics of the consumer into a bottle of 
mezcal. In other words, the final product has already localised its future 
consumer. And herein lies the 'secret' of the Janus-face of a bottle of 
mezcal. In the words of Hennion (1989:199) , the object - in our case, 
drink - is "... a thing, but a thing for a person. A technical product and a 
product which communicates. A product that fulfils a need if it knows 
how to create the needer. And not in two successive phases, but more 
and more as a single, unified collective process." 
But how can we conceive of this unified, collective process? As we have 
seen in the above narrative, the argument on the quality of the mezcal 
centred around bubbles, the way agaves are cooked, the ageing process, 
sweetness, stickiness, the absence of alcohol, 'true' mezcal flavour. But 
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these are not merely quality indicators that exist in isolation from the 
production process. If one is allowed to peep over mezcal producers' 
shoulders, as I was, it quickly becomes obvious that there is no such thing 
as a secluded producer manufacturing mezca/ the way he, and only he, 
thinks appropriate. Mezcal producers are not ascetic monks. They define 
the consumer and incorporate him into the bottle through knowledge 
gained in practical negotiations with mediators of all sorts: consumers 
themselves, distributors passing on information about the success or 
failure of specific innovations, gossip about competitors' products, 
reports about the 'state of the market'. Clearly, the list of elements 
mobilised to define the client is not limited to fifteen or more varieties of 
agaves cultivated by dozens of farmers, tavernas distilling different types 
of mezcal, or manufacturers of synthetic flavours, artificial dyes or glycer-
ine to make mezcal 'sticky'. It is indeed a much lengthier network that 
may expand or contract according to the circumstances and the inventive-
ness of mezcal producers. It is like a shapeless amoeba that swallows up 
all sorts of elements: bottles of different sizes, shapes and materials; 
polyurethane jerrycans; designer studios and their product stickers; 
cardboard boxes; charcoal filters; almond essence; wood; publicity 
through all sorts of means; different types of agaves. With this cavalry 
localising and defining the client, it would indeed take some stubborn 
customer to dissent! 
Changing relations between producers and consumers: reversing tradi-
tion 
Localizing the consumer and defining his desire clearly is not a wanton 
process. It has a historical dimension. A market for mezcal already exists 
prior to the distiller's productive activities just as mezcal already exists 
before it becomes an object of desire for the consumers of our interface 
situations. Producers can never provide a once-and-for-all definition of the 
consumer, just as consumers can never give a final meaning to mezcal. 
The form that desire for mezcal takes changes over time because desire is 
differently articulated with all sorts of entities and ideas. This is an 
ongoing process of fine-tuning between he who produces and he who 
consumes. When customer a makes the quality of mezcal (and of beans!) 
hinge on the material its is cooked with, then this is a representation that 
is place- and time-bound. In different places, at different times, consumers 
may prefer mezcal made from agaves cooked differently, e.g. in pressur-
ized ovens. Thus the heterogeneous entities responsible for a specific 
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relation between producers and consumers may be differently articulated 
or re-ordered. 
One such re-ordering is that of the introduction of so-called 'commercial 
mezcal'. Around 1990-91 , a shortage of money became evident among 
the poorer part of Jalisco's population. This had a consequence on 
tequila consumption - mezcal's more expensive cousin. Sales of this 
drink plummeted and, because of strict quality norms, producers thereof 
could not 'downgrade' their product and 'reach out' to low-income 
consumers.17 This provided a golden opportunity for mezcal producers. 
Contrary to tequila producers, there existed no legislation to regulate the 
quality of mezcal and producers could - and did - experiment. And so it 
was that 'commercial mezcal' came into being. This type of mezcal is 
obtained from the last fraction of the distillation process, which has an 
alcohol content of 1 5 - 2 0 ° G L (as compared to the 7 0 - 7 5 ° G L of the first 
fraction of the distillation gradient which is basically quality mezcal). 
Normally, the last fraction would be added to the boiling cauldron to 
boost a second distillation run. However, in 1991 a mezcal producer 
'discovered' that by adding a small percentage of 9 6 % ethyl-alcohol and 
water to the last fraction, a drinkable product tasting of mezcal could be 
obtained. Bottled in one- and two-litre plastic containers, the drink of 30-
3 5 ° G L was baptised as 'commercial mezcal'. Its low price and its name 
of 'mezcal' assured market success, as it found wide acceptance with low-
income consumers. 
By the time of the encounter at Miraplanes, in October 1 9 9 3 , all 
3 0 registered mezcal producers in Jalisco were marketing this type of 
drink. Competition was cut-throat, and this in turn facilitated a number of 
further innovations in the product. These innovations changed, for 
example, the character of the relations between mezcal producers and the 
owners of agave plantations. Indeed, 'commercial mezcal' permitted a 
higher turnover of the plantations since, strictly speaking, mature agaves 
were not any more needed for its elaboration (sugar and ethyl alcohol did 
the job equally well). Consequently, sharecropping and renting agree-
ments with producers of agave changed dramatically. Similarly, the 
addition of glycerine to mezcal to bring about the sticky property that 
characterises traditional, strong, 1 0 0 % pure mezcal can be seen as a re-
ordering effect. And so can the presence of almond essence for obtaining 
a characteristic smell; or of saccharin to give 'commercial mezcal' the 
sweet property typical of mature agaves; or artificial colouring to antici-
pate consumers' knowledge that oak barrels change the colour of 
mezcal; or oily soap to foresee consumer knowledge of the propensity of 
186 TACOS, TIENDAS AND MEZCAL 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter I have shown how the cherished dichotomy between 
producers and consumers comes crumbling down once one adopts 
alternative views that do more justice to the actual practices of producers, 
consumers and, crucially, mediating distributors. By using some concepts 
from actor-network theory, it is not difficult indeed to imagine that a 
radical critique of the political economy of food lies within grasp. Here I 
have begun such a critique by showing how the identities of producers 
and consumers of mezcal, cannot be reduced to social or economic 
essences. Instead, these identities are instead constructed at a variety of 
different points that go beyond the realm of production - or, for that 
matter, that of consumption. 
In order to develop this argument, I introduced a number of 
vignettes focusing upon a number of interface situations; situations that 
involved actors trying to define each other's identities through inter-
mediaries. If 'unproblematic', the interfaces showed ongoing action. But 
once the apparent simplicity of the action was breached, the struggles, 
negotiations and accommodations to define the identities of the partici-
pants - both physically present or more distant in space or time - were 
made apparent. In this way, interfaces unfolded vast networks, manifesting 
cacophonies of people and things that were subsequently brought to bear 
on the interaction. The effect of these interactions pointed, on the one 
hand, to the existence of producers and, on the other, to that of con-
sumers. But these poles, I argued, cannot be taken as starting points. 
Rather, they should be seen as end products - as the outcomes of a 
quality mezcal (of more than 4 6 ° G L - which nobody is going to corrobor-
ate anyway) to produce long-lasting bubbles on the surface when agitated; 
or adding alcohol to the boiling cauldron before distillation, not after-
wards so that the alcohol becomes less harsh on the throat and assimilates 
the taste of fermented agaves. 
Clearly, the re-ordering of all these heterogeneous elements is 
simultaneously related to the technical and social aspects of mezcal 
production, as well as to the market. Through all sorts of re-arrangements, 
producers try to fix the identity of the (localized) consumers by translating 
- through trial-and-error - preferences and inscribing them into a bottle. As 
we have seen, this may take the form of: "So you think bubbles are an 
indicator for good mezcal? No problem: I'll add bubbles to the mezcal 
you will buy from mel" 
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linkage between producing and consuming; a linkage that is constructed 
through the mediation of an object, namely mezcal. (It would in fact be 
impossible to say anything about consumers or producers of this liquor 
without referring to the product itself!) Mezcal, of course, does not map 
out, trace, or mediate this relationship all by itself. It needs help. It needs 
allies, if only for the reason that the definition of the consumer - as 
inscribed in a specific bottle of mezcal - can be challenged any time. This 
is most patent when a customer turns his/her back on the product, or buys 
another brand. Thus in the vignettes sketched above mezcal bottles can 
count upon a powerful ally: the distributor. Indeed, Pablo's capacity as 
mediator between product and consumer is crucial. Selling a bottle is not 
automatic, but entails knowledge of consumers and the skills of translating 
from one domain to the other. And, symmetrically, it requires knowledge 
about the manufacturing process. Thus Pablo cannot rely on the technical 
characteristics of the bottle alone. Nor can he resort only to his skills as a 
good salesman. He has to negotiate, to respond to the local situation. 
Modesty and the certainty that the attributes of his mezcal will sell them-
selves will not do the job for him. But neither will success be guaranteed 
if he is over confident, believing he can seduce his clients into buying 
without making reference to the properties of the mezcal. In fact - and 
this is a methodological point - Pablo's mediating position between 
people producing and consuming in fact prevents one, as analyst, from 
making simple reductions from producers to consumers.18 
One and the other are made explicit in the different sections of 
this Chapter by addressing the way in which, first, an operational context 
(i.e. a 'global' network) is defined, after which the identity of both 
producers and consumers is simultaneously constructed in the 'inside' of 
the project - in other words, how these identities are localized in a 'local' 
network. At stake in these processes are a number of issues. Does the 
consumer, for example, know the price range of mezca/? Does he 
recognise differences in quality? Does he have any preferences for mezcal 
from particular localities? Pablo negotiates these questions in situ by 
bringing to bear some critical elements on the situation: the type and 
origin of agaves that are employed in the distillation of a specific mezcal, 
the character of his competitors' products, the 'oiliness' of the liquor, the 
material from which the bottles are made, the quality of the barrels in 
which mezcal is aged, and so forth. The effect of these negotiations is the 
fixing of the identity of the product and the producer. Both identities are 
inscribed in the form of a bottle of mezcal passing hands, which some-
times implicates the consumer in buying a bottle of 'inferior quality' 
mezcal for an astronomical price. 
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Likewise, at the interface between Pablo and the owner of the 
distillery, negotiations take place as to the identity of the producer: is he 
willing to expand his business? Does he know the preferences of clients? 
Pablo translates these and other questions by mobilising different 
elements from the 'consumer' domain: preference for the taste of agaves 
coming from specific localities, a choice for a competitor's product, 
consumer's perceptions that good mezcal should be 'oily' or 'sticky', 
approval of the taste of mezcal aged in oak barrels, and so on. The effect 
of this translation is that if a producer accepts the identity attributed to 
him by Pablo, then he simultaneously has to take account of the identity 
of different consumers. Thus the identities of both producers and con-
sumers are a simultaneous construction, and are both reflected in the 
taste, colour, presentation etc. of a bottle of mezcal. 
Another way of stating this is to say that producing and con-
suming are no more and no less than a set of localizing practices that cut 
through space and time in a specific way. One attendant circumstance of 
this image (should I say representation?) is that it allows one to side-step 
the difficulties involved in legislating between what should count as 
global, and what is local. The paradox of 'the global' and 'the local' can 
now take a more tangible form: for Pablo, for producers and for con-
sumers, to talk of mezcal is to localise, to talk locally. The networks that 
make up mezcal, as we have seen, are always local, even if they take us 
to geographically distant places. Agaves in Jalisco and construction 
workers in California are close to one another insofar as they share the 
same network topology. From an actor-network perspective, the global is 
local in all places (Latour 1987) . This insight clearly does not follow by 
referring to stories that are external to the accounts given by my 
'informants'. Rather, it follows from the description of a set of intermedi-
aries which/who make visible otherwise indistinguishable molochs such 
as the California construction sector or international sugar prices. 
Notes 
1 . Vino literally means 'wine'. In the regional context, vino is often used to 
refer to any sort of alcoholic drink (except beer). In practice, 'mezcal' and 
vino are used interchangeably. So are they in this text. 
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2. The low concentration of police patrols was actually the reason Pablo 
wished to try out the Pacific Coast route. Other alternatives routes he longed 
to 'do' (Guanajuato, Leon) featured a much higher concentration of police 
activity. And, significantly, they led through nightmarish roundabouts in 
congested cities he despised (Pablo had never actually driven there). 
3. Seguro de Ahorro para el Retiro is a retirement pension. The employer's 
contribution amounts to 2% of the monthly gross salary of the worker. 
4. Institute para el Fomento Nacional de Vivienda para los Trabajadores. The 
employer's share in this housing fund amounts to 5% of the worker's gross 
monthly income. 
5. Long (1989:2) defines interfaces as those "critical points of intersection or 
linkage between different social systems, fields or levels of social order where 
structural discontinuities, based upon differences of normative value and 
social interest, are most likely to be found." 
6. An actor can be of a 'social' character, such as an organization, an individ-
ual, a group etc. But it can also be a thing. Whether an actor is human or 
non-human cannot be established a priori. This is an empirical question since 
it is the outcome of identity constituting practices entailing struggles, negoti-
ations, and accommodations. 
7. Thus a seemingly 'simple' exchange encounter may disguise, blur, render 
invisible complex sets of relations - what Latour (1994a) calls collective 
agents - made up of humans and nonhumans. Here I emphasise may 
because, at any moment, the relationships between the different elements 
making up the collective may be problematized and questioned, opening up, 
as it were, all the complexities involved. 
8. A galon is a five-litre bottle. White and yellow refers to the colour of the 
mezcal: yellow is supposed to have been aged in an oak barrel while white 
mezcal is supposed to come directly from the alembic. 
9. Glass bottles are easier to clean than plastic ones. Benigno is quite keen 
that Pablo returns all 5-litre glass bottles he takes with him, since these are 
not produced any more. 
10. In the end, we only dropped by those customers that paid a high price 
for the mezcal. The reason for this was that "I can calm down the better 
customers next week on my next trip. They'll understand". So friendship 
does not always run thicker than money! 
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11. Thus, while in 1987 Pablo paid USD 5 for a five-litre gallon at the gate of 
the taverna (which he sold for a profit of 60-80%), in 1993 he was paying 
USD 2.70 for the same gallon (which he sold for a profit of 40-60%). During 
this period, Pablo thus experienced a considerable decline in income. 
Similarly, a twelve-liter box of Cordobés mezcal sold for an average of USD 
20 at the beginning of 1993, while by mid-1994 average prices had dropped 
to somewhere between USD 13-15. Although total sales of mezcal producers 
increased enormously in this period, the profit margin for individual traders 
like Pablo fell substantially. The main reason given for this was Tonayàn's -
and others - aggressive selling methods. These companies recently started 
marketing and distributing their own produce, with salesmen-chauffeurs 
obtaining a salary and not a percentage of possible profits. Thus standardiza-
tion of mezcal prices was taking place along their distribution routes. 
12. The mezcal was not 'poisonous' in the sense that it may have contained 
methanol or other unhealthy substances. Quite simply, it meant that the taste 
and the smell were faulty. 
13. This points to the fact that the party obtained by Pablo was probably the 
cola or last distillation fragment. The better fraction had apparently been used 
by Benigno himself for the production of strong ponche. In that case, the 
smell and taste of the mezcal would not be apparent because they are 
dominated by the smell and taste of the fruit. 
14. In this 'traditional' process, agaves are split with an axe and piled into a 
crater-like hole in the ground. At the bottom of the hole there is burning 
charcoal covered with stones to disperse the heat. The split agaves rest on 
top of the stones, and are then covered with earth and allowed to 'cook' 
slowly (72 hours) in order to convert their sour juices into sugars. See 
Chapter Seven for further technical details of the production process of 
mezcal. 
15. A glass of Cordobés goes for 2,000 pesos at the canteen. A one-litre 
bottle contains some 8 servings. 
16. Pablo can still achieve high profit rates in places that are distant from the 
main roads. Since official distributors from the larger companies (Tonayân, El 
Mezcalito or Arias) do not visit these places, there is no standardization of 
price there. New, or barely known brands thus offer a huge profit margin in 
isolated hamlets because people can still be charmed by 'special' attributes. 
Here (but not only here), price and desire stand in a direct relationship to one 
another; a relationship mediated by the distributor. 
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17. From these years onwards, tequila producers have increasingly turned 
towards export (cf. Luna 1991). Some of them, however, have gradually 
decreased the quality of their product - much to the annoyance of quality-
tequila producers who thereby fear their product will lose its image. 
18. I take this point from Hennion and Meadel (1989). 
CHAPTER 9 
TRANSFORMING COLLECTIFS 
In the preceding Chapters the locus of attention were specific, small-scale 
entrepreneurial projects and the global and local networks they helped 
put in place. In this Chapter I shift attention away from specific projects, 
and address a much larger network of firms. This network or collectif 
encompasses those actors involved in the production of mezcal - a 
commodity that figured prominently in Chapters Seven and Eight. In this 
Chapter I deal with the transformation of the collectif, and the way in 
which this transformation is given shape through the continuous realign-
ment of so-called social, technical, economic and political elements 
entailing the mobilization of both humans and non-humans. However, as 
Latour (1994a:49) points out, to do so is not without its problems: 
"To view people and nonhumans as interacting within collec-
tives, to define objects as institutions, to fuse subject and object 
in a corporate body, we need to know what a collective, an 
institution, and a corporate body are. The difficulty is that we 
cannot rely on how social theory defines these, since, for many 
sociologists, a social order is the source of explanation and not 
what needs explaining". 
Indeed, questions such as 'What is mezcalV, 'What is the mezcal sector?', 
are tricky in that notions of 'mezcal' and 'mezcal sector' are taken to be 
essential, pre-existing categories not in need of explanation. In light of 
this, questions such as 'What have changes in the mezcal sector consisted 
of?' are even more misleading. 
What, then, is mezcal? This is a difficult question, for different 
people may attribute different meanings to it. To talk of mezcal as a 
category, then, is to conceal these attributions. In a way, the term 
'mezcal' stands for a black box, a script (Akrich 1992). A script that 
describes a world from which it derives (the realm of production) but 
which at the same time prescribes a projected world (the domain of 
consumption). As a potential commodity, mezcal seeks to stabilize this 
projected world. As a real object though, mezcal stabilizes these de-
scribed and pre-scribed worlds - bringing, as it were, order into the 
disordered conditions of its existence. In other words the term mezcal 
conceals or black-boxes the myriad of struggles and negotiations that 
underlie its creation. 
In the next section, I portray some of these underlying struggles 
and negotiations by way of a short historical overview of the trajectory of 
mezcal - describing, as it were, how a collectif acquired a certain degree 
of convergence, and was able to standardize a number of relations - in 
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the process temporarily giving momentum to some of these. This sets the 
stage for a further discussion of how a 'fact' (mezcal) born long ago has 
become a stable feature of the rural Jalisco landscape, shaping action and 
giving direction to certain kinds of change, while inhibiting others. This is 
followed by a description of the dynamics which result from the character 
of mezcal production. Finally, I discuss the development of the mezcal 
collectif in terms of the concepts of convergence, standardization and 
momentum. 
Mezcal - historical overview1 
There are no records of the existence of distilled spirits in prehispanic 
Mexico, and there is widespread agreement that the process of distilling 
already fermented beverages such as mexcalli or vino mezcal (made from 
the heart of the mezcal agave) was introduced by the Spanish conquerors 
in the early 16th century. At the beginning of the 17th century some 
hacendados in the vicinity of Guadalajara were known to produce 
distilled mexcalli for their own and their labourers' consumption. How-
ever, from the Conquista in 1510 to roughly 1650 producers, traders and 
consumers of vino mezcal had to put up quite a fight against a series of 
prohibitions and restrictions that ranged from hefty fines to jail sentences 
and even the death penalty for whoever was found drunk upon arrival at 
certain colonial cities. The latter was the case in the city of Colima and 
some districts of the coast of Jalisco and Southern Nayarit where early 
colonialists were engaged in a war with the Colimotes whom they tried to 
"pacify". Despite the penalties, evidence suggests that from the middle of 
the 16th to the middle of the 17th century, vino mezcal was being 
produced at an ever larger scale. Most consumers were neo-Galicians and 
criollos for the local population liked pulque2 better. It is not until half-
way into the 17th century when Guadalajara becomes a regional center 
that vino mezcal is produced for commercial purposes. For tax reasons, a 
legal break was given to both producers and consumers of the well-liked 
beverage, and an official estanco3 was created in which all liquor enter-
ing the gates of Guadalajara had to be sold.4 
The actual boost in the production of vino mezcal, however, did 
not take place before the start of the 18th century when the northern part 
of Sonora, Baja and Alta California were "pacified" and opened to colon-
ization by the Jesuits Kino and Salvatierra. Slowly a market developed, 
with Guadalajara as the natural supplier. This market grew significantly 
after 1767, when all Jesuits were expelled from the Castilian Empire and 
opportunistic friars such as Junipero Serra expanded the Spanish and 
Franciscan jurisdiction to what is now San Francisco in California. 
Another factor promoting the mezcal market was the increase in trade 
between Spain and the Philippines in the middle of the 18th century - a 
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large portion of which passed through Guadalajara on its way from San 
Bias (Nayarit) to Veracruz and finally to Cadiz in Spain. These devel-
opments opened new windows to the world for Guadalajara, and by 1800 
the city was a major trading center communicating the Philippines, Upper 
and Lower California as well as Northern Mexico with Spain. The import-
ance of Guadalajara as a regional trade center increased along with these 
developments, and was further boosted during the Independence War 
(1810-1821) when the leader of the insurrection, Morelos, dominated the 
Southern coasts of Guerrero and its important harbour of Acapulco. This 
made it necessary to re-route a large part of Spain's Far East trade through 
the port of San Bias (and thus Guadalajara). Vino mezcal became an 
important by product of this trade, and those Alcaldfas (jurisdictions) on 
the road between Guadalajara and San Bias such as Tequila, Amatitan, 
and Ahualulco benefitted most. Vino mezcal produced in these jurisdic-
tions became widely known in Mexico City, where it was preferred over 
its cheaper cousins from Oaxaca and San Luis Potosf. In due time, the 
product became known for its region of origin - hence the name tequila. 
Halfway through the 18th century, the colonial Administration 
opened two more estancos in Sayula and Colima, both on the road to the 
alternative harbour of Manzanillo. The vino mezcal offered in these cities, 
however, was produced in the relatively nearby towns situated in the 
region known as El Llano (Tonaya, Toliman, Tuxcacuesco and San 
Gabriel). In time, vino mezcal reaching Colima and Sayula also became 
known by its place of origin and was (and is) called tuxca (from 
Tuxcacuesco) in the vernacular.5 
Mezcal never profited from an expanding market the way tequila 
did. Because of the remoteness of the location of mezcal production -
roads into the area were built only after 1960 - the liquor was never 
manufactured on a large scale and was mainly consumed locally. With 
the exception of liquor from Tuxcacuesco, mezcal from the South of 
Jalisco rarely passed the hacienda gate. The secret of distilling was passed 
on from father to son, to the extent that even nowadays most producers 
are directly related to former hacendados. Notwithstanding its exclusivity 
(or perhaps precisely because of it), mezcal from around El Llano enjoyed 
the reputation of being of exceptional quality. This status was a strong 
incentive for arrieros (merchants who carried goods with mule packs 
along centuries-old trade routes) to enlarge their profits with the illegal 
transport of the liquor to larger urban centres. Thus, by the end of the last 
century, quite a significant smuggling network had emerged, connecting 
mezcal producing communities from the rugged interior of Jalisco to the 
wider world. Former arrieros still recall that they were awaited with great 
expectation (both by users of the drink as well as by the police) in Autlan, 
Sayula, Zapotlan - now Ciudad Guzman - and Colima if it was known that 
they had passed through El Llano on their way. Indeed, by the 1920's 
illicit traffic of mezcal had become more important than the trade in any 
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other good - with the exception of sugar - transported by arrieros. As an 
eighty-five year old ex-arriero hilariously explained to me after I ignorant-
ly asked him whether or not mezcal was traded in those days: 
"Young lad, vino was precisely what the business was all 
about!" 
These tenacious smugglers slowly but steadily brought about a functional 
network linking producers and consumers. When, by the 1940s, trade in 
mezcal was made legal (though amenable to taxation), marketing chan-
nels and a secure pool of consumers had already been established. 
Supported by the effects of the implementation of the land reform, supply 
of the liquor immediately skyrocketed. In the words of one of the first 
ejidatarios in San Gabriel: 
"Before the land reform everybody worked for the boss at the 
hacienda. With the agrarian reform everybody got his own 
piece of land. From then on, everybody had his own maize plot 
to live from and most sowed agaves to earn some money." 
The lifting of prohibition, the land reform, and extra-regional demand thus 
set the stage for an increase in mezcal production, and small distilleries 
mushroomed in El Llano during the 1940s and 1950s. An increasing 
number of local arrieros took care of its distribution, supplying 
Guadalajara, the North of Jalisco and the Western part of Michoacan with 
the well-liked liquor. As a side effect, a number of these arrieros -
especially those doing the route to Los Altos - took on jobs at tequila 
distilleries in Arandas, Atotonilco and Tepatitlan. Some of these distilleries 
had already industrialized the production of tequila, and when these 
former arrieros moved back to their home communities in El Llano they 
took with them their knowledge of industrialized distillation. As a conse-
quence, by the 1950s mezcal producers in Tonaya, Toliman and San 
Gabriel introduced industrialized production of the drink. 
Full industrialization of mezcal production, however, did not take 
root in the South of Jalisco until very recently. There are many reasons for 
this relatively late expansion, but three are the most commonly expressed. 
The first involved the appearance of bogus producers who, perceiving the 
great demand for the product, fabricated cheap, bootleg imitations of 
inferior quality. Customer dissatisfaction was the result, thus inhibiting the 
market. Another reason often cited was the construction of the 
Guadalajara-Autlan road in the 1950s. Before then, traffic between these 
two cities used to pass through Sayula and Ciudad Guzman (which were 
relatively close to El Llano) and created a demand for the local mezcal. 
With the construction of the new road, old and regional trade centres 
such as Sayula and San Gabriel (the gravitational centres of the El Llano 
196 TACOS, TIENDAS AND MEZCAL 
communities) lost their relative importance. With their demise the market 
for mezcal also diminished, taking with it the incentive to increase 
productivity at the distillery. The third factor that is mentioned to have put 
a brake on the expansion of industrialized mezcal production was the 
over-supply of agaves, the raw material needed to produce the liquor. 
Prices for agave fell, and most farmers discontinued their cultivation to 
seek employment in the US during the bracero6 programme of the 1960s. 
Despite remittances sent by migrants to their home communities, this had 
a tremendous impact on the economic development of places such as 
Tonaya, Toliman and Tuxcacuesco which had as much as 75% of their 
arable land sown in agaves.7 As a consequence, most of the distilleries 
founded in the 1940s and 1950s had disappeared from the landscape. 
This situation was altered when a new, paved road was built 
between Autlan and Ciudad Guzman in 1974. With the road, local 
strongmen (who objected to it) lost some of their trade-based power. Free 
from the grip of caciques, the local population of these isolated areas was 
suddenly able to buy cheaper agricultural inputs and obtain higher prices 
for their products (especially maize and chilies). This meant that more 
cash circulated within the communities {caciques used to invest their 
profits in Guadalajara's real estate market), which in turn had a positive 
effect on mezcal demand.8 
Mezcal production has since expanded enormously, and presently 
the product is sold in both national and international markets.9 Today, a 
relatively small number of producers are concentrated in a small geo-
graphical area that comprises the municipalities of El Grullo, Tonaya, San 
Gabriel, Tuxcacuesco and Toliman. Out of a total of 27 producers, 21 
have operating permits and 6 distil mezcal illegally (that is, they are not 
registered). Apart from these producers, there are some 5 to 10 resellers 
who "baptize" most of the mezcal made by illegal producers (and some of 
the legal ones) by bottling the product and providing it with their own 
sticker. Most producers have industrialized their production through the 
use of hermetically sealed cauldrons in which agaves are cooked with the 
injection of pressurized vapour, aluminum fermentation tanks, copper 
stills, fossil fuels, bottling machines and the like. Most distilleries produce 
more than one brand of mezcal, and each brand is offered in a variety 
(three to five) of gradations, ages and, of course, prices. The size of the 
enterprises, as well as their output, varies greatly: whereas the owner of 
the smallest illegal distillery obtains 200 litres of mezcal every so many 
weeks and employs only one casual labourer for harvesting, the largest 
firm has an output of 30,000 litres a week and 58 labourers on the 
payroll (most of them women at the bottling and packaging plant), not 
including 3 secretaries, a lawyer and an accountant. Three producers are 
presently exporting mezcal, and others are ready join the lucrative export 
market as well 1 0 . To-day, the larger mezcal producers (especially in 
Tonaya) form a new power elite and have replaced the traditional trade-
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based local cacicazgos. Some of them have held office as municipal 
presidents (especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s), but at present 
prefer to promote strawmen to these positions to represent their interests. 
Indeed, these distillers have strongly benefitted from the networks devel-
oped by their predecessors in which a market for mezcal was established 
and standards were created. 
Along with the developments sketched above, a set of convergent 
interests involving producers, suppliers of inputs, and consumers has been 
created. This has resulted in a strongly localized standardization of 
relationships and of mezcal qualities. It is a standardization that would 
take great efforts to destroy because of its momentum. In fact, the crisis 
that affected Mexico in the early 1990s and, especially, the virtual 
collapse of the economy at the end of 1994 has left the sector relatively 
unscathed. 
Problematizations: perceived obstacles to the development of the market 
for mezcal 
In the foregoing section we have seen that mezcal producers live in a 
world that was constructed long before them. Hence their goals are 
embedded in, or are a continuity of, historical processes. This, of course, 
is not to suggest that 'the past' should be seen as somehow determining 
the future direction of mezcal producers' endeavours. Rather, it means 
that - to a certain extent - producers' strategies are related to what has 
historically proven to be possible or impossible. The producers' 'universe 
of the possible', so to speak, is informed by past situations that are either 
remembered personally, passed on orally or, importantly, remembered 
collectively through inscription in the technologies utilized, or in such 
intermediaries as (tacit) skills. Thus, for example, although there exists no 
explicit rule about the way in which agave hearts should be threshed, in 
practice it would not be sensible to switch from electric mills used at 
present, to ox-driven threshing stones as was common before. Likewise, 
there is no specific rule that requires producers to provide their product 
labels with seductive designs. But, in order to go back to a situation in 
which mezcal would "sell itself" and no product labels were needed 
would entail great costs, and the clientele would certainly diminish. The 
point, then, is that all the actors and intermediaries making up the mezcal 
collectif have inscribed in them a 'way of doing things' that is difficult to 
ignore if producers wish to turn (or maintain) their projects into successful 
ones. 
Having said this, however, one should add that 'things can always 
be done otherwise'. Indeed, a cat in gloves catches no mice, and 'doing 
things otherwise' is a basic characteristic of entrepreneurs, as Schumpeter 
(1934) showed long ago. Through painstaking trial-and-error, producers 
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incessantly vie for alternatives that may enhance their market position. 
This they do by constantly adding actors and intermediaries to the already 
existing collectif" and sometimes - though not often - by redefining the 
character of inscriptions present in existing intermediaries. The projects of 
whomever is not skilled enough in adding and redefining will never 
become an obligatory point of passage and will - as the history of mezcal 
shows - be eliminated from the game. 
Where does this addition (and redefinition) of actors and intermediaries 
into already existing collectifs come from? In the final instance, probably 
from intuition12: knowledge of present conditions, and insight into poss-
ible developments thereof. These result in a goal or set of goals to be 
achieved, and are in turn translated into a potential 'script' or 
'problematization': that is, the roles to be played by different actors and 
intermediaries (existent or to be devised) if the goal is to become real. 
Without doubt, the main goal of mezcal producers is closely linked to the 
market. Production and distribution of the liquor is commoditized to a 
great extent, and in order to increase market share producers have to face 
the perceived obstacles of the market head-on. As an effect, different 
strategies crystallize. One particular producer may, for example, try to 
increase profit through product differentiation, while another one may try 
to achieve the same goal by concentrating on the production of quality 
mezcal. In the process, of course, the goals may themselves change (e.g. a 
producer may decide to 'technify' production). In this way, the composite 
agent or collectif grows and its complexity increases through the addition 
of various social, economic, political, technical or natural elements. 
Of what, however, did the 'perceived obstacles' of the market consist? To 
be sure, they were of a heterogeneous nature, but nevertheless took the 
form of specific accusations towards the 'social' ("lack of collective 
organization" or "lack of trust"); the 'political' ("political unwillingness"); 
the 'economic' ("lack of capital"); the 'technical' ("faulty machines"); the 
'natural' ("poor quality of raw materials") and even the 'supernatural' 
("unwilling Gods"). 
Instances in which such accusations could be observed abounded. 
In the case of denouncement of the 'social', for example, most producers 
agreed that the main reason for the underdeveloped state of their busi-
nesses - as compared to the businesses of their cousins, the producers of 
tequila - was their lack of union and collective organization.13 Because 
of this, they reckoned, they were not in a state to minimize financial and 
fiscal risks through, for example, collective bargains with commercial 
banks or with the Tax Ministry. Also, lack of collective organization was 
said to bring about huge variations in product quality - which was seen to 
have a negative impact on consumer confidence. Underlying the absence 
of collective organization, most agreed, was the lack of trust among 
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individual producers. Thus, for example, producers never supplied 
production or market data to competitors, even though many of them 
were related by kin or through compadrazgo. In fact, many producers saw 
competition as a form of individual revenge, and only rarely would 
cooperation be sought. A case in point was NAFINSA's initiative halfway 
through 1993 to start an Empresa lntegradora.u After an initial meeting, 
most producers immediately alleged that this form of collective enterprise 
would only serve the interests of a few. For example, two mezcal produ-
cers from Tonaya were imputed to be willing to participate only because 
they intended to use potential loans from NAFINSA to pay off their (huge) 
individual debts. These debts ensued from previous commercial credits 
ear-marked for the commercialization of mezcal and for the purchase of 
cattle, but which were partially detoured for the acquisition of luxury 
automobiles for themselves and kin, and holiday trips to Europe and the 
U.S. Remarkably, in this instance a complex, hybrid phenomenon 
encompassing 'social' components (buying cars for relatives), 'economic' 
elements (debts) and 'natural' ingredients (cows) was reduced to the 
merely 'social': particular individuals were accused of being untrust-
worthy. But other examples in which complex phenomena were 
attributed to distrustful individuals also existed. For example, the largest 
producer of mezcal from Tonaya distrusted all competitors (including his 
own brother) ever since he had been kidnapped and two of his agave 
fields burned down. Yet another Tonaya producer was utterly suspicious 
of his labourers whom he considered listless and treacherous creatures 
pursuing their own interests. Or the most highly-technified producer 
attributed a 'traditionalist'15 attitude to fellow producers and questioned 
any possibility of formal collective action. Here, again, 'distrust', 
'suspicion' and 'tradition' had many faces and linked many different 
actors from different domains, but were in practice attributed to particular 
individuals. 
In the same way, so-called 'political' obstacles were blamed for the 
irregular nature of the market for mezcal. Thus, for example, 'unwilling' 
inspectors of the Forestry Department were accused of the temporary 
closure of a distillery in which wood to fuel stills had been obtained 
illegally; tax inspectors were charged of being intolerant when issuing 
fines in cases of untimely payment of taxes; local politicians were con-
sidered to be 'unwilling' by demanding that producers pay social security 
for employees. Or regional politicians were blamed for not effectively 
lobbying against mezcal producers from Oaxaca who launched an 
initiative to obtain denomination de origen ("appelation contrôlée") only 
for their product.16 Or national legislators were accused of charging a 
15% sales tax on top of an already existing special duty on alcohol 1 7 -
which, according to producers, was unconstitutional - or for endorsing 
volatile credit policies. Interestingly, in these cases the 'political' obscured 
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or black-boxed a complex set of factors that led to the use of wood 
obtained illegally (and the equally complex process of decision-making 
with which Forestry Department inspectors were faced), the failure of 
producers to comply with legal requirements, the consideration of 
regional politicians to endorse or reject an initiative by mezcal producers 
from Oaxaca, the ideologies underlying the plans of national legislators, 
and so on. 
Likewise, so-called 'economic' obstacles hid complex, heterogeneous 
processes from view. Thus lack of capital, lack of access to formal credit 
channels, high interest rates, shortages in the supply of inputs, deficient 
marketing infrastructure, high financial entry thresholds for the export 
market,18 the powerful position of intermediaries,19 and rising labour 
costs due to social benefits, were all held responsible for hindering the 
successful expansion of business. Clearly, as in the case of 'social' and 
'political' impediments, any one of these 'economic' villains implicated a 
large number of other accomplices that did not strictly belong to the 
domain of the economic. And the same was true for all those 'technical', 
'natural' and 'supernatural' impediments that were said to plague pro-
ducers. Thus 'technical' issues such as leaking gas burners and clogged 
pipes were held culpable for a sub-optimal distillation process. Or 
'natural' felons such as 'bad' soil texture, insufficient rain or excessive 
heat were made responsible for the low sugar contents of some agaves. 
Or 'religious' actors such as San Ramdn (in charge of not letting gossip 
spread) could not prevent certain "business secrets" leaking out - despite 
monetary offers at Church and hours of praying. Or forces of the occult 
would thwart a tatema20 - even though the producer had planted a cross 
on top of the agaves to keep the Devil from "peeing" on them, thereby 
halting the hydrolysis process. Indeed, the perceived obstacles were never 
purely 'economic', 'political', 'social' or 'technical'. Rather, they were 
nothing but black boxes. 
Attacking black boxes through heterogeneous means. 
As I spelled out in the previous section, mezcal producers' 
problematizations often took the form of accusations towards black boxes. 
Once these black boxes were 'known' - once accusations found a target -
strategies had to be devised to remove them: the villains had to be 
brought to task. Thus, in 1991-92 an attempt to bypass 'social' obstacles 
(i.e. lack of collective organization) was made through the establishment 
of an informal mezcal producers' union in Tonaya. The general objective 
behind it was that, by agreeing on minimum prices, price control would 
be possible. The union, however, was short-lived as producers tended to 
sell below agreed prices, asking customers not to pass on the word. Also, 
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some producers would send 'spies' to monitor competitors and gather 
information about who was buying with whom. 2 1 As an effect, existing 
distrust was exacerbated. The end result, then, was that although pro-
ducers associated collective organization with increasing countervailing 
power vis-a-vis the Tax Ministry and banks, distrust and a set of deeply 
engrained practices turned out to be stronger. Other unmanageable actors 
included mayoristas (wholesale purchasers) who were impossible to beat 
without producers entering into some form of alliance through which they 
could offer some form countervailing power. 
Likewise, 'economic' obstacles (constant lack of capital to expand produc-
tion and, especially, low availability of credit due to the volatile financial 
situation the banks found themselves in) 2 2 was tackled through hetero-
geneous strategies. One such strategy involved the specialization of 
productive activities. This was evident by the fact that producers - most of 
whom previously engaged in a number of other, unrelated agricultural 
activities and animal husbandry - were increasingly selling their grazing 
and arable land as well as their agave fields23, thus redirecting resources 
to the production of mezcal and investing in the 'modernization' or tech-
nification of their distilleries. This technification was based on innovations 
that were taken over from 'external' actors: namely, the highly technified 
producers of tequila.24 Thus the distillation process has evolved from a 
relatively straightforward design25 into a more complex process - both 
technologically and socially - akin to that used in elaborating tequila. For 
example, most producers nowadays distil mezcal through the use of 
pressurized boilers, serially connected stainless steel fermentation tubs 
and a complicated set of filtering devices. Larger producers, for their part, 
have copied a procedure widely utilized in the production of tequila, and 
which consists of recirculating the hot water from the still through the 
fermentations tanks - thus increasing the temperature in the tanks and 
decreasing fermentation time from something over a week to a mere three 
to four days. Although there is a huge difference between distilleries in 
terms of their technological setup, these modifications have allowed for a 
wide availability of skills and technological know-how concerning mezcal 
production. Successful innovations are quickly diffused through direct 
advice from the original developer, by way of gossip, or through the 
continuous switching of distillery personnel from one producer to 
another. The rapid diffusion of innovations, know-how and skills - apart 
from reducing the technological gap between firms - effectively increases 
their ability to react to market changes. For example, when sales of 
quality mezcal plummeted in 1992, one producer quickly reacted and 
successfully started selling his liquor in the same bottles he was using for 
export purposes. Within a year, five fellow producers bought second-
hand, rudimentary bottling machines and multiplied the sales of their 
quality mezcal as well. 
2 0 2 TACOS, TIENDAS AND MEZCAL 
This technification was often accompanied by a second strategy: 
the 'externalization' of the production process (cf. Benvenuti 1989 ; van 
der Ploeg 1990) . Thus, whereas only a few years ago producers tried to 
keep direct control over their businesses by owning their own agave 
fields and utilizing self-made implements and machinery, nowadays this 
situation is increasingly making way for a fragmentation of the production 
process, that is, the delegation of tasks to parties outside the distillery 
proper. Thus an extra-regional network of suppliers of raw materials, a 
range of intermediate products, and a variety of producer services have 
emerged. W e have, for example, middlemen selling agaves from the Te-
quila and Los Altos region. These middlemen take advantage of the 
presence of many producers concentrated in a relatively small geographi-
cal area, and do not risk being left with an unsold perishable product 
since they are virtually certain to find a buyer. This lowers costs for 
mezcal producers who would otherwise have to pay for individual 
transport of agaves. Other important suppliers include specialized water 
purification factories in nearby El Grullo which, having soft lime water 
ideal for the fermentation process, send daily tankers to Tonaya and 
Apulco at a fraction of the cost involved for an individual producer 
wishing to dig deep wells 5 0 0 feet deep. Also, a variety of producers of 
plastic and glass bottles cater specially for the mezcal sector. Here too, 
distillers profit from relatively low prices as a consequence of the econ-
omies of scale involved in bottle producers being able to plan ahead and 
send only full containers to the mezcal producing area. Likewise there is 
the emergence of a supportive network of specialized producer services. 
The list of services includes specialized repair and maintenance shops, 
accounting offices, fax and photocopying facilities, notary publics, busi-
ness and financial planning, legal advisors, and tax and financial services. 
These services, which are often shared, would otherwise be unaffordable 
for the smaller firms. 
A third strategy followed by producers to counter 'economic' 
problems - such as dependence on consumer preferences - has been that 
of product diversification. Thus most distillers presently cater for different 
types of consumers in different markets by offering mezcal that differs in 
appearance, quality and price. In their quest to reach new consumers, 
distilleries nowadays produce two, three and even four different brands of 
mezcal, each brand coming in different price (and quality) ranges. 
Specialization, fragmentation, and diversification of production 
have called for a reorganization or realignment of the technical and social 
division of labour at the firm level. 2 6 In other words, labour relations 
have been redesigned to accommodate to the needs of the changing 
character of the production process. Thus, for example, a decade ago no 
clear separation existed between the different tasks to be performed at the 
distillery, and labourers were skilled in performing a variety of different 
duties. Nowadays the general picture is different in that most distilleries 
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have separate distillation, bottling, and distribution units, each encompass-
ing a variety of different tasks. Larger firms, in turn, tend to have their 
own plantation and administrative departments. Along with these changes 
there has been a shift towards the use of more specialized, skilled labour 
for administrative tasks, for the management of the actual distillation 
process, and for the distribution and sale of mezcal. Not all tasks, though, 
are specialized, and semi-skilled work is utilized for the harvesting of 
agaves as well as for bottling and packaging purposes.27 Clearly, the shift 
in the character of the production process has not been a straightforward 
operation, and producers have utilized a variety of strategies to cope with 
labour problems related to this shift. Thus, for example, most semi-skilled 
and unskilled work at the bottling and packaging departments is carried 
out by women. This presented some problems, since it was not unusual 
for women to go home unexpectedly because of a sick child, or to feed 
the youngest one. And, as a consequence, and with few exceptions, 
producers nowadays prefer to hire women with grown up children. This 
way, absenteeism is efficiently controlled.28 
A fourth strategy to solve 'economic' obstacles center around a 
reduction of labour costs. Thus, for example, there is not one single 
producer with all his employees on formal contracts. In fact, only admin-
istrative personnel, distributors and workers in charge of the distillation 
process are given contracts with full social benefits (social security, 
SAR 2 9, INFONAVIT 3 0). Most employees are hired 'informally', that is, 
on a casual basis, and payment can be in cash or kind. Thus salesmen are 
generally given a commission on sales, and most workers at packing and 
bottling plants are paid in cash and do not obatin benefits of any kind. 
Others such as agave harvesters are also paid in cash, but producers tend 
to 'bind' them morally through gifts of mezcal or by letting them have a 
small part of the maize harvest for home consumption. In the case of 
labourers not receiving full social benefits, producers may sometimes offer 
to cover labourers' (and their families') extra expenses such as unantici-
pated doctor's bills or even expensive surgical treatment. These latter 
arrangements, however, are open to negotiation and labourers are not 
treated equally.31 
A fifth strategy to counter 'economic' obstacles is that of an emerg-
ent, inter-firm division of labour. This division, which by the way is not 
consciously pursued,32 arises in the interstice between cooperation and 
competition. This sort of inter-firm division of labour may arise when, for 
example, a specific producer obtains an order of 'commercial' mezcal but 
does not have enough bottles for the shipment. In this case, the producer 
may turn to the competitor and take over a yet unlabel led quantity of 
standardized, plastic bottles. Likewise, when a producer - for whatever 
reason - does not have enough mezcal in stock to deliver an order, it is 
quite common that he will buy mezcal in bulk from a competitor who has 
enough stock and is not expecting a large order at that point in time. In 
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this case, the competitor's unbottled product is graded to meet specific 
characteristics (i.e. by adding artificial flavouring or colouring, alcohol or 
water to it), bottled, and provided with the label of the end producer. 
Clearly, not all producers engage in this sort of practice which presup-
poses a good relationship between the partners to the exchange. The 
practice itself, however, has led to the emergence of a number of small-
scale - mostly 'illegal' - manufacturers who partly derive their existence 
from their specialization as maquiladores (contract distillers) for one or 
more of the larger firms. This incipient inter-firm division of labour 
between larger and smaller enterprises benefits both. Larger producers, for 
example, may buy a truckload of jerrycans of 96% alcohol at wholesale 
markets to be used later in the distillation of 'commercial' mezcal. 
Although they may not need all of the alcohol at once, buying in bulk is 
advantageous to them because it lowers transport costs. Small producers 
in turn benefit from the bulk purchases of their larger colleagues by 
buying modest quantities from them (five to ten 20-litre jerrycans), thus 
ending up paying a much lower price (sometimes as much as fifty per-
cent) than they would when stocking from local merchants. Other, more 
'covert' or 'involuntary' forms of cooperation resulting from this increased 
inter-firm division of labour are apparent when, for example, a large 
customer asks a distributor of brand X to bring along a certain amount of 
'commercial' mezcal from the competitor on his next visit. The distributor 
may then pass on the request to his employer, who - in order not to give 
away the client's name by placing the order directly with the competitor -
may then proceed to emulate the competitor's product. This can be done 
by grading the taste of his own mezcal to match that of the specific 
competitor, 'stealing' his labels33, and attaching these to his own bottles. 
This has the effect of creating a productive structure from which all profit, 
and in which the delivery of mezcal in near and far away markets can be 
met at short notice and at great speed. 
What, however, is entailed in the removal of the obstacles referred to 
above? What we see here is that a problem that is attributed to be of an 
'economic' nature (e.g. "lack of capital to reinvest") has been (partially) 
solved through both 'social' and 'technical' means. In the process, a 
realignment of all elements involved in the collectif has been brought 
about. Thus the procurement of capital has been brought about, for 
example, through a rearrangement of social relations between producers 
and ejidatarios with whom new labour and sharecropping agreements 
have emerged.34 Or technical innovations, such as the introduction of 
mills or aluminum fermentation tanks, have speeded up the production 
process - in turn allowing for a rearrangement of the inter- and intra-firm 
division of labour. These rearrangements, which may differ from producer 
to producer, are (re)created, reproduced and inscribed not only in the 
sociality of daily practice but also in the materiality of money, mezcal, 
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maize harvests or legal contracts. Indeed, the resolution of so-called 
'economic' obstacles is mediated through all sorts of means within the 
realms of morality, health care, insurance, trust, and so forth. 
Translations: adding complexity to the collectif 
In the foregoing sections, I made the point that specialization, 
external ization and diversification of production, as well as the ease of 
diffusion of technologies and the creation of backward and forward link-
ages, are phenomena that are general for the mezcal sector. Each of these 
different processes, and the way in which they work themselves out in 
particular settings, can be labelled processes of transformation. But what 
exactly are these processes of transformation? What is entailed when one 
talks of specialization, product diversification, or the fragmentation of the 
production process? Most studies on innovation processes that have 
outcomes similar to those portrayed in the case of the mezcal sector 
bypass these questions and merely refer to the evolution or trajectory of 
transformation processes in terms of changes between two points in time. 
By not addressing the question of the content of the transformations them-
selves, their specific dynamics are rendered invisible. One needs then to 
delve further, and understand the actual character, the content, the 
dynamics of transformation. By this I mean that one needs to pay atten-
tion to the way in which heterogeneous elements are re-combined, 
translated or associated differently with one another. In other words, one 
needs to address the way in which the problems which are perceived to 
hinder mezcal producers' goals are tackled, giving rise to a shift of goals 
in the process. By such a shift is meant the reconfiguration or re-associ-
ation of social, political, and economic alliances as well as skills (and 
their distribution) and techniques of production. Hence the understanding 
of the dynamics of transformation entails a focus on the way in which a 
chain of associations is modified. 
Before examining this question, let us first go back to the transformations 
of the mezcal sector themselves (specialization, external ization, diversifi-
cation etc.). What do they consist of? So far, I have argued that the 
content of these transformations can be seen as emerging from a 
reconfiguration of the collectif of actors that make up the 'mezcal sector'. 
Thus the social, the economic, the technical and so on are related, 
associated differently with one another. But there is an additional point 
that has to do with the qualities of the collectif. Individual actants and, 
indeed, the whole collectif are not transformed merely by a process of 
reconfiguration. Each move, each strategy also involves the addition of 
new actants to the collectif. So, for example, when producers delegate 
tasks they used to carry out themselves to others it is not enough to state 
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that relations with these 'others' have been articulated. The reason is 
simple. These 'others' did not exist previously: they had to be constructed 
from scratch through processes of problematization, intéressement, enrol-
ment and mobilization. External ization thus not only implies a shift from a 
situation in which producers obtained agaves from their own fields 
through the mobilization of their own or their labourers' efforts, but also 
involves the unanticipated addition of new actors to the collectif: local 
and extra-local ejidatarios and pequenos propietarios (private land-
holders), middlemen (and their transport) and so forth, have been incor-
porated, implicated in the process. Similarly, product labels, middle-aged 
women working in packaging plants, stainless steel fermentation tanks, 
notary publics, water purification factories, oak barrels, accountants, 
different types of bottles etc. all play a crucial role in the process of 
transformation. Specialization, external ization and diversification of 
production thus not only mean a qualitative shift in relations, but also a 
quantitative increase of the collectif. 
But focusing on all the new actors brought into play is not enough to 
comprehend the nature of transformation. W e need also to be concerned 
with the distributed effect of transformations. In other words, one needs to 
consider the people and things who/that initially conspired against mezcal 
producers' goals, but finally became favourable to them (and vice versa) 
through the transformations. To take an example: women who were 
previously very much against anything to do with mezcal for the simple 
reason that their sons and husbands spend hard-needed cash on drinking, 
now earn some cash at the tavernas - while their loved ones still get 
drunk. Or bacteria that opposed quick fermentation of agaves become -
through intermediation of hot water - collaborators in a more efficient 
fermentation process. The contrary procedure also obtains: agave har-
vesters who worked for their boss have been made jobless by ejidatarios 
sowing, tendering and harvesting their own agaves. Or independent 
middlemen have to make place for company distributors who are on 
producers' payrolls. Former harvesters and distributors condemn the 
changes, and have no kind words for their former employers - while 
ejidatarios and official distributors rejoice in the new situation. The 
picture, however, would not be complete if we only focused on the 
displacement of people by transformations in the collectif. It is equally 
important to consider the role of all those things that formerly were in 
favour of their employers, and now conspire against their bosses' strat-
egies. Thus deep burning holes made to fit large quantities of agaves of 
different qualities now obstruct producers' plans to elaborate smaller 
batches of mezcal for different markets. Or capital investments in technol-
ogy that have not yet been redeemed now stand in the way of newer, and 
often more expensive, investments. The point is that, when talking of 
transformations, one has to take into account that these unfold unequally, 
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distributing properties in a contingent way. What was once against pro-
ducers' goals may now be in their favour, and what was once in their 
favour may now work against them. By not considering these shifts, these 
distributions, one will never be able to grasp the nature of change, and 
instead be doomed to cast a unilinear, often deterministic, light on socio-
technical transformations. 
As we have seen above, following the qualitative and quantitative 
changes of collectifs - and their distributed effects - brings us some way 
into understanding the nature of transformations in the mezcal sector. But 
the account is still insufficient, for it does not address changes that may 
affect the state of the actors composing the collectif. Indeed, through the 
passage of time actors (both human and non-human) find themselves 
endowed with new properties. For example, the female bottlers who have 
joined producers' strategies are not the same women any more. They now 
have some money of their own - even though their men still drink 
profusely. But perhaps by elaborating a bit further on an example from 
Chapter Two clarifies the point. It is the case of Matilde - a marginal 
producer of mezcal from San Gabriel - who, back in the 1970s, used to 
sell unbottled liquor at his distillery to local customers and passers-by 
only. His goal thus was the identification of local consumers willing to 
put down a certain amount of money for his product. Then, in 1978, the 
attainment of this goal was obstructed by the passing of a federal health 
law that prohibited the sale of 'unidentifiable' liquor in bulk. For Matilde, 
this meant that from then on he had to take a triple detour in order to 
achieve his goal of selling mezcal. First, he had to legalize his product by 
registering with the Federal Taxpayers' Registry and the Ministry of 
Health. Second, he had to provide public evidence of his legality through 
the purchase (and design) of product stickers. And third, he had to find 
suppliers of bottles on which to adhere his product stickers. Matilde went 
through these detours in a matter of months, and was once again able to 
reach his objective: to sell mezcal. After the detours, however, Matilde's 
mezcal was not the same any more. It was now mezca/-in-a-bottle-with-a-
sticker. This made the product transportable, in due time changing the 
character of Matilde's goal. Official registration, product stickers and 
bottles (and, later, distributors) allowed for new links that did not exist 
before, and a new goal emerged: to identify consumers in distant places. 
Effectively, a translation of the consumer, a transformation of the goal, 
had taken place. The local, known consumer who dropped into the 
distillery with his own receptacle was amplified, transformed, shifted into 
the distant, unknown consumer who could be seduced through official 
(and other) legends on a product sticker appended to a bottle. Note, also, 
that in this vignette the process of translation is symmetrical. The identity 
of mezcal is different when it is bottled and provided with a sticker. 
Likewise, the identity of Matilde has changed when associated with 
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bottles and stickers. He is not any more a producer of illegal mezcal, but 
a producer of legal mezcal that can be sold in far-away localities. Hence 
one could say that Matilde is another subject because he is now not only 
associated with mezcal, but also with bottles and product stickers. 
Symmetrically, bottles and stickers are now different objects because they 
have entered into a relationship with Matilde and his mezcal. Indeed, as 
Latour (1994a:33) suggests, neither subject nor object are fixed entities. 
Both change their properties when they become a gathering, a collectif, a 
hybrid actor made up of people-and-things. 
Attention to the change of state of actors in a collectif, together with an 
interest in the quantitative and qualitative alterations thereof, takes us one 
step further in understanding how producers mobilize and hold together 
the pieces of which they are assembled. However, the picture would not 
be complete if we did not address the fact that, as producers change their 
goals, they also change the matter in which these goals are concretized or 
inscribed. In other words, we have to look at the way in which beings 
substitute one another in the process of transformation. How, for example, 
bottling machines come to replace people - doing the job quickly and 
reliably. Of course, Marxists have taught us long ago that in the final 
analysis, it is we - human actors - who make machines. But to put it like 
this is problematic, for it suggests a world made out of two species: 
humans and objects. Yet - and this is one of the arguments of this thesis -
the matter is much more complicated. Producers of mezcal, for example, 
are not anymore alone in the world. For sure, they are made up of 
feelings, cognitive capacities, cultural frameworks and the like. But they 
are also made up of the objects they utilize to achieve their endeavours. 
Producers of mezcal are hybrid beings. Hence it is crucial to understand 
how these hybrids, these collective or de-centred actors,35 change their 
properties in time. How objects or subjects mediate in the construction of 
subject-objects - what Latour (1993) calls 'quasi-objects'. In the case of the 
mezcal sector, examples abound. To illustrate the argument, let me go 
back to an example I developed at some length in Chapter Seven. Leon, a 
producer from Toliman, wished to reduce the hydrolysis time without al-
tering the characteristic flavour of his mezcal. This meant that the use of a 
common innovation used by fellow producers - calderas or hermetically 
sealed chambers in which agaves are cooked with pressurized vapour -
was out of the question for calderas modified the taste of the final prod-
uct. In the end - after a lengthy struggle with all sorts of elements - Le6n 
devised a mechanism through which agaves were burnt faster while 
retaining their typical properties in terms of taste. In the process, however, 
humans were replaced by objects, while at the same time the function of 
some objects were replaced by other objects. Thus the arduous work of 
loading and unloading stones, wood, and agaves into the hole each time 
agaves needed to be burnt was displaced by a relatively simple device 
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made up of bricks, tiles, metal grids, a door, and a tunnel. Some of the 
characteristics of his labourers were thus delegated to these objects, while 
at the same time some of the properties of these objects changed the 
character of the tasks (labour!) to be performed. What we see, then, is that 
Le6n constructed a new assembly of people and things that maintained 
the same function (burning agaves) but in different materials. 
The quantitative and qualitative changes of the collectif, the change in the 
properties of the actors involved, and the delegation of action to other 
materials take us a long way into an understanding of the character of 
transformations of mezcal production. However, a last - but crucial -
factor that can easily be overlooked comes from the packaging or 
'blackboxing' of the way in which different human and non-human actors 
have been enrolled in the collectif. Thus casual observers - such as myself 
- but also participating actors tend to ignore the complex sets of struggles 
and negotiations whose effect has been the rise of a relatively consoli-
dated sector. But why is it that these networks, these configurations, tend 
to be unclear and hidden from view? The answer, as Law (1992 ) suggests, 
is that relatively consolidated networks can often be simplified. In other 
words, "if a network acts as a single block, then it disappears, to be 
replaced by the action itself and the seemingly simple author of that 
action. At the same time, the way in which the effect is generated is also 
effaced: for the time being it is neither visible, nor relevant." (ibid. p. 3 8 5 ; 
emphasis in original). Indeed, actors involved in mezcal production do 
not - and cannot - cope with endless complexity. Take, for example, 
middle-aged women operating a bottling machine. They represent a point 
in a sequence of action - taken for granted mediators determined by their 
function. They have become a silent package that is part of a larger 
whole. Simplified resources to be handled at will by producers. The 
strategies and tactics, the efforts to integrate them into the collectif has in 
practice been deleted from view. To state this more generally, the effect 
of the network of mezcal production is that the mediations through which 
producers, ejidatarios, middlemen, product labels, bottles, labourers, 
notary publics, fermentation tanks, oak barrels, and so on are rendered 
commensurate disappear. The work is packaged, simplified, blackboxed. 
In other words, the process by which heterogeneous actors come to 
conform a relatively homogeneous collectif becomes opaque. Fragile, 
contingent existences turn into stable essences, routines, taken-for-
granteds.36 
The five steps - quantitative and qualitative changes of the collectif, the 
changing properties of the actors involved, the delegation of action to 
other materials, and black-boxing - are all crucial (cf. Latour 1995) . 
Together, they allow us to understand how different actors become 
aligned - that is, how 'something' which was not there before gains 
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momentum and makes place for 'something' new. The processes referred 
to above, however, should not be seen in isolation from one another. Yes, 
the mezcal sector develops by shifts and substitutions, but producers, 
ejidatarios, middle-aged women, middlemen, technological artifacts, and 
legal arrangements evolve too. The mezcal sector, then, is like a word in 
a sentence. It is connected to other words in a single syntax that unites 
producers, artifacts, drink, and so on. Take out one word and the sen-
tence is rendered meaningless. Bracket technology and you obtain 
isolated, static human beings. Bracket human beings and you obtain an 
assembly worthy of a museum, but impotent to produce mezcal. 
Mezcal: a (relatively) strongly co-ordinated collectif 
The modifications in mezcal production - which I translate in terms of 
specialization, external ization and diversification of production; changes 
in the division of labour; reconfiguration of labour relations; the emerg-
ence of an inter-firm division of labour and the creation of extra-regional 
networks; as well as a quick diffusion of innovations, know-how and skills 
- are held in place by the addition or emergence of a set of agreements. 
Like words in a sentence, interactions between actors in the collectif are 
codified by a set of rules, norms and conventions. The latter - which are 
always partial, amenable to review, and changing - are the product of past 
interactions. These regulatory principles may steer present and future 
action, and may be tacit (as in custom) or explicit (as in written laws). 
These rules and conventions, moreover, come in a multiplicity of forms 
and coordinate different domains. 
Some of these rules and norms deal with the identity of actors. For 
example, permits from the Tax Ministry and the Ministry of Health 
attribute mezcal firms with the right to produce drink and put it into 
circulation. In the same way, a letter of credit from a bank allows one and 
only one actor to make use of the bank's facilities. More informal regula-
tions, however, also exist, such as the unwritten rule that mezcal pro-
ducers will not market their product under the name of tequila. In all 
these cases, the identity of actors is regulated: only those producers who 
are formally registered are justified to make and sell mezcal; a bank's 
form allows an actor to claim a loan; an unspoken agreement defines the 
identity of mezcal producers as just that - and not as producers of similar 
tegu//a.37 
These rules and conventions often also deal with the issue of who 
is supposed to do what, and under what circumstances. For example, 
working conditions, social benefits and payment - who is supposed to do 
what? - may be regulated either through explicit, contractual agreements 
or implicit, customary law based on local cultural constructs. The latter 
will only rarely be addressed in a straightforward manner, yet any devi-
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ation from them will immediately call into question the behaviour of the 
actor trespassing the rules. Such is the case in the operation of the market 
for mezcal, where price controls and the passing on of important informa-
tion is subject to local cultural standards. Both implicit and explicit norms 
and conventions have the effect of delimiting and regulating the universe 
of possible actors, their identities, as well as their responsibilities. In other 
words, implicit and explicit rules and norms codify interaction - even 
though some of them may be longer-lasting than others, and more or less 
open to change. Also, several norms and conventions may be in operation 
simultaneously. Thus relations between, for example, producers and 
labourers may be shaped by conventions that apply to the domain of the 
market (e.g. the salary level), fictional kinship (are they compadres or 
not?), the political (e.g. Union membership), the legislative (e.g. eligibility 
for social security and welfare), the organization of the enterprise (e.g. the 
need to have only trustworthy labourers perform certain activities), and so 
on. 
The regulatory processes referred to above can, as proposed by 
Callon (1992), be termed forms of coordination. The latter may be of a 
general or a local character. Forms of coordination which apply to anyone 
involved in the collectif embody general definitions - such as the condi-
tions under which credit may be obtained from a bank, official operating 
permits, accountancy forms and practices, or standardized technical 
objects such as distillation stills. Yet other forms of coordination are of 
more limited scope, and apply only locally within the collectif - that is, 
they lose their validity outside of the network that spawned them. 
Examples of local forms of coordination could be agreements on prices of 
products, conditions of payment negotiated with input suppliers, settle-
ment of disputes with retailers or middlemen, rate of interest for loans 
obtained outside the official bank circuit, tacit understandings about the 
degree of inter-firm co-operation, and the like. 
The distinction between general and local forms of coordination is 
important because it allows one to gauge the relative resilience of interac-
tions between the different actors of the collectif. Thus, when a collectif 
has added on local norms and rules to general regulations one can speak 
of a strong coordination. Inversely, a weakly coordinated collectif is one 
in which no local rules have been added to procedures generally fol-
lowed at any point in time. When coordination is weak, interactions 
between actors are relatively unpredictable. When it is strong, actors' 
'universe of the possible' is limited, and developing interactions may be 
less constrained by regulatory frameworks. Clearly, the distinction 
between general and local coordination is of an abstract character. In 
reality, however, it is relatively easy to find instances of rules and regula-
tions which are limited or more wide in scope. In the case of mezcal, a 
number of local rules has been added to the range of general conventions 
existing at any given moment. Hence - and especially if compared with 
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Convergence 
As I mentioned in Chapter Two, the degree of convergence of a network 
of collectif results from its degrees of alignment and coordination. In the 
case of mezcal, there is a relatively high degree of both alignment and 
coordination - and hence of convergence. Let us take the example of an 
unsatisfied client who returns a bottle of mezcal to the store where it was 
purchased. The owner of the store knows the distributor to whom he must 
in turn complain. The distributor, on his part, knows how to formulate the 
problem to the producer of the said mezcal. Finally, the producer will set 
out to solve the problem by translating the latter into its constituent parts: 
was the quality of the agaves not good enough? Was the mezcal not aged 
sufficiently? Eventually, the source of the problem can be located, and 
corresponding action be taken. In this case, the interdefinitions of actors 
seem to converge, that is, there seems to exist some common ground on 
which collective action can be taken. 
Now, the point with the degree of convergence is that it allows 
one to make statements about the feasibility of the firms involved in the 
collectif. Are mezcal producers' firms feasible? On what was said above 
on convergence, the answer is yes. Having said so, however, I immediate-
ly need to qualify my answer. Yes, mezcal firms are feasible but only to 
the extent that they are able to translate and coordinate the collectif. I 
build in this caveat because convergence is a necessary but not a suffi-
cient condition for feasibility. In other words, a convergent network may 
allow for the emergence of feasible firms, yet this is not the same as 
stating that all economic components of the collectif are feasible. Thus, as 
I showed at length through the case of mezcal distribution (Chapter Eight), 
not all actors composing the collectif can be said to have feasible enter-
prises. It is only those who are pulling the strings - those who coordinate -
who do. Feasibility, then, is a distributed characteristic of a convergent 
network. 
In the case of the mezcal collectif, it can be concluded that the 
activity of making and marketing mezcal - either by large- or small-scale, 
legal or illegal producers - is a feasible venture. But there is an additional 
caveat that needs to be introduced here: the activity of producing mezcal 
may itself be feasible, but from this it does not follow that mezcal pro-
ducers operate feasible firms. This has to do with the actors' insertion into 
other networks or collectifs. For example, the mezcal producer and cattle 
owner from Tonaya (see above) may be pulling some strings in the 
relatively convergent mezcal network, yet he is pushed around in the 
the case studies on firms in Chapters Four, Five and Six - the mezcal 
collectif (producers, consumers, suppliers, distributors, artifacts etc.) can 
be characterized as one with a relatively strong coordination. 
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networks that span the production, marketing and consumption of beef. 
Both, then, should be taken into account when making statements about 
the feasibility of firms. 
Momentum 
Feasibility - and its distribution - however, is a temporal condition. 
Therefore, we need to ask the question: how durable is feasibility? To this 
end, I use the concept of momentum. The concept refers back to that of 
translation, and suggests that the latter has been 'locked into place'. 
Adapting Callon's (1991:149-50) notion of irreversibility, the momentum 
of a translation depends on two things: 
(a) the extent to which it is subsequently impossible to go 
back to a point where the translation was only one amongst 
others; and 
(b) the extent to which it shapes and determines subsequent 
translations. 
How can specific translations (such as externalization, specialization and 
so on) succeed in resisting and eliminating other possible alternatives? 
This depends on the durability and robustness of these translations (Callon 
1992). Both durability and robustness are, above all, inscribed in inter-
mediaries. Let us take the example of a mezcal producer opening a credit 
line at a bank. Once the operation is legally sanctioned by some form or 
document, it becomes difficult if not outright impossible for the parties to 
withdraw from the agreement and go back to the beginning of the transac-
tion, when multiple alternatives for obtaining credit may have been open 
to the entrepreneur. At the same time, this translation may shape the 
future decisions of the entrepreneur. Thus he can set out to attain specific 
goals that were not possible without the credit, while at the same time 
remembering to fulfil his contractual obligations with the bank. In this 
case, a legal document assures both durability and robustness, albeit only 
to a degree: the entrepreneur could always get involved in alternative, 
emergent courses of action which could not have been forecast at the 
outset. This is a matter that cannot be determined a priori but which can 
only be decided by following the producer in his actual practice. 
Not all intermediaries, however, guarantee durability or robustness. Let us 
take the example of Juan Arias, who at the time of my study was having 
trouble with the export of his mezcal to California. The situation was as 
follows. The mezcal passed the border legally, and was send to his cousin 
in Sylmar, in the Los Angeles area. Officially, the cousin took care of 
distributing the mezcal to liquor stores only, since he did not have a 
214 TACOS, TIENDAS AND MEZCAL 
selling permit. Most liquor stores, however, were operated by Iranians 
and Armenians who were difficult to convince to sell a product they did 
not know. Hence Juan Arias' cousin sold the larger part of the mezcal 
directly to consumers. In this he was "covered" by an Armenian owning a 
liquor store who befriended him and provided the invoices. This setup 
had been working fine for over three years (although Juan Arias com-
plained that "for every bottle my cousin sells, he drinks three for free"). 
Then, at the beginning of 1994, an inspector from the IRS (Internal 
Revenue Service) paid a call to the friendly Armenian, and cast doubts 
about the large quantity of mezcal boxes he was supposedly selling. The 
Armenian, afraid that the matter might be followed, decided to cut down 
drastically on the number of boxes he allowed Juan Arias' cousin to sell 
under cover of his invoices. This example shows how the intermediary 
(invoices) was relatively durable, but not at all robust: when an actor (IRS) 
challenged the legality of the setup, the enterprise crumbled and new 
ways of selling mezcal in the US had to be devised.38 Hence a certain 
configuration or translation may run smoothly for a time, but this is not in 
itself a guarantee for the future. Again, durability and robustness cannot 
be established a priori Nevertheless it can be speculated that Juan Arias' 
export venture subsided because the links between his cousin and "the 
market" turned out to be relatively weak when put to the test. In the end, 
these links - which consisted of little more than invoices, a brittle recipro-
cal trust relationship with an Armenian, and a relationship with con-
sumers that was not sanctioned by the law - were not durable and robust 
enough. The example, then, suggests that there is a relationship between 
durability, robustness, and the number of actors involved in a specific 
translation. Had Juan Arias' cousin had more links (e.g. more liquor store 
owners willing to cover-up his activities in the same fashion as the 
Armenian, or a permit to sell liquor himself), then the whole operation 
would have been more difficult to challenge by the IRS inspector. Indeed, 
one could posit that it is more difficult for a competing translation to 
impose itself in a situation in which more and more actors are associated 
with one another through durable and robust intermediaries. 
This is exactly the case at Apulco, the production site of Arias' 
mezcal. There, in the early 1960s, Jesus Arias took over a distillery that 
was out of function. In the mid 1980s, his four children (Juan, Luis, Chuy 
and Suzana) took over operations and gradually technified production. 
Each of the siblings now has its own market. The eldest, Chuy, has the 
Guadalajara region; Luis operates in Colima; Juan dominates the coast of 
Jalisco and is in charge of exporting, and Suzana caters for the Ciudad 
Guzman market. Sales are on the rise since demand is higher than supply, 
and sometimes pick-up trucks stand in line in front of the distillery to load 
the liquor. The enterprise itself is split in three locations. At the distillery 
(behind the church) mezcal is actually distilled; on one of the corners of 
the main plaza 'export', 'quality' and ane/o (mature) mezcal is bottled and 
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labelled, while 'commercial' mezcal is bottled on the opposite corner of 
the same plaza. At the distillery the hearts of agaves are cut and stored. 
From there, up to 9 tons of cut agaves are taken to a cauldron. Depend-
ing on the type of mezcal to be distilled, different varieties are steam-
cooked with steam that is injected into the caldera from a gas-fuelled 
central heating plant connected to two separate gas tanks of 20,000 litres 
each. This way nothing is lost due to burning (as in the traditional way of 
cooking agaves; see Chapter Eight), and a homogeneous product is 
obtained in 22 hours (instead of 72 if cooked in a hole). From the caul-
dron the cooked product is taken to an electric mill to obtain the bagazo 
or threshed agave fibres to be fermented, which is subsequently brought 
to three 5,000 litre, stainless steel tubs. Next to the mill there is the 
remains of a large centrifuge used to extract the saps from the bagazo. 
This machine is no longer used as the centrifugation process affected the 
taste of the final product (it made mezcal taste like tequila). 
From the tubs - which are heated by recirculating hot water coming 
from the still in order to decrease fermentation time from seven days to a 
mere four - the fermented bagazo is transported through huge hoses to a 
2,000 litre stainless steel still or alembic for distillation. Distilled mezcal 
is then collected into a 2,500 litre plastic container to level the percen-
tage of alcohol). The mezcal is then filtered and put into plastic jerrycans 
of 20 litres each to be taken to the two different bottling plants by a pick-
up truck. Before actual bottling, export-quality and the ane/o variety are 
first left to mature in wooden barrels - anywhere between three days and 
three months, depending on demand (the 'special' variety is not matured). 
Then the product passes through five filters, and is bottled in previously 
cleaned bottles through a machine that fits 6 bottles at a time. The bottles 
are then sealed, labelled, put into individual cases (in the case of export 
mezcal), packed in 12-litre boxes and stored to await distribution. The 
bottling of 'commercial' mezcal is somewhat different, as the product 
comes in four types of flasks (each coming from a different producer). 
Some 25 labourers participate in the whole production process. 
What we see in Apulco is that a specific way of organizing and 
ordering production has taken shape in the course of some 30 years. As 
with the majority of mezcal producers, the productive organization of 
mezcal has been subject to a trend in externalization, product specializ-
ation and diversification, an increasing division of labour, and so on. This 
trend is difficult to defy by different, alternative trends (e.g. going back to 
activities which are unrelated to the production of mezcal; returning to a 
point were all tasks - including the manufacture of necessary inputs - are 
performed at the distillery itself; or a replacement of specialized, 
inflexible labour by flexible labourers skilled in a variety of tasks). The 
reason for this impossibility to go back is that the production process is 
based not only on informal agreements (that are difficult to enforce!) on 
who should do what, when, or how. It is also inscribed in a number of 
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Conclusion 
This Chapter examined one instance of network building in a rural area of 
Western Mexico. The expansion of this network was described through 
durable and robust artefacts such as alembics, calderas, stainless steel con-
tainers and pick-up trucks; and legal arrangements such as contracts with 
input suppliers which make people carry out specific actions. In short: 
unlike Juan Arias' export venture, at Apulco the production process is 
held together through durable and robust intermediaries (machines, legal 
documents) as well as less durable and robust ones (people, skills). These 
intermediaries have been associated with one another through trial-and-
error over time, and their attributes have been finely tuned so as to make 
them compatible. 
Durability and robustness help one to understand why it is sometimes 
difficult, if not outright impossible, to return to a situation in which a 
trend was only one out of many possible ones. However, these concepts 
tell us little about the extent to which future trends are shaped or prede-
termined. To what extent, for example, does product specialization -
which attributes and distributes roles to different actors, and defines 
which problems should be tackled and which not - render certain actions 
predictable or indispensable? A central concept for analyzing possible 
future trends is that of skill. Skill indicates the process by which, through 
gradual learning, the different elements involved in a collectif come to 
depend on one another. Thus, in the example of product specialization at 
the Arias' enterprise, women employees cannot bottle mezcal without the 
bottling machine; mezcal of specific characteristics can only be distilled 
by specialists who have received particular training; mezcal distributors' 
trade bind them to putting the liquor into circulation. Symmetrically, 
things have to be adapted (the corollary of human skills) to suit one 
another. Thus, in the case of Le6n's basin (see Chapter Seven) the artefact 
is designed to dovetail closely with the taste and preferences Ledn 
attributes to consumers; Matilde's product labels have to conform to 
national legislation; Juan Arias' large centrifuge has to be made compat-
ible with consumer taste (which in the end cannot be achieved). 
Skills, adaptation, robustness, durability: they are part and parcel of 
collectifs that gain momentum and become standardized. They predeter-
mine, influence, or circumscribe whatever one wishes to build in the 
future. "The past engages the future", so to speak. And, what is important 
in terms of feasibility: the more finely-tuned humans and nonhumans are -
through skills and adaptations - and the more actors are bound through 
robust and durable intermediaries, the higher the chance that their 
collective acting - mezcal production - becomes a feasible one. 
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the use of the concept of collectif (Callon and Law 1995). This concept 
differs from the notion of network usually encountered. It contrasts 
sharply with economists' notions of a 'technical network' in that it does 
not reduce the dynamics of production to mere associations between 
things that are only marginally connected to people. It also differs from 
the notion of 'social network' used in sociology and anthropology in that I 
emphasize the materiality of human interactions. A collectif, then, focuses 
on the composite nature of relationships, paying attention not so much to 
the actors themselves, but to interactions between them. 
The collectif described in this Chapter thus includes mezcal 
producers, labourers, financial institutions, consumers, ejidatarios, govern-
ment bodies and so on, as well as a host of nonhuman intermediaries. 
Each of these actors is a crucial ingredient in the production of mezcal. I 
argued that this collectif encouraged transformations with regard to 
product specialization and diversification, externalization, inter- and intra-
firm division of labour, and the diffusion of innovations and know-how 
amongst producers of mezcal. Furthermore, these transformations 
coincided with the appearance of input suppliers and parties providing 
new and second hand equipment and spare parts; a rapid supply of 
products at short notice; the arrival of distributors willing to sell in both 
national and international markets; specialized financial and accounting 
services; as well as the emergence of a pool of skilled labourers. 
Instead of imputing the expansion and transformation of mezcal 
production to the mechanisms of an increasingly globalized society or an 
overarching economy, I have chosen to analyse how this collectif devel-
oped. I argued that, in order to understand the feasibility of mezcal firms, 
one needs to de-scribe the alliances mezcal entrepreneurs enter into, and 
the ways in which these evolve. This was done through a short historical 
overview of the expansion of the market for mezcal, followed by some 
contemporary changes of the collectif. 
In a nutshell, I argued that the expansion and transformation of the 
mezcal network had to do with five different, though interrelated pro-
cesses. First, it was due to the addition of new, human and non-human 
beings to the collectif. Second, it was a result of the enrolment of people 
and things who/that initially conspired against mezcal producers' goals, 
but finally became favourable to them. Third, it involved a qualitative 
change in the properties of the heterogeneous actors involved in the 
collectif itself. Fourth, the collectif expanded through a substitution of 
beings, that is, the delegation of human properties to non-humans. Finally, 
the transformations were made possible by means of an effective packag-
ing or black-boxing of the actors making up the collectif. This way atten-
tion was given to the interrelationship between the technical and the 
social. 
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What characterized this interrelationship, I argued, was a strong 
degree of alignment and co-ordination amongst the actors making up the 
collectif, as well as a relative standardization of the actor-network as a 
whole. As an effect, mezcal firms showed a high degree of feasibility -
inscribed both socially through a language of the market, trust, and 
organization; and technically through the circulation of durable and 
robust intermediaries. 
Notes 
1. This part draws extensively on Murici (1990) and Luna (1991). 
2. A fermented beverage obtained from the heart of another type of agave. 
3. Outlet store under government supervision. 
4. Many municipalities heavily protested against this measure because the 
only official site (estanco,) in New Galicia where distilled products could be 
sold was seen as a centralizing move that effectively prevented these places 
from levying taxes and pursuing their own development. This collection of 
taxes through the sale of (above all) vino mezcal was not trivial. For example, 
by 1672 the Governor of Guadalajara alleviated the city's water shortage 
through the construction of an aqueduct that allowed transport of the liquid 
from Chapala lake 40kms away. This costly operation was fully financed by 
tax revenues from the estanco. Another example is Guadalajara's magnificent 
Palacio de Gobierno (one of Guadalajara's most impressive colonial build-
ings), the first half of which was built with mezcal money coming from the 
estanco. In 1785, in order to support the export of peninsular spirits, King 
Carlos III prohibited the production of local liquor. This prohibition was 
partially lifted in 1795, five years after the completion of the building. 
5. It took some time, though, before these differences in name became 
officially acknowledged. By the beginning of the 20th Century, nearly one 
hundred years after tequila was a burgeoning term, official statistics still 
referred to both tequila and mezcal as vino mezcal. Today, tequila is widely 
understood to be a different product from mezcal. This difference is mainly 
based on the deodorization process of tequila by which it loses the somewhat 
harsher flavour characteristic of mezcal. In their respective production areas, 
however, confusion still exists as both tequila and mezcal are simply referred 
to as vino. 
6. A US program started in 1964 that for a time officially allowed Mexican 
labourers to work in the agricultural sector. 
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7. Agaves have the characteristic that they grow on extremely poor soils. 
Thus when production was given up, no alternative crops were found. Until 
well into the 1970s, the municipalities of El Llano (San Gabriel, Toliman, 
Tuxcacuesco and Tonaya) figured among the poorest in the State in terms of 
per capita income. 
8. Some of the mezcal producers also opposed the road as they feared that, 
with it, the State (taxes, quality control) would arrive. 
9. In Mexico mezcal from El Llano is distributed in the states of Jalisco, 
Colima, Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, Zacatecas, Michoacan, Nayarit, Sinaloa 
and Sonora. In the U.S. it is sold in Washington, Oregon and California. 
10. Negotiations are currently ongoing with distributors in Venezuela, 
Colombia, Chile and Costa Rica (with which Mexico has a Free Trade 
Agreement or will soon sign one). 
11. For this reason alone, the term collectif is superior to that of 'system': The 
size and scope of a collectif - in contrast with the size and scope of a 
system - are never fixed since complexity (in terms of the number of actors 
and intermediaries circulating within a collectif) only increases in time. Of 
course, if a collectif is successfully challenged, then it may fall apart and lose 
in complexity. 
12. 'Intuition' is here seen as a relational concept: actors always set their 
plans in accordance with their position vis-a-vis other actors. 
13. This had historical grounds. Past attempts to achieve collective forms of 
organization had proven to be too weak to generate positive effects. For 
example, all officially recognized mezcal producers joined the CRIT (Cimara 
Regional de la Industria del Tequila) in the early 1980s. Initially, there existed 
some hope that the association would help them further their interests. 
However, mezcal producers soon became aware that the association did not 
protect their interests at all, thus making the initial reason for mezcal pro-
ducers to join the association ill-founded. 
14. This programme, supported by SECOFI (Ministry of Trade and Industrial 
Promotion) and NAFINSA, was geared to unite producers of different sectors 
in order to allow the sector to have more thrust, while respecting the auton-
omy of individual enterprises. This could be achieved through the acquisition 
of common computing facilities, the contracting of common financial and 
accounting services, the setting up of quality control mechanisms, and the 
common search for export possibilities. 
220 TACOS, TIENDAS AND MEZCAL 
15. By this the producer meant that fellow producers had a 'domestic' type of 
administration (that is, they did not utilize accounting techniques or market 
analysis); generally showed a tendency to mix all sorts of businesses with 
mezcal production proper; and were not eager to 'modernize', i.e. technify 
their production process. 
16. The initiative was turned down in 1993 by CANACO (National Chamber 
of Commerce). The reasons for this however were foreign to regional politi-
cians from Jalisco who strongly supported the name tequila and considered 
local mezcal producers as potential 'troublemakers' for tequila producers. 
Had it been approved, then mezcal producers from other regions (including 
those from Jalisco) would have been compelled to call their product different-
ly-
17. This special duty or IESPS (Impuesto Especial Sobre Productos y Servicios) 
was introduced to raise funds after the September 1985 earthquake that hit 
Mexico City and other areas of the country. In essence, the IESPS is a duty of 
44.4% that is levied on spirits containing less than 50% of alcohol (cigarettes 
and gasoline are also affected). Larger producers in particular saw IESPS as a 
huge obstacle to the development of their enterprises. This was due to the 
fact that the duty was levied on invoiced sales (that is, the seller - not the 
producer - pays). As a consequence, final consumer prices increased. Many 
distributors, however, would carry expensive (that is, registered and invoiced) 
mezcal from larger producers as well as inexpensive, often 'illegal' mezcal for 
which there existed no invoice (see the case of Pablo in Chapter Eight). This 
way, final consumer prices were relatively higher for 'registered' mezcal than 
for the inexpensive, 'unregistered' one. This situation obviously allowed some 
room for manoeuvre to small-scale, 'illegal' distillers of spirit - to the detri-
ment of larger-scale producers. 
18. For example, Seagram's of California, U.S., was sympathetic to the export 
initiatives of the two largest producers of mezcal. In fact, the company was 
willing to distribute the product at its regular outlets, but demanded that a 
publicity campaign - financed by the producers - be mounted first. The 
campaign would have easily run into 6-digit figures, and both producers 
abandoned the idea for lack of means. 
19. When selling on a larger scale, producers often fell into the hands of 
mayoristas (large scale intermediaries) who asked for huge rebates and long-
term periods to pay. This lead to constant problems concerning reinvestments 
and of liquidity vis-a-vis suppliers (who were generally paid cash). As one 
producer put it: "They [intermediaries] have got me by the balls: they pay me 
every two to three months, but I have my commitments with my labourers, 
suppliers and the Tax Ministry every month." 
20. Burning of agaves in a pit in order to hydrolyse sugars. 
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21. When customers left the distillery these 'spies' intercepted them and took 
them to their employer, who would then ask for his competitors' price and 
offer a lower one. 
22. Yearly interest rates oscillated between more than 125% in 1976 to over 
18% in 1994 (the lowest figure since 1972). The amount of credit that could 
be obtained through alternative channels - kin, local moneylenders - could 
never cover the capital needs of an expanding taverna. Moreover, most 
producers considered 'informal' credit to be too expensive. The only pro-
ducer who once was in a position to obtain substantial financial backing was 
Federico Paz, producer of Tonayin, who was approached in 1990 by a 
Japanese consortium willing to invest close to USD 3,000,000 and export the 
spirit to Japan and the EU. Federico however declined because the move 
would have virtually made him a minor shareholder of his own company. 
23. The two largest producers, however, pursue a different strategy and are 
reconverting their properties into agave fields. The reason for this is to secure 
control over supply and demand of this prime resource, as well as the 
economic potential of the crop: agave is a very profitable crop provided one 
has enough capital to wait 6 to 10 years for the plant to mature. With profits 
in the range of $3,500-4,000 USD per hectare/year, unirrigated agave is 
second only to sugarcane production (which requires irrigation) and the 
extremely risky horticultural crops such as tomatoes, melons or watermelon. 
24. Mezcal and tequila are nearly identical products, and innovations in one 
productive sector quickly find their way into the other. Diffusion is facilitated 
by the fact that most personnel in charge of managing the distillation process 
of mezcal have had prior experience working with tequila companies. Of 
course, the sheer volume of capital investments made by tequila producers 
makes it impossible for mezcal firms to adopt certain techniques. 
25. Traditionally, vapours emitted from the wood-fuelled copper cauldron 
were condensed against a wooden plate hung above. From there, mezcal 
dripped along a tube into a can. 
26. Thus, for example, labourers used to producing only one type of mezcal 
must now be skilled in different production processes. 
27. On-the-job training is provided in the administrative and distillation 
departments, while semi-skilled work is learnt quickly by casual labourers 
accompanying more experienced ones. Upward mobility does exist, but is 
confined to the skilled and semi-skilled categories. 
28. Such a strategy can only arise in a situation of labour surplus. Such is the 
case in the mezcal producing region of the South of Jalisco, where few 
alternative income opportunities - especially for women - exist. 
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29. Seguro de Ahorro para el Retiro is a retirement pension. Employers' 
participation amounts to 2% of the monthly gross salary of the worker. 
30. Institute para el Fomento Nacional de Vivienda para los Trabajadores. 
The employers' share in this housing fund amounts to 5% of the workers' 
gross monthly income. 
31. Most labourers prefer to have 'informal' arrangements with producers -
solidified through compadrazgo - rather than formal contracts. In fact it seems 
that formal contracts are only given to those workers who are more visible to 
'outside' authorities such as the Ministry of Health or the Tax Ministry. 
32. See the prior section on the obstacles encountered by mezcal producers 
in creating some form of collective organization. 
33. This can be achieved by asking, for example, a female employee to 
procure them through a sister or a relative working for the competitor. 
34. As mezcal producers sell their agave fields to third parties who in turn 
convert these agave fields into grazing land, a need emerges to procure 
agaves elsewhere. Here ejidatarios jump into the opportunity by turning 
formerly idle communal land into agave fields. Of course, different arrange-
ments between producers and ejidatarios exist, the most typical one being 
that of sharecropping: ejidatarios provide land and (paid) labour while 
producers contribute with seedlings and fertilizers. The harvest is then usually 
split by half, and producers buy the ejidatarios' part at current prices. 
35. De-centred actors in the sense that their agency is not to be found in te 
individual agent, but rather that it is distributed among a host of heterogen-
eous materials. 
36. This is not to say that simplification or blackboxing is final. It may always 
be subject to contestation. Actors can, at any moment, resist or betray the 
collectif. Their enrolment is a precarious matter. 
37. The name tequila is protected. It may only be used for distilled mezcal 
produced in the State of Jalisco and in a number of adjacent municipalities in 
the States of Nayarit and Michoacan. In principle, then, any mezca/ originat-
ing in Jalisco can be called tequila. In practice, however, changing the name 
of mezcal into that of tequila is full of problems. Amongst the reasons given, 
the most important one is that mezcal - due to its insufficient technification -
could never compete with tequila in terms of name, quality and price (this is 
one of the reasons why mezcal producers prefer not to change their relatively 
'backward' production methods.) But there is another reason as well: the 
NOM (Norma Oficial Mexicana) for tequila is much stricter than the NOM 
for mezcal (for example concerning the degree of maturity of agaves at 
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harvest time, the alcohol content of the final product, ageing time in oak 
barrels, and so on). Thus tequila producers would have a relatively easy time 
in sending inspectors for example to Tonaya to close down those firms which 
attempted to emulate the name only tequila producers feel entitled to. 
38. Although in principle Juan Arias' cousin could himself start a liquor store, 
in practice financial constraints were too high. For example, the permit to 
operate a liquor store in the Los Angeles area ran at about USD 60,000 at the 
time of the study, and large sums would have to be invested to rent a locale 
and buy stock. In addition, running a liquor store is a pretty risky business as 
such stores are easy prey for robberies - a circumstance Juan Arias' cousin at 
least did not prize very much. 
CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION 
In Chapter One, I stated that the general aim of this thesis was to cast 
new light on the dynamics of small firms in general, and on their feasibil-
ity in particular. To do so, I argued that one first had to avoid four 
interrelated epistemological pitfalls common to most studies on small-
scale enterprise. The first one was the separation between the knower and 
the known - that is, the creation of a divide between 'things in 
themselves' (such as small-scale enterprise) and knowledge about these 
'things' (such as the different social science discourses about small firms). 
The roots of this pitfall, I maintained, could be traced back to the 
Enlightenment's Critique which created a division between Nature (the 
world of nonhuman objects) and Culture (the world of human subjects). 
Once the Great Divide was put into place, a division of tasks took place 
between the early sciences (physics, biology, astronomy, chemistry) and 
relative 'latecomers' such as economics, sociology, and psychology. The 
former concentrated on the study of Nature, while the latter concentrated 
on Culture. This Great Divide was later paralleled within the social 
sciences by separating Culture into two different spheres: The Economy 
(to be studied by economists) and Society (to be examined by 'the rest': 
historians, sociologists, psychologists, and so on). Emulating the Great 
Divide between Nature and Culture, The Economy was conceived as a 
part of Nature - that is, it functioned according to its own, rational, 
internal, and natural laws. In contrast, Society represented non-economic, 
irrational behaviour often based on ideological and religious beliefs, and 
tarnished by human politics. 
Once Economy and Society were separated and purified from each 
other's influence, it became possible to posit the idea of a homo 
economicus (the rational, atomized, self-interested individual who is 
minimally affected by social relations in his/her market competitive 
behaviour) and a homo sociologicus (whose behaviour is norm- or rule-
guided) to provide a philosophical underpinning to both sides of the 
divide. In due time, the debate over the role of small-scale enterprise in 
development was cast in terms of which side of the Divide was espoused. 
Thus while adherents of homo sociologicus suggested that small-scale 
enterprise had an important say in economic development because of the 
relations of reciprocity and redistribution they entailed, proponents of 
homo economicus put forward that sustained economic development 
could only be achieved by replacing the irrational behaviour of petty 
entrepreneurs by the laws of The Economy. These laws, which were seen 
to be objective, natural and evolutionary, dictated a strategy of acceler-
ated industrialization based on capital intensive, large firms utilizing 
modern technology. The debate, as history shows, was 'won' by the 
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homo economicus position. 'Won' in the sense that, for decades, official 
policies towards the small firm sector took it as their task to replace 
'tradition' with 'modernity' in order to achieve economic development. 
Clearly, however, evidence from Third World countries and the Western 
World alike shows that development based on such discriminating 
policies is much too simplistic. This thesis addressed this simplicity by not 
taking Great Divides (such as that between Nature and Culture, or that 
between Economy and Society) as its starting point. 
The second epistemological danger this thesis tried to sidestep is 
that entailed in essentialism or the idea that so-called social, economic, or 
natural phenomena exist prior to becoming scientific objects. Thus, in 
this thesis the analytical utility of notions such as 'the market', 
'development', 'capitalist relations' or 'post-Fordist production regimes' -
to name a few - is questioned. The reason for this is that these terms do 
not enjoy a pre-existence of their own. Rather, they reflect classificatory 
practices that have been constructed in the course of the history of the 
social sciences, and which are in turn based on the Enlightenment's 
Critique. 
The third epistemological trap this thesis aimed to avoid is that of 
dualism or the position that two different types of economies coexist 
within a single spatial setting. This is often apparent in theories about the 
role of small firms in development when reference is made, for example, 
to an 'informal' or 'traditional' sector next to a 'formal' or 'modern' one, 
'pre-capitalist' next to 'capitalist' relations, or 'mass production' next to 
'flexible specialization'. In this thesis I took the stance that these divides 
or even 'common sense' assumptions cannot be the starting point for a 
meaningful discussion of small firms. Like the Great Divides referred to 
before, dualism is a construction from the side of the knower: it reduces 
the practices of small-scale entrepreneurs to 'either/or' categories. 
Finally, this thesis wished to escape the epistemological risk of 
crude reductionism. By this is meant the apparent necessity of first 
establishing a relation between dualist categories, then propelling one of 
these categories as the 'driver'. This pitfall becomes apparent when, for 
example, the economic and institutional environment are seen to 'drive' 
small firms, when the 'informal sector' is presumed to be dependent or 
subordinate to the 'formal' sector, or when 'commoditized' relations are 
believed to increasingly shape individual decisions. Again, I tried to avoid 
this type of reductionism - if only because, in the last instance, it can only 
lead to tautology. 
In this thesis, then, I tried to avoid the pitfalls of dualism, 
essentialism, reductionism and the separation between the knower and 
the known by way of a threefold strategy. First, I did not fix the identity of 
entrepreneurs a priori. Instead, I followed them in their strategies and 
stratagems - exploring how, in the process, they constructed their ident-
ities (and that of others). In other words, I suspended assumptions about 
226 TACOS, TlENDAS AND MEZCAL 
the nature of small firms. Second, I did not impose traditional analytical 
categories upon the practices of entrepreneurs. Rather, I described small 
firms without reducing entrepreneurs' practices to social (or economic, or 
political, or cultural) attributes alone. Finally, I avoided making assump-
tions about a backdrop of social, economic, cultural or technical factors 
affecting small firms, and started from the notion that the definition of the 
backdrop was itself at stake in action. In other words, I did not draw upon 
an externalist narrative and pre-established, exogenous factors to account 
for entrepreneurs' actions. 
In Chapter Two, I developed an analytical framework that dovetailed with 
these three strategies. To do so, I first reviewed two theoretical perspec-
tives (flexible specialization and the actor-oriented approach), and argued 
that one could retain what was good in them in order to sidestep the 
main shortcomings of traditional views on the role of small firms in 
development. More specifically, I argued that one should retain flexible 
specialization's idea to take networks of firms - and not the individual 
firm - as the unit of analysis, and adopt the actor-oriented emphasis on 
practice as a point of departure. Though useful, I also argued that one 
should go beyond flexible specialization and the actor-oriented approach 
on a number of issues. So, for example, I maintained that flexible special-
ization had only limited usefulness because of its uneasiness to accommo-
date anything other than social actors into its theoretical architecture. 
Likewise, the actor-oriented perspective was seen to be problematic 
because of its notion of agency as a property of humans. This notion 
ultimately assumes hat things do not have agency, which in turn ran 
counter to my strategies as outlined above. 
To accommodate my strategies, I then turned to an analytical 
framework that took networks and practice in earnest, but which did not 
start from the ontological assumptions of flexible specialization or the 
actor-oriented approach. Such a framework - actor-network theory - had 
been developed in the context of the social studies of science. However, 
it remained to be seen whether or not it could be usefully employed in 
the study of small firms. This thesis, then, was in part a struggle to 
'translate' actor-network theory into the domain of small firms, and 
particularly, their dynamics and feasibility. The concepts I used to address 
these issues included: global and local networks, obligatory points of 
passage, convergence, momentum and collectif. 
The conceptual toolbox I use is, admittedly, not a very large one. How-
ever, there is a certain 'elegance' in using only a minimum of concepts 
and assumptions in order to draw a maximum of results. After all: why 
resort to a gigantic arsenal of concepts - as in 'traditional' sociology - if, in 
the end, the conceptual toolbox becomes more complex and difficult to 
handle than the problem(s) one tries to resolve with it? Why use a whole 
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army to kill a fly? Throughout the thesis, I preferred to use an innovative, 
'minimalist' theoretical framework to explore small-scale entrepreneurial 
projects, than to be theoretically rigorous and relying on 'correct', pre-
scribed methodological procedures. Sure enough, I may be blamed for 
not having taken the burden of verification too seriously. But then I chose 
to say something new about small firms rather than to tread well-known 
theoretical paths leading to single recipes. 
Findings from the case studies 
In the empirical Chapters of this thesis, I sought to focus on cases of 
entrepreneurial projects that contrasted as much as possible in terms of 
their dynamics and feasibility. Thus in Chapter Four I deployed the case 
of Carlos, an entrepreneur involved in two projects simultaneously: taco 
vending and public transport. As the case showed, the taco project was 
able to build its own context and content, thereby enabling Carlos to sell 
tacos with a profit. In the terminology of this thesis, the project was 
successful in establishing itself as an obligatory point of passage - even 
though, in the end, the point of passage proved to be a weak one. The 
reason for this was that neither the inside nor the outside of the project 
were strongly regulated - that is, the project participated in a collectif that 
was not strongly integrated in the sense that not many rules, regulations 
or cultural arrangements governed interactions between participating 
actors. This low degree of convergence, therefore, at all times endangered 
the feasibility of the project. 
In contrast with the taco business, the minibus project developed 
within a collectif that showed a relatively strong degree of convergence. A 
strong regulatory framework for the operation of the minibus already 
existed, making Carlos' work relatively easy as he did not have to build a 
context for his project from scratch. In fact, all Carlos needed to do was to 
build an appropriate local network to support the project. Carlos, as the 
case showed, succeeded in this and for a time the minibus enterprise 
proved to be a feasible and viable one. However, when actors from the 
global network changed the rules of the game and came forward with 
new expectations, Carlos could not find the room for manoeuvre required 
to adapt his local network and fulfil expected returns. The minibus project 
thus stopped acting as an obligatory point of passage between the 
project's global and local networks, and finally disintegrated. 
Both of Carlos' projects, then, showed a trajectory in which 
projected plans were first materialized, then collapsed. As I tried to show, 
however, the putting together - or giving up - of a business cannot be 
attributed to any one single factor. Projects are not clear-cut events, but 
rather trajectories that reflect contingencies of their own. These trajec-
tories cannot be reduced to the machinations of 'context' or to 
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economistic notions of success or failure. To understand them, one cannot 
rely solely on premade analytical categories (which is always easy); 
instead, one must show how all the elements related to a project are 
sorted out, ordered, related and held together in practice (which is always 
difficult). 
In Chapter Five Carlos' projects were contrasted with those of Chabelo -
an entrepreneur engaged in the setting up of a small shop and a bar. As 
the case showed, Chabelo successfully managed to build a global and a 
local network within which the shop project could be operated. The shop 
thus acted as an obligatory point of passage: it orchestrated the local 
network and controlled transactions between the local network 
(softdrinks, beer, groceries, etc.) and the global network (consumers, etc.). 
The collectif - that is, the relations between all the actors involved in the 
project - however, was a fragile one. As in the case of Carlos' taco 
business, the global network was not strongly regulated, and the project 
itself did not succeed in creating any rules of its own which could be 
added to practices generally followed: after all, Chabelo's shop did not 
significantly alter local consumption patterns. 
The case of Chabelo's bar differs from the shop project in that the 
former never became an obligatory point of passage. For a time, the bar 
project succeeded in gradually building up the local and global networks 
that were crucial if it were to become a reality. As it turned out, however, 
the project was unable to add its own rules to already existing ones (think 
of building permits; health insurance for workers; reforms to Article 2 7 of 
the Constitution which allowed ejidatarios to sell their land, and so on), 
and hence the degree of convergence of the project's collectif remained 
low. This lack of convergence in turn made it possible for some of the 
actors involved in the bar project's 'script' to define their interests and 
roles differently - thus making off on their own and leaving Chabelo 
empty-handed in the process. Interestingly, the bar project nevertheless 
gained momentum: after it became evident that the project had failed, 
Chabelo could not go back to the initial situation for the simple reason 
that he not any more owned the e/'/'do plot. 
Again, as in Carlos' case, the specific trajectory of Chabelo's 
projects cannot be reduced to a clear-cut set of events. The projects did 
not become unfeasible because they were badly designed from the outset, 
or because a specific 'context' worked against them. Especially in the case 
of the bar one can see that the project gained (and lost) reality by 
degrees. For a time, it was feasible: all actors involved in its implementa-
tion agreed to their attributed roles. The next moment, the project seemed 
to be all but feasible because some of the actors betrayed or opposed 
Chabelo's plan. After removing obstacles, the same project would look 
feasible once again. And so on. The fact that the bar never became a 
reality is itself a contingency. It could have been otherwise, and there is 
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nothing in the so-called 'context' that may be held accountable for the 
eventual success or failure. The solution of the problem of whether or not 
a project becomes feasible or remains unfeasible lies in the problem itself, 
and is not external to it. 
The case of David and Chela's store project in Chapter Six differs from 
those of Carlos' taco stall and Chabelo's shop in that it was never able to 
act as an obligatory point of passage between its global and local net-
works. Although for a short period the store provided its global network 
with a timely reward, difficulties in a successful contextualization of the 
project denied the room for manoeuvre necessary to construct a durable 
local network. In other words, problems with the 'context' impeded 
David and Chela to turn their project into a locus of control over transac-
tions between the local and the global networks. The main reason for this 
was that, despite the forthright conditions put forward by David and 
Chela when taking over the store, they did not succeed in enroling the 
necessary actors to fulfil the roles laid out for them. Hence, the project 
did not take the direction David and Chela wished. In other words: the 
degree of convergence between the actors involved in the project was 
low, and the collectif did not act as one enterprise. 
As in Carlos' and Chabelo's case, David and Chela's project was 
not in a 'context'. Through painstaking negotiations with all sorts of 
actors, the project tried to give itself one. The fact that it was not able to 
succeed in this eventually put the feasibility of the project in question. 
Nevertheless, and unlike Carlos' and Chabelo's projects, David and 
Chela's never really gained momentum. That is, at no point was it imposs-
ible for them to go back on their steps, and neither were their future 
activities determined by the take-over of the store. This points to the 
dissimilar effects similar projects may have - effects which, as the case 
showed, could not be imputed to a fixed notion of context, but were 
intricately linked to David and Chela's negotiating skills and heterogen-
eous strategies. 
In Chapter Seven I described the case of Le6n, a producer of mezcal. 
Leon's project differed from those of the previous Chapters in that the 
degree of convergence was relatively high, even though it was unable to 
add its local rules to more general ones. Otherwise, the project achieved 
a momentum of its own, and acted as an obligatory point of passage by 
successfully constructing its global and local networks and controlling 
transactions between these. Thus Le6n's project was able to control 
consumers of its mezcal by at the same time controlling the local network 
de-scribed by the liquor. In other words, by holding together the collectif 
(workers, collaborators, peers and so on) the project managed to simulta-
neously create, control and enlarge his clientele. Le6n thus became a 
"good seller" (Law and Akrich, 1994) in order to create and control the 
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"good client". One and the other was made apparent by focusing on how 
the competition was held at bay, how collaborators (both human and 
nonhuman) were enlisted, and how workers were put in place - that is, 
how the different elements that make up the production, distribution and 
consumption of mezcal were made to converge. 
While the projects of Carlos, Chabelo, David and Chela, and Ledn 
portrayed the different ways in which these acted (or failed to act) as 
obligatory points of passage through the continuous work of localizing 
and contextualizing, in Chapter Eight the thesis took a slightly different 
direction. Putting less emphasis on obligatory points of passage, conver-
gence and momentum, the Chapter instead concentrated on a theme that 
was only developed to a degree in Chapters Four through Seven - namely 
that of the relationship between projects and crucial actors from their 
global networks: the final consumers of its products and services. Thus, in 
Chapter Eight I delved further into the character of this relationship by 
way of a case study on Pablo, an independent distributor of mezcal. The 
main finding was that, by following this distributor in his practices, one 
could in fact throw new light on traditional notions about the identities of 
producers and consumers. So, for example, the case showed that it made 
little sense to talk about producers and consumers as if they had fixed 
identities that could be unproblematically reduced to their social or 
economic essences. Rather, these identities were shown to be continuous-
ly constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed in the process of produc-
ing and consuming - a process that vastly exceeds the realm of production 
and consumption proper. Producers and consumers, I argued in the 
Chapter, are thus not mere essences, but the simultaneous end product of 
all sorts of relations - relations which are often, if not always, mediated 
through objects. Thus, as the case on the distribution of mezcal showed, 
it would in fact be impossible to say anything about consumers or pro-
ducers of this liquor without referring to the product itself. However, a 
producer is always more than what s/he makes, just as a consumer is 
always more than that which s/he consumes. That is, the identity of both 
producers and consumers is mediated through things (produced or 
consumed) and services (provided or used) as well as the complex array 
of skills, knowledge, and all else that is needed to produce, consume, 
provide or use a product or service. Thus mezcal did not mediate the 
relationship between producers and consumers of it all by itself. It needed 
help. It needed allies. It was here that Pablo's skills and knowledge of 
different domains (both of consumers' as of producers') proved crucial 
for - like all else - the identities of producers and consumers were negoti-
able. 
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In Chapters Seven and Eight the locus of attention were specific, small-
scale entrepreneurial projects related to the production and distribution of 
mezcal. In Chapter Nine, I shifted attention away from specific projects, 
and further elaborated on the notion of collectif by way of a study of the 
larger network of firms engaged in the production of the liquor. Particular-
ly, the Chapter dealt with the collectifs expansion and transformation, 
and the way in which these were given shape through a continuous 
realignment of so-called social, technical, economic and political 
elements. Both expansion and transformation encouraged product special-
ization and diversification, externalization of production, inter- and intra 
firm division of labour, and the diffusion of innovations and know-how 
amongst producers of mezcal. Underlying these processes, I argued, was 
the constant addition of new human and non-human beings to the 
collectif, the enrolment of people and things who/that initially conspired 
against mezcal producers' goals, a qualitative change in the properties of 
actors involved in the collectif, the delegation of human properties to 
non-humans, and the effective packaging or black-boxing of heterogen-
eous actors. Furthermore, the collectif was characterized by a strong 
degree of convergence, making it possible for mezcal producers to 
develop feasible firms. 
Some theoretical implications for the study of small-scale entrepreneur-
ial projects. 
Throughout the thesis, I treated a number of cases that dealt with the 
enterprising endeavours of a variety of actors. However, the main aim was 
not to provide some type of 'heroic' account of the wheelings and 
dealings of Carlos, Chabelo, David and Chela, Pablo, or Leon and a 
number of his fellow mezcal producers. As Latour (1988b) states in his 
treatment of Pasteur, the idea is not to show the 'greatness' of a man, but 
to describe how a 'great man' is constructed. This however is problematic 
for two different reasons. The first one is that if one takes individuals such 
as Pasteur - or Carlos, Chabelo, Le6n, etc. - to be final products or effects, 
then one cannot any more take them as starting points for study. If 
individuals are decentered subjects then how can one analyse them? 
And - this is the second reason - how can one frame their projects if one 
does not know, a priori, what these projects are? The first problem I tried 
to resolve by not assuming, a priori, what the essence of Pablo, Chabelo, 
and so on was. Doing so offered the advantage of not having to picture 
actors as naked, essential human beings surrounded by things. Rather, the 
human beings of the case studies were conceived as gatherings, as 
assemblies of all sorts of materials. Sure, the humans had their bodies and 
their souls. But if we took away their tacos, their tiendas or their mezcal 
these actors would not any more be the successful or unsuccessful 
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entrepreneurs I described. The entrepreneurs of this thesis, then, can be 
seen as collectifs in their own right. Collectifs which keep on growing (or 
shrinking) as new elements are added (or withdrawn) to it in order to 
counter whatever threatens to interfere with actors' projects. 
The second problem - how to define what a project is when a 
project does not yet exist and is still a fiction - I addressed by following 
the actors and sticking to the framework and the boundaries they them-
selves displayed through their practices, that is, by tracing their work of 
globalizing and localizing. This I did by not making any a priori dis-
tinction between the social, the technical, the political and so on in the 
case studies. The narrative thus respected the frameworks and Categories 
used by the actors themselves to describe their situation, and followed 
them in their work of producing homogeneity out of heterogeneity - of 
creating order out of disorder. This way, I was able to give a more 
complete analysis of action - opening up, as it were, a new way of 
understanding small-scale projects that is closed-off for traditional sociol-
ogy-
Having said this, what general theoretical implications does this thesis 
have for the study of small-scale entrepreneurial projects in general? 
Perhaps the most compelling significance of this study is that it shows that 
theoretically-informed empirical cases can make a start in breaking down 
disciplinary walls, making it possible to grasp the essentially contingent, 
unfixed nature of entrepreneurial projects. Particularly, what this means is 
that these projects can be approached as not being economic, social, 
technological, or political first and foremost - as traditional sociology or 
economics tells us. Indeed, if entrepreneurial projects wish to become 
feasible then psycho-socio-legal-technical-politico-economic compromises 
need to be accepted. And, more importantly, what counts is not so much 
the exact characterization or categorization of these compromises, but 
rather deciding upon what needs to be negotiated when and where, and 
under what circumstances. 
The mixing, compromising, weaving and re-weaving of the actors 
from the case studies furthermore suggest that traditional notions such as 
'structure' are in much need of overhauling. Following the actors, it 
becomes clear that projects are not embedded in a structure, but rather 
that they are progressive concepts: there is no way to get a clear picture 
of them without taking into account the work of continuous, incremental 
contextualizing. Indeed, as the trajectories of the entrepreneurial projects 
of this thesis show, their form and scope undergo metamorphosis through 
time. And, as is also apparent, the progressive projects of this thesis are 
not the work of individual agents, but of composite agents (de-centered 
subjects) who attribute agency to a host of both social and material actors. 
Entrepreneurs are thus collective actors who address 'social' problems 
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through the mobilization of the 'technical', and who settle 'technical' 
problems through the mobilization of the 'social'. 
Clearly, much work is still needed to refine the arguments I made. Actor-
network theory was developed within science studies, and in this thesis 
only a first attempt was made to assess its potential in overcoming some 
of what I saw as the main shortcomings to the study of small-scale 
entrepreneurial projects. Thus, for example, I do not address one of the 
inherent problems of actor-network theory: that of the necessity of 
describing cases from the point of view of attempts to build one specific 
obligatory point of passage only - when clearly the situation is so that 
entrepreneurs may have multiple memberships in different projects and 
thus conduct their translations simultaneously (cf. Star 1991; Star and 
Criesemer 1989:389-90; see Latour's (1996) masterpiece Aramis or the 
Love of Technology, though, for a polycentric narrative). Likewise, issues 
relating to power were not systematically developed in the cases - even 
though it is obvious that as collectifs or actor-networks extend 
assymmetries are simultaneously constructed. And neither did I develop 
the full potential of the approach to understand the issues of spatiality that 
surfaced throughout the cases. And perhaps the most pressing question 
that this thesis failed to address was that related to representation: if, as 
actor-network proposes, there is no 'fixed' world 'out there' to be repre-
sented because objects and subjects are fused, then what can one repre-
sent at all? Network building only, as actor-network theory suggests? As 
Lee and Brown (1994:783) remark, does this not entail the trap of creating 
the illusion of the "final final vocabulary?" Is representation (i.e. 
'comparison', 'generalization') anthropology's business, after all? Should 
not, evocation instead be the object of anthropology's concern, as 
Strathern (1991) advises? 
Some policy implications for small-scale entrepreneurial projects 
Without doubt, small firms (many of them often labelled as 'informal') are 
important because in Mexico - as in other areas of the so-called Third 
World - they are thriving and provide employment for the largest part of 
the population. As never before, their potential for sustained economic 
growth and welfare provision is now realized. Indeed, re-evaluations of 
small firms' contribution to development presently run high in the 
Mexican political agenda. Never before, then, has the task of understand-
ing small firms - how they are shaped, how they shape development -
been so urgent. The argument developed in this thesis represents one 
more step to address this urgent task. With its stress on the heterogenous 
nature of small-scale entrepreneurial projects, the thesis re-directs atten-
tion to an often forgotten dimension in the debate on the role of small 
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firms in development - namely that the technical or economic questions 
small firms confront are never narrowly technical or economic, just as the 
social or political problems they face are never narrowly social or politi-
cal. 
A first general recommendation flowing from this thesis, then, is 
the not always obvious insight that it is difficult to formulate policies to 
support small-scale business through social, political, economic or techni-
cal incentives alone. Indeed, as the cases show, the more one ventures 
into actors' behaviour, the more one is confronted with complex relation-
ships, and the less evident it becomes to index action in specifically 
social, political, technical or economic terms. Hence, policies towards 
small firms should address the multidimensional character of action. 
Related to this, a second general recommendation is that schemes 
promoting small firms need to go beyond treating small-scale entrepre-
neurial projects as isolated, self-contained entities. Instead, they should be 
geared to the collectif of actors engaged in the production, dissemination, 
and consumption of specific goods and services. This is not without its 
problems for, as the empirical Chapters have shown, one cannot general-
ize about collectifs: each one represents a specific and unique configur-
ation of actors. To consider collectifs as loci for policy formulation thus 
calls for a different way of 'measuring' small firms. 
The issue of 'measuring' the dynamics and feasibility of small firms is 
exactly what I address in this thesis. In doing so, I advanced a number of 
conceptual tools which - if one takes on board the above recommenda-
tions - may have policy implications. Thus, for example, the tool kit used 
in this thesis may be used to address questions such as: what small firms 
should be helped? How should these firms be helped? But these questions 
are not neutral, and hence the conceptual apparatus of actor-network 
theory is a double-edged weapon. For actor-network theory can show 
which enterprise forms are successful and thus worthy of attention in 
terms of political support, technical assistance, credit programs, and so 
on. Such an interpretation however would pay lip service to liberal 
policies and supply-side economics. Symmetrically, the tool kit used in 
this thesis offers the possibility to detect those enterprise forms which are 
unsuccessful, and thus aid populist policies and demand-side economics 
to mount an argument for the protection and promotion of these firms 
which are clearly not a part of the microentrepreneurial elite that knows 
how to take care of itself. The policy implications of actor-network theory 
thus vary because these implications may mean different things to differ-
ent policy makers. 
The policy implications of this thesis, then, involve a range of political, 
ethical and moral issues. What is the 'right' way to use some of the 
findings of the cases? There is no way of deciding this a priori, because 
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discerning what is 'right' from what is 'wrong' can only be established 
afterwards, when large constituencies have been enroled and mobilized 
to endorse a specific point of view. After all, as a tool to discern feasible 
from unfeasible enterprise forms, actor-network theory may be welcomed 
by the arguments of liberal and populist policy makers alike. These, like 
the entrepreneurs from this thesis, are all busy trying to contextualize and 
localize their own political (social, technical, economic) projects through 
heterogeneous means. The outcome of this power struggle is also pro-
gressive and depends on the kind and the number of elements mobilized 
(one of which could be the tool kit of actor-network theory) as well as the 
strategies deployed by their opponents. 
This call for epistemological relativism - not nihilism - concerning possible 
policies towards small-scale business does not mean that one has to give 
up our involvement and our commitment to a fairer world. Indeed, as 
Law (1991:6) puts it, "to be a relativist - to recognise multivocality -
implies no obligatory commitment to immorality or opportunism... rather, 
it may lead us to an important form of intelectual caution: the sense that 
all knowledges are shaped, contingent, and in some other world could be 
otherwise." Maybe, then - and I hope this is not wishful thinking - by 
listening to what the entrepreneurs of these pages have to tell us we can 
come closer to understanding the dynamics not so much of success, but 
of the effects of its distribution. 
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GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS 
adobe: 
alameda: 
alambique: 
Alianza de 
Camioneros: 
arrendadora: 
Banca de Desarrollo: 
birria: 
caciques: 
Ca/a Popular: 
Central de Abastos: 
centro botanero: 
chOntaro: 
corraldn: 
cremerla: 
compadre: 
comadre: 
compadrazgo: 
Consumo: 
cuaresma: 
cuesta: 
ejido: 
fiesta: 
Hacienda: 
Mariscos: 
mezcal: 
mordida: 
mud bricks, 
town garden, 
still. 
public transport organization in'Jalisco. 
credit institution. 
Development Bank. 
traditional goat meat dish. 
commonly applied to strong men in rural areas. 
Caciques are power brokers at local or regional level 
who accrue power by controlling rewards, such as 
access to information concerning legislations, and to 
political networks which open up possibilities of 
approaching important officers to deal with 
bureaucratic issues. 
co-operative credit union. 
wholesale marketplace 
bar; usually attended by prostitutes. 
a disrespectful name applied to Amerindians from 
Oaxaca and Guerrero who come to El Grullo to 
harvest sugarcane or work in the tomato fields. 
confinement place. 
cheese shop. 
co-father; ritual kinsman; see also comadre. 
co-mother; quasi-kin status attained through Catholic 
rituals, genberally implying godmother (in baptism, 
confirmation, marriage or other celebrations) of the 
co-mother or co-father's son or daughter, 
ritual kinship. 
a co-operative store in El Grullo. 
Lent. 
uphill; difficult period. 
a socio-legal entity concerned with the administration 
of land and other collective properties. Ejidos were 
established under the 1920's land reform law that 
followed the Mexican Revolution. The term ejido is 
commonly used to designate the geographical site as 
well as an organization of members, 
celebration (both religious and non-religious). 
Ministry of Taxes. 
bar where drinks are accompanied by sea food, 
a distilled liquor made from the heart of agave 
plants, 
bribe. 
2 5 2 TACOS, TIENDAS AND MEZCAL 
panela: fresh cheese. 
padrino: godfather. 
palapa: a wooden structure with a thatched roof made from 
palm leafs. 
plaza: central place in town. 
prilsta: * a member of the PRI. 
Procuradurla Agraria: Bureau of Land Affairs. 
quinceanos: celebration of a woman's fifteenth birthday. 
rancheros: people from the ranches. 
rancho: small village or settlement. 
solar: urban plot. 
tacos: a tort/7/a filled with food. 
taverna: distillery. 
tequila: a variety of mezcal which originates in the region of 
Tequila. 
tianguis: ambulant marketplace. 
tianguistas: vendors at ambulant marketplaces 
tiendas: stores or shops; usually small-scale. 
tortas: bread filled with food. 
tortilla: staple made from maize dough, similar to pancakes 
and used in the same way that other cultures use 
bread. 
tortillerla: shop where tortillas are made. 
tortilleros: wooden press utilized to make tortillas. 
unidad de riego: small-scale irrigation unit operated by water users 
organized in an association. 
vino: utilized as a synonym for distilled liquor. 
zafra: sugarcane harvest. 
ACRONYMS 
BANAMEX: 
BANCOMEXT: 
BANRURAL: 
CANACO: 
CROC: 
CRIT: 
CNOP: 
Banco Nacional de Mexico (National Bank of 
Mexico). 
Banco de Comercio Exterior (Foreign Trade Bank). 
Banco Nacional de Credito Rural (National Rural 
Credit Bank). 
Camara Nacional de Comercio (National Chamber 
of Commerce). 
Confederaci6n Revolucionaria de Obreros y 
Campesinos (Revolutionary Union of Workers and 
Peasants; affiliated to PRI). 
Camara Regional de la Industria del Tequila. 
Confederacidn Nacional de Organ izaciones 
Populares (National Union of Popular Organizations; 
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affiliated to PRI). 
Confederaciön Nacional Campesina (National 
Peasant Union; affiliated to PRI). 
Confederaciön Nacional de Pequefios Propietarios 
(National Union of Private Landholders; affiliated to 
PRI). 
Comisiön para la Regularizaciön de la Tenencia de 
la Tierra (Commission for the Regulation of Land 
Tenure). 
Confederaciön de Trabajadores de Mexico (Mexican 
Labour Union; affiliated to PRI). 
Fideicomisos Institufdos en Relaciön a la Agricultura 
(second-level governement funding for agriculture). 
Institute Mexicano del Seguro Social (Mexican 
Institute of Social Security). 
Institute para el Fomento Nacional de la Vivienda 
para los Trabajadores (Institute for the National 
Promotion of Housing for Labourers). 
Nacional Financiera (National Financing Institution). 
Norma Oficial Mexicana (Mexican Official Norm). 
Partido Acciön Nacional (National Action Party). 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional 
Revolutionary Party; political party in power since 
1929). 
Programa de Certificaciön de Derechos Ejidales 
(Ejidal Rights Certification Programme; government 
institute in charge of issuing formal land titles to 
e/'/do-plot owners). 
Procuradurfa Federal del Consumidor (Federal 
Consumer Agency). 
Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (National 
Programme for Solidarity). 
Seguro de Ahorro para el Retiro (Pension Fund). 
Secretarfa de Agricultura y Recursos Hidräulicos 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources). 
Secretarfa de Comercio y Fomento Industrial 
(Ministry of Trade and Industrial Promotion). 
Secretarfa de Desarrollo Urbano (Ministry of Urban 
Development) 
Sistema de Transporte Colectivo de la Zona 
Metropolitana (Public Transport System of the 
Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara). 
Telefonos de Mexico (Mexican Telephone Company). 
SUMMARY 
The role of small firms in developing countries is a subject of continuous 
interest in both academic and policy circles. Small firms account for a large 
part of economic activity, and their employment share is remarkable. Yet, 
although considerable knowledge about them exists, some of the key issues 
concerning small businesses remain relatively underexposed or are highly 
debatable. One such issue is that of their feasibility. What firms are feasible? 
What are the conditions for their success? Is it technology choice, flexibility, 
innovativeness or relative size which determine the vitality of small firms? 
Or is it their organizational practices, or the institutional environment within 
which they operate that is crucial? These questions are important, because 
great hopes are placed on the role of small firms as a 'cure-all' for economic 
crisis. The present study aims to contribute towards a better understanding 
of small firms by answering some of these central issues in development. 
Although the study focuses on a number of small businesses in Western 
Mexico, the scope of the argument has much broader implications, and may 
help shed light on the dynamics and feasibility of small firms in development 
contexts in general. 
To understand the dynamics and feasibility of small firms, in Chapter 
1 it is argued that existing perspectives on the phenomenon of small firms, 
and the assumptions on which they are based, should be challenged. On the 
basis of a questioning of different theoretical perspectives, in Chapter 2 some 
promising analytical frameworks that provide useful insights into the study 
of small firms - flexible specialization and the actor-oriented approach - are 
discussed. Drawing upon their shortcomings, the Chapter elaborates on actor-
network theory, a body of theoretical work developed in the context of the 
sociology of science which treats social relations as network effects. According 
to Law (1992:379) this theory is distinctive because"... it insists that networks 
are materially heterogeneous and argues that society and organization would 
not exist if they were simply social." Hence, from this point of view the task 
of sociology is to characterize the ways in which different materials are 
juxtaposed to create realities theretofore unimaginable. In the context of this 
study, the analytical framework of actor-network theory sets the stage to 
address the two main research questions: 
a. how can one account for the heterogeneous processes that shape the 
projects of small-scale entrepreneurs in a rural area of Western 
Mexico? 
b. under what conditions are durable (i.e. feasible) entrepreneurial 
projects constructed? 
Chapter 3 deals with the methodological implications of the theoretical 
framework, and how these in turn affected the research process. In order to 
address these issues, a reflexive account of the research genealogy is given: 
why the theme of small-scale enterprise was chosen, what paths had to be 
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trod to obtain funding for the research, what problems were faced during the 
fieldwork period and, finally, how the theoretical position developed in Chap-
ter 2 came to be adopted. 
Chapters 4 through 9 address the main research concerns through a 
number of case studies on small-scale entrepreneurial projects. In a nutshell, 
the argument runs that the dynamics and feasibility of small firms are a func-
tion of three interrelated factors. First, the ability of entrepreneurs to set up 
and sustain a global network capable of providing a range of different 
resources in exchange for some kind of future return; second, the ability of 
entrepreneurs to use resources from a global network to build a local network 
with the aim of satisfying the expectations of actors lodged in the global 
network; third, the degree in which an entrepreneur succeeds in controlling 
all transactions between the global and the local networks of the firm. This 
does not imply that there necessarily exists a relationship between the values 
and significations shared by actors belonging to these different networks. 
Chapter 4 takes up these dimensions through an in-depth case study 
of Carlos, an entrepreneur involved in two projects simultaneously: taco 
selling and public transport. As the case shows, the taco project was relatively 
successful as Carlos was able to build a global and a local network, and 
control the transactions between the two. However, a lack of integration 
between actors from both networks at all times endangered the feasibility of 
the enterprise. In contrast, in the minibus project Carlos did not succeed in 
maintaining a global network, and when actors from this network came up 
with new regulations the local network could not anymore fulfil expected 
returns and the project collapsed. 
Chapter 5 displays an entrepreneur engaged in the setting up of two 
projects: a small shop and a bar. As the case shows, the entrepreneur 
successfully managed to build a global and a local network within which the 
shop project could be operated. However, the project turned out to be a 
fragile one because the entrepreneur did not succeed in regulating the 
transactions between both networks. In the case of the bar, the entrepreneur 
could not successfully link the actors from both the local and global network -
let alone control their transactions. 
Chapter 6 pictures a couple - David and Chela - who take over a store 
from relatives. The case differs from the prior ones in that the project provided 
its global network with a timely reward, but only for a short period. The 
reason for this is that difficulties arose in the contextualization of the project, 
which in turn denied the room for manoeuvre necessary to construct a 
durable local network. The main reason for this was that, despite the forthright 
conditions put forward by David and Chela when taking over the store, they 
did not succeed in enroling the necessary actors to fulfil the roles laid out 
for them. Hence, the project did not take the direction David and Chela 
wished, eventually putting the feasibility of the store in question. 
Chapter 7 describes the case of Le6n, a producer of mezcal. Le6n's 
project differs from those of the previous Chapters in that Ledn's project sue-
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cessfuIly constructed its global and local networks, and controlled transactions 
between these. Thus Leon controlled consumers of his mezcal by at the same 
time controlling the local network implicated in the production of the liquor. 
One and the other is made apparent by focusing on how the competition is 
held at bay, how collaborators (both human and nonhuman) are enlisted, and 
how workers are put in place - that is, how the different interests of the actors 
who make up the production, distribution and consumption of mezcal are 
made to converge. 
In Chapter 8 the thesis takes a slightly different turn by concentrating 
on a theme only partially developed in Chapters 4 through 7 namely the 
relationship between projects and crucial actors from their global networks: 
the final consumers of projects' products and services. Through a case study 
on Pablo, an independent distributor of mezcal, Chapter 8 throws new light 
on traditional notions about the identities of producers and consumers, and 
shows that these identities are continuously constructed, deconstructed and 
reconstructed in the process of producing and consuming - a process that 
vastly exceeds the realm of production and consumption proper. Thus in this 
Chapter it is argued that producers and consumers are nothing but the end 
product of heterogeneous relations which are often mediated through 
objects. 
In Chapter 9 attention shifts away from specific projects, and focuses 
on the larger network of firms engaged in the production of mezcal. In 
general, the Chapter deals with the expansion and transformation of this 
network, and the way in which it takes shape through a continuous realign-
ment of so-called social, technical, economic and political elements. 
Particularly, the Chapter focuses on the way in which the network of mezcal 
firms transforms and expands in time through a) a constant addition of new 
human and non-human beings to the network, b) the enrolment of people 
and things who/that initially conspired against mezcal producers' goals, c) 
a qualitative change in the properties of actors involved in the network, d) 
the delegation of human properties to non-humans, and e) the effective 
packaging or black-boxing of heterogeneous actors. Furthermore, the network 
is shown to be characterized by a strong degree of convergence of interests 
of all actors involved, making it possible for mezcal producers to develop 
feasible firms. 
The general conclusion of this thesis is that the feasibility of small-
scale entrepreneurial projects is a function of the morphology of the local and 
global networks which these projects help build and maintain. This and some 
other findings that follow from the case studies are made explicit in Chapter 
10. Also, this final Chapter retakes the issue of why it is important to look 
at the feasibility of small firms, and why the approach chosen in this study 
can be seen as a positive contribution for both academic and policy debates 
concerning the role of small firms in rural areas of developing regions. 
Theoretically, the significance of this study is that it shows that, through 
theoretically-informed empirical cases, one can avert disciplinary myopia, 
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making it possible to grasp the essentially contingent, unfixed nature of 
entrepreneurial projects. Furthermore, the study suggests that traditional 
sociological and anthropological notions such as 'structure' are in much need 
of overhauling for, as the cases demonstrate, small firms are not embedded 
in a fixed structure, but rather they are progressive ideas which materialize 
through practices, that is, through the work contextualizing and localizing 
objects that create social relations. As to policy concerns, this study suggests 
that it is precarious to formulate policies to support small-scale business 
through social, political, economic or technical incentives alone but that, 
instead policies should address the multidimensional character of 
entrepreneurial activity. Related to this, a general policy recommendation of 
this study is that schemes promoting small firms need to go beyond treating 
small-scale entrepreneurialI projects as isolated, self-contained islands. Instead, 
they should be geared to the materially heterogeneous networks of actors 
engaged in the production, dissemination, and consumption of specific goods 
and services. 
RESUMEN 
Tacos, tiendas y mezcal: una perspectiva del actor-red hacia pequenos 
proyectos empresariales en el Occidente de Mexico. 
El papel de la pequefia empresa en pafses en vfas de desarrollo es objeto 
de gran interés en cfrculos académicos y polfticos. Sin duda alguna, este 
tipo de empresas contribuyen de una manera significativa en la actividad 
econômica nacional, e incorporan a una gran parte de la mano de obra. 
Sin embargo, y a pesar de que existen muchos datas sobre el fenomeno 
de la microempresa, algunos aspectos centrales han recibido poca aten-
ciôn, o bien se prestan a diferentes interpretaciones. Uno de estas aspec-
tos esta relacionado con la viabilidad de la microempresa. ^Qué tipo de 
empresa es viable? jCuâles son las condiciones de éxito? ^Son acaso la 
elecciôn de tecnologfa, flexibilidad, innovaciôn, o escala relativa las 
variables que determinan la vitalidad de pequenas empresas? O son mas 
bien las prâcticas organizativas, o el entorno institucional dentro del cual 
operan estas empresas, las condicionantes del éxito? Estas preguntas son 
importantes debido a la creciente esperanza que se deposita en el papel 
de la pequefia empresa como remedio a situaciones de crisis econômica. 
El présente estudio prétende contribuir a un mejor entendimiento de la 
microempresa respondiendo a algunas de estas cuestiones centrales de 
desarrollo. A pesar de que el estudio gira en torno a una série de peque-
nas empresas en el Occidente de Mexico, la dimension del argumenta 
tiene implicaciones mas amplias, y puede iluminar la dinâmica y viabili-
dad de pequenas empresas en contextes mas générales de desarrollo. 
Para entender la dinâmica y viabilidad de la pequena empresa, en 
el Capftulo 1 se argumenta que las diferentes perspectivas sobre el 
fenômeno de la microempresa, asf como las presunciones sobre las cuâles 
se basan estas perspectivas, tienen que ser puestas en tela de juicio. En 
base a un cuestionamiento de un abanico de teorfas sobre le papel de la 
pequena empresa en el desarrollo, en el Capftulo 2 se discuten dos 
marcos teôricos que permiten un acercamiento promisorio al estudio de la 
pequena empresa - la especializaciôn flexible y la perspectiva orientada 
hacia el actor. Haciendo uso de las deficiencias de estas dos ûltimas 
perspectivas, el Capftulo élabora sobre una teorfa desarrollada en el 
âmbito de la sociologfa de la ciencia: la teorfa del actor-red. Esta teorfa 
conceptual iza a las relaciones sociales como efectos de la construcciôn de 
redes. Este marco teôrico se distingue por su insistencia en la heteroge-
neidad material de todo tipo de redes sociales, y argumenta que ni la 
sociedad, ni cualquier tipo de organizaciôn, podrfa existir si estas fuesen 
simplemente de una naturaleza social. Por consecuencia, desde este 
punto de vista, el papel de la sociologfa es el de caracterizar los medios 
por los cuales diferentes materias se juntan para generarse a sf mismas y 
para crear nuevas realidades hasta ese momento inimaginables. En el 
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contexto de este estudio, ei marco tedrico de la red-actor sirve como 
punto de partida para responder las siguientes preguntas de investigacidn: 
a. ^Cdmo dar cuenta de los procesos heterogeneos que dan forma a 
pequenos proyectos empresariales en una regidn rural del Occiden-
te de Mexico? 
b. $Bajo cuales condiciones es posible construir proyectos empresaria-
les viables? 
El Capftulo 3 trata sobre las implicaciones metodoldgicas del marco 
te6rico, y cdmo estas a su vez afectaron el proceso de investigaci6n. Para 
abordar estos asuntos, el Capftulo relata, de una manera reflexiva, la 
genealogfa de la investigaci6n: del porqud se escogid el tema de la 
pequena empresa, que pasos se dieron para obtener fondos para la 
realizacidn del proyecto de investigacidn, cuales fueron los problemas 
que se encontraron durante el perfodo de trabajo de campo y, finalmente, 
del porqud se adoptd la posicidn tedrica elaborada en el Capftulo 2. 
Los Capftulos 4 a 9 abordan las preguntas de investigacidn median-
te una serie de estudios de caso sobre proyectos empresariales de peque-
na escala. En sfntesis, el argumento central de estos casos es el de que la 
dinamica y viabilidad de la microempresa son una funcidn de la interrela-
cidn de tres factores. Primero, la habilidad, por parte de empresarios, de 
establecer y mantener una red global que proporciona al empresario una 
gama de recursos diversos a cambio de una remuneracidn futura. Segun-
do, la habilidad del empresario en utilizar estos recursos que le propor-
ciona la red global, para construir una red local cuyo objetivo es la 
satisfaccidn de las expectaciones de los adores insertos en la red global. 
Tercero, el grado en el cual un empresario logra controlar todas las 
transacciones entre la red global y la red local de la empresa. Esto implica 
que no necesariamente haya una relacidn entre valores y significados 
compartidos por adores pertenecientes a las diferentes redes. 
El Capftulo 4 retoma estas dimensiones a traves de un estudio de 
Carlos, un pequefio empresario involucrado simultaneamente en dos 
proyedos: la venta de tacos, y transports publico. El caso revela que, en 
la venta de tacos, Carlos es relativamente exitoso debido a que puede 
armar una red global y una red local, logrando controlar las transacciones 
entre estas dos redes. Sin embargo, una falta de integracidn entre los 
adores de ambas redes pone en peligro continuo la viabilidad del puesto 
de tacos. En contraste, en su proyedo de transports ptiblico Carlos es 
incapaz de mantener una red global. Cuando los diversos adores de la 
red global cambian las reglas de juego, la red local deja de satisfacer las 
expedaciones previstas por los adores de la red global y el proyedo 
fracasa. 
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El Capftulo 5 presenta a un empresario que intenta crear dos 
proyectos: una tienda y un bar. El estudio de caso nos indica que el 
empresario logra armar y mantener una red global y otra local para el 
manejo exitoso de la tienda. Sin embargo, el proyecto es de una naturale-
za fragil ya que el empresario no logra regular las transacciones entre 
ambas redes. En el caso del bar, el empresario no logra relacionar a los 
actores de la red global con los de la red local, y menos aun de controlar 
las transacciones entre el los. 
El Capftulo 6 muestra a una pareja - David y Chela - que hereda el 
manejo de una tienda de abarrotes. Este caso difiere de los anteriores en 
el sentido que la tienda es capaz de generar una retribucidn puntual a los 
actores de su red global, pero s6lo durante un corto perfodo. La razdn de 
esto es el surgimiento de dificultades en la contextualizacidn del proyecto 
empresarial, lo cual a su vez niega el espacio de maniobra requerido para 
la construcci6n de una red local estable. Esto se debe principalmente a 
que, a pesar de las condiciones bajo las cuales David y Chela deciden 
manejar el negocio, no logran enrolar a los actores necesarios. Por lo 
tanto, el proyecto no toma la direccidn requerida por David y Chela, 
eventualmente poniendo en peligro la viabilidad de la tienda. 
En el Capftulo 7 se describe el caso de Le6n, un productor de 
mezcal. El proyecto de Ledn difiere de los casos anteriores en el sentido 
que Leon consigue construir su red global y local, y logra controlar las 
transacciones entre ambas redes. Es decir, Le6n es capaz de controlar los 
consumidores de su mezcal a la vez que controla la red local implicada 
en la produccidn del licor. Este proceso de control se ilustra a traves de 
un analisis de como Leon logra mantener a distancia a la competencia, de 
cdmo enrola a sus colaboradores (sociales y materiales), y de c6mo 
coopta a sus trabajadores - es decir, de c6mo Ledn hace converger los 
diferentes intereses de los actores involucrados en la produccidn, distribu-
ci6n y consumo de mezcal. 
En el Capftulo 8 el presente estudio toma una ligera desviacidn, y 
se concentra en un tema que se desarrolla solo parcialmente en los 
Capftulos 4 a 7: la relacidn entre proyectos y actores cruciales de su red 
global - los consumidores finales de productos y servicios. Haciendo uso 
de un estudio de caso sobre Pablo - un distribuidor independiente de 
mezcal - este Capftulo proyecta una nueva perspectiva hacia nociones 
tradicionales sobre la identidad de productores y consumidores, e ilustra 
que estas identidades son construidas, deconstruidas y reconstruidas 
durante el proceso de producir y de consumir - un proceso que sobrepasa 
ampliamente el ambito de la produccidn y el consumo. Es decir, en este 
Capftulo se llega a la conclusidn de que tanto productores como consumi-
dores no son sino el producto final de relaciones mediadas a travel de 
objetos tales como el mezcal. 
En el Capftulo 9 el estudio no enfoca en proyectos especfficos, sino 
que analiza la red mas amplia de empresas productoras de mezcal. En 
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general, el Capftulo trata sobre la expansion y transformation de esta red, 
y de cômo esta toma forma a través de un realineamiento continuo de 
elementos tanto sociales, como técnicos, econômicos y polfticos. En 
particular, el Capftulo ilumina la manera en la cual la red de empresas 
productoras de mezcal se transforma y se expande al a) incorporar 
elementos humanos y materiales a la red, b) al reclutar personas y cosas 
que inicialmente se oponfan a los goles de los productores de mezcal, c) 
al cambiar las propiedades cualitativas de los actores que participan en la 
red, d) al delegar propiedades humanas a actores no-humanos y, final-
mente, e) al simplificar efectivamente a actores heterogéneos. Ademas, la 
red se caracteriza por la fuerte convergencia de intereses de todos los 
actores involucrados, permitiendo asf a productores de mezcal desarrollar 
empresas viables. 
La conclusion general del estudio es que la viabilidad de pequenas 
empresas es una funciôn de la morfologfa de las redes globales y locales 
que las mismas empresas engendran y mantienen. Esta y otras conclusio-
nes que surgen de los estudios de caso se elaboran en el Capftulo 10. 
Asimismo, en este Capftulo final se retoma la cuestiôn de porqué es 
importante examinar la viabilidad de la microempresa, y de porqué la 
perspectiva que se adopta en el estudio puede ofrecer una contribuciôn 
positiva a debates tanto académicos como polfticos concernientes al papel 
que juega la microempresa en las zonas rurales de regiones en desarrollo. 
En lo que toca a lo teôrico, la significancia del estudio estriba en el hecho 
que, a través de estudios de caso guiados por conceptos teôricos, se 
puede prévenir la miopfa disciplinaria, haciendo posible asf un entendi-
miento de la naturaleza esencialmente contingente de proyectos empresa-
riales. Ademas, el estudio sugiere que nociones sociolôgicas y antropolô-
gicas tradicionales taies como 'estructura' estân sujetos a revision ya que, 
como se demuestra por medio de los casos de estudio, los proyectos 
empresariales no estân insertos dentro de una estructura fija, sino que mâs 
bien representan ideas que se materializan a través de las prâcticas, es 
decir, de la contextualizaciôn y localizaciôn de objetos que crean relacio-
nes sociales. En lo que refiere a polfticas de desarrollo, el estudio sugiere 
que es precario formular polfticas de apoyo a la pequena empresa basa-
das solamente en el âmbito de lo social, lo polftico, lo econômico o lo 
técnico, sin considerar la relaciôn entre estas diferentes esteras. Relaciona-
do a esto, una recomendaciôn general que émana de este trabajo es que 
los esquemas que intentan apoyar al cambio social necesitan ir mas alla 
de una concepciôn que intenta aislar lo que en la prâctica se da como 
una concatenaciôn singular de elementos diversos. Por lo tanto, estas 
polfticas deberfan enfatizar el carâcter materialmente heterogéneo que 
constituyen redes de actores involucrados en la producciôn, distribucion y 
consumo de bienes y servicios. 
SAMENVATTING 
Tacos, winkels en mezcal: een actor-netwerk benadering van kleinschali-
ge ondernemers-projecten in West Mexico. 
De rol van kleine bedrijven in ontwikkelingslanden heeft altijd in de 
belangstelling gestaan van zowel academische als politieke kringen. 
Kleine bedrijven zorgen voor een groot deel van de economische activi-
teit en leveren een aanzienlijke bijdrage op het gebied van de werkgele-
genheid. Hoewel er veel kennis over hen bestaat, blijven enkele van de 
belangrijkste onderwerpen omtrent kleine bedrijven relatief onderbelicht. 
Een van deze onderwerpen betreff, hun levensvatbaarheid. Welke bedrij-
ven zijn levensvatbaar? Wat zijn de voorwaarden voor hun succes? 
Bepalen technologische keuzes, flexibiliteit, innovatie of relatieve grootte 
de vitaliteit van kleine bedrijven? Of is het de manier waarop zij georga-
niseerd zijn, of de institutionele omgeving waarin zij opereren, dat van 
doorslaggevend belang is? Deze vragen zijn van belang omdat kleine 
bedrijven dikwijls gezien worden als d6 oplossing voor een economische 
crisis. Dit proefschrift hoopt door antwoord te geven op bovengenoemde 
vragen het inzicht te vergroten van de rol die kleine bedrijven spelen in 
ontwikkelingsregio's. Hoewel de Studie zieh rieht op een aantal onderne-
mingen in West Mexico heeft het theoretisch argument veel bredere 
implicaties. Zij beoogt een licht te werpen op de dynamiek en levensvat-
baarheid van kleine bedrijven binnen de ontwikkelingscontext in het alge-
meen. 
Om de dynamiek en levensvatbaarheid van kleine bedrijven te 
begrijpen, wordt in Hoofdstuk 1 betoogt dat de bestaande benaderingen 
van kleine bedrijven en de veronderstellingen waarop deze zijn geba-
seerd zouden moeten worden herzien. Vervolgens volgt in Hoofdstuk 2 
een discussie over twee veelbelovende theoretische raamwerken die 
bruikbare inzichten verlenen in de Studie van kleine bedrijven: flexibele 
specialisatie en de actor-georienteerde benadering. Bouwend op hun 
tekortkomingen wordt in dit hoofdstuk ingegaan op de actor-netwerk 
theorie, een stroming ontwikkeld binnen de wetenschapssociologie die 
sociale relaties als effecten van netwerken conceptualiseert. Deze theorie 
onderscheidt zieh door de nadruk op de materiele heterogeniteit van 
sociale relaties, en betoogt dat de maatschappij niet zou kunnen bestaan 
als deze alleen uit sociale relaties zou zijn opgebouwd. Daarom wordt 
binnen dit perspectief de rol van de sociologie gezien als de Studie naar 
de manier waarop verschillende menselijke en materiele elementen met 
elkaar in verband gebracht worden om zodoende nieuwe, tot dan toe 
onvoorstelbare werkelijkheden te creeren. Deze zienswijze vormt tevens 
de aanzet tot de twee belangrijkste onderzoeksvragen van deze Studie: 
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a. Hoe kan men de heterogene Processen verklaren die vorm geven 
aan de projecten van kleinschalige ondernemers in een ruraal 
gebied in West Mexico? 
b. Onder welke voorwaarden komen levensvatbare ondernemers-
projecten tot stand? 
Hoofdstuk 3 schenkt aandacht aan de methodologische gevolgen van dit 
theoretisch raamwerk, en hoe deze op hun beurt het onderzoeksproces 
be'fnvloedden. Een reflexief verslag geeft de geschiedenis van het onder-
zoek weer: waarom is gekozen voor het onderwerp kleine bedrijven, 
welke paden zijn bewandeld om geld voor het onderzoek te verkrijgen, 
welke Problemen traden er op tijdens de veldwerkperiode en hoe is het 
theoretisch standpunt zoals uitgewerkt in Hoofdstuk 2, tot stand geko-
men? 
In hoofdstukken 4 tot en met 9 worden de belangrijkste onder-
zoeksvragen behandeld aan de hand van een aantal case-studies van 
kleinschalige ondernemers-projecten. Samenvattend kan uit deze case-
studies worden geconcludeerd dat de levensvatbaarheid van kleinschalige 
bedrijven een functie is van drie aan elkaar gerelateerde factoren: a) het 
vermögen van ondernemers om een globaal netwerk van actoren op te 
zetten die bereid zijn middelen ter beschikking te stellen in ruil voor een 
beloofd resultaat; b) het vermögen van ondernemers om m.b.v. middelen 
uit het globale netwerk een lokaal netwerk van actoren op te zetten met 
als doel het bevredigen van de verwachtingen van actoren uit het globale 
netwerk; c) de mate waarin een bedrijf er in slaagt om contrôle uit te 
oefenen over alle transacties tussen haar lokale en globale netwerken. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 worden de bovengenoemde dimensies uitgewerkt 
in een diepte case-studie over Carlos. Carlos is als ondernemer bij twee 
projecten tegelijkertijd betrokken: de verkoop van tacos en openbaar 
vervoer. Zoals de case toont, was het taco-project relatief succesvol omdat 
Carlos in Staat was een globaal en lokaal netwerk te bouwen en de 
transacties tussen deze te beheersen. Een voortdurend gebrek aan integra-
t e van actoren van beide netwerken bracht de levensvatbaarheid van de 
onderneming in gevaar. Dit in tegenstelling tot het minibusproject, waar 
Carlos er niet eens in slaagde het globale netwerk in stand te houden. 
Toen actoren van dit netwerk met nieuwe voorschriften kwamen, kon het 
lokale netwerk niet meer aan de verwachtingen voldoen en stortte het 
project in. 
Hoofdstuk 5 handelt over een ondernemer die twee projecten 
probeert te ontwikkelen: een kleine winkel en een bar. Zoals de case-
studie toont, slaagde de ondernemer erin een globaal en lokaal netwerk te 
bouwen waarbinnen het winkelproject had kunnen functioneren. Het 
project bleek echter kwestbaar omdat de ondernemer er niet in slaagde 
de transacties tussen de twee netwerken te reguleren. In het geval van de 
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bar lukte het de ondernemer niet om de actoren van het lokale en globale 
netwerk te koppelen, laat staan hun transacties te controleren. 
In Hoofdstuk 6 wordt het echtpaar David en Chela besproken. Zij 
namen een winkel over van familieleden. Deze case-studie is anders dan 
de voorgaande omdat het project al zijn eigen globale netwerk met zieh 
meebracht. Slechts voor een korte tijd hebben David en Chela hiervan 
kunnen profiteren, want er traden problemen met de contextualisering 
van het project op. Deze blokkeerden op hun beurt de bewegingsruimte 
die David en Chela nodig hadden om een lokaal netwerk op te bouwen. 
De belangrijkste reden hiervoor was dat, ondanks de voorwaarden die 
Chela en David gesteld hadden bij de overname van de winkel, zij er niet 
in slaagden de actoren erbij te betrekken die nodig waren voor de rol die 
zij voor de actoren zagen. Het project ging niet de kant op die David en 
Chela wilden, waardoor zij uiteindelijk gingen twijfelen aan de levensvat-
baarheid van de winkel. 
Leon is een mezca/-producent, wiens case-studie wordt uitgewerkt 
in Hoofdstuk 7. Leon's project had zijn globale en lokale netwerken 
succesvol opgebouwd en hij beheerstte de transacties tussen beide. 
Hiermee verschilt het project met de voorgaande. Leon had contrôle over 
de consumenten van zijn mezcal door tegelijkertijd het lokale netwerk 
betrokken bij de productie van de drank te beheren. Dit wordt duidelijk 
gemaakt door de manier waarop de concurrence bedwongen wordt, 
allerlei materiële en menselijke zaken in het project worden ingelijfd en 
arbeiders geworven worden - dat wil zeggen, hoe de verschillende 
belangen die deel uitmaken van de productie, distributie en consumptie 
van mezcal, worden samengebracht. 
In Hoofdstuk 8 wordt ingegaan op een thema dat in de 
hoofdstukken 4 tot en met 7 slechts gedeeltelijk aan de orde gekomen is, 
namelijk de relatie tussen projecten en de cruciale actoren van hun 
globale netwerken: de uiteindelijke consumenten van de producten en 
diensten van de projecten. Middels een case-studie over Pablo, een 
onafhankelijke distributeur van mezcal, werpt Hoofdstuk 8 nieuw licht op 
de traditionele opvattingen over de identiteit van producenten en consu-
menten. Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat deze identiteiten gelijktijdig worden 
gevormd, ontbonden en hergestructureerd gedurende het procès van 
produceren en consumeren - een procès dat veel verder reikt dan produc-
tie en consumptie alleen. 
In Hoofdstuk 9 wordt de aandacht verlegt van specifieke projecten 
naar het grotere netwerk van bedrijven betrokken bij de productie van 
mezcal. In het hoofdstuk wordt de uitbreiding en transformatie van dit 
netwerk in het algemeen behandelt. In het bijzonder bestudeert dit 
hoofdstuk de manier waarop het netwerk van mezcal bedrijven in de tijd 
verändert en uitbreidt door a. een constante toevoeging van menselijke en 
materiële elementen, b. de inlijving van mensen en dingen die oor-
spronkelijk samenwerkten tegen de mezcal producenten, c. een kwalita-
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tieve verandering in de verhoudingen van de actoren betrokken bij het 
netwerk, d. het over brengen van menselijke eigenschappen op materie 
en e. een effectieve simplificering of black-boxing van heterogene acto-
ren. Bovendien wordt het netwerk gekarakteriseerd door een sterke 
convergentie van intéresses van alle betrokken actoren, wat het mogelijk 
maakt voor mezcaZ-producenten om levensvatbare bedrijven te ontwikke-
len. 
De algemene conclusie van dit proefschrift luidt, dat de levensvat-
baarheid van kleinschalige ondernemers-projecten een afgeleide is van de 
morfologie van de lokale en globale netwerken die deze projecten 
bouwen en in stand houden. Deze en enkele andere bevindingen uit de 
case-studies worden expliciet gemaakt in Hoofdstuk 10. Dit hoofdstuk 
komt ook terug op de vraag waarom het van belang is om naar de 
levensvatbaarheid van kleine bedrijven te kijken, en waarom de gekozen 
benadering van dit proefschrift gezien kan worden als een positieve 
bijdrage aan zowel het academische als aan het politieke debat over de 
rol van kleine bedrijven in rurale gebieden in ontwikkelingsregio's. Wat 
theorie betreff., laat deze studie zien dat men zieh door middel van 
theoretisch-geinformeerde empirische cases kan afwenden van disciplinai-
re bijziendheid, waardoor het mogelijk wordt grip te krijgen op de 
voornamelijk onzekere, ongefixeerde aard van ondernemers-projecten. 
Bovendien concludeert de studie dat traditionele sociologische en antro-
pologische begrippen als 'structuur' hoognodig gereviseerd zouden 
moeten worden, want uit de beschreven cases blijkt dat kleine bedrijven 
niet ingebed zijn in een vaste structuur maar eigenlijk ideeën voorstellen 
die in meer of mindere mate geconcretiseerd worden door middel van 
praktijken, dat wil zeggen, door middel van een continue contextualise-
ring en localisering. Deze studie laat zien dat het precair is om beleid te 
formuleren dat kleine bedrijven steunt door middel van alleen sociale, öf 
politieke, öf economische, öf technische maatregelen zonder naar de 
relaties van deze verschillende domeinen te kijken. Een hieruit voortvloei-
ende algemene beleidsaanbeveling is dat plannen ter promotie van kleine 
bedrijven verder moeten gaan dan de kleinschalige ondernemers-projec-
ten te behandelen als geïsoleerde, afzonderlijke eenheden. In plaats 
daarvan zouden ze gericht moeten zijn op de materieel heterogene 
netwerken van actoren die betrokken zijn bij de productie, distributie en 
consumptie van goederen en diensten. 
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